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Ci)
' S ù m r h à r y
Five experiments -were carried out to explore the vays in vhich 
individuals structure the social environment under minimal conditions, 
re-interpret minimal intergroup differences, and re-define their group 
memberships through "psychological" social mobility, in a -way which 
achieves a more favourable social identity for them.
In the first two experiments, the interpersonal relationships 
between subjects were defined by at least 8 levels of similarity on 
one or more dimensions of differing salience. Social categorisation 
was introduced by the subjects. They treated the most similar others 
positively, the most dissimilar others negatively and the 'neutral' 
others without bias. A consistent adoption by the subjects of certain 
similarity levels as boundaries demarcating categories was observed.
This finding is discussed in relation to the social rules and meanings 
which the subjects perceived to be relevant to the situation.
In the third experiment, a real and important, and an artificial 
and seemingly trivial criterion for social categorisation were introduced 
in independent and identical settings. It was hypothesised in both 
instances that differences between groups would be treated as simi1arly 
important, since they were the only basis for intergroup differentiation 
and ingroup favouritism. This hypothesis was confirmed.
Two further studies, designed to demonstrate "psychological" social 
mobility, are reported. The first involved real groups - 'high' valued 
and 'low' valued Nationalities respectively. The second study, which was 
a replication and extension of Allen and Wilder's (l9T5) experiment, 
involved artificially created groups. There were 8  conditions across which 
the level of similarity of the subjects with the ingroup and outgroup was 
varied on both trivial and important criteria. In both experiments, 
increased identification with highly valued outgroups was observed.
Certain elaborations of Tajfel's theory of intergroup behaviour are 
proposed, with the aim of placing more emphasis on the social evaluative 
system influencing behaviour and the process of "psychological" social 
mobility.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
"Oh, if I had done nothing simply from laziness! Heavens, how I
should have respected myself, then. I should have respected myself because
I should at least have been capable of being lazy; there would at least
have been one quality, as it were, positive in me..... Question; what is he?
Answer: A sluggard; how very pleasant it would have been to hear that of
oneself! It would mean that I was positively defined... I should then be
a member of the best club by right, and should find my occupation in
continually respecting myself". _ , , ^
Dostoevsky (Notes from Underground)
Despite man's capacity for self mockery, his desire to achieve an 
identity which is favourably evaluated persists. However, such evaluation 
might sometimes take place on highly idiosyncratic criteria. Man's concern 
with self-identity is an influential factor in all social life. We argue 
that this influence has special significance in the area of intergroup 
behaviour. This is partly because the identity of an individual is in 
important ways dependent on the groups he is perceived to be a member of by 
others, as well as those groups with which he identifies himself.
A more basic concern of man,than that of achieving a favourably 
evaluated identity, might be that of establishing some kind of a stable 
identity and position in the social structure. Such questions as,'who am 
I?' and,'where is my place in the World?', are ones which concern most, if 
not all, men from their earliest years. The concern with identity is 
reflected in the belief systems of all religious and mystical sects. These 
often propagate the view that to become a 'believer', the individual must 
achieve a 're-birth', an extinction and re-emergence. To quote the lines 
of the Andalusian Sufi Shustari (d. 1269),
"After extinction I came out and I
External now am, though not as I,
Yet whom am I, 0 I, but I?".
Self-identity is partly established through actively structuring the social 
world and defining the place of the self within the social structure 
achieved. The social categorisation system salient in a society is partly 
an outcome of this structuring process. The characteristics of social 
categories, such as those achieved on the basis of ethnicity, are dependent
on social factors. These social factors might, and often do, vary across 
cultures; they are not 'universal*.
By assuming and emphasising the influence of the desire for 
favourable social evaluation in intergroup behaviour, we are adopting an 
approach which is specifically social psychological. That is, the 
intentional and,in some respects, idiosyncratic behaviour of individuals 
is viewed in its interdependence with the social environment; while inter­
group behaviour is explained in terms of the social psychological processes 
resulting from this interdependence. Basic existential experiences which 
are confined to the private world of the individual, reflecting,as they 
may^both the desire for high social evaluation and the often personalised 
criteria on which social evaluation takes place, are also part of these 
social psychological processes.
We use the term social evaluation to refer to the process through
which the phenomenon Max Weber termed 'honour' is established. Weber wrote,
"In contrast to the purely economically determined 'class situation', we
wish to designate as 'status situation' every typical component of the life
fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social
estimation of honour. This honour may be connected with any quality shared
by a plurality, and of course, it can be linked to a class situation;
class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways with status distinctions" 
*
(pp. 186-187). Weber saw the striving for power and wealth not.as a 
reflection of the desire to reach economic riches only, but as a means of 
achieving social 'honour' also. In our analysis all man's actions are viewed 
as being affected by the desire for what Weber termed 'social honour', and 
what we have termed 'favourable social evaluation'.
The emphasis on man's desire for high social evaluation as the 
behavioural component orienting intergroup behaviour leads to the adoption 
of a concept of groups as highly flexible social psychological constructions.
It is not simply in terms of the objectively defined characteristics of a set 
of individuals that we should view the concept of a 'group'. But, more 
importantly, also in terms of the individual's desire to be a part of some 
particular collectives rather than others. Moreover, the individual might 
position of himself in relation to the social categories which 
he might join. He might also re-define the boundaries of potential and 
actual ingroups and outgroups. The re-defining of the self in relation to
*
Gerth and Mills (I9T0),"i'rom Max Weber".
the social environment need not correlate with actual 'objectively 
measurable' changes in the environment.
Once an individual perceives himself as part of a group and uses the 
group as a reference point in defining himself within the social 
environment, the nature of such identification may be manifested in various 
different ways. For example, he may interact a great deal with other group 
members, he may come to share the norms and values which dominate the group 
(if any do), he may adopt a specific role in relation to other members, he 
may combine forces with others with the aim of achieving a commonly adopted 
goal, or he may in physical and emotional ways develop interdependent 
relationships with others in the group. Later (in Chapter 2), we shall 
discuss the work of social scientists who have defined the group solely in 
terms of such (mainly overt) behavioural manifestations (Sherif, Le win, 
Newcomb, Cattell, Allport, Homans, Cartwright and Zander, Deutsch). In view 
of the actual and potential diversity of such manifestations, it is not 
surprising that no general agreement has been reached as regards the 
definition of a group ("The term "group"... has achieved no standard meaning 
among social psychologists'», Newcomb, 19^1, p.8?. See also Gibb, 1969, pp. 
206-210).
Identification with Groups
A significant determinant of whether or not identification with a 
group takes place is the nature of the contribution which membership would 
make to the social identity,of the potential group member. Changes in the 
criteria for social evaluation, whether they occur at the individual or 
social level, lead to differential evaluation of particular groups. This,in 
turn,leads to variations in the nature of contributions/such group member­
ships make to the social identity of members. The consequences of this 
process might be changes in the nature of identification which members and 
potential members feel towards such groups. Thus, group memberships are in 
a state of continual flux. Groups might be most usefully viewed as social 
psychological constructions which are in a state of continual transformation. 
They should not be viewed as objectively given,static entities.
In relation to what has been termed the 'exit ' option (Hirschman,
1970, 1973, 1974) and the process of social mobility (Tajfel, 1974a, 1974b., 
1975, undated (mimeo), in press), the transformations referred to above 
reflect, firstly, the weakening of identifications with groups which are
increasingly negatively evaluated. Tiiis negative evaluation might be on 
the basis of newly evolved social evaluation systems. Secondly, they 
reflect attempts to identify with and become part of groups which are 
increasingly favourably evaluated. This favourable evaluation being through 
the said changes in social evaluation systems.#
The Importance of the Social Context
The salience of group membership for the ingroup and the nature of 
the contribution such membership makes to the social identity of members 
must be viewed in the context of the social environment in which the group 
exists. It is not valid to assume that a particular criterion for social 
evaluation will have the same importance in two different social settings.
Nor should we assume that a social category will be similarly evaluated 
in different settings. It is possible that a criterion for social 
categorisation, 'C, which is validly described as 'trivial* 
in one social context might become highly important in a second social 
context. This second context might be one, for example, in which 'G' becomes 
the only, or one of the only, basis for social categorisation and represents 
one of the few social cues available to guide action. It has been 
demonstrated that social categorisation on the basis of criteria which are 
evaluated as ' trivial ' in the everyday context can lead to inter group bias 
in the social context of the laboratory. (We discuss this research in 
Chapter 3). This demonstration is interpreted as supporting the view that 
it is the social context which to a significant degree determines the 
salience of the basis for social categorisation. The role of the social 
context in determining the salience and meaning of the basis for social 
categorisation was further examined in the experiments we carried out and 
report later.
Defining Social Problems
One of the aims of social research is to create solutions, or at
least new ways of approaching solutions, to social 'problems'. The kind of
questions which researchers apply themselves to, and the kind of research
findings they generate, depend in important ways on what they perceive to
be 'problems' worthy of stucy’. In defining such social problems, researchers
are directly and indirectly influenced by the definitions of such phenomena
which their own society has established. More specifically, the definitions
c^-This assumes that members are aware that"alternatives to their present ,
circumstances are possible.
of 'problems' which are salient in society are created by the dominant 
social group. Researchers themselves might be defined as members of 
this dominant group. The issues which researchers define as 'problematic*, 
and which they explore, are not necessarily 'problematic* from the point 
of view of subordinate groups.
The interests of the dominant and subordinate groups conflict in 
important ways. These conflicting interests might lead a subordinate 
group to define as 'problematic ' issues which are not defined as such by 
the dominant group. For example, a subordinate group might perceive its 
interests as best served through achieving independence from the dominant 
group. The path to independence might involve conflict. In order to 
achieve cohesion, as a preliminary step to the struggle for independence, 
the subordinate group might aim to create conflict between itself and the 
dominant group. With such an aim in mind, peace would be a 'problem' for 
the subordinate group. Thus, the subordinate group might attempt to break 
the peace and create conflict, while the dominant group might attempt to 
maintain peace (anaunity). Peace and unity would help to maintain the 
status quo. Thus, these conditions might serve the interests of the 
dominant group.
An explicit aim in social research is that of achieving or maintaining 
peace and avoiding conflict. This approach to research helps to maintain 
the status quo (Billig, 1976; Eide, 1974). Researchers have neglected the 
ideological basis of conflict and cooperation between groups (this 
criticism is elaborated in Chapter 6). The question of 'why' there is 
conflict or cooperation is often taken out of its political context and the 
activities under study are reduced to a set of psycho-physiological 
variables. Explanations emphasising intra- and inter-personal (micro) 
processes are emphasised, while those emphasing inter-group (macro) processes 
are neglected.
A classic example of the approach just criticised is provided by the 
work of M ^ k  and Ervin (1970), whose actual research is on violent behaviour 
and brain abnormalities. They begin their report with the kind of 
declaration which has become customary for workers dealing with conflict, 
whether at the interpersonal or intergroup level; "Human violence is the 
most threatening problem in our world today" (p.l,). Also in the customary 
manner, they fail to point out that some violence occurs within the frame-
work of a meaningful ideology and its purpose is to directly threaten 
certain power groups. Thus, the 'problem* they refer to is, in certain 
conditions at least, only a 'problem* from the point of view of those 
whose power is threatened.
Mark and Ervin (1970) discuss various forms of brain disorder which 
they believe are linked to 'abnormal* levels of violent behaviour, but do 
not limit their explanations and recommendations to the arena of intra­
personal or inter-personal behaviour. Both implicitly and explicitly^they 
attempt to account for intergroup conflict in terms of intra or inter­
personal variables. For example, in discussing the increase in *domestic 
violence* in America. ,they identify two distinct responses from *an 
afflicted society', "One approach concentrates on the rigid enforcement 
of 'Law and Order*... The other approach... calls for the dissolution of 
the slums, the abolition of poverty, the correction of social injustices"
(p.152). These two responses, claim Mark and ErVin, share the weakness 
of ignoring "the individual and his brain" (p.152). The rise of the Black 
power. Women's liberation and Gay Rights movements, the campaign by many 
Americans against their government's Vietnamese policy, the very recent 
clashes between liberal groups and uprising Nazi organisations - these are 
all intergroup activities which have involved violent clashes between 
different groups in America. To explain such violent clashes in terms of 
individual brain functioning - whether it be 'normal* or * abnormal* - is to 
miss soMe key aspects of the situation. It is essential that we view 
cooperation and.conflict within relevant socio-political contexts and take 
into consideration the ideological framework which makes action 
directional and intentional,at the personal as well as group level.
The study of intergroup behaviour must also take place within a 
wide historical perspective. It seems necessary to remind ourselves of 
the nature of the birth of the French and American Republics, to take just 
two examples, and to reflect on the role of violent conflict in such past 
contexts. Mark and Ervin (1970) define acceptable violence as the "... 
controlled minimum necessary action to prevent personal physical injury 
or wanton destruction of property" (p.l60). They proceed to say that,
"This definition would apply equally to police or public authorities as 
well.as to the politically activist groups (students, racial, etc.) and
violent acts that did not fit into this category would be 'unacceptable ' *» 
Thus, by definition, they find the violence leading to their own American
Revolution unacceptable. A narrow historical perspective is clearly 
another important handicap to research in this area.
The Emphasis on the Functional Characteristics of the Group and the 
Neglect of the Issue of Identity
Psychologists have neglected the issues of identity and identification
in groups. Freud: is one i m p a r t a n t :  exception to this general trend
(Scheidlinger, 1955, p.56). It has generally been the functional aspects of
groups which have been emphasised. We identify two main influences on this
trend. The first influencing facor is that group and intergroup behaviour 
ed
has been approach/by researchers from the point of view of the dominant 
group. The second influencing factor has been the potential contribution 
of the psychologist to achieving greater efficiency in the production process. 
These two influences are discussed below.
One reason why psychologists have neglected the issues of identity 
and identification in groups might be because these issues are probably 
problematic from the point of view of the subordinate group, rather than 
the dominant group. The dominant group tends to be perceived as relatively 
successful and to have a high social status. It is, by definition, the 
superior group according to the social evaluative criteria salient in society. 
Those individuals who are members of the dominant group tend to have high 
social esteem,on the basis of this membership at least. Those who are not 
members of the dominant group would be, by definition, members of lower status 
groups and might feel that they have an inadequate social esteem. This 
feeling of inadequacy might lead to perceived self-inferiority and an attempt 
to identify with other groups. The subordinate group, therefore, might 
find it difficult to achieve cohesion^directly as a result of its lovr status. 
These issues are further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
An important reason why group research has been dominated by 
'functionalist* models of behaviour is the psychologists potential and 
sometimes actual role, in industry. This role requires  ^ the psychologist tb 
help in achieving maximum efficiency in the production process. It has been 
noted that those factors which have failed to show a direct relationship 
with rate of productivity, such as satisfaction in work, have been 
subsequently neglected by researchers (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964, p.11; 
Moscovici, 1972, p.24). Although the techniques used by present day 
psychologists are more sophisticated, the basic question they are asking
(how can group productivity be increased?) via various routes have 
remained fairly static. Compare, for example, the paper Burnham wrote 
in 1910 ('The group as a stimulus to mental activity') to that by 
Bourchard et al.,(concerning 'brainstorming') in 1974. Or, the work 
carried out in the late 1920's at the Hawthorne works of the Western 
Electric Company (Roethlinsberger and Dickson, 1939) with that carried out 
by, for exanple. Glass and Singer (1972).
It was this role of the psychologist in relation to industiy which 
(a) influenced the decision to adopt the 'small group* as the unit of study 
and (b) influenced the decision to emphasise the 'functional* and 
'operational* aspects of groups. The fact that the small group could be 
more easily studied in the laboratory was of course another significant 
factor leading to its receiving intense attention. Since the boundaries 
between groups in industry are mainly demarcated by differential tasks, it 
was possible for psychologists to operationally define groups in experiments 
where task efficiency was the dependent variable and the characteristics of 
the group and its members, together with the conditions in which they worked, 
constituted the independent variables. This approach became thetnormi So 
much so that eventually writers would make no attempt to define the group.
The assumption being that it is generally understood and accepted that a 
group is constituted when a number of individuals are brought together to 
perform a task.
Even when we move away from the research more obviously linked to 
industrial performance (such as Horsfall and Avensberg's "Teamwork and 
productivity in a shoe factory", 1949), the psychologist appears to be 
trapped by the assumed requirements of the experimental setting. One such 
assumed requirement is that subjects have to *do things', as individuals 
or as a unit, they have to perform and be productive in some way(s) in order 
that group(s) might be assumed to have emerged. It is as a result of their 
interactions during such performance that group characteristics are assumed 
to emerge. The idea that social,non-productive (in the material sense) 
groups are also worth considering seems to be as yet alien to the field of 
psychological research. Clearly, the ‘Protestant Ethic* has been influential 
on research in this field, which is dominated by Western Industrialised 
nations.
The influence of functionalist models of behaviour adopted in groiip
research have spread to influence intergroup research also. This 
influence was lilcely to occur insofar as certain methodologies and 
concepts developed through the study of group behaviour formed an 
obvious stepping-stone for researchers investigating intergroup behaviour. 
This explanation assumes that intergroup behaviour claims second place 
when compared to the attention group dynamics has received - an assumption 
which is validated when we compare the number of researchers each area has 
attracted. The outcome of the functionalist influence on intergroup 
research can be seen in terms of how the groups themselves, as well as the 
relations between them,are viewed. In this respect, emphasis is placed on 
functioning rather than identifying, while changes in intergroup relations 
are seen in terms of mechanistic puU-push movements created by the impact 
of power changes. However, changes in the perceptual systems through which 
intergroup relations are interpreted and evaluated have received little 
attention.
Even Sherif, a progressive authority figure in this area, does not 
escape such influence. Sherif and Sherif (1969) offer a definition of 
intergroup relations as, "functional relationships between two or more 
groups and their respective members" (p.223), and one of intergroup 
behaviour as, "the actions of individuals belonging to one group when they 
interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members 
in terms of their group membership (with its standards for loyalty, norms, 
etc.)" (p.223).
They proceed to explain that by referring to functional relations 
between groups they "... mean that the actions of one group and its members 
have an impact on another group and its members, regardless of whether the 
two groups are actually engaged in direct give and take at the time"
(p.223). It is only by use of the phrase 'in terms of their group member­
ship' that Sherif. and Sherif give any importance to the issues of 
'identification' with and loyalty towards groups - both 'own' and 'other'.
The research of Tajfel and his associates on intergroup behaviour is 
exceptional in that they place emphasis on the issues of identity and 
identification. The individual is perceived as being concerned with 
structuring the social environment and defining his place within it. Thus, 
Tajfel describes social.categorisation as being a means of "... 
systematizing and ordering the social environment particularly with regards
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to its role as a guide for action, and as a reflection of social values"
(1972, p.292). Self-identity is viewed by Tajfel as being in important 
ways dependent on the groups the individual belongs to. Tajfel explains 
social identity as "... the individual's knowledge that he belongs to 
certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance 
to him of this group membership" (1972, p.292). ¥e adopt these definitions 
also.
Identification with Groups and Political Action
The importance of the 'identification' issue in intergroup relations 
should not be underestimated, since it is a link between social 
psychological processes and political action. The processes of social 
mobility and social chance (relating respectively to the 'exit' and 'voice' 
options) have their direct counterparts in the political arena. The classic 
'Elite' theorists, for example, view society in terras of social mobility.
In "The. Rise and Fall of the Elites" Vilfredo Pabeto (I9OI), who provided 
the ideological basis for Italian fascism in the 1920's and 30's, states 
that, "The history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of : 
elites; as one ascends, another declines" (p.36). Pareto believed it to 
be inevitable that the most able individuals would gain upward social 
mobility. He argued that the only way existing elite groups could survive 
was not to become more rigid and exclusive, but to open the door to upward 
mobile individuals who were deserting their former classes. Of course, the 
Marxist view of social evolution is one which is completely opposite to 
this. It contends that social change will evolve towards a final 
confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with action in 
the interests of, and identification with, the group being of primary 
importance. In order to understand intergroup behaviour, it is clearly 
necessary to study loyalty and identification,as well asother issues related 
to the person's identity - both 'self* and 'social'.
Identity - A Central Theme
It has been argued that the word identity, like thatof alienation 
(Schlacht, 1971), has become a fetish word and has been "driven out of its 
wits by over-use" (MacKenzie, 1978, p.11). There is no doubt that the 
word identity is used extensively, both in written and spoken communications. 
At one level, possibly the more intra-personal or individualistic one, 
this influence is due to the work of Freud (1949), Erikson (1950, 1959),. 
Maslow (1969), Fromm (1942, 1955^ 1974) and Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963a, 1963b,
11
1967, 1968, 1971, 1974), together with the Existentialists (e.g. Satre, 
Camus), and such writers as John Osborne ('Young Man Luther', 1959, c.f. 
Erikson). At a second level, in which the word identity is identifying 
a more 'collective' behavioural manifestation, is the influence of 
writers who frequently harness identity with 'nationality' (Almond and 
Coleman, I960, Binder, 1971) and 'class' (Marquand and Clegy, 1969). This 
emphasis on identity is present also in the messages carried by the mass 
media. For example, publicity is used to persuade us that we can transform 
our identities through the purchase of the 'right' product (Berger, 1972). 
The freedom to choose between different products and achieve (supposedly) 
different kinds of identities may substitute, or at least compensate for, 
the lack of choice in the political arena. As regards the identity of a 
group, the mass media emphasise simply the 'finding' of an identity. Hence 
such headlines as "Canada in Search of an Identity" (The Observer, 9 July, 
1978).
Finally, in pinpointing the reasons why the word identity has been 
so extensively used, we should consider two distinct movements,which have 
both been influenced by the recent self-questionings and doubts of Western 
values. The first was the 'hippy' movement,whose intellectual roots are to 
be found in the writings of the American Transcendentalists (among whom 
were Emerson, Whitman and Thoreau). The second movement was that of various 
racial, national and ethnic groups (mainly minorities) attempting to achieve 
political independence. An essential feature of both movements was the goal 
of achieving an identity distinct from the established ones they rejected , 
for political or moral reasons. It is interesting that the writings of the 
Transcendentalist Henry Thoreau influenced both these movements. His essay 
on 'Civil Disobedience' (1849) outlined the policy of passive resistence, 
l^ ll'iOTLcing Ghandi and Martin Luther King (among others). His essays in the 
'Walden' volume (1854) were one of the initial inspirations to the hippy 
movement. But whichever part of Thoreau's writings we turn to, the same 
search for an identity which is 'true' and independent confronts us.
This lengthy^ yet incomplete, discussion on some reasons why the issue 
of identity - and hence the word - is receiving such attention is for good 
reason. The concern with identity, both that of the individual and that of 
the group, has a rich and extensive intellectual background. So has the 
concern with 'positive' identity. In the passages to follow, a great deal 
of importance will be given to what Tajfel has described as social identity.
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Besides this, the desire for positive social evaluation of the self will 
be assumed. This is not to be explained by stating that the word 
identity is in vogue, but because it reflects significant aspects of social 
behaviour we believe to be prevalent at present.
The Concern with Identity need not lead to Reductionist Accounts of 
Intergroup Behaviour
¥e have criticised explanations of intergroup behaviour which 
emphasise intra- and inter- personal processes, labelling these 
'reductionist* explanations. At the same time, we have argued that the 
issues of identity and identification are of crucial importance and should 
be given primary place in an account of intergroup behaviour. Two criticisms 
of our approach might be introduced. Firstly, it might be claimed that an 
emphasis on identity and identification will inevitably lead to a 
reductionist account of intergroup behaviour. Secondly, it might be claimed 
that the key to understanding intergroup behaviour is found by explaining 
the relative power of each group in relation to the production process, 
together with the relative share of each group from the output of this 
process. Unless we concentrate on these material realities, it might be 
claimed, we shall fail to reveal the real factors determining intergroup 
behaviour. We briefly respond to each of these two criticisms below.
It is invalid to assume that our concern with the issue of identity 
will inevitably lead us to adopt a reductionist explanation of intergroup 
behaviour. This is because identity does not emerge through a process 
which takes place within or between individuals only. The evolution of 
identity takes place within, and is influenced by, a dominant social 
evaluative system. In important ways society shapes the identity of 
individuals and groups. Berger and Luckmann have stated that, "Identity is 
a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society" 
(1975, p.195). Our emphasis on identity leads us to investigate this 
dialectic. We are, therefore, as much concerned with macro social issues as 
we are with micro intra- and inter- personal issues.
An account of intergroup behaviour which places importance on the 
issue of identity will ultimately lead to a consideration of the political 
structure, among other things. More specifically, it will lead to a 
consideration of the role of the dominant group in shaping individual and 
group identity. The dominant group has, by definition, the greatest
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influence in many aspects of social life. This influence is particularly 
important in the construction of social reality. A crucial aspect of this 
social reality is the identity of the dominant and subordinate groups. The 
view of group, identity which is propagated by the dominant group may be 
rejected by subordinate groups, but it is more likely to be adopted by 
them, in some respects at least. Particularly through influencing the 
values attached to subordinate groups, the dominant group influences the 
identity of the individuals who are members of subordinate groups. A 
concern with identity, whether of the individual or of the group, will 
therefore lead to an exploration of the forces which influence social reality. 
This exploration ultimately leads us to analyse the political structure.
An account of intergroup behaviour which gives importance to the issue 
of identity might be criticised by those who advocate that intergroup 
behaviour can be only understood through an analysis of the process of 
production and the means of distribution of resources. Such critics might 
argue that identity is a peripheral issue only. They might view identity 
as being entirely dependent on the material conditions, an artifact rather  ^
than a major source of influence by itself. Such critics might argue that 
the groups of real significance are the 'classes', and the crucial conflicts 
are class conflicts. All other conflicts might be seen as.somehow 
'contrived'. Thus Nikolinakos (1972-1973, p.368) states that "... racial 
conflicts appear as racial only on the surface. In reality they are class 
conflicts...", and Suyin (1971-1972., p.4) claims that "racism today is an 
invented psychological justification... to camouflage exploitation and 
oppression by a class or ethnic group...".
But even if we accepted the propositions of Nikolinakos (1972 -33) ?
Suyin (1973-72)and others, concerning the 'real' nature of intergroup conflicts, 
we would still be left with the problem of explaining the social psychological 
processes which lead to conflict between races, nations, sexes, religious 
groups, football fans, and so on, occurring in some conditions and not in 
others. Also, why is it that such conflicts have been so successful at 
'camouflaging' the 'real' source of conflicts (if, as is claimed, class ^  
the real cause)? An adequate response to such questions, we argue, 
requires an incorporation of the issue of identity as a central theme in the 
explanation of intergroup behaviour.
ih
An account of intergroup behaviour should pay particular attention 
to two issues, among others. Firstly, the contribution which memberships 
of a group will make to the identity of the individual. Secondly, whether 
or not this contribution will influence the individual to want to identify 
with the group. In Chapter 4, we shall discuss social categorisation on 
the basis of diverse criteria (for example, ethnicity, race, language, 
similarity). An underlying theme in this discussion will be the issues of 
identity and identification with groups. These themes are also present in 
the experiments we carried out and report later.
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CHAPTER; TWO
. DEFINING THE GROUP, INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR 
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS
For, to define true madness,
Wliat ist but to be nothing else but mad.
Hamlet (II, ii, 93)
How might we define a group and what constitutes intergroup 
behaviour? Some issues relevant to these questions are briefly- 
considered in this section. We proceed on the assumption that it is 
not enough to just provide circular definitions,which rest upon 
everyday interpretations of these terms. Shared understandings about 
how to define the terms are inadequate- at least for guiding certain 
types of research.
PART 1 SOME ISSUES CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF THE GROUP 
Differing Definitions of the Group
Different definitions of the group have been used by researchers. 
To point this out is not necessarily highlighting weaknesses. On the 
contrary, if it were the case that researchers were aware of the inter­
implications of the differing definitions they had adopted, then 
diverse definitions might be more fruitful. The adoption of varying 
perspectives might, in this case, be an intentional and creative act - 
leading to a more cohesive and complete picture of group behaviour. 
Unfortunately, however,, the literature reflects not only a lack of 
agreement about meanings, but also a lack of understanding about the 
inter-implications of these disagreements.
Some writers have used the interaction of members as the basis 
for defining the group (e.g. Calhoun, 1976; Homans, 1975, p.84; Sprott, 
1958, p.9). We might paraphrase their approach by stating that a group 
exists when high levels of interaction between individuals take place. 
Although interaction is not "... the whole of group life" (Homans, 1975, 
p.86). Other writers have defined the group in terms of the inter­
dependence of its members (e.g. Brodbeck, 1958; Cartwright and zander, 
1968, p.46; Deutch, 1955, p.330; Lewin, 1948, p.137).
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As Proshansky and Seidenberg (1969, p.377) pointed out, most 
social psychologists emphasise such criteria as values, roles, beliefs, 
norms and status in defining the group. Among this majority we may 
include Newcomb (1951: 1972, p.87) and the Sherifs (1969, p.131).
Several more general definitions worthy of note also exist.
Those introduced by Cattell and Allport place greater emphasis on the 
functional aspects of groups. The former defines a group as an "... 
aggregate of organisms in which the existence of all is utilised for 
the satisfaction of some needs of each" (Cattell, 1951, p.3.69).
Allport defines a group as an aggregate "... consisting of two or more 
persons who are assembled to perform some task, to deliberate upon some 
proposal or topic of interest, or to share some affective experience of 
common appeal" (1924: 1972, p.306). Hollander (1976, p.376), after 
considering various ways in which the boundaries of groups might be 
defined, described their essential features as being "... the potential 
for an impact on their members through shared psychological states".
Hare, not apparently wishing to neglect any criterion, emphasised 
interaction, goals, norms, roles, together with interpersonal 
attractions as the characteristics differentiating the group from a 
collection of individuals (1962, p.10).
Criticisms of Definitions of the Group
The first criticism of the definitions referred to concerns the 
lack of attention given specifically to the nature of the identification 
which takes place in groups. This situation seems to reflect a general 
emphasis on the more obviously observable phenomena, a desire to 
analyse group behaviour.by direct reference to group functioning and 
the social structure (reflected by roles, status, and so on) without 
involving the subjective evaluations of the individuals involved.
A second criticism concerns the disparity between the definitions 
and the creation and treatment of groups in experimental studies. On 
the one hand, properties of groups are described in terms of norms, 
roles, values, interactions, interpersonal attractions^ interdependencies 
and the like; on the other hand, group research is often conducted by 
gathering a number of strangers in one place for a brief period and 
measuring their performance according to some criteria, with little or no 
regard for the assumed group properties. This disparity has been noted
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by several writers (Hollander and Hunt, 1972, p.295; Sherif and 
Sherif, 1969, p.131) and the issue receives very full treatment by 
Golembiewski (1962),
Identity and Identification
The nature of the contribution which a group makes to a person's 
identity and the link between this contribution and the nature of a 
person's identification with a group are not factors obviously linked 
to group efficiency. For this reason, they have largely been neglected 
by psychologists. The nearest concept which has received significant 
attention from psychologists is probably cohesiveness. Group 
cohesiveness is typically defined as, "The resultant of all forces 
acting on all the members to remain in the group'.* But often a 
reductionist approach is adopted in that it is the individual's prestige 
and status within a group which is linked to factors reflecting 
identification. See, for example, Burnstein and ZajoNcs ' (1965^ ) study 
which links status with task performance.
Freud
Freud has been the most influential exponent of a definition of a 
group which emphasises identity and identification (Freud, 1921, Vol.
18, p.116). But there are at least two important limitations to Freud's 
approach. Firstly, in linking the formation of the group to his concept 
of Oedipus Complex, drawing similarities between the importance of the 
child's father in the Oedipus Complex and the importance of the leader 
in the social group, Freud is reducing what may be viewed as group 
behaviour to an intra- and inter- personal level. Secondly, although 
Freud distinguishes between groups with leaders and groups without 
leaders, it is only the former which he believes to be worthy of study. 
This primary interest in authoritarian group structures neglects a great 
deal of important group behaviour (see, for example, "Tribes without 
Rulers: Studies jji African Segmentary Systems", Middleton and 
1958). Even if most - or all - groups were of an authoritarian nature, 
one might still wish to study or speculate about social systems which 
did not have fixed positions for leaders, or even saw leaders as being 
necessary. A more extensive critical examination of Freud's group 
psychology can be found in 'Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations'
Cartwright and Zander (I960,P.T4)
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(Billig, 1976, pp.7-43).
Symbolic Interactionists
Symbolic interactionists have had little influence on the work
of social psychologists researching group and intergroup behaviour,
although their description of what constitutes a group is highly
developed and useful. It is a description which reveals a (possibly
surprising) similarity between strands of symbolic interactionism and
the work of Tajfel and his associates. Symbolic interactionism requires
that we view social life as consisting of acting units in interaction.
A group may be said to have evolved when an acting unit develops common
ways of forming action by shared interpretations of situations. As
Herbert Blumer describes the process, "Group life consists of acting
units developing acts to meet the situations in which they are placed"
(1962: 1972, p.151). It is through the development of common
' .
definitions and understandings of situations that group members can act 
alike. These common shared understandings and interpretations exist 
prior to the individual; and in this respect the group is antecedent to 
the individual.
According to symbolic interactionism,language is the vehicle 
through which the group evolves and the basis on which it exists ("the 
group exists in its communication", Kuhn, 1964: 1972, p.178). The 
categorisation of the world and the qualities of the phenomena 
categorised are carried by the language of the group. It is through 
adopting this language that the individual member shares the common 
evaluative system of the group ("As a new individual is inducted into 
the group, he takes on its objects, whose attributes derive from the 
group's communication categories", Kuhn, 1964: 1972, pp. 178-179).
The individual is not passive in the process of incorporation 
into the group - and at this point the similarity to Tajfel's approach 
begins - he is very much active in the sense that he forms links with 
the group partly through the nature of his identification with it, and 
partly through 'group relationships'. Kuhn states, "It is the group 
or groups with whom one feels identified which are the source of the 
very vocabulary creating the categories and their meanings" (1964:
1972, p.179) and that, "The dynanics for the support or modification of 
the self, and therefore, the dynamics for the organisation and
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redirection of action, lie in one*s group relationships" (1964: 1972, 
p.179).
The linking of self characteristics and group characteristics, 
together with the emphasis on the feeling of identification with the 
group and the utilisation of groups as frames of reference for action, 
is also present in the writings of Tajfel. However, Tajfel’s account 
of social identity is unique in that it provides a specific 
orientation to viewing intergroup behaviour. Kuhn's use of the term 
'group relations' reflects a greater concern with intra group behaviour, 
particularly roles within groups. (See also Denzin’s, 1966,study as an 
example of how symbolic interactionists place significance on roles).
The account of group characteristics provided by symbolic 
interactionists has several important limitations. Firstly, although 
the language of a group is important for its existence and most likely 
reflects shared understandings and definitions 6f situations within the 
group, the evolution or adoption of such unique language is not, as 
implied by symbolic interactionists, a necessary prerequisite for group 
identification. The analysis offered by symbolic interactionists is, 
in this respect, more relevant to groups with loyal and longstanding 
members. However, even when an individual has been a member of an 
established group for a long period, so that (i) the group has evolved 
shared views of the world and common use of language and (ii) the 
individual has had time to adopt such a perspective and language, events 
may lead him to disengage from the group and identify with it no longer. 
He may still share the group's particular view of the world to a great 
extent, but not feel himself to be part of the group.
Once we have recognised that some element of choice exists for 
the individual as to whether or not - or in which situations - he 
identifies with a given group, then other criteria for group description 
become less significant.
The symbolic interactionists give no indication as to why 
individuals should desire to identify with or join some groups and not 
others. They direct us to look to meanings and interpretative processes, 
then leave us in a maze without a guide to follow. For example, in 
pointing to the consensus on a person's assigned categories and to the 
construction of part of the self as constituted by assignments of the .
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self to various categories, Kuhn (1964: 1972, p.179) is merely 
presenting a view of what may be the case, not why or how the events 
have or will occur. This approach has limited explanatory and 
predictive value.
A final criticism is that symbolic interactionism provides an 
individually based account of mass social processes, seeing group 
action as a "fitting together of individual lines of action" (Blumer,
1969, p.82). Exactly how this 'fitting together' takes place, 
especially in relation to varying inter group economic and political 
interests, is not accounted for.
Identification and Membership
Another important reason why the issue of identification with
groups has been neglected is that psychologists have mostly been 4
' C ' i
concerned with groups whose membership remains çonstant. Such groups
may be described as being 'closed' (Ziller, et al, I96I; Ziller, 1965),
or as being perceived to be without exit (Hirschman, 1970, 1973, 1974).
The pre-occupation with closed groups has been accompanied, and was
probably influenced by, contemporary beliefs that harmony and stability
are desired by most people (Becker, 1950; Berlyne, I96O; March ahcj
Simon, 1958). The open group has been seen as being in a state of
flux and disharmony. Ziller (1965, p. 166) comments, "It has been
repeatedly suggested that instability is a basic shortcoming of an open
group system. Changing leadership at an inopportune time, a rapid
turnover of personnel, a sudden exodus of members, a loss of group
identity, a concern for sources of replacements or additions, and the
unpredictability of future social contacts are just a few of the
problems inherently involved in open groups".
There are two points worth making about Ziller's comment. Firstly, 
from the terminology used (e.g. 'leadership', 'personnel') it is probably 
1^1^ to assume that Ziller, and the literature Ziller is referring to, 
are more relevant to the industrial context than to social 'non-work' 
contexts. Secondly, the question of identification with a group becomes 
important when we assume that exit from the group,on one level at least, 
is possible. That is, the individual member can oease to identify with 
one group and develop identification with other group(s),of which he is
not presently a member. By concentrating on closed groups, from
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which there is,by definition,no kind of exit, psychologists have 
distorted the whole issue of psychological identification with groups.
Cognitive Bases of the Group
A basic step in defining the group might be to tackle the 
question of why social groups should exist at all. a first kind of 
explanation might refer to the practical requirements of certain tasks 
which lead man to work in organised groups. A second kind of 
explanation might refer to the psychological characteristics of man ' 
which lead him to distinguish between groups and identify with particular 
ones. Anong these characteristics are (a) the desire to define himself 
and his world, creating a frame of reference for identification, 
evaluation and action, (b) the need to process information arriving from 
his potentially infinite social environment,in order to be able to cope 
with and malce sense of it. The former point will be discussed in 
relation to the work of Tajfel and his associates* . The
latter point (b) is briefly discussed below.
' The social world constitutes part of the total environment. As 
such, it is the source of one set of so-called messages 'bombarding' the 
central nervous system. The processing of information from the social 
world can be usefully described along the same lines as the processing 
of any other information (Lindsay and Norman, 1972, provide an account 
of information processing theories). "While contradictory accounts of 
exactly how information is processed exist (compare Neisser, I967, with 
Bruner et al,,1961, for example), the significant role which 
categorisation plays in this process is generally agreed upon.
Bruner et al.,(l96l) have argued that all perceptual experience 
is the end result of a categorisation process. Current debates around 
such issues as whether or not categorisation can preclude identification 
(as reflected by the studies of Brand, 1971; Dick, 1971; Ingling, 1972; 
Jonides and Gleitman, 1972) have not so much negated Bruner et al's 
arguments,as shown their questions to be too sweeping and perhaps 
simplistic. Bruner et al.,have commented that "... any behaviour 
involving the placement of objects or events on the basis of selected 
cues may be profitably conceived of as categorisation, whether perceptual 
or conceptual..." (I96I, p.231). The categorisation of the social world 
can be said to take place on a conceptual rather than perceptual level
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and it develops partly because of the need to select, transform, 
reduce ,and utilise relevant data from a potentially unlimited field.
The preceding discussion has relevance for the way we
define the group, since it was implied that through information 
processing the social world is necessarily categorised. The nature of 
the information entailed in the social environment is in itself an 
influential factor - and can potentially be the sole influential 
factor - on how social categorisation taJces place. Other factors, such 
as the characteristics of the relations between individuals (inter­
action level, interdependence, similarity, and the lilœ) can also 
influence the way categorisation of the social world takes place. But 
these other factors are not necessary prerequisites for the occurrence 
of social categorisation.
FART 2 SOME ISSUES CONGERNIE} THE DEFINITION:. OF INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR
Very few attempts have been made to define intergroup relations 
or intergroup behaviour. Indeed, the distinction between the two 
concepts is seldom clarified. The definitions and clarifications 
offered by Sherif and Sherif (1969, p.223), recounted in the 
introductory section, are an exception. The more usual procedure is for 
writers either to ignore the issues or provide highly general and 
unclarified definitions,which are of little value (e.g. " 'inter-group 
relations ' refers to the psychological character of the relations that 
exist between two or more groups and their members", Hollander, 1976, 
p.427).
The lack of debate about what constitutes intergroup behaviour
and intergroup relations reflects several illuminating aspects of
present research approachesFirstly, there is little feeling that
these issues need to be discussed. This is presumably because no
disagreements of significance are perceived. Researchers either study
behaviour between real groups which are already interacting, or create
'artificial' groups and analyse the nature of their interactions under
various conditions. Little or no attention is given to the issue of
whether or not the individuals assumed to be in particular groups
actually share this perception and identify with their so-called ingroup, 
 :          —
The relative lack of research in this area is obviously an
important element minimising debate.
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It might be argued that researchers often implicitly show 
concern for the identification issue by their attention to such 
elements as intergroup competition and conflict and ingroup bias. If 
identification with the ingroup did not take place, it might be argued, 
then the group member would not (for example) be biased in favour of 
the ingroup or hostile towards the outgroup. . This argument would have 
more validity if the process it refers to could be shown to work also 
in reverse. That is, to use the examples given, if the researchers 
also work on the assumption that when ingroup bias and outgroup 
hostility do not occur^then identification with the group has not 
evolved and group(s) cannot be said to exist - from the point of view 
of the individuals who are potential ingroup members. However, the 
work initiated by Tajfel is exceptional in that it links directly the 
existence or non-existence of the group to the action of potential . 
group members,inferring group identification from ingroup favouritism.
The psychologist should take into consideration the total 
context in which the subject of his study exists. Among the relevant 
characteristics of such a context may be its historical, geographical, 
economic, political and social features. These would establish the 
setting and represent a set of influencing (limiting) factors on group 
and intergroup behaviour. It would be useful to refer to these features 
by a specific term and that of d.ntergroup relations ' seems a fitting 
choice.
Thus, intergroup relations become the back-cloth, the scenery 
behind the actions. It reflects the general atmosphere, the wider 
social themes guiding behaviour. The term 'behaviour* in this case 
refers to a) the recognition of and identification with an ingroup, and
b) interaction with an outgroup in terms of ingroup and outgroup 
identities. It is the total set of factors influencing intergroup 
relations which helps to mould group identity. Intergroup behaviour 
becomes the expression which specifically refers to the interactions 
of the members of various groups in terms of group identification and 
identity. In intergroup behaviour, it is group characteristics and not 
individual characteristics which are the dominant influences on the 
outcome. Before intergroup behaviour can be initiated and groups can be 
said to exist, however, individuals have to identify with groups.
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Concluding Remarks
This brief section was intended to illustrate our orientation 
to the task of defining the group, intergroup behaviour and intergroup 
relations. Such an orientation is necessarily biased by personal 
values. This is not to say that one approach cannot be shown to be 
more useful and valid than any other. Our aim has not been to survey 
all types of description of group and intergroup behaviour. For 
example, nothing has been said about the distinctions sometimes made 
between primary groups, secondary groups and reference groups. But by 
making.more explicit the approach we favour, it is hoped to attacK the 
task of literature survey in a sharper and more penetrating manner .
Ultimately, the researcher's approach to the study of group and 
intergroup behaviour depends upon the model of Man he is adopting - 
implicitly or explicitly. Almost a quarter of a century ago Gordon 
Allport noted that "... the 'behavioural sciences', including 
psychology, have not provided us with a picture of man capable of 
creating or living in a democracy. These sciences in large part have 
imitated the billiard ball model of physics, now of course outmoded. 
They have delivered into our hands a psychology of 'empty organisms', 
pushed by drives and moulded by environmental circumstances. What is 
small and partial, what is external and mechanical, what is early, what 
is peripheral and opportunistic - have received the chief attention of 
psychological system builders. But the theory of democracy requires 
that man possess a measure of rationality, a portion of freedom, a 
generic conscience, propriate ideals, and unique value" (1955, p.lOO). 
This assessment is still relevant to the research carried out on group 
and intergroUp behaviour, where group membership has been assumed to 
come about mainly by a group imposing itself on a passive individual.
We take the view that it is the active, directional and intentional 
behaviour of the individual which leads to his identification with a 
group. To understand the intentions and account for the directions of 
such behaviour, we should look to the social and psychological reasons 
why identification takes place with one group and not another.
25
CHAPTER THREE
MINIMAL SOCIAL CATEGORIES
The structure of Chapter 3 is as follows. Firstly (l), the two 
initial experiments carried out by Tajfel and his associates, testing 
the hypothesis that social categorisation is a sufficient basis for 
ingroup favouritism in certain conditions, are outlined. Secondly (2), 
a list of possible weaknesses of these two initial experiments is 
presented. Thirdly (3), subsequent experiments using the same minimal 
group design are reviewed,with reference to their achievements in 
overcoming any/all of the possible weaknesses earlier noted. Fourthly
(4), a concluding review of the research using the minimal group 
design is undertaken.
Guide to Reader;- It is possibly useful if part 4 (Pp. 65-68) is
read first.
PART
(1) The Two Initial Studies
1 .1) "... can the very act of social categorisation, as far as it
can be identified and isolated from other variables lead - under
certain conditions - to intergroup behaviour which discriminates against
the outgroup and favours the ingroup?"
(Tajfel et al., 1971, p.5l).
That social categorisation is a necessary condition for the 
occurrence of discriminatory intergroup behavioiu? is a truism. There 
must be at least two distinct groups before any kind of intergroup 
behaviour can take place. The research reviewed in this section deals 
with the issue of whether, under certain conditions, social 
categorisation can be a sufficient basis for intergroup behaviour which 
discriminates against the outgroup and favours the ingroup.
In the present review we are not primarily interested in the 
'macro' theoretical explanations of intergroup behaviour which have been 
a part of the minimal group, studies. Our primary interest is in 
explanations of the role of each variable entailed in these studies.
The experiments will be, for now, linked to each other by their respective
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contributions to the task of illuminating the significance of each 
variable entailed in the minimal group context.
The research reviewed has wide-ranging implications. Firstly, 
because it questions the basis of former approaches to the task of 
defining the group (reviewed in Chapter 2). Clearly, if social 
categorisation per se can lead to ingroup favouritism, then one may 
argue that,under certain conditions,it becomes the only necessary 
requirement for group formation. The second wide-ranging implication 
of the research reviewed is particularly linked to the work of Turner, 
whose research has produced evidence which is incompatible with the 
predictions of the prominent theories of intergroup behaviour.
The first two studies to tackle the question posed by Tajfel 
et al., are reported here in some detail. This is partly in order to 
highlight the procedural problems confronting researchers - especially 
in the initial phase of this research approach. Such procedural 
problems revolve around two central tasks; (a) the isolation of social 
categorisation and, (b) the recognition and assessment of intergroup 
bias. After these two initial studies,the development of research was 
to a great extent concerned with the task of illuminating the role of 
variables other than social catégorisâtion,which were possibly entailed 
in the conditions of the first experiments. The aim was to refute 
'alternative' explanations which rested on the assumed influence of 
variables other than social categorisation.
Guides to the minimal group design
The term 'minimal group ' will be used in reference to those 
experiments designed after the manner of the first two experiments to 
be described (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al, 1971). The design of these 
experiments was highly influenced by a set of criteria (Tajfel et al, 
1971, p. 153-154) which were given primary importance at the outset of 
the research and are listed below;
1) "There should be no face-to-face interaction whatever between 
the Ss, either in the ingroup or in the outgroup or between the groups.
2) Complete anonymity of group membership should be preserved.
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3) There should be no instrumental or rational link between the 
criteria for intergroup categorisation and the nature of ingroup and 
outgroup responses requested from subjects.
4) The responses should not represent any utilitarian value to 
the subject making them.
5). A strategy of responding in terms of intergroup differentiation 
(i.e. favouring the ingroup and detrimental to the outgroup) should be 
in competition with a strategy based on other more 'rational* and 
'utilitarian' principles such as obtaining maximum profit for all. A 
further step in this direction would be to oppose a strategy of maximum 
material benefit to the ingroup to one in which the group,gains less 
than it could but more than the outgroup.
6) Last but not least, the responses should be made as important 
as possible to the subjects. They should consist of real decisions 
about the distribution of concrete rewards (and/or penalties) to others 
rather than of some form of evaluation of others."
Considered together, these six criteria imposed strict 
limitations as to the kinds of research which could be carried out - 
while still meeting their specific requirements. The two most important 
criteria in this respect are probably numbers 1 and 2, stipulating "no 
face-to-face interaction" and "complete anonymity of Ss" respectively.
The first experiments which to a significant degree met the six 
requirements were carried out in a laboratory by Tajfel and his 
associates.
These two experiments initiated an important tradition which 
relates to our previous discussion on identification in groups. Referring 
to such experiments, Billig (1976, p.344-345) has commented that, "In 
these experiments the existence of ingroup identification is inferred 
Indirectly from the occurrence or non—occurrence of ingroup favouritism.
If a sub ject awards more money to his own group members than to the 
members of the other group, then he can be said to have identified with 
his oi'Ui group".
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Experiment I
The subjects in this first experiment were 64 British schoolboys, 
aged 14-15.
FART I
The experiment began with subjects doing a dot-estimation task. 
They were then assigned to either of two conditions; with the following 
different instructions;
I) 'Neutral' condition;- Subjects were told that findings show that 
in dot-estimation tasks some people tend consistently to over-estimate, 
while others tend to consistently under-estimate the number of dots; 
but these tendencies are unrelated to accuracy.
II) 'Value' condition;- Subjects were told that some people are 
consistently more and some less accurate at dot-estimation.
It was hypothesised that greater ingroup favouritism would occur 
in the 'value' than in the 'neutral' condition.
PART II
Subjects were next told that the experimenter wished to take 
advantage of their presence to conduct an investigation involving a 
completely different kind of judgement task. For the purposes of 
convenience, they would be divided into groups on the basis of their* 
performance at dot-estimation. But, in fact, the division into groups 
was made on a random basis. Subjects were told of their group 
membership privately. They were not aware of the group memberships of 
others. '
Next, those in the Neutral Condition were told that they would be 
assigned to groups on the basis of whether they under—estimated or over­
estimated the number of dots. Neither group, it was stressed, had 
performed better than the other. Those in the Value Condition were told 
that groups would be formed on the basis of accuracy of dot-estimation. 
The more accurate would be in one group and the less accurate in another.
The second judgement task which subjects had been told they would 
carry out consisted of making choices on the basis of a set of matrices*
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These choices amounted to choosing rewards and penalties in real money 
for others. These others would only be identified by code numbers. 
Subjects were taken to separate cubicles, informed privately of their 
own group identity, then instructed on the use of the matrices. These 
matrices were developed in the proceeding years and we shall not 
describe their earliest (reported) forms here (see Billig, 1972, pp. 
31-32; Tajfel, 1970, p.97; Tajfel et al., 1971, p.157; Turner, 1975a ,
pp. 21-22).
The most important aspects of the choices made by subjects were;
i) On no occasion would subjects be rewarding or penalising 
themselves. Their choices only determined the rewards of others.
ii) They would only know the group identity and not the personal 
identity of the individuals they were making choices for.
iii) The amount of money each person received at the end would depend 
on how much others had awarded him.
iv) Everyone was guaranteed a standard sum of money for taking part 
in the experiment.
v) Each point on the matrices was worth 1/10 penny.
vi) There were three types of choice on each matrix; (a) subjects
were choosing for two members of their own group other than themselves
(b) subjects were choosing for two members of the outgroup (c) subjects
were choosing for a member of the ingroup, other than the self, and a
member of the outgroup.
The results of this experiment conclusively demonstrated that 
when subjects were faced with a choice between an ingroup and an out­
group member they favoured the former at the expense of the latter. The 
nature of this discrimination did not differ significantly between the 
two (neutral and value) conditions. On the choices where subjects were 
choosing between two outgroups or two ingroups, they used a 'fair' 
strategy for allocating rewards.
Experiment II
A second experiment was designed to test and elaborate upon the 
findings of the first. This later experiment differed from the early
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one in three essential ways. Firstly, as regards the criterion for 
social categorisation. Secondly, there was only one condition and 
this corresponded to the 'neutral' condition of Experiment I. Thirdly, 
the matrices used to assess intergroup bias were modified. The 
matrices used in the first experiment did not allow for the clear 
isolation of choice strategies,because they included a complicating 
variable by incorporating negative or 'penalty' points.
The subjects (N-48) were British schoolboys.
PART I
The criterion for social categorisation in this experiment was 
the aesthetic preferences of subjects. Abstract paintings were shown 
and subjects indicated whether they preferred paintings by Klee or 
Kandinslq/-.
'
PART II
Following the procedure of Experiment I, subjects were informed 
that the experimenter would like to take advantage of their presence to 
carry out an investigation using a completely different judgement task. 
For the sake of making these judgements, subjects were told, it was 
convenient to divide them into two groups on the basis of whether they 
preferred Klee or Kandinsky. In fact, subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of two groups.
The rest of the procedure was the same as in Experiment I, except 
that the matrices used were different.
The Matrices measuring Intergroup Bias in Experiment II
The choice strategies investigated by the matrices in this 
experiment were as follows;
"1) MJP (maximum joint profit) defined as that choice in a matrix 
which results in the greatest possible common benefit to the 
two individuals to whom the choice pertains, i.e. the tem of 
the matrix which corresponds to the highest total number of 
points that can be awarded.
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2) MIP (maximum ingroup payoff) defined as that choice in a 
matrix which corresponds to the highest nuinber of points 
that can be awarded to the member of the ingroup.
3) MD (maximum difference in favour of the ingroup) defined as 
that choice in the matrix which results in the greatest 
possible difference between points awarded to the two 
individuals to whom the choice pertains, this difference 
being in favour of the ingroup member".
(Tajfel et al., 1971, p. 163).
Table I which follows (fromTurner, 1975^ pp.29-30) gives the 
titles, abbreviations for, and definitions of strategies we shall be 
referring to in coming discussions.
TABLE I
MINIMAL INTERGROUP STRATEGIES AND CHOICES
Strategy Abbreviation Definition
Maximum Joint 
Profit or 
Payoff
M.J.P. That choice in a matrix which 
results in the greatest possible 
common benefit to the two 
recipients to whom the choice 
pertains i.e. the column in the 
matrix which corresponds to the 
highest total number of points 
that can be awarded.
Maximum Ingroup 
Profit or Payoff 
or Absolute Ingroup 
Favouritism
M.I.P. That choice in a matrix which 
corresponds to the highest 
number of points that can be 
awarded to the ingroup member of . 
the two recipients.
Maximum ' 
Difference in 
favour of the 
Ingroup or 
Relative Ingroup 
Favouritism
M.D. That choice in a matrix which 
results in the greatest possible 
difference between the numbers of 
points awarded to the two 
recipients to whom the choice 
pertains, this difference being 
in favour of the ingroup recipient
Fairness F. That choice in a matrix which 
awards equal numbers of points to 
the two recipients to whom the 
choice pertains.
Ingroup
Favouritism
MIP + MD That choice in a matrix where the 
optimal choices for MIP and MD. 
coincide.
Table I (contd)
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Choices . Abbreviation Definition
Ingroup I or I A choice where the two
Choice I recipients are both ingroup 
members
Outgroup 0 or 0 A choice where the two
Choice 0 recipients are both outgroup 
members
A Differential D or A choice where one recipient
Intergroup I or 0 is an ingroup member and the
Choice 0 I other an outgroup member
The four matrices used in experiment II were as follows : 
TABLE II
THE MATRICES IN EXPERIMENT 2 (Tajfel et al. 1971, p. 164)
( Matrix 1 
(
( Matrix 2 
(
B
Version ‘
Version -
( Matrix 3 
(
( Matrix 4 
(
Version
Version
19 18 17 16 15 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
1 3 5. 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 l4 13.12 11
5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
MIP and MD opposite to MJP
MIP, MJP and MD coincide
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 19
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
MIP and MJP opposite to MD
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
10 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
noted:
2 • MIP, MJP and MD coincide 
With respect to these matrices, the following points should be
i) The differential intergroup choices (D) are between an ingroup
and an outgroup. D choices are of two types; i or — .
0 I
ii) The choices between two ingroup members (I) are of one type; -î,
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iii) The choices between two outgroup members (O) are of one
X 0
type: q *
iv) An Q choice means that the numbers for the ingroup member are on
the top row of the matrix. An ^  choice, correspondingly, means that 
the numbers for the outgroup member are on the top row and, thus, the 
numbers for the ingroup member are on the bottom row.
The essential feature of these matrices is that,by changing the 
position of the two recipients of rewards across two choices, it is 
possible to detect the strategy of choice which subjects apparently 
followed. For example, in choice I person 'A' receives points from the 
top row of the matrix and person receives points from the bottom 
row. In choice II, their situation is reversed. A comparison of the 
points allocated in the two situations reveals the relative 'puli' of 
stragegies being measured by a given matrix. •
The matrices used were of two types and there was two of each
type of matrix. All h matrices assess MJP, MIP and MD strategies. The 
particular features of these matrices were as follows:
Matrix A (l and 2): In the I/O version of (D) choices, MJP is on the
extreme right-hand side of the matrix and MIP and MD are on the extreme 
left. For example, in matrix A (1), when row 19...? stands for the
rewards of the ingroup member, and row 1 ...2 5  stands for rewards for the
outgroup member, then box represents MJP and b o x  -12 represents MIP 
together with MD. In I/O choices, therefore, the strategy of MJP 
conflicts with the strategies of MIP and MD. When the position is 
reversed and the outgroup member receives points from the top row of the 
matrix^while the ingroup member receives points from the bottom row 
(i.e. j ), then MJP coincides with the strategies of MIP and MD. Since 
MIP and MD always coincide on these matrices (i.e. A 1 and 2), it is not 
possible to assess relative (MD) and absolute (MIP) favouritism 
separately.
In order to assess the relative pulls of MJP and MIP + MD 
strategies, the I/O and 0/1 choices are scored and their scores are 
compared. That is, the choices made when the strategies of MJP and 
MIP + MD conflict are compared to scores made when they correspond. The 
choice signifying MJP is always scored as zero and the choice furthest ■
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from MJP is always scored 12 . We shall give an example of scoring
methods using matrix A (1). If on an l/O choice and an O/l choice,
17 9the boxes —g and ^  are chosen respectively, then the score on the 
I/o choice will be 10 and the score on the O/I choice will be 2 . This 
means that the score for when the strategies of MJP and MIP + MD 
conflict is greater than the score for when they correspond (10 in the 
former case and 2 in the latter). This result is interpreted as meaning 
that MD + MIP have pulled the choice of subjects away from MJP.
Matrix B (3 and 4)
Through these matrices the distinction between the strategies of 
MIP and MD can be made. This is, of course, only relevant to D choices. 
In these two matrices MJP does not conflict at any time with MIP. The . 
strategies of MJP and MIP either conflict or correspond to that of MD, 
depending on whether the ingroup is receiving points from the top of the 
bottom row of the matrix.
In all four matrices the point of fairness (F) is constant and 
corresponds to the central box in each matrix.
Making a choice on a Matrix
As in Experiment I, the subjects in Experiment II were led 
individually to cubicles where they were given the booklets of matrices 
and told privately of their own group memberships. In order to choose 
rewards for two particular others, the subjects were required to simply 
tick on each page the box which was their choice, then write do’wn the 
numbers they had awarded at the bottom. An example of a booklet page is 
given below (Tajfel et al, 1971, p.166):
. Booklet for group preferring Klee
These numbers are rewards for:
member no. 74 of Klee group 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1
member no. 44 of Kandinsky group 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
Please fill in below details of the box you have just chosen:
Amount
Reward for member 74 of Klee gioup _____ ______
Reward for member 44 of Kandinsky group____________
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The results of Experiment II confirmed the findings of 
Experiment I. with re spec t to ingroup bias.. When choices were made 
comparing an ingroup and an outgroup member, the ingroup member was 
relatively highly rewarded. As regards particular bias strategies,
MIP and MD were found to exert a significant pull on MJP - but the pull 
of MJP on MIP and MD was not significant. MD was found to exert a 
significant pull on MIP and MJP, but MIP and MJP did not have a 
significant pull on MD. Thus, MD emerged as the important strategy - 
reflecting the subjects' apparent concern to give relatively more to 
their own group. They apparently neglected to use a strategy which 
would have gained both groups more rewards. They seemed to choose, 
instead, to ensure a relatively better position for the ingroup - at the 
expense of greater absolute rewards.
Two final points about these two initial studies is that, firstly, 
F appeared also to be an influential strategy, acting as a moderating 
force or bias. Secondly, very little indication is given as to how the 
subjects viewed their experiences.
It is worth noting that Tajfel et al., (1971) also report the 
results of a pilot study which preceded Experiment II. There were only 
14 subjects and only the results relevant to the 10 male subjects are 
presented. However, these results do confirm the general pattern of 
findings from Experiments I and II.
PART es
(2) Possible Weakness^ in the Early Studies
Before proceeding to discussions of experiments which followed
this initial work, we shall list and briefly comment on the possible
weaknesses of the two early studies.
The issues have been classified into foin? groups with the titles:
cultural,, instrumental, procedural and 'intra-subject'. The criteria 
for classification are not, however, very strict.
a) CULTURAL : the population for sample subjects; the social context
,  ^ of the experiment.
(1) The Subjects
Ail subjects were schoolboys aged 14-15 from one school in Bristol, 
The peculiarities of the subject sub-culture may influence the particular 
results.
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(2) The Context
Both experiments were carried out in a psychology laboratory 
at Bristol. Can the findings be replicated in another context?
h) INSTRUMENTAL: concerning experimental tools.
(3) The Nature of Rewards
It may have been money which most influenced choices. Would 
these choices have been different if the nature of rewards was not ; 
monetary?
(4) The Basis of Categorisation
Although the basis of social categorisation in the two 
experiments was different, there is no evidence to suggest that either
of these criteria were viewed as being 'trivial' ■ by subjects
It may be true that in the context of everyday life the two criteria 
would be considered by subjects as 'trivial' bases for
social categorisation. However, to transfer this (assumed) evaluation 
to the context of the laboratory, clearly involves an assumption - and 
this assumption needs to be tested. The experimental context would 
probably have changed the salience of the two criteria because they were 
one of the few social ones available as a guide to action . The new 
evaluation of these criteria, within, the experimental context, may mean 
that they are viewed by subjects as important - not 'trivial'.
c) PROCEDURAL: concerning procedural aspects of the experiments.
(5) Isolation of Subjects
Subjects were placed in individual cubicles and made their choices 
in isolated conditions. Their responses may have revealed a different 
pattern if they had been in the company of others through the experiment.
(6) The Views of Subjects
The perceptions and interpretations of subjects would have helped 
us assess these experiments more comprehensively. With the help of 
information from subjects, certain issues in our list of possible 
weaknesses might have been clarified - and other points not mentioned by 
us might have been added to this list.
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(?) Numbers of Ingroups and Outgroups
In both experiments only two groups were used - one ingroup and
one outgroup. We have no evidence to suggest that the same ingroup, 
bias would occur in such a setting if each subject had two or more 
ingroups or/and two or more outgroups.
(8) Self vs Group
Subjects were not able to reward themselves directly. Would 
social categorisation have the same influence if the experimental 
design was modified to allow subjects directly to reward themselves - 
in comparison with other ingroup and outgroup members?
INTRA-SUBJECT: generally concerning the attributions, assumptions, 
and feelings of subjects during the experiment .
(9) Anxiety of Subjects
Subjects may have been anxious and confused on arrival and during 
their experiences at the psychology laboratory. These feelings may have 
led to the development of an ingroup - as manifested through ingroup 
favouritism.
(10) Anticipation of Interaction
It may be that subjects anticipated some kind of future inter­
action on the basis of groupings foirmed and this led to intergroup 
differentiation and ingroup bias. We have to keep in mind, firstly, that 
subjects had no clear idea what the end of the experimental session would 
entail. Secondly, subjects had already once been asked by the 
experimenter to take part in a different kind of task. Perhaps they 
expected a third task in which group interaction wasinvolved.
(11) Common Fate
Subjects may in some ways have assumed that they share, or will 
share, some kind of a common fate with others of the ingroup. This 
'fate* may have related to the rewards received, interactions to come,or 
simply sharing membership of one group, among other factors, and may have 
influenced the choices they made.
(12) Assumed Reciprocity
Subjects may have assumed that everyone would give their own
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group as many points as possible, taking the grouping as guides to 
reciprocity in choices. This need not entail identification with 
groups, but it does entail identification of self-interest with 
monetary ingroup favouritism. Thus, ingroup favouritism may have been 
based on the wish to reward others j as they were assumed to be rewarding 
the self.
(13) Interpersonal Similarity
In these experiments,the variables of social categorisation and 
inter-individual similarity are confounded. That is, the subjects are 
not simply placed into groups - they are placed inX groups apparently 
because they performed, in a similar way on a previous task. It is 
similar others who constitute the ingroup. We look to future experiments 
to elucidate the influence of these similarities.
PART
(3) Confirmation and Extension of the Initial Minimal Group Findings
The structure of part 3 is as follows. Firstly, experiments 
which followed the basic minimal group design (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et 
al., 1971) and which produced evidence in harmony with the initial 
interpretations of the role of social categorisation in this design, 
are reported (Billig, 1973; Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Deutsch et al., . 
I97I; Boise, 1972; Boise et al., 1972a; 1972b; Tajfel and Billig, 1974; 
Wilder „ ,,1978). Secondly, experiments are described which
replicated or modified the basic minimal group design and:
(a) seemed to produce evidence which required us to review the 
initial interpretations of the role of social categorisation 
and/or
(b) confirmed the initial findings and interpretations but seemed 
to entail a characteristic which might lead to new inter­
pretations if explored further. The studies placed in these 
categories were those by Allen and Wilder (1975), Chase (1971), 
Deutsch et al.,(l969). Turner (1975a, 1975b, forthcoming) and 
Turner et al,,(jn Press).
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Experiments Confirming the initial findings of Tajfel and his Associates
The order in which we discuss these studies is to some extent 
influenced by their individual contributions to the task of overcoming 
all/any of the possible weaknesses of the earliest studies. On Table IC 
(page 40 ) we present a list of possible weaknesses, together with 
examples of studies which have been interpreted as providing evidence 
relevant to each of them. Some studies are referred to more than once, 
since their findings are relevant to more than one point on the list.
The first group of studies we report (Deutsch et al, 1971;
Doise, 1972; Doise et al., 1972a; 1972b; Wilder , 1978) were
all carried out with subjects from a different population and in some 
ways in a different context than the original studies. Apart from this 
similarity, each of these studies represents a modification of the basic 
minimal group design.
Experiments carried out outside Bristol
An experiment was carried out under the direction of Doise (1972) 
to test and extend findings from the studies at Bristol. The subjects 
were from the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium. The context of the 
study was a school. The matrices were completed by subjects in the 
company of other subjects. Each subject's group membership was only 
knoim to himself. The three conditions (two control and one experimental) 
had the following characteristics. In control condition (A) subjects were 
divided up in the same way as in the Klee-Kandinsky experiment, on the 
basis of their picture preferences. In control condition (B) subjects 
were told they were being shown pictures by ^  different artists and were 
divided into 3 groups : Klee, Kandinsky and Kokoschka. In the experimental 
condition the groups were: Klee, Kandinsky and Kandinsky-Klee. Subjects 
who apparently liked the pictures of Klee and Kandinsky equally went into 
the third group. Each subject had one ingroup and two outgroups.
Subjects in all conditions made choices comparing (a) ingroups (b) 
outgroups (c) ingroups and outgroups. All subjects received two booklets 
of matrices. In control condition A, these 2 booklets were identical.
In control condition B and in the experimental condition, the matrices in 
the booklets were the same, but the first booklet was for comparison of 
the ingroup with one outgroup, while the second one was for comparison of
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TABLE n
Possible Weaknesses Examples of Experiments providing evidence 
defending the initial interpretations of 
the influence of social categorisation
1. The subjects Doise (1972); Doise et al., (1972a); 
Deutsch et al., (1971)
2. The Context Doise (1972)
3. The Nature of 
Rewards'
Turner (1975a, 1975b, forthcoming)
h. The Basis of 
Categorisation
5. Isolation of 
Subjects
Deutsch et al., (I97I); Doise (1972)
6 . The views of 
sub jects-5c~
7. Number of Ingroup/ 
Outgroup
Doise (1972) '
8. Self vs. Group
9. Anxiety of subjects Billig and Tajfel (1974)
10. Anticipation of 
Interaction
Doise et al.,(1972a)
11. Common fate Doise et al.,(1972a)
12. Assumed
Reciprocity
Deutsch et al., (1971)
13. Interpersonal
similarity
Doise (1972); Billig and Tajfel (1973); 
Allen and Wilder (1975); Chase (1971); 
Deutsch et al., (I969)
"Experdjnents generating results which also reveal the views of subjects 
as defending the interpretations of Experimenters as regards the use of 
choice strategies.
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the ingroup with the second outgroup. After subjects had completed 
booklet one, and again after they completed booklet two, they Were 
asked to rate on several scales certain personality characteristics of 
the ingroup and outgroups.
The results revealed that subjects in all three conditions made 
choices specifically favouring the ingroup. The hypothesis that subjects 
would show greater discrimination towards outgroups who were more 
dissimilar was not confirmed. The expectation that subjects would show 
more favouritism in the second booklet of matrices was not confirmed 
either. This expectation was on the basis of post hoc interpretations 
of Tajfel and Billig (1974) and Boise et al., (1972a) and rested on the 
assumption that as subjects become more familiar with the experimental 
situation, they would be distracted less and follow the strategy of 
ingroup favouritism more strictly.
With respect to subjects and context, this experiment does not 
diverge far from the initial minimal group ones.
The initial minimal group studies did not only link ingroup 
favouritism with social categorisation per se, they.also stressed the 
significance of group distinctiveness. Making the distinction between 
ingroup and outgroup(s) clear could be achieved, among other ways, by 
seeking information which would highlight or accentuate differences 
between the former and latter. In an experiment by Wilder '
-^ 278) ,the^effect of social categorisation in competitive/non-competitive 
situations onIinformation about similar/dissimilar others was explored. 
Wilder and Allen derived their main hypothesis from Heider (1958). W e  
shall be concerned with our post hoc interpretation,that the presence of 
social categorisation in the minimal group setting would lead subjects 
to seek information about others which would accentuate differences
between the self and the outgroup,and diminish differences between the 
self and the ingroup.
The subjects were 112 male Jtaerioan students. The first step in 
the procedure was the completion of an attitude inventory (used in Allen
and Wilder, 1975). After this, subjects indicated their aesthetic
preferences (Klee and Kandinsky). Subjects were then taken to different 
rooms individually and told that the next task involved a discussion among
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all the participants. For this purpose, everyone would be identified 
by code numbers. In fact, all subjects were assigned the number *1*.
The instructions from this point differed in each condition:
1) Non-competitive group condition
Subjects were apparently placed in groups on the basis of 
aesthetic preferences. However, they were in reality randomly assigned 
to groups. They were told each group wasof an equal size. Before the 
final task, which apparently involved group discussions, subjects were 
given the opportunity of indicating their preferences for receiving 
information about others who were more or less similar to them on 
attitudes - as measured by the initial questionnaire.
2) Competitive group condition
The instructions were identical to the non-competitive group 
condition, except that subjects were told that the group which performed 
best in the competitive discussion between the two groups would receive 
extra rewards.
3) Aggregate - Control Conditions
This condition was identical to the non-competitive one, except 
that the word * group * was not introduced and subjects were not members 
of groups.
4) Group - Control Condition
The term 'group* was introduced, but subjects were told they were 
all assigned to the same group because they had all preferred the same 
pictures. The purpose of this condition was to test the influence of the 
term 'group* as distinct from the act of social categorisation.
Dependent measures :— In all conditions involving an ingroup and 
an outgroup,subjects rank-ordered four alternatives in terms of 
preference for seeing the items that indicated greatest degree of (i) 
similarity of self with ingroup (persons 2, 3, 4, 5)^  (ii) dissimilarity 
of self and ingroup, (iii) similarity of self and outgroup (persons 6, 7, 
83 9, 10), (iv) dissimilarity of self and outgroup. In the aggregate 
and group-control conditions, subjects also responded to the four 
alternatives, but this tirnie others were simply identified by code numbers , 
since ingroups and/or outgroups were not relevant.
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The results show that in the aggregate and group-control 
conditions, subjects had no strong preferences for one type of , 
information over another. In the first two conditions, by contrast, 
in which social categorisation had been introduced, subjects strongly 
preferred information which would enhance their similarity with the 
ingroup and their dissimilarity with the outgroup. Comparisons across 
competitive and non-competitive conditions show no significant 
differences. However, comparisons of the first two conditions, which 
entailed social categorisation, with the second two, which did not, do 
show significant differences.
,A post-experimental questionnaire confirmed that most subjects 
in the competitive condition and only a few in the non-competitive 
condition anticipated competitive discussion in the expected 3rd stage.
The experiment conducted by Wilder (1973) entailed the
compileatory variable 'anticipation of interaction'. Our interpretation 
of the results, linking social categorisation to accentuation of ingroup 
and outgroup differences, may be rightly criticised for neglecting the 
possible influence of 'expectation of interaction' (No. 10 on the list 
of possible weaknesses). We now proceed to discuss an experiment which 
illuminates the role of this confounding variable.
Doise et al (1972a) carried out an experiment investigating how 
anticipated interaction between groups influences the representations 
groups have of each other.
5u.t>jec{$ were told that they were in X-type 
or Y-type group on the basis of photograph preferences. In fact, they 
were randomly assigned to groups. Next, they were to describe ingroup 
and outgroup members on rating scales (involving evaluative and physical 
traits). Subjects in the control condition completed these rating scales 
without knowing that, in the third part, they would be awarding money to 
others on the basis of matrices. Subjects in the experimental condition 
completed the rating scales after they were told about the awards to be 
made in the third part. This represented the manipulation of expected 
interaction. The nature of this anticipated interaction was varied by 
telling half the experimental subjects to gain as much money as possible 
for their own group (competitive groups), and the other half to gain as 
much money as possible for both groups - since both groups would receive
hk
equal share of total rewards in the end (cooperative groups). The 
variable high/low common fate was also introduced by telling half the 
competitive and cooperative subjects that it would be possible for 
each of them to earn between 0.^0 and 1 Dm (low common fate), while the 
corresponding figures for the other half of the subjects were 5 Dm and 
10 Dm (high common fate). A summary of manipulations can be thus 
expressed:
Control Condition - N - 31
(High fate N-30 
Competitive (
EwlJnental Condition (Low fate N-30 
Condition (High fate N-30
Condition ^^te N-27
There were effectively 3 kinds of dependent measures: the 
matrices, ratings of evaluative traits, ratings of physical traits. 
Considered together, the results reveal significant differences between 
control and experimental conditions - but subjects in both conditions 
showed significant ingroup bias. This ingroup bias was greater in the 
competitive — high fate situation, especially as reflected by ratings 
of physical.traits.
The inclusion of rating scales on evaluative (e.g. flexible- 
stubborn, kind-unkind) and physical (e.g. blonde-dark, tall-short) traits 
must be critically questioned. One might argue that the particulars of 
these traits do not tell us anything about how subjects perceived the 
ingroup or the outgroup. The significant features of subjects* 
perceptions seem to be:
(i) their » super-ordinate * evaluation of the ingroup in a more 
positive manner and,
(ii) their wish to accentuate the gap between the ingroup and 
outgroup(s).
The particular traits we ask subjects to evaluate may reflect 
only this super-ordinate evaluation and not anything linked to the 
specific nature of the trait itself. With this in mind, we should avoid 
the trap of assuming that we have information suggesting that subjects
h5
believe the ingroup is, for example, more dark, or taller, or keener,
There are two points we should make about the last study to be 
reported in this section. Firstly, it specifically tests the effect 
of the isolation of subjects. This isolation, we noted, may have 
created anxiety and been responsible for the development of a group 
feeling in the initial studies (possible weakness Numbers ^ & 9).
Secondly, although it appears to have been assumed that this experiment 
is of the minimal group type, objections to it raised here seem to test 
this assumption.
Deutsch et al»,(1971) carried out an experiment in which subjects 
were divided into two groups on the basis of whether they were ^levellers» 
or (sharpeners*. Subjects only identified others by their group (and not 
personalj identities. In the second part of the experiment, intergroup 
bias was assessed. The two independent variables were the interdependence 
between donor and recipient of rewards and whether sub jects were alone or 
in the company of others when they made choices.
The subjects were 3h male students. ; On arrival (presumably at a 
laboratory) they were told they would be taking part in three separate 
experiments; on cognitive style, on money judgements and on impression 
formation. The first (test* involved measures of cognitive style,termed 
(levelling* and * sharpening *. Without going into details, we should note 
that the difference between these two was elaborated and they were said 
to have broad applications, correlating with some personality traits.
Code numbers assigned to subjects informed them whether they were * levellers * 
or (sharpeners*. In fact, they were randomly assigned to these groups. 
Experimenters, however, avoided using (collective* terms such as * groups * 
in this experiment.
Subjects were told the second experiment involved decisions about 
money. They would award money to others, as well as estimate how others 
awarded money. The money given to subjects for taking part in the 
experiment would consist of what others awarded them. The interdependence
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between donor and receiver was varied. In the third section, subjects 
indicated their impressions of two others (one ingroup, one outgroup) 
by reviewing what was apparently their handwriting. All subjects,in 
fact,received the same handwriting specimens.
The findings from this experiment are difficult to summarise 
coherently,because indicators from different measures appear to 
contradict each other. Although in both conditions other subjects were 
assumed to be choosing in favour of their own group, in the actual 
choices only subjects in the Alone Condition favoured the ingroup.
But, the rating scales show that only in the Together Condition were 
subjects favoured. The differential dependencies of donor and recipient 
did not significantly alter choice strategies. This seems to be the 
one point we can clarify on the basis of the findings. It is not an 
unimportant point, since it may weaken the argument that it is assumed 
reciprocity (possible weakness number 12) which leads to ingroup 
favouritism. Since, if assumed reciprocity is important, subjects should 
only favour those who can return the favour.
However, it might be argued that this experiment is not concerned 
with (minimal* categories. Deutsch et al., describe how subjects were 
told about the broad applications of the distinction between a (leveller* 
and a (sharpener* (1971; p.11). The term * sharpener *was used to describe 
a person who notices and reacts to small differences in what goes on 
around him, while a (leveller* was a person who pays relatively more 
attention to the overall picture. These may have been viewed by subjects 
as highly important differences between people. The categories derived 
on their basis should not be assumed to be minimal.
Further Experiments carried out at Bristol
¥e now report four experiments,carried out at Bristol,which not 
only seemed to confirm the findings of the original minimal group studies, 
but also counteract certain criticisms of those studies.
We noted that Deutsch et al., (1971) had found that subjects expected 
others to favour their own ingroups. This finding, considered by itself, 
seemed to add support to the criticism of (assumed reciprocity* (possible 
weakness No. 12). However, since Deutsch et al., did nob find that
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subjects followed their as sumption,by actually consistently favouring 
their ingroup themselves, this casts doubt on how much their data 
does support the (assumed reciprocity* criticism. An experiment was 
carried out at Bristol to specifically test the validity of the 
(assumed reciprocity* criticism.
Poise et al., (1972b) carried out an experiment aimed at 
comparing subjects* choices with their expectations of hovr others would 
choose in the minimal group setting. The context was a laboratory at 
Bristol. The subjects were British schoolboys. It was hypothesised 
that subjects would expect others, whetherof the ingroup or the outgroup, 
to favour their own ingroups. This experiment was essentially the same 
as the second one (Klee and Kandinsky) we described. There were several 
differences we need to note, however. Firstly, matrices which isolated:
F were used. Secondly, subjects were told that only some of them would. 
be making decisions using the matrices. The remainder would be 
predicting the others* decisions. However, the procedure was such that 
all subjects eventually made choices on the matrices,while only some 
predicted the choices of others. Thirdly, after the matrices were 
completed, the subjects rated an anonymous member of the ingroup and an^  
anonymous member of the outgroup on several nine-point scales (e.g. 
kind-unkind, and other descriptive evaluations). The fourth difference, 
between this experiment and Klee and Kankinsky, was that only D choices 
were incorporated.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the results of this 
experiment,because it is reported that the comments of subjects both 
during and after the experiment showed that a number of them were 
confused. The complication of predicting and making choices may have 
caused this confusion. Three points will be made about the results, 
however. Firstly, the choices on the rating scales reflected ingroup 
favouritism. Secondly, F was a very influential strategy moderating bias 
in choices. Thirdly, subjects seemed to expect ingroup favouritism from 
members of the ingroup but not from members of the outgroup. This 
evidence relating to the (assumed reciprocity* criticism is not 
conclusive since (a) some subjects were confused and, (b) it was still 
found that subjects expected the ingroup to show ingroup favouritism.
Consistent evidence in relation to the assumed reciprocity
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criticism is not yet available. The situation is different with 
regards to evidence relevant to the criticism based on interpersonal 
similarity (possible weakness No. 13). In the original minimal group 
studies, subjects were categorised apparently on the basis of their 
similar performance on a task. This apparent similarity, rather than 
social categorisation per se, could have influenced choices. The next 
experiment reported presents evidence relevant to this issue.
Eillig and Tajfel (1973) carried out an experiment aiming to 
illuminate the relative importance of similarity and social 
categorisation as two distinct variables in the minimal group setting.
The 75^subjects in this experiment were British schoolboys.
In the first part of the experiment,subjects took part in an 
aesthetic preference task (Klee and Kandinsky). However, only subjects 
in the two similarity conditions were given the.names of artists and 
told which picture was by whom. In fact, as before, these relationships 
were fictitious. The instructions given in part two of the experiment 
differed for each experimental condition.
1) Categorisation; Similarity; The standard instructions for the
minimal intergroup experiment were given in this condition. The 
important point is that subjects knew that those in the ingroup were
also similar to them on aesthetic preference .
2) Categorisation; Non-Similarity: Subjects were told that parts 1
and 2 were completely different and distinct. Their group membership 
in part two was apparently decided on the toss of a coin.
3) Non-Categorisation; Similarity; There was no mention of (groups *.
Subjects only knew that others were similar or dissimilar to themselves 
on aesthetic preference .
4) Non-Categorisation; Non-Similarity ; Code numbers identified others 
as usual, but no information about these others was available. This was
a control condition with both variables, similarity and social 
categorisation, absent.
All subjects worked alone in part 2.
The results show that only when explicit categorisation was 
introduced did ingroup favouritism take place. Similarity was also
influential, particularly on MJP. However, sbnilarity was not a
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sufficient basis for significant bias.
An important element in all these studies is that subjects are 
in a context which may make them feel highly anxious and to some 
extent confused. It may be this anxiety and confusion which leads to 
the bias towards the ingroup. Through favouritism, subjects may be 
creating group cohesion and finding a way of relieving anxiety. . Two 
experiments which seem to directly relate to this issue are reported 
by Billig (1973) and Tajfel and Billig (1974).
An experiment was carried out by Tajfel and Billig (1974) 
specifically designed to illuminate the influence of subjects» level 
of anxiety in the minimal group setting. It was. assumed that if 
anxiety of subjects had influenced the choices and led to ingroup 
favouritism,then it must have been present to a significant degree in 
both the initial experiments (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). They 
now aimed to diminish the hypothesised effect of anxiety for one group 
of subjects,by making them more familiar with the setting. The responses 
of this (familiarised* group would then be compared with the responses 
of an unfamiliarised group of subjects. The latter group would, it was 
proposed, reflect the effect of relatively greater anxiety, if this was 
an important variable influencing choices.
The subjects were 48 British schoolboys, aged l4 and 1^. Half 
of them came to the psychology laboratory several days before the actual 
experiment and toox part in a mock experiment. This mock experiment 
involved making-up titles for pictures and completing the Ma.udsley 
Personality Inventory (Eysenck, 1969) alone in cubicles. The non- 
familiar subjects came with the familiarised subjects a few days later 
to the laboratory and took part in an experiment similar to *Klee and 
Kandinsky*. In each session,half the subjects were familiarised and the 
other half unfamiliarised.
The results showed that both, sets of subjects favoured the 
ingroup. The familiarised subjects were more biased towards the ingroup 
than the unfamiliarised ones. They also showed more consistency in 
their decisions . Neuroticism, as measured by the MPI, did not correlate 
highly with intergroup discrimination. The evidence provided by this 
study thus seems to refute the idea that anxiety was the determining 
factor leading to ingroup favouritism. However, an experiment reported
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by Billig (1973) produces evidence which may be interpreted as 
contradicting the findings of Tajfel and Billig (1974). This 
interpretation, set out below, is post hoc and is not derived from 
interpretations in the report of the study itself.
Billig (1973) reports a study in which inter-subject communication 
was incorporated alongside the Experimenter's communication, in order to 
compare responses of first-generation subjects with second-generation 
subjects. The subjects were 80 schoolboys from Bristol, aged l4-l6.. The 
basic design of this experiment followed that of the Cat non-siM 
condition in Billig and Tajfel (1973). Subjects were assigned randomly 
to group X or group Y, they identified others only through group 
memberships.
The two experimental conditions had the following characteristics;
Condition one; These subjects were told'which was their ingroup 
and how to fill in the matrices. Because of an apparent lack of time, they 
were asked to explain the procedure and workings of the matrices and 
groups to one of the second set of subjects. They were free to pass on 
any comments which they felt might be of use.
Condition two; These subjects received standard instructions as 
regards the matrices and groups from the Experimenter. Because of an 
apparent lack of time, the instructions were completed by a subject from 
the first group. Only when these instructions were finished were they 
told which groups they were in.
After the matrices were completed, all subjects answered questions 
concerning the strategies they had used. Subjects were also asked about 
the communications which took place. It had been expected that second 
generation subjects might build up stronger ingroup preferences through 
the instructions they had received from the first generation subjects.
This expectation was not confirmed. Both sets of subjects showed 
significant ingroup favouritism, but this bias was stronger in the case of • 
first generation subjects.
The questionnaires revealed, firstly, that very few subjects could, 
or perhaps would,verbalise the strategies they had 'used*. This finding 
leads us to question the extent to which subjects were aware of the
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different choice strategies measured by the matrices. It has been 
assumed that subjects ^  use the various choice strategies, but the 
validity of this assumption is seriously questioned by the finding 
that subjects do not actually report having used them. A second factor 
revealed by the questionnaires was that first-generation subjects did 
not, except for one case, communicate choice strategies to second- 
generation subjects. Thus, the communication which took place between 
the two sets of subjects was possibly the factor which caused second- 
generation subjects to show less ingroup favouritism.
An alternative explanation of this finding is one which emphasises 
the role of anxiety. The second-generation subjects, it may be argued, 
were relaxed and comforted by the discussion they had prior to filling 
in the matrices. This was particularly because this discussion was with 
a group who had already experienced what was as yet unknoxm to them and 
could provide comforting guides. The communications between the two 
sets of subjects thus may have helped to relieve the anxiety of second- 
generation subjects and this may have caused them to shoxf less ingroup 
favouritism. The adoption of this interpretation might lead us to 
speculate that the results of this experiment contradict those of Tajfel 
and Billig (1974), in which anxiety level was not found to influence 
choices.
Concluding remarks
The experiments we have reviewed so far have shared three common 
characteristics. Firstly, they have all generally confirmed the findings 
of the initial minimal group experiments in shovring that social 
categorisation , as far as it could be isolated, could under certain 
conditions be a sufficient basis for ingroup favouritism. Secondly, each 
of them has made a contribution to illuininating the role of a variable 
other than social categorisation in the minimal group context. In 
particular, the variables of interpersonal similarity (Boise, 1971;
Billig and Tajfel, 1973), assumed reciprocity (Deutsch et al., 1971;
Boise et al., 1972b), common fate (Boise et al., 1972a), anticipation of 
interaction (Boise et al., 1972a), anxiety of subjects (Tajfel and
^974), numbers of groups (Boise, 1971). and isolation of subjects 
(Beutsch et al., 1971) have been explored. Particular reference should 
be made to the study by Wilder - (1978) in which subjects showed
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preferences for information which would accentuate differences between 
the self and the outgroup and diminish differences between the self 
and the ingroup. This study revealed the way in which similarity might 
be used to construct a particular social environment, one which more 
rigidly defined the ingroup and set it clearly apart from the outgroup. 
Similarity is not here viewed as a force which necessarily pulls people 
together to form groups. Rather, it is seen as one of the many tools 
through which a particular construction of reality may be actively 
developed.
The third common characteristic of the experiments we have 
reviewed so far is that they all produced evidence which falls within 
the explanatory power of the 'generic norm* theoretical explanation.
This had been put forward by Tajfel et al., (1971, p.174) on the basis 
of the assumption that there was some kind of a social norm of ingroup- 
outgroup behaviour, which was perceived by subjects to be relevant to 
the minimal group situation and which guided their choices. Like most 
other theoretical approaches to intergroup behaviour, the generic-norm 
approach was of little value once the behaviour under consideration 
became other than simple ingroup favouritism. Some of the experiments 
reported in the next section produce evidence of such behaviour - where 
the ingroup is not favoured in the minimal group setting. A second 
set of experiments are also reported which are felt to have particularly 
interesting characteristics worthy of further study.
Minimal Group Studies; Toxfards a New Direction
a) Self vs Group
The minimal group experiments we have reviewed so far have not
allowed subjects the opportunity to reward themselves directly (possible
criticism No. 8). If there is a norm guiding behaviour so that
in
favouritism towards the ^ roup takes place, and if the primary issue is 
the position of the group as such, then allowing subjects the opportunity 
of rewarding the self directly should still lead to ingroup favouritism. 
However, the crucial influencing factor may not be the position of the 
group, but that of the self. Wliat was reported as important in the 
choices was the achievement of relatively more rewards for the ingroup, 
rather than more absolute rewards. But the primary concern of subjects
53
may have been the achievement of a better comparative position for 
the self - an aim which could only be achieved via ingroup 
favouritism. We now report two experiments by Turner which produce 
evidence relevant to these issues.
Turner (1975a, 1975b, forthcoming) carried out an experiment to 
investigate whether,in a competitive situation involving the self and 
unidentified others, the classification of subjects on a minimal 
criterion would lead to ingroup favouritism. In this experiment,the 
standard method of using the matrices for awarding money was modified 
so that subjects were always distributing money through comparisons of 
the self and others. The expectation was that bias towards the self 
would occur. However, in a condition where social categorisation was 
introduced, then if there is an intrinsic link between social 
categorisation per se and intergroup discrimination, this should act 
as an intervening variable modifying bias towards the self and replacing 
it by bias towards the ingroup.
The subjects in this experiment were 30 British schoolboys, aged 
II4-I6 . The study was carried out in a classroom of the boys * school.
In the first part of the experiment subjects indicated their aesthetic 
preferences (Klee and Kandinsky). Similarity between subjects was 
defined in terms of these preferences. In the second part of the 
experiment, subjects awarded money to others. The three experimental 
conditions were as follows ;
(a) Non-Categorisation and individual method of payment
This was the control condition. There was no explicit mention of
groups by the experimenter. Subjects would make awards to themselves
and similar/dissimilar others. Each person was to receive all the 
money awarded to him.
(b) Categorisation and individual method of payment
Subjects were explicitly categorised on the basis of similarity. 
The method of payment was the same as in the control condition, with 
subjects making choices for themselves and others - this time ingroup 
and outgroup members.
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(c) Categorisation and group method of payment
Subjects were categorised into two groups on the basis of 
similarity as in the categorisation and individual method of payment 
condition (b above). However, in this case they were told they would 
each receive an equal share of the money which their ingroup receives. 
Thus, in this condition self-identity and self-interest is directly 
linked to the group.
When subjects had completed the matrices, they were given , '
questionnaires to fill. These asked about the choice strategies they 
had used and also their prediction of how much 'they would like ' the 
other per sons, who had preferred Klee or Kandinsky,if their personal 
identities were to be revealed.
The results show that whenever it was possible, subjects were 
biased towards themselves. Only in condition (c), where the self- 
interest was linked directly to that of the group, was there ingroup 
favouritism. The prediction of how much subjects would like others,if 
their identities were revealed,also showed that ingroup favouritism 
was only present in condition (c). We might note that, again, there 
were only 2 levels of similarity defining the relationships between 
subjects. The inclusion of more than 2 levels may have altered the 
situation, since it would have potentially involved ingroups very 
similar to the subjects and outgroups very dissimilar to them, as well 
as moderately similar, quite dissimilar ones, and so on. Given this 
greater range, a very similar ingroup, for example, might have been 
preferred and favoured to some extent at the expense of self-interest.
As regards the strategies subjects reported using, again few 
subjects articulated their strategies in a way which supports the 
assumptions concerning their use. We are faced with an important 
question to which we return several times; if subjects do not actually 
report having used particular bias strategies, are we justified - or 
in what conditions are we justified — in assuming they shared our 
perceptions of the bias strategies,just because their actual choices 
can be viewed within the framework of our assumptions about the way the 
choices were made?
The first two conditions (a and b) in this experiment cannot be
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strictly considered as being in the minimal group tradition. This is 
because comparisons involved directly the self and others. The self 
cannot be assumed to be in any way minimal. In fact, it may be argued, 
the self is the most meaningful, important and stable component in the 
person's construction of social reality.
Turner (1975a, 197^, forthcoming) carried out a second 
experiment with three major aims. Firstly, to further test the 
hypothesis that when subjects can achieve a better position for them­
selves (in terms of rewards),without recourse to intergroup comparisons, 
then social categorisation per se will not be a sufficient condition to 
lead to ingroup favouritism. Secondly, to demonstrate that the finding; 
of ingroup favouritism common to the minimal group situation is not 
dependent on monetary rewards. Thirdly, to demonstrate the identification 
of subjects with the ingroup under given conditions.
The subjects were 88 British schoolboys,'aged 14-16. The 
experimental context was the school classroom. There were two 
independent variables: (i) the order in which subjects were to complete
the 2 separate books of matrices (ii) the nature of the rewards subjects 
distributed.
In the first part of the experiment, subjects were categorised 
into two groups apparently on the basis of aesthetic preferences. The 
groupings were in fact achieved on a random basis. Reference to groups 
was explicit. All subjects were to be given payment, the amount of 
which depended on how much they were awarded by others. All subjects 
completed 2 different matrix booklets. The first booklet was completed 
in ignorance that a second would follow. One booklet was similar to 
the standard kind, involving comparisons of others. The other booklet 
involved comparisons of self and others. Half of those subjects who 
were told to fill the self-other oooIcLet first and half of those subjects 
who were told to fill the other-other booklet first, were informed that 
the numbers on the matrices represented monetary rewards. The other half 
of each set of subjects were informed that they would receive a set sum 
for taking part in the experiment. The numbers on the matrices, they 
were told, had nothing to do with this set sum and in fact 'did not stand 
for anything in particular', they were simply 'points', as in a game.
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The four experimental conditions had the follox-ring 
characteristics:
Cond. 1) Categorised subjects firstly distributed money to others and, 
secondly, to themselves and others.
Cond. 2) Categorised subjects firstly distributed points to others and, 
secondly, to themselves and others.
. Cond. 3) Categorised subjects firstly distributed money to self and 
others and, secondly, to others.
Cond. 4) Categorised subjects firstly distributed points to self and 
others and, secondly, to others.
Others were only identified by code numbers and care was taken 
to make explicit references to groups in corresponding fashions in all 
4 conditions. At the end of each experimental session, questionnaires 
were given to subjects. These asked about the choice strategies 
subjects had used and their prediction of how much they would like 
others in each group,if their personal identities were revealed.
The results showed that when categorised subjects were 
distributing money or points to ingroup and outgroup, ingroup 
favouritism occurred. Bias towards the self, not towards the ingroup, 
occurred when categorised subjects were distributing money or points, 
directly to self and others - but this bias was modified when rewards 
were firstly distributed to the ingroup and outgroup. Wien bias 
towards the ingroup had already occurred through a first set of choices, 
the second set of choices between the self and others were less biased 
towards the self and more in favour of the ingroup. Whether the 
rewards allocated were points or money did not alter the role of social 
categorisation, its sufficiency for ingroup favouritism was maintained. 
However, the nature of rewards did influence the strategies through which 
discrimination was expressed.
The questionnaires revealed that, even considering each condition 
separately, all subjects showed a positive bias towards the ingroup.
As regards the strategies subjects reported they used, a comparison with 
the strategies the ebcperimenter assumes them to have used, leads us again 
to question the validity of the experimenter's assumptions about the
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subjects' understandings, use and perceptions of the strategies. This 
is particularly with respect to the strategies of MD and MIP, and the 
distinction between them. Subjects do not report this distinction, nor 
do they report these particular strategies. Fifteen subjects 
apparently reported a general strategy of ingroup favouritism. In 
contrast to this, the experimenter assumes these specific strategies 
(MD and MIP),and the distinction between them,to be important.
When positive bias towards a group takes place in the minimal 
group context, it is assumed that identification with the group under­
lies such action. This study by Turner takes the usual paradigm a 
step further. It demonstrates that once identification with a group 
takes place, its effect can be to influence future strategies so that 
bias towards the self is moderated, allowing greater bias towards the 
ingroup at the expense of self-interest. This behaviour might be 
reflecting a form of group loyalty. .
These two studies by Turner represent significant advances in
several important ways. Firstly, it was reported that thé primary
concern of subjects was to achieve a relatively better position for the
self. However, once the interests of the self had been directly linked
to those of a group, then in future self-interest might be sacrificed
in order to achieve a relatively better position for the ingroup. Also,
it was shown that monetary rewards were not the crucial influencing
factor in the minimal group setting. The incorporation of points,
which 'did not mean anything in particular', led to behaviour suggesting
that any criteria might be used as a means of accentuating the differences
between the ingroup and outgroup, achieving a relatively better position
for the ,former. Earlier, particularly in discussing the rating scales
used in an experiment by Doise et al., (1972a), we proposed that
subjects' differentiations between the ingroup and outgroup need not tell
us anything about the specific criteria on which this differentiation
is being achieved. For example, if subjects rate the unidentified 
• ■ 1 .
ingroup as being more talkative or thin, this behaviour might be 
reflecting a general concern for accentuating or creating differences, 
rather than reflecting evaluations on these specific criteria. In fact, 
the everyday meanings of the specific criteria can be quite irrelevant.
New meanings and values might be ascribed to them, they might become 
tools through which a given social environment can be constructed. Their
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meanings might be derived from the role they play in this construction 
process. In the experiments by Turner, it did not matter that some 
subjects were allocating money and others were allocating 'points'.
Within the context of the experiment and in the process of reality - 
construction embarked upon by subjects these two, money and points, 
played the same role and were ascribed the same significance. The 
everyday meanings of points and money were not crucial to this 
context.
Hoxfever, although 'points' and 'money' did not seem to 
influence choices, it may be argued that different amounts of money 
used as rewards should make a difference to choices. Since money still 
presumably has an intrinsic intact value in the experimental context, 
different levels of it should differentially influence rewards (this 
'intrinsic' value is of course only intact as far as the economic order 
remains as present). Some levels of money might be perceived by 
subjects as 'meaningful' rewards for taking part in an experiment lasting 
one hour, while other levels might be considered negligible or too much. 
One might postulate that when such 'meaningful' rewards are available, 
ingroup favouritism would be higher than when only 'insignificant' 
rewards were available. The experiment we report next explores this 
issue. It also further examines the issues of identification and,
possibly, loyalty in groups.
Turner, Broxm and Tajfel (in Press) report an experiment designed to 
test the following three hypotheses (Turner et al.,in a e s g , p.5):
I» "That subjects would be willing to some degree to sacrifice group
and personal monetary profit to achieve positive group 
distinctiveness".
2. "That ingroup favouritism would be greater in High than Low
Reward Conditions".
3. "That ingroup favouritism would be greater against a relevant
than irrelevant group".
The subjects were 62 British schoolchildren, aged 14-15. A pilot 
study was carried out using subjects from the same sample population to 
determine what would be perceived as a 'pleasing' and 'meaningful' sum
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of money to receive for participating in an hours social research.
Subjects in both conditions underwent the same basic procedure. 
They firstly expressed their preferences for pairs of abstract 
paintings . They were then told that categorisation would take place on 
the basis of their focus on shapes and patterns (shape people) or on 
colours and colour mixtures (colour people). In turn, shape people 
would be sub-divided into the Triangle Group (TG) and the Circle Group 
(CG). Correspondingly, Colour people would be sub-divided into 
Dichromatic (DG) or Polychromatic groups (PG). This meant, subjects 
were told, the creation of 4 equal-sized groups.
Next, Shape people were to take part in a shape task while 
Colour people were to take part in a colour task. But, subjects were 
told that Shape and Colour people could not be compared on these tasks , 
because of differing criteria and objectives being used. The amount of 
money they received for taking part in the experiment, they were told, 
would depend on how much was awarded to each group. Each person would 
receive an equal share of the rewards given to his ingroup. In the Low 
Reward Condition,the maximum a person could receive on the basis of 
choices was 20 p. In the High Reward Condition,this figure was 80 p.
Unknown to themselves, all subjects were placed in TG. The 
choices on the matrices involved comparisons of the TG and the CG, and 
the TG and the PG. Thus, TG and CG represent relevant comparison 
groups, while TG and PG represent irrelevant comparison groups 
(remembering colours vs. shapes).
The results tended to confirm hypothesis I as valid. Absolute 
levels of group and personal gain were sacrificed to some degree,in 
order to achieve group differentiation and a relatively better position 
for the ingroup. This is reflected by the influence of MD. Ingroup 
favouritism did not increase directly with the size of rewards being 
allocated. Thus, hypothesis 2 was not fully confirmed. The nature of 
the outgroup (relevant or irrelevant as a comparison group) did not 
increase.intergroup discrimination in a consistent manner. The like­
lihood that this was because subjects misunderstood the instructions 
and believed the wrong group to be the relevant or irrelevant one, is 
lessened by the fact that 58 of them answered correctly that CG was the
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relevant comparison group for TG. A closer look at the influence 
which the nature of the outgroup had on discrimination shows that 
there is consistent evidence confirming hypothesis 3 from the High 
Reward condition. Discrimination against the relevant outgroup was 
greater than that against the irrelevant outgroup when the rewards 
to be gained were higher and, according to the pilot study,
'meaningful' and 'pleasing'.
Thus, the two studies by Turner and this one by Turner et al ,,
point to new directions. Firstly, it seems that at least the 
initial concern of subjects is the achievement of a comparatively 
better position for the self. But, once identification with a group 
takes place, then self-interest may be sacrificed for the good of the 
ingroup. Although the nature of rewards need not influence this 
process, discrimination will be greater against a relevant outgroup 
than against an irrelevant one when the rewards* to be gained are more 
meaningful. The results of Wilder , (1978) suggest that
subjects may specifically seek information which leads to a clearer 
distinction between the ingroup and outgroup. One might now postulate 
that there is one underlying reason why, under given conditions,
(i) subjects choose to try and accentuate differences between the 
ingroup and outgroup and, (ii) achieve a comparatively better position 
for the ingroup (through ingroup favouritism). The finding that once 
subjects have been associated with a group, they may sacrifice self- 
interest in order to improve its position also points to this one 
plausible explanation - which is that when the identity of an 
individual is dependent on that of a group, ingroup favouritism will 
occur, since it represents the means through which the position of the 
self can be improved. Of course, we are assuming that the subjects 
recognise where their interests lie - within the limits of the 
experimental context at least.
But if it is the recognition by subjects that their interests 
are directly linked to that of an ingroup's which leads to 
identification with and bias for this ingroup, why is it that ingroup 
favouritism has not developed from a situation where only interpersonal 
similarity was present? Under certain conditions, one might argue, 
subjects should identify with similar others, treating them as an
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ingroup. In a condi.tion where the identity of the self was interpreted 
to be linked to that of similar others, as distinct from dissimilar
others, bias towards similar others might occur. An experiment
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by Bill and Tajfel (1973) showed, however, that interpersonal 
similarity is not a sufficient basis for 'ingroup* favouritism. Three 
experiments which will be described next (Chase, 1971; Deutsch et al., 
1969 ) also confirm this finding. However, these experiments only used 
two levels of similarity (similar/dissimilar) to define relationships 
between subjects. An alternative design, using more than two levels, 
may have produced different results.
Deutsch et al., (1969) report two studies which differed from 
the basic minimal group design (Tajfel et al., 1971) in two major ways. 
Firstly, they avoided explicit references to 'groups', arguing that 
such references act as powerful demand characteristics favouring the 
confirmation of the experimenter's hypothesis (p.2). Subjects were 
simply told if they had 'judged poorly' or 'judged well' on the first 
task,through the kind of code number given to them. A second 
innovation in this experiment was that of response formats which 
apparently gave subjects more choice of strategies. Two further 
dependent measures were: (i) semantic differential scales for
detecting different impressions subjects had of the ingroup and out­
group and, (ii) the task of picking a partner for future tasks between 
similar and dissimilar others.
A brief account is given by Deutsch of how this design was put 
into action, using 45 l4-year-old subjects. The results did not shoxf 
favouritism towards similar others.
A second similar experiment is more comprehensively reported.
The subjects were a group of 93 mixed-sex students. Subjects firstly 
had the task of judging the number of beans in a jar. The procedure 
then differed for each condition. In the evaluative conditions, 
subjects were told that they had either judged poorly or judged well 
in the first task. In the non-evaluative conditions, subjects were told 
that they had either underestimated or overestimated in the first task. 
Code numbers informed them which classification they belonged to. They 
then chose rewards for others, gave their impressions of others and 
chose partners for future tasks.
62
The most clear findings of this experiment are as follows.
Firstly, no significant favouritism towards similar others emerged. 
Secondly, comparisons involving the self and others in the 
evaluative conditinn led to 'good* judges giving themselves comparatively 
more money. The 'poor' judges, like the overestimaters and under- 
estimaters in the non-evaluative conditions, were less 'greedy'. Among 
the 'good' judges in the evaluative condition, there appeared to be 
important sex differences^with males being more biased against similar 
others.
An important point is that what Deutsch et al., (and also 
Hornstein, 1972) criticise as the 'demand characteristics' are, as 
Turner (1975a, p.34) has pointed out, the very same independent 
variables which Tajfel et al., (1971) aimed to manipulate and establish 
the effect of. Tajfel wanted the subjects to view the situation as 
entailing social categorisation. •
A similar experiment, in which social categorisation and reference 
to groups was not explicit, is reported by Chase (1971). In the first 
part of this experiment, subjects carried out a task which they believed 
to be trivial or important - this denoted manipulation of the level of 
involvement. They were then classified as 'good' or 'bad' in performance 
this constituted positive or negative evaluation. The degree of self­
applicability was varied,by telling half the subjects that their 
classifications were 'invalid'. The only information subjects had about 
each other was how they had been classified. They were then asked to 
allocate money to self and others as rewards for taking p.art in the 
experiment. They were also asked to rate self and others on semantic 
differential scales. The results shoxred that there was no significant 
favouritism towards similar others in any condition. This was 
reflected both by money allocation and evaluation tasks. Subjects are 
reported to have assumed that others would adopt the strategies of 
'fairness' and 'rewarding merit', as they themselves had done.
Limitations of the 'minimal' Interpersonal Similarity Experiments
All the experiments exploring the role of similarity in the 
minimal group design reported thus far have only incorporated two levels 
of similarity in their designs - i.e. similarity and dissimilarity.
Their results have demonstrated that similarity, thus defined on two
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levels, is not a sufficient condition for favouritism towards the 
similar 'group. If more than two levels of similarity had been used, 
discrimination against the most dissimilar and in favour of the most 
similar might have occurred. In elaborating this argument,we begin 
by describing social categorisation as an act which the person can and 
sometimes does undertake in order to structure the social environment. 
Social categories, we argue, need not be static entities which the 
person passively adopts. Rather, social categories might be created 
and used on the initiative and for the purpose of a person himself.
Interpersonal similarity is one criterion on the basis of which 
social categorisation might take place. Two aspects of the 
categorisation process which seem to be important are minimisation, 
of ingroup differences, and differentiation, of between group 
differences. "When interpersonal similarity is defined on two levels 
oi4Ly, minimisation cannot play a part in the social categorisation 
occurring on the basis of this similarity. It may be that social 
categorisation is more likely to take place if the occurrence of both 
minimisation and differentiation is possible. For this to occur, 
interpersonal similarity must be defined on more than two levels. An 
experiment which meets the requirements for such a condition was 
carried out by us and is reported later.
We might further underline the active role of the person,by 
pointing out that when social categorisation has been introduced by the 
experimenter, the subjects may neglect the experimenter's social 
categories and use salient interpersonal similarity cues to create 
their own alternative category systems. Such a situation might come 
about, we expect, when the ide nt if ic at ion of subjects with most similar 
others who are in the outgroup is stronger than their identification 
with their (dissimilar) ingroup. We later report a study which 
demonstrates this process. In this study,we replicated and extended 
Allen and Wilder's (1975) design.
Earlier, we reported an experiment by Doise (1971), who 
incorporated two outgroups in a design where one outgroup was more 
similar than the other. He found that the degree of discrimination 
against the outgroups was not influenced by their differential 
similarities. Similar findings are reported by Allen and Wilder (1975),
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who carried out an experiment to test the hypothesis that belief 
similarity is a more important determinant of discrimination than 
social categorisation. Their subjects were a mixed-sex group of 
students (n - 100). Subjects first filled in a questionnaire concerning 
attitudes on a wide range of issues. While this questionnaire was 
allegedly being scored, subjects expressed their preferences for 
abstract paintings (Klee and Kandinsky). For the second part of the 
experiment, they were apparently assigned to groups on the basis of 
aesthetic preference . But, in fact, they were assigned randor,ily.
The independent variable was ingroup and outgroup belief similarity 
or dissimilarity. The four conditions, to which subjects were 
randomly assigned, were (i) ingroup similar - outgroup similar,
(ii) ingroup similar - outgroup dissimilar (iii) ingroup dissimilar - 
outgroup similar and, (iv) ingroup dissimilar - outgroup dissimilar. 
Similarity was defined as agreement on between 70^ - 90^•of items of 
the attitude questionnaire. Dissimilarity was ‘defined as agreement on 
between 10^-30^ of the items of the attitude questionnaire. Subjects 
allocated monetary rewards to others and then completed a questionnaire 
concerning the strategies used. '
The results showed that ingroup favouritism occurred whenever 
possible. The similarity or dissimilarity of the ingroup and outgroup 
did not significantly influence this tendency to favour the ingroup.
The post-experimental questionnaire showed that subjects tended to 
assume that others, both ingroup and outgroup, had behaved in the same 
kind of biased manner as themselves. This was true for all conditions. 
Thus, the criticism based on 'assumed reciprocity' (possible weakness 
No. 12) gains further support here.
However, while there are two criteria for social categorisation 
present in Allen and Wilder's study, similarity on aesthetic 
preference and attitude similarity, the influence of only the latter 
is taken into consideration. It is not enough to assume that aesthetic 
preference is, in comparison xfith attitude similarity, an 
insignificant influence on intergroup behaviour in the minimal group 
condition. This assumption needs to be validated. We later report on 
an experiment we carried out which modifies and elaborates upon the 
basic design used by Allen and Wilder. The alterations allow, it is 
argued, for both a comparatively trivial and an important basis for
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social categorisation to be accounted for in an experiment involving 
several levels of similarity.
We next summarise the findings and implications of the minimal 
group studies.
(D) Summary and Conclusion to Chapter 3
The findings of Tajfel (1970) and Tajfel et al.,(1971) have been 
amply replicated. Social categorisation, as far as it can be isolated, 
has been shoxm to be a sufficient basis for ingroup favouritism under 
certain conditions. Experiments confirming this finding have 
incorporated subject samplesfrom diverse populations and been executed 
in diverse contexts.
Evidence relevant to the possible influences of variables other 
than social categorisation in the minimal group, design may be 
classified into two types. Firstly, there is evidence, from one or 
more studies, which we believe clearly shows the influence of a given 
variable and/or demonstrates its negligible influence in the minimal 
group setting. The second type of evidence shows this influence in a 
more ambiguous manner, according to oiu? interpretations. To cite some 
examples of cases which fall into the first category: Deutsch et al.,
(1971) and Doise (1971), showed that subjects working in the company of 
others still discriminated in favour of theingroup on the basis of 
social categorisation. Doise et al., (1972a) showed that ingroup 
favouritism occurs independently of the nature of anticipated interaction. 
Turner (1975a, 1975b, forthcoming) shoxfed that the nature of rewards 
(points/money) does not significantly influence ingroup favouritism. 
Billig and Tajfel (1973), Chace (1971) and Deutsch et al., (1969) showed 
that inteipersonal relationships defined by two levels of similarity, 
without the explicit introduction of social categorisation, do not lead 
to 'ingroup* favouritism. Doise (1971) demonstrated that the 
differential similarity of two outgroups need noteffect the level of 
negative bias towards them. In addition to this list, we might add 
studies which found that the nature of discrimination on monetary reward 
criteria corresponded to the nature of discrimination on evaluative 
criteria (the most obvious examples here are Doise et al., 1972a; Doise 
et al., 1972b; Turner, 1975a, 1975b, forthcoming).
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A second set of evidence,relevant to the possible influences 
of variables other than social categorisation in the minimal group 
setting,are those whose implications we judged to be more open to 
different interpretations. For example, Allen and Wilder (1975) 
argued that their data demonstrated the relatively weak influence of 
similarity (measured by attitude questionnaires) in comparison with 
social categorisation. However, we pointed out that social 
categorisation was on the basis of a similarity criterion unaccounted 
for by them - similarity on aesthetic preference . Their data could 
thus be re-interpreted to imply that similarity on aesthetic 
preference , demonstrated in practice, is more important than similarity 
on attitudes measured by a questionnaire. Since, the ingroups, who were 
similar on the former criterion, were preferred always to the outgroup, 
who were always dissimilar on the former criterion - the second 
criterion had little influence on choices . Another experiment we 
described as generating data which is possibly open to reinterpretation 
is reported by Billig (1973). In this experiment,greater ingroup 
favouritism was shown by a 'first-generation* set of subjects than a 
'second-generation'. We argued that this may have reflected the 
influence of anxiety felt by subjects. The second, generation subjects 
may have been relieved and less anxious,because of the discussions they 
had with first generation subjects before they made their choices. This 
possible interpretation might contradict the results and interpretations 
of Tajfel and Billig (1974).
Contradictory evidence seems to exist in relation to the possible 
role of assumed reciprocity in the minimal group setting. As regards 
the expectations subjects had about the way others make choices, Allen 
and Wilder (1975) and Deutsch et al., (1971) produce evidence that 
subjects expect others to favour the ingroup. Subjects in the 
experiment by Doise et al., (1972b) expected the ingroup to favour 
themselves, but not the outgroup. Comparing these expectations with the 
actual behaviour of subjects, we find that subjects in Deutsch et al
(I97I) did not actually behave in the way they (the subjects) assumed 
others would. The evidence from Allen and Wilder (1975) is clear 
however, subjects were biased towards the ingroup^as they expected others 
to be.
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Another possible area of debate is the manner in which the 
choices made by subjects on the matrices are interpreted. When 
subjects have been asked to describe the strategies they used to 
allocate rewards, their responses reflect an apparent lack of 
recognition of the different possible strategies (Billig, 1972;
Turner, 1975a). In general, the views of subjects concerning their, 
experimental experiences have apparently been neglected. This is 
particularly so in relation to the criteria used for social 
categorisation in these studies. The subjects may, we argued, perceive 
these criteria as highly salient - simply because each criterion has. 
represented the most significant guide for action in the experiment it 
has been a part of.
The norms, values and meanings subjects perceive as salient and 
relevant in these experiments have been mostly neglected, and sometimes 
assumed without reference to the subjects themselves. This criticism is 
particularly relevant to Allen and Wilder (1975).
A break from the early work on minimal groups seems to have 
developed with the work of Turner. His experiments seem to demonstrate 
that it is the self, rather than the group, whose comparative position 
is of primary interest to subjects. But, he argues, once self-interest 
has been linked to group interest, then identification and possibly 
loyalty may develop. Then, the self-interest may be sacrificed to some 
extent for ingroup interests. But even when identification of self- 
interest with group interest does arise, inter-group discrimination does 
not take place indiscriminately. It is relevant comparison groups which 
are the more likely targets for discrimination (Turner et al.,inPress).
Final Note
The general approach to minimal group studies - and intergroup 
theory - is changing to incorporate a more active model of Man, one 
who intentionally identifies with particular groups and selects specific 
comparison outgroups. But, more than this, a man who selects 
information from the social environment and uses it to create a more 
cohesive ingroup which is sharply distinguished from outgroups (Wilder ,
 ^ , 1978).
We argue that such a man should also be able to 'impose* social
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categories and use them to define himself and his social world. 
Specifically, such categories might be based on information about 
similarity between self and others - given a wide enough range of 
such similarities, so that both 'minimisation* and 'differentiation' 
can occur. Also, this man might have the power,to discard established 
social category systems and the 'objective' definition of his position 
in the social structure. He might identify with 'outgroups' under 
certain conditions.
Social categories need not be viewed as static, objectively 
given entities. The power of the individual to transform and re­
structure the social environment, creating social categories, should 
also be recognised.
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CHAPTER POUR
General Introduction
In Chapter IP we take up certain issues referred to in previous 
chapters, particularly in the conclusion to Chapter III, and further 
explore them with reference to relevant literature.
Firstly (l), the evidence favouring the assumption that people 
desire to be favourably evaluated is discussed. This assumption plays 
a crucial role in the theory of intergroup behaviour developed by 
Tajfel and his associates at Bristol. Secondly (2), we review evidence 
which underlines the ease with which discriminatory inter group behaviour 
arises. Much of this evidence is derived from studies which have been 
carried out in contexts rich with social cues, in contrast to the 
contexts of the minimal group studies. In the next section (l), we 
develop the theme linking social categorisation and social reality. It 
is argued that social categories are best viewed,not as objectively 
given static entities, but as socially constructed and psychologically 
interpreted phenomena,which are continually transformed. The conteNts 
of social categories need not, and usually do not, correspond to what 
they are objectively meant to entail. There need be no logical link 
between the elements contained in a social category. Cognitive studies 
demonstrating the minimisation — differentiation outcome of categorisation 
are discussed. The role of the categorisation process in stereotyping is 
considered. A wide range of literature is reviewed suggesting that 
although the act of categorisation is universal, the contents and 
boundaries of social categories depend on social factors, at least partly.
This theme is developed by considering social categorisation and 
similarity (i;), social categorisation and race and ethnicity (5), 
language and intergroup behaviour (6). It becomes evident that the 
boundaries and contents of the social categories derived on the basis of 
these three criteria are strongly, influenced by social factors. The 
social evaluation of such social categories seem to take place according 
to the rules and va.lues of given cultures. In the process of 
socialisation, the rules and values by which social categories are 
differentiated and evaluated are acquired. Certain theoretical accounts
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and empirical studies relevant to the development of intergroup 
attitudes are considered in the final section (?).
Some of the literature we review in this Chapter is much more 
directly relevant to the studies which we carried out and report 
later. The organisation of this chapter is such that the sections 
which include discussions that are of less direct interest to our 
experiments are situated towards the end. These are the sections in 
which race and social categorisation, language and intergroup 
behaviour, and the development of intergroup attitudes are discussed 
(sections 6 and 7 respectively).
An important underlying theme in this chapter is the concern 
with identity. This is because we believe that such issues as inter- 
,group discrimination, the salience of a social categorisation criterion, 
and identification with a group, can be usefully explored by considering 
the role which groups play in establishing the identity of the 
individual.
(1) THE DESIRE FOR FAVOURABLE SOCIAL EVALUATION 
Introduction
"A man's social self is the recognition which he gets from his 
mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in the 
sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get 
ourselves noticed favourably, by our kind. Properly speaking, 
a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who 
recognise him and carry an image of him in their minds. To 
wound any of these is to wound him".
William James (1896)
"There is a drive in the human organism for some form of self- 
affirmation or positive self-evaluation.... The fact that the 
need (or drive) exists may be obvious... But the ways in which 
it can be altered by circumstances can be surprisingly varied",
Benson (197^)
An implicit and explicit assumption in our writings is that 
people wish to achieve favourable social evaluation and that this leads 
to a desire to be a member of highly evaluated groups. In what follows, 
we shall discuss some aspects of the assumed desire for favourable 
social evaluation. The tendency to be over-concerned with and to 
inflate the 'self-image' has been described as an attempt to compensate 
for basic personality inadequacies (Fromm, 19^^; Maslow, I9685 Rogers,
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1.961). The mature (or, to use Maslow*s terminology, the 'self- 
actualised') person remains 'himself',despite all social pressures on 
him to conform to the generally approved model of behaviour. However, 
this view implicitly suggests that there is something wrong with the 
'generally approved' model of behaviour. Much more interesting than 
such ethical issues, which we side-step, is thatof the probable cross- 
cultural differences in (i) the strength of the desire for favourable 
social evaluation and, (ii) the criteria for social evaluation.
Social Evaluation and Self-Evaluation
The way others evaluate and perceive the self (social-ovaluation) 
has been assumed to influence self-evaluation (Cameron, 19h7) Cooley,
1922; Mead, 193^; Newcomb, 1950; Rogers, I96I) . The iiaplication has been 
that the person can adopt the perceptual stance of others,to view 
himself with some degree of accuracy. Lundgreen (19?8) found that inter­
personal stress is associated with discrepancies between how the 
individual evaluates himself, how he perceives others evaluate him ,
and how others actually evaluate him. 
Secord and Backman (1965) put forward 'social cogruity theory', 
suggesting that people prefer others who evaluate them in a way they 
consider to be accurate, irrespective of whether the evaluation is 
positive or negative. Skolnick (1971) predicts that people (especially 
those of low self-esteem) will prefer others who evaluate them 
favourably and give far less importance to accuracy. Eiser and Smith
(I972) tested these two contradictory accounts and reported that subjects 
preferred to be described favourably, while 'accuracy' influenced their 
preferences for unidentified others to a far less degree. However, we 
propose that on certain criteria,an individual may not care how he is 
evaluated. The salience of the criteria for social evaluation is an 
important factor in the situation.
Status Congruency
Social evaluation occurs on a number of different bases. The 
social status of an individual may be defined on a number of 
hierarchies, such as power, wealth, education and race. The correspondence 
between the relative positions a person has on his various status 
hierarchies is termed 'status congruence'. 'Status congruityl,'status
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correspondence' and 'status consensusare some of the other terms 
used to refer to this concept. A number of researchers have proposed 
that individuals strive after status congruency (Blalock, 196?
Burnstein and Zajonc, 1965a;Moore, 1968), E\ridence that status 
incongruency is an unfavourable state for individuals is reported by
lenski (1956) and Geschwender (I967), among 
others. Status incongruent groups have been shown to be less cohesive 
and cooperative than status congruent groups (Exline and Ziller, 1959) 
Kreveld et al., (197U) have recently questioned the status congruency 
model. They did this partly on the basis of a replication of Burnstein 
and Zajonc's (19650 study. Through this replieation^the status 
congruency model was tested against a self-interest model, by 
introducing a competitive condition alongside the cooperative condition 
used by Burnstein and Zajonc (196^). Results showed incongruent self­
rankings in the competitive condition, when only one person would receive 
rewards and incongruent self-ranking was the only way to realise self- 
interests.
Avoiding Negative Social Evaluation
A number of researchers have stressed the need to avoid negative 
social evaluation, describing it as a kind of defensive behavioural 
component. The 'need for approval' (N.A) construct was created by 
Crowne and Marlowe (I96O) to measure the extent to which people attempt 
to gain approval by appearing to possess socially desirable 
characteristics. The revised version of this construct included a 
'defensive' component (Crowne and Marlowe, I96I1.). This arose from 
evidence suggesting that high N.A. scorers are concerned with avoiding 
censure,rather than seeking approval (Millham, 1972). Berger et al., 
(1977), using the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, found that 
only the highest N.A. scorers cheated and then only in the ' avoid 
disapproval' motivation situation.
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Relevant to this theme is McClelland and Apiella's (I9ii5) finding 
that experimentally induced failure, which could be interpreted as a 
threat to self-esteem, led to reactions which could be classified in 
four ways. Two of these categories were aimed at increasing success 
('attack' and 'substitution'), while two were aimed at decreasing 
failure.('escape' and 'limitation'). Also of relevance is the finding
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by Pepitone and Kleiner (195?) and Kleiner (1960)^that the greater the 
threat of a group losing status, the less will be the mutual attraction 
of members. The defensive component in self-esteem was also explored 
by Diggory (1966). The subject's success rate in a task performance 
was manipulated and,prior to every trial,the subject indicated his 
estimate of his success probability for the future. It was found that 
when performance related to a specific goal which was to be achieved in 
well defined conditions, then self-evaluations could be changed by 
manipulating succèss-rate. However, lowering the individual's self- 
evaluation on a specific field did not coincide with a lowering of general 
self-evaluation.
In Lemaine's (I97I4) theoretical account also, Man is placed in a 
'negative' and 'defensive' position. Action derives from some kind of a 
threat to identity, resulting in an inferiority feeling. Once this 
initial stage has been passed, the individual steps from a passive to an 
active role and moves towards 'vacant spaces' (social differentiation) 
and the achievement of 'non-c omparability'.
Social Evaluation and Social Perception
The desire for high social evaluation leads to a biased perception 
of one's actions and their outcomes. Those outcomes which are positive 
and successful are viewed as being caused by factors internal to the 
self, while negative outcomes are more likely to be seen as being caused 
by factors external to the self. This tendency was probably first 
demonstrated on the individual level (Fitch, 1970; Wortman et al., 1973). 
More recent experiments have shown that group members are more likely to 
see themselves as responsible for performance if the group succeeds than 
if it fails (Forsyth and Schlenker, 1977; Schlenker, 1975;
Wolosin et al., 1973). In a review of this literature. Miller 
and Ross (1975) claimed that studies have found self-enhancement 
attributions which helped to improve status, but they have not found 
defensive, self-protective attributions. They put forward an 
information-processing model which explains the tendency for individuals 
to take responsibility for success,rather than for failure,by 
emphasising non-motivational processes. One such process involves the 
taking of responsibility for expected outcomes, with success being more 
likely to be expected than failure. They predicted that people would not
Ti+
deny responsibility for a failure. However, Schlenker and Miller 
(1977) tested this view and found it was contradicted by their findings. 
The 'self-serving' bias explanation accounts for their results more 
satisfactorily. In accounting for past events, people are more likely 
to attribute positive outcomes to factors within themselves - even 
though they may not have expected such outcomes.
Social Evaluation and the Experimental Subject
The experimenter bias effect and the 'cooperative' subject have 
received a great deal of attention recently (Barber and Silver, 1968; 
Friedman, 1967; Miller, 1972; Orne, 1962; Orne and Holland, I968; 
Rosenthal, 1966; Schultz, 1969; Sigall et al., 1970). Although the 
intensity of attention on these issues is new, some important aspects of 
the issues themselves seem to have been raised much previously (Pierce, 
1908). That is, it has been proposed that subjects taking part in 
experiments wish to be favourably evaluated by the experimenter. To 
this end, they attempt to cooperate with the experimenter and behave as 
they believe he wishes them to behave. This 'belief they derive from 
the subtle social cues presented by the setting and the experimenter.
If the desire for favourable social evaluation is indeed an important 
factor in the experimental setting, it is in general agreement with our 
assumption that this desire is an important influence in all social life. 
However, in situations where the subjects could only meet the 
experimental demand characteristics by acting 'ignorant' or 'foolish', 
there would be a conflict. This conflict is between the need to appear, 
according to present social norms, a 'success' and the need, to meet what 
they assume to be the experimenter's expectations. This 'conflict' has 
béen the subject of some controversy (Orne, 1962; Rosenberg, 1965;
Sigal et al., 1970). In an experiment designed to clarify this issue, 
Sigal et al., (1970) found that subjects cooperated with the experimental 
demand characteristics only insofar as this cooperation resulted in a 
'successful' image for themselves.
Social Evaluation and Social Influence
Being favourably evaluated seems to give individuals more 
confidence. It also seems to increase their social influence. Burnstein 
and Zajonc (19650 found that the task perfoimance of a group member 
improved when his social status increased, while his performance suffered
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when his status decreased. A number of studies seem to show that those 
with highest social status exert greatest social influence. (Back and 
Davis,. 1965; Cole, 195b; Gerard, 1953; Polansky et al., 1950;
Strodtbeck et al., 1957). However, this simple relationship is put into 
doubt by more recent work (of. Moscovici, 1976). The need for social 
approval seems to lead those of high as well as low social status to be 
influenced by others (Jones, 1965). However, in general, manipulations 
of 'status' as an independent variable suggest that a number of 
desirable social outcomes may follow an increase in status for an 
individual or group. . The desire for high status may thus be viewed as an 
attempt to achieve other socially desirable goals.
Social Evaluation and Social Differentiation
The related concepts of 'competition', 'diversification of life 
style' and 'vacant spaces',as developed by Darwin,have had particular 
influence on work in the area of divisions of Ihbour, animal and human 
ecology, and - more recently - social differentiation. (The term 
'vacant spaces' was developed by others to describe a phenomenon 
discussed by Darwin).
In his work 'The Divisions of Labour' (1893) Durkheim outlined 
his theory of how specialisation in the labour force arises through 
increasing competition. Applying many of the ideas which Darwin had 
used in the analysis of species evolution, he suggested that as the 
'struggle for existence' becomes more acute, divisions of labour increase. 
It is collective life which precedes and gives rise to divisions of 
labour, which in turn lead to greater inter-dependence and cohesion.
This theme, as developed by Durkheim, is reflected in present-day 
sociological research. For example, it has influenced Mulkay and 
Turner's (1971) outline of the relationship between overproduction, scarce 
resources and innovation in three different social settings: the Saints in 
North African Islam, French painting in the 19th century and the 20th 
century scientific community. The work of Gellner reflects the same 
influence (1969).
Some modem ecologists have placed much importance on the role of 
diversification and dispersion in terms of space use. The role of 
aggression in achieving space allocation is outlined by Lorenz (I966).
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Moving closer to social psychology, there are areas of research
which come under the broad definition of social differentiation and
which hav6 been influenced by Darwinian concepts. For example,
Fishman (1972) has outlined the role of nationalism as a means for a
country to establish or re-establish social identity. The achievement
of social differentiation in these group terms necessarily involves
social competition and the search for what has been termed 'vacant
spaces'. That is, in this case, an identity which other nations do not 
have.
Lemaine (I97b) is a social psychologist who has been especially 
influenced by the concepts of social differentiation and vacant spaces. 
Social, evaluation is also given much importance in his work. Lemaine 
reports two experiments (Lemaine, 197b) involving competition between 
two social agents, with one of them being handicapped in some way. In 
the first, the competitors were groups of boys making huts. One of the 
groups did not receive an important element needed to make a completed 
hut and was thus handicapped. In the second experiment,the competition 
was between students who were applying for a fictitious job. In one 
condition,the other applicant was described as being from a very high 
status college (Grande Ecole) in France. The students felt handicapped 
competing against this very high status rival. The results of both 
experiments showed that subjects attempted to alter the criteria for 
social evaluation,so that they could find some basis on which they were 
highly evaluated. It was apparent that within the existing role- 
structure and comparison-framework, they were not likely to succeed; so 
they made an effort to change the rules and framework of social comparison.
another experiment Lemaine asked the question, "... as to 
whether the mere presence of another person might be enough to give rise 
to differentiatory behaviour and whether competition in the narrow sense 
of the term is really necessary for its appearance" (I97b, pp. 37-38).
This IS the same kind of approach adopted in the minimal group research.
The task facing subjects involved using colours to make patterns. An 
accomplice presented himself in various ways (for example, as an art 
expert or novice) to create conditions, with 'inferiority' for subjects 
absent or present. The experimental 'conjecture' was that different 
behaviour would arise in the conditions where subjects felt inferior.
They would tiy to create non-cojuparability in order to avoid appearing •
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inferior. The results support this 'conjecture*. In the inferiority 
conditions, divergence from instructions was very apparent. Lemaine 
proposes that, "Even without direct and explicit competition, 
comparison with another which results in a negative evaluation of self 
tends to create diversity. The assessment that one makes of oneself 
through comparison does not constitute p'ure knowledge : there enters 
into it important notions of value which may, in given conditions, cast 
doubt on the image of the self and the idea that one has formed of 
one's social identity. The threat which is brought to bear by a 
depreciatory comparison is averted by a search for otherness, by the 
creation and then the accentuation of heterogeneity in terms of the 
other" (197b, pp. 39-bO). The emphasis Lemaine places on non­
comparability specifically reflects the influence of Darwinian concepts.
Social Evaluation and Economic Growth
Among the issues with which social evaluation might be linked is 
that of economic growth. The role of psychological factors in economic 
growth was recognised by Max Weber (190b). Hé saw the development of 
modern industrial capitalism as stemming from the hew industrious , 
attitude produced by the Protestant Reformation. This new attitude placed 
emphasis on self-reliance and thrift. The socio-economic condition of 
each man was seen as his personal responsibility, to be improved by self- 
help. More recently, McClelland (1961) has argued that achievement 
motivation is in part responsible for economic growth. He developed a 
measure of need for achievement (N Achievement). It has been found that 
there are certain key differences between high and low N Achievement 
scorers. For example, the former are more often from the middle than 
the lower or upper class and are more active in community activities 
(McClelland et al., 1953; Atkinson, 1958). The need for achievement may 
itself be one manifestation for favourable social evaluation. The 
intense concern for the accumulation of material goods, far beyond the 
bounds of physical needs, is probably another manifestation of this 
desire (Veblen, 1958).
Conclusion to Section 1
People wish to be favourably evaluated by others. Wliat seems to 
be particularly important is how the evaluation of themselves compares 
with the evaluation of relevant comparison others. In situations where
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an individual is likely to compare unfavourably with others, he might 
try to change the bases for comparisons.
We referred to evidence which suggests that 
people prefer to be evaluated favourably, rather than accurately. We 
also referred to evidence which suggests that subjects will cooperate 
with the experimental demand characteristics insofar as this cooperation 
will result in a successfulimage of themselves.
The desire for favourable social evaluation might be universal,
but different social environments seem to influence this desire to be
( )
manifested differently. For example, the Protestant Ethic has influenced 
some societies to give importance to self-reliance, personal-responsibility 
and self-help as bases for social evaluation.
The experiments which we carried out and later report tested 
•hypotheses which were derived from the theory of intergroup behaviour 
developed by Tajfel and his associates at Bristol. The desire for 
favourable social evaluation plays a central part in this theory. The 
preceding discussion is therefore of central importance in this thesis.
This discussion is in obvious ways concerned with the general issue of 
identity. The social evaluation of a person directly influences his 
identity. It is this influence which gives the issue of social 
evaluation its central importance.
(2) THE EVOLUTION OF DISCRIMINATORY INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction
Findings from the minimal group studies suggested that, in 
certain conditions, social categorisation per se may be a sufficient 
basis for discriminatory intergroup behaviour favouring the ingroup. The 
two most important requirements for this behaviour appeared to be, 
firstly, that self-identity be perceived to be directly linked to group 
identity and, secondly, that the outgroup be perceived as a relevant 
comparison group. We may expect that in experiments where these 
requirements are met, discriminatory intergroup behaviour might occur 
with ease. That is, such factors as contradictory goals or competition 
for scarce resources would only need to be present at a minimal level, 
or not be present at all, before ingroup favouritism and discrimination 
against the outgroup occurs. Examples of experiments whose conditions
T9
meet these requirements are referred to in the following discussion.
Sherif
With the publication of "A preliminary experimental study of 
inter-group relations", in 1951, Sherif initiated his considerable 
influence on the area of intergroup research. Sherif's theory of 
intergroup behaviour draws heavily upon evidence which was generated by 
him in three experiments. Each experiment lasted about three weeks, was 
conducted in a separate location (camp site) and involved different 
groups of 11-12 year old boy subjects, (cf. Sherif, 1951; Sherif and 
Sherif, 1953; Sherif et al., 1955; Sherif et al., 1961).
The Stages of Intergroup Processes
In these experiments Sherif distinguished between four phases in 
the course which intergroup processes might take: the stage of
spontaneous interpersonal friendship choices, the stage of group formation, 
the stage of intergroup conflict, the stage of intergroup cooperation.
In the early experiments, the first phase had shown that friendship choices 
were not strictly on the basis of personal preferences. Once friendship 
patterns emerged, they changed again drastically after boys had been 
placed in cabins with their previously chosen best friends in another 
cabin. In the Robbers Cave Experiment (I95ii), the 'friendship formation' 
stage was missed out and the study began with the stage of group formation. 
During this stage, which lasted about one week, the two groups lived in 
cabins some distance from each other and, in the 195U study, were not 
aware of each others' presence. Different group tasks were carried out 
and group cohesion and group structure developed. The stage of intergroup 
conflict arose in the Robbers Cave Experiment as soon as each group became 
aware of the presence of the other. Conflict increased through intergroup 
competition. Intense discrimination against the outgroup and ingroup 
favouritism was manifested. In stage four, the groups were faced with a 
'superordinate' goal which could only be achieved by combining forces 
and acting as one organised unit. This led to decreased tension and a 
change towards friendly intergroup attitudes.
Key Features of Sherif's Findings
Several key features of Sherif's findings should be underlined. 
Firstly, the striking ease with which discriminatory intergroup behaviour
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arose. In the Robbers Cave Experiment it seems that the mere awareness 
that another group was present was enough to create negative attitudes 
towards them. Secondly, the extent to which friendship patterns seemed 
to depend on which cabin the boys were in (during phase one of the 
early experiments). Thirdly, the fact that it was the group who had 
been victorious in the intergroup competitions which was more prone to 
remain cohesive and to attribute negative qualities to the outgroup , 
even during the intergroup cooperation stage. We interpret this to mean 
that those who derived the more favourable social identity from the ■ 
conflict intergroup situation of phase three, were more likely to want to 
maintain the characteristics of that stage.
Confirmation and Extensions of Sherif's Findings
The findings of Sherif have been to a significant extent 
replicated by Sussman and Weil (I96O) in a study also carried out at a 
camp. Several other studies (Avigdor, 1952; Bass and Duntemann, 1965; 
Blake and Mouton, 1962a'Harvey, 1956) have produced evidence underlining 
the ease with which discrimination against the outgroup and ingroup 
favouritism came about and seem to be linked to whether the intergroup 
situation is perceived as a cooperative or a competitive one.
In the work of Sherif, especially, there are indications that 
competition is not a necessary requirement for the occurrence of 
discriminatory intergroup behavio'ur. This indication is strengthened by 
evidence from several other studies (e.g. Ferguson and Kelley, 196U;
Rabble and Horwitz, 1969). The experiment by Ferguson and Kelley is 
particularly interesting,because it seems to demonstrate group loyalty 
under near minimal conditions. On each of three tasks,a different subject 
was removed from the room and used as a non-participating judge of the 
solutions created by pairs of groups. Even though these subjects had ' 
not taken part in the task and even though the experimenter had emphasised 
that the groups were not in competition, ingroup favouritism occurred. 
These results led Ferguson and Kelley to comment that "... preference for 
own group and its products begins to operate at a lower "threshold" than 
has previously been reported" (196i|, p.227). In the Rabble and Horwitz 
(1969) study ingroup favouritism occurred when a coin was flipped to 
decide which group would receive a prize. However, when subjects were 
simply classified into two groups (control condition) no ingroup
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favouritism occurred. This finding particularly needs explanation, 
since on the surface it seems to contradict the results of the minimal 
group studies. The procedure for this control condition was that 
strangers were explicitly assigned to groups on a random basis, each 
group sitting out of sight of the other behind a screen. A few tasks
were carried out by each subject alone. The screen was then lifted, 
subjects introduced themselves briefly and then wrote down their 
impressions of individual, others . The important factor is that the 
initial division of subjects into groups, on what may be described as 
minimal criteria, was then superceded by information from the physical 
appearance and self-descriptions of other subjects. Babbie and Horwitz
are not justified in claiming on the basis of their results that "Group
classification per se appears to be insufficient to produce
discriminatory evaluations" (1969, p.2?2), since group classification 
was notisolated and interpersonal attraction was a confounding variable 
in the situation. Nothing in fact occurred to act as a cue for group 
identification to counter-balance the influence of interpersonal 
attraction. When something did occur, in the Experimental condition, 
ingroup favouritism arose. The ease with which discriminatory intergroup 
behaviour evolves, this time through the toss of a coin, is again 
emphasised by these results.
Status and Social Categorisation
Certain conceptual tools and findings from minimal group studies 
have been tested and extended in contexts relatively rich in social cues. 
This is particularly so with regards to groups and individuals with 
differential status positions. In the minimal group studies,the status 
relations between individuals and groups were not defined in any way 
prior to the experiment, nor were status relations created by anyone 
other than the subjects themselves during the experiment. In the studies 
we refer to now, pre-existing status relations seemed to influence 
behaviour.
Doise and Sinclaire (1973) conducted an experiment comparing the 
images group members form of the ingroup and the outgroup, in situations 
where social categorisation can take place and in situations where its 
occurrence is less likely. There were two groups of subjects; low 
status (apprentis) and high status (collégiens). In condition one.
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subjects described the ingroup and afterwards were asked to describe the 
outgroup. In condition two, subjects were told at the start of the 
experiment that they would be asked to describe both ingroup and outgroup. 
Results show that in the first condition both groups tended to describe 
the outgroup slightly more favourably. But in the second condition, when 
the outgroup Was evoked as a relevant comparison group at the beginning, 
significant ingroup favouritism occurred. There were two further 
conditions in this experiment. In the third condition, one collégien and 
one apprenti met. They described their own group and the outgroup, held 
a discussion, then gave descriptions of the two groups again. In the 
fourth condition, the procedure for condition three was followed, except 
that two members from each group participated at the same time, instead 
of one member from each group. The results show that in the individual 
discussion condition, before the discussion the only discrimination was 
outgroup favouritism by the low status group members. Responses after 
the discussion show that the high status group acted out ingroup bias .
In the collective encounter situation the ingroup bias, particularly for 
collégiens, increased. Doise and Sinclaire comment, "Before the 
individual encounter, even though no member of the same group is physically 
present, there is an implicit consensus between members of one group 
concerning the responses which should be made. This implicit consensus 
disappears somewhat after discussion with the member of the other group... 
Things happen very differently in the collective encounter. The tacit 
agreement between some group members is not veiy strong before the 
encounter but increases during it" (1973, p.l55). This finding of 
judgement polarization through group interaction has been confirmed in 
other studies (Doise, 1969a«Fraser et al., 1971; Moscovici and 
Zavalloni, 1969).
Social Categorisation and Potential Status Changes
Group distinctiveness (cf. Tajfel, 197U) is a central concept in
H /h v C t ' t t  f j - j  /A/
the analysis of intergroup behaviour which Brown ( ) conducted in the
context of an engineering factory. The study focused on relations 
between two large sections of the work force, 'Production* and 
'Development', together with a third smaller group - 'Toolmen'. The 
particularly interesting aspect of the study was that it combined a 
method of structured interviewing with the use of matrices adapted from 
Tajfel (1971). Both these techniques produced evidence underlining the.
83
importance of social comparison processes in intergroup evaluations and 
attitudes. It was the relative position of their own group in 
comparison with the other groups which most concerned workers. 
Characteristics which were perceived as positively distinguishing the 
ingroup were emphasised. Choices made on the matrices reflected the 
strong pull of 'maximum difference' as a strategy. The Development group, 
who are described as viewing the present intergroup structure as 
illegitimate, were more biased than the Production group. This was true 
both when this bias resulted in more absolute rewards for themselves and 
when it did not.
In the situation described by Brown, there was a total lack of 
cooperation between groups of workers. What might have been perceived as 
the 'superordinate goal' (of. Sherif, 1967) of confronting the management 
did not seem at all influential.
«
Groups with more Stable Status Outcomes
In Brown's study the groups involved still had everything to fight 
for,since the outcome of their conflict was very uncertain. Skevington's 
(N.D) study focused on groups whose relations and conflicts had already 
led to an outcome with some certainty. Conditions of probable social 
change in the nursing profession provided the context for the study.
Groups with differential status levels were identified within the nursing 
profession and the strategies adopted by them for improving or 
maintaining their status positions were studied. As expected, the high 
status group perceived the existing status relations as more legitimate 
than did low status groups. Those of the low status group who were 
potentially mobile were significantly less favourable towards the ingroup 
than were the stable low status members. Aq unexpected finding was that 
when faced with a prospective merger of both groups, the high status 
group did not seem to emphasise or accentuate the differences between the 
groups. This may have been because the merger had been expected for a 
long time and accommodation for the potential change had taken place.
th
A study by Branwaite and Jones (1975) demonstrates another instance 
when the 'top dog' may not show the kind of bias we might expect. There 
were two groups of subjects: English students and Welsh students. Using 
payment matrices, they allocated rewards to others. Results showed Uie 
pull of the 'fair' strategy to be very strong, with the Welsh group showing
8U
more ingroup favouritism than the English group. Some evidence of 
outgroup favouritism by the English group was also revealed. After 
post-experimental discussions Branwaite and Jones commented, "What seems 
to be important is a perceived under-privileged position on the part of 
one group and their beliefs of the way they are perceived by the other 
group; the under-privileged group perceives antagonism and threats 
(which may be real or projected) to its independence and individuality... 
partisan discrimination is more common on the part of the 'underdogs* "
(1975, p.337).
Status within Groups
Apart from the issue of status positions of groups in relation to 
one another, there is the issue of status positions within groups 
influencing attitudes towards own and other groups. Some writers have r 
described  ^ : low status ingroup members as highly ethnocentric and 
negatively biased towards the outgroup (Almond,* I960; Eroram, 196U; 
Rosenblatt, I96I4.), while other writers have provided the same description 
of high status members (e.g. Bethelheim and Janowitz, 1961;). Sherif and ; 
Sherif (1953) found low status and less skilled boys to be more biased 
towards the ingroup. Results from Rabble and Willcins (1971) seem to 
suggest that,in certain conditions,intergfoup competition may create 
uncertainty and a lack of confidence for low status group members,who may 
then attempt to gain social support through creating positive relations 
with high status others - both of the ingroup and outgroup. Skevington 
(1976) seemed to show that the low status members most confident of 
social mobility manifested most negative ingroup bias. Thus, potential 
mobility, level of confidence and intergroup attitudes seem to be 
strongly linked.
Social Influence, Status and Social Categorisation
The relationship between level of confidence and social Influence 
has been a traditional focus of interest (Crutchfield, 1955; Gurnee,
1937; Hockbaum, 1952;; Kelley and Lamb, 1957)» More recently, studies 
have pinpointed the necessity of high confidence and consistency in the 
actions of minority groups if they are to exert social influence 
(Moscovici, 1976; Nemeth et al., 197l;a;Spitzer and Davis, 1978). By acting 
in a more confident and consistent manner, it is proposed, the minority 
group would be making distinct, and possibly accentuating, the differences
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between themselves and others. They would be more likely to exert 
social influence as a cohesive group, with a well defined and established 
position, than they would as an apparently diffuse and diverse set of 
persons. A recent experiment by Wilder (1978) has demonstrated that the 
mere perception of a set of individuals as a group, rather than as an 
aggregate or unrelated individuals, influences the evaluations and 
perceptions of them. Thus, social categorisation per se appears not 
only to influence the behaviour of those who perceive themselves to be 
categorised, but also the behaviour of outsiders towards the categories 
formed. .
Conclusion to Section 2
The ease with which discriminatory intergroup behaviour occurs, 
is demonstrated by a number of "realistic" studies. An important element 
•2*^ this discriminatory situation is the relative status of the groups, 
together with the direction which potential or actual change seems to be 
taking. If change is expected to bring relatively higher status to an 
individual or group, it is more likely to be seen as legitimate,than if 
it is expected to bring low status. It seems to be the comparative 
social status of a group which is most important. It is partly to 
improve relative status that groups compete and discriminate. Social 
influence seems to be best exerted by a group when it establishes a 
distinct and stable position — thus achieving to some extent a distinct 
identity.
In this section we have discussed the importance of group status 
in intergroup behaviour, among other things. Through this discussion we 
have again underlined our concern with tlfe issue of identity. The status 
of a group reflects directly on the social identity of its members. The 
relationship between groups in society is in a constat state of flux, 
as is their relative status positions. Because these status positions 
reflect on the identity of group members, individuals tend to try and 
ijnprove the relative status positions of their ingroups. The actions 
which individuals undertake ±n attempting to achieve this improvement 
often involve or lead to discriminatory intergroup behaviour.
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(3) THE ARBITRARY MATURE OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND THEIR CONTENTS
"Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we 
call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whist all about it, 
parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms 
of consoio^isness entirely different". James (1958)
"Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of 
the linguistic tradition into which he is born - the beneficiary in as 
much as language gives access to the accumulated records of other people's 
experience, the victim insofar as it confirms him in the belief that 
reduced awareness is the only awareness, and as it bedevils his sense of 
reality, so that he is all tooapt to take his concepts for data, his
words for actual things". . Aidons Huxley (195W
"....we discover not ideas given in advance but values emanating
from the system. When we say that the values correspond to concepts, it
is understood that these concepts are purely differential, not positively
defined by their content but negatively defined by their relations with
other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is that they
are what the others are not". t. j jFerdinand de Saussure (I960)
What is conceived of as reality by one group may not be regarded 
as such by another. Communication of a group's understanding of reality
is conducted through, and limiited by, signs. The most important kind of
signs are linguistic ones. Saussure argued that linguistic signs should 
be considered - like all other signs - as being arbitrary. By this he 
meant that a particular combination of signifier and signified is an 
arbitrary entity. Each language produces a different set of signifiers, 
as well as a different set of signified. We are particularly interested 
in the signified, the phenomena 'out there' which signs refer to.
Saussure proposed that there are diverse and arbitrary ways of structuring 
the world into categories and concepts. It is only when we have under­
stood the relation between the categories in a language system that we may 
know their meanings . This is because each category is not independent and 
defined by some essential qualities,but is simply segment(s) of a 
continuum, best understood in relation to other categories which delimit 
it.
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SemiÇology
Language is one of many systems of signs. Saussure believed it 
could serve as the model for Semiology. This is because in the case of 
language the arbitrary nature of the signifier, the signified and their 
relationship is most apparent. Modern structuralists, particularly 
those working in the field of anthropology, have been influenced by 
this argument and have adopted linguistics as a model. Claude Lévi- 
Strauss went as far as to define anthropology as a branch of Semiology 
(1961).
The most influential proposition of semiology is that there is an 
underlying structure which makes signs meaningful in relation to one 
another. This proposition has at least two important implications.
Firstly, in order to understand actions or objects which have social 
meaning, it is necessary to consider the relationships between the 
meanings given to particular actions or objects' within a system of 
relations understood by a given culture. This is a point made by Lévi- 
Strauss (1963, 1966). The second implication of this fundamental 
proposition is that the underlying structure itself is of primary importance. 
It is this second implication which relates to the work of structuralists, 
who argue that the underlying structures have specific universal 
characteristics. Piaget (1971), for example, specifies the characteristics 
of 'self-regulation', 'transformation' and 'totality'.
Nominal Essences
Although the classification of the environment specifically, and 
the relation between the signifier and the signified generally, takes 
place in different ways across different cultures, the continuity of 
perceived social reality within a given culture proceeds very smoothly 
from generation to generation. This is mainly because the adoption of a 
particular sign system, especially language, provides the new generation 
with an esoteric perceptual framework unique to their particular culture, 
"Language becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective 
sedimentations, which can be acquired.... as cohesive wholes and without 
reconstructing their original process of formation" (Berger and LuckmanN, 
1966, p.87). These 'cohesive wholes' will contain categories whose 
meanings are derived from their relations with the meanings of other 
categories. The phenomena entailed in a category may or may not have a
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common characteristic. Jolin Locke (1690:1976) is among those 
contradicting this point. He argued that all phenomena placed in a 
given category entail the same 'nominal' essence which is not contained 
in any other category. But to accept Locke »s viewpoint, as some 
psychologists have done implicitly or explicitly (see Billig, 1972, 
pp. 56-68 for a discussion of this point), is to assume that the 
structuring of the social world evolves on a purely rational basis, with 
categories and the phenomena they structure being perfectly matched on 
at least one dimension. This one dimension corresponding to the nominal 
essence Locke referred to.
Comparing across cultures, it becomes apparent that the 
categorisation of the world takes place in diverse ways. That is, the 
same so-called objective world is viewed via different perceptual 
frameworks. The classification of phenomena seems to take place according 
to social convention, rather than an objective logical method. The 
classification of the colour continuum is a classic example of the way in 
which such differential categorisation takes place (Berlin and Berlin, 
1975; Berlin and Kay, 1969; Bernstein, 1973a, 1973b; Heider and Olivier, 
1972; Kay, 1975; Segall et al., 1966; Ray, 1953; Rivers, 1901).
Considering the language used by any one group, both psychologists 
(e.g. Vygotsky) and philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein) have pointed out the 
existence of categories whose constituents do not seem to be logically 
related to one another on any rational basis (one is reminded of Freud's 
^aflactions on what characteristics the Jewish People share that they 
should be so clearly demarcated throughout history). Vygotsky argues 
that, just as the child differs from the adult in the way he groups 
objects together conceptually, future man will differ fi*om more primitive 
man and outgrow early ways of thinking^so that his concepts will be 
composed of more scientific, logical structures. The same kind of idea 
is reflected in the writings of social anthropologists. For example, 
Durkheim and Mauss (1903; 1973, P»35) write "... for those who are called 
primitives, a species of things is not a simple object of knowledge but 
corresponds above all to a certain sentimental attitude". The assumption 
that we are moving towards an understanding which is in some ways closer 
to 'reality' is itself only meaningful and possibly valid when viewed in 
relation to the value system oT the culture from which it is derived. 
Science itself may be described as being of social origin.
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different scientific truths being accepted by different societies.
Categories, Probablistic Estimates and Constructs
The act of categorisation is often described as one means by which 
a person can deal with the flow of information and not be overwhelmed by 
it (Bruner et al., 1956). However, in spite of the great deal of 
information available to our senses at any one time, relevant information 
is often lacking. This is partly because of our physical limitations.
For example, we cannot determine tri-dimensionality directly, nor do we 
possess a direct monocular sense of distance. However, we compensate for 
these physical limitations by learning accurately to make probablistic 
estimates of what exactly is 'out there'. The Transactional 
Functionalists, the most prominent of whom are Ames and Ittelson 
(Ittelson, 1973; Ittelson et al, 197U; Pastore, 1971), have explored the 
nature of the 'bets' we make about the environment. These 'bets', like 
the categories we use to structure the environment, only relate our 
perception to what is 'out there'. They do not provide us with an under­
standing which corresponds exactly to what may be 'reality'. Analogous 
to the probablistic estimates considered by Ames and others is the personal 
construct system described by George Kelly (1955). Kelly conceived of a 
personal reality constructed by each person through his own constructs. 
These constructs may be likened to scientific hynotheses. Like the 
probablistic estimates of Ames and others, constructs are created through 
experience and modified by way of feedback through action. Categories, 
probablistic estimates and constructs may be viewed as three similar 
concepts developed by social scientists to describe man's biased, yet 
workable view of the world. They all emphasise the point that, firstly, 
there is more than one view of reality and, secondly, the important 
factor is not necessarily which view is closer to reality but, rather, 
which view suits a particular social order to best cope with the 
environment in which it exists.
B) Social Categorisation and Stereotyping
It is apparent that the act of categorisation is important in the 
structuring of reality. The psychological influences of this act have 
been to some extent illuminated by experimental studies. Tajfel's- (1959) 
elaboration of the process of categorisation, by which the social 
characteristics of particular phenomena influence a person's perceptioh
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of their physical characteristics, may be noted as an influential 
pioneering work. An earlier study by Campbell (1956) should also 
be mentioned. This study used stimuli forming two overlapping 
similarity groups. It was found that subjects tended to treat the 
stimuli as two distinct classes, exaggerating the differences between 
the classes and underestimating the differences within the classes. It 
is relevant to note that in this experiment the experimenter did not 
explicitly introduce categorisation; the subjects imposed their own 
categories to structure the continuum.
Categorisation of Non-Social Stimuli
An experiment by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) contrasted situations 
in which stimuli were categorised by the experimenter and a situation 
in which the experimenter did not introduce categorisation. The stimuli 
in question were eight lines, differing from each other in length by a 
constant ratio. Subjects had the task of estimating the length of each 
line. In the experimental condition the four shortest and the four 
longest lines were given different labels (A and B respectively). In one 
control condition the lines were again given these labels, but this time 
the constituents of each category were randomly chosen. Iq the other 
control condition, no labels were assigned. Results showed, firstly, 
significant differences between the estimates made in the experimental 
condition and the two control conditions and, secondly, the differences 
between the categories in the experimental condition were exaggerated, 
while the differences within the categories were underestimated. More 
recent work indicates that when the numbers of ways of classifying 
phenomena increase and cross categorisation occurs (so that, "for each 
subject, one part of the members of his membership category according to 
a first categorisation belongs to another category according to another 
criterion". Deschamps, 1977, p.517), there arises a weakening of category 
differentiation. However, this weakening. Deschamps (1977) seems to 
demonstrate in replicating Marchand »s (1970) study, is not due to the 
increased complexity of the situation, but linked to the categorisation 
process proper.
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The Categorisation Process and Stereotyping
The experiments referred to above (Campbell, 1956; Deschamps,
1977; Marchand, 1970; Tajfel and Wilkes, 1963) have all used non-social 
stimuli. In what way do their findings help us understand the 
categorisation of social phenomena? Particularly relevant to this issue 
is a discussion by Tajfel (1969) on stereotyping. Tajfel defines stereo­
typing as the "attribution of general psychological characteristics to 
large human groups" (1969, p.82). He proposes that if the length of 
lines used in the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study "... would stand for 
personal characteristics subjectively correlated with a classification 
that is being used, and the classification itself would be in terms of 
racial, ethnic, national or any other social criterion, we would have a 
full-blown stereotype" (1969, p.85). In fact, Tajfel argues that 
stereotypes arise through a process of categorisation (1969, p.82). But 
he also points out that there are important differences between the 
biases involving non-social phenomena, as in lengths of lines, and those 
involving social phenomena. The most important difference being that 
there is greater resistance to changes of biases in relation to social 
phenomena than there is of biases in relation to non-social phenomena.
The preservation of biased judgements of particular others is described 
as 'self rewarding', and "... this is particularly so when prejudiced 
judgements are made in a social context strongly supportive of hostile . 
attitudes towards a particular group" (1969, p.86). In the case of 
non-social phenomena, a biased viewpoint is more likely to be problematic 
in a practical sense. But, as the work of the Transactional 
functionalists shows, this disparity between the perceived world and what 
may be described as the objective world, is still present in relation to 
non-social phenomena.
The view that stereotypes arise from a process of categorisation 
is supported by a variety of evidence. The first kind of evidence is 
linked to what may be termed 'strongly established' stereotypes. These 
are stereotypes which have their contents most clearly demarcated by 
the historical tradition of a culture. The Negro stereotype in. Western 
cultures (at least) was, and probably still is, a classic example of 
this phenomenon. Studies by Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956) and Secord 
(1959) demonstrated the linic between categorisation and the Negro 
stereotype held by white subjects. Subjects were shown photographs of
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people they were asked to evaluate. A ijegro not identified as a wegro 
by white subjects was likely to be judged as less stupid, dishonest, 
lazy and superstitious, than a %egro perceived aS a j^ egro. The mere 
perception of a person as a member of the ^egro category led to the 
accentuation of the differences between him and members of other 
categories.
The Labelling Effect
A classic study by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) provides evidence 
which links categorisation - accentuation with stereotyping in a very 
dramatic manner.
Rosenthal and Jacobson (I968) tested the proposition that 
favourable expectations by teachers could lead to an increase in 
intellectual competence. At the beginning of the academic year, the 
names of pupils who were apparently expected, on the basis of intelligence 
tests, to 'bloom* in the following year were given to teachers. In fact, 
their names had been chosen randomly from each class in a school. , 
Intelligence tests were conducted on all the children in the school after 
one semester, after a full academic year, and after two full academic 
years. A significant advantage was detected in those classified as 
"bloomers".
The relation between categorisation and stereotyping is reflected 
by these results and particularly underlined by the results for the 
Mexican group. Teachers who previously placed Mexican children in the 
category of 'low intellectual performance ' were given evidence which 
apparently suggested that some of these children should move to the 
category of 'high intellectual performance' during the coming year.
Having reviewed the position of these children and perceived them as part 
of a different category, these teachers acted differently towards the 
children. Here, the improved performance of children with greater 
expectancy advantage is not of primary importance in itself, but because 
it reflects the potential influence of the categorisation process on 
stereotyping.
An interesting question to ask is what would have occurred if 
Rosenthal and Jacobson had told teachers that, according to their tests, 
9 Ü  the Mexican children were 'bloomers '? In this case they may be
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asking teachers to revise their evaluation of an entire group. The 
stereotype of this group was influenced by cultural and historical 
factors, the reassessment of this stereotype would have involved a very 
significant change in perception. Rosenthal and Jacobson demonstrated 
that a form of social mobility could occur once given individuals from 
a negatively evaluated group were encouraged and helped to improve, 
once they were viewed as potential members of a positively evaluated 
group. The demonstration that a form of social change might also arise 
through such tactics is less likely. This is because social change ; 
inevitably leads to a change in power relations between groups. Dominant 
groups would strongly oppose such power changes.
Intergroup Discrimination and Interpersonal Behaviour
The racist who defends himself and his stereotypes by pointing out 
that "some of my best friends are Blacks" is a common phenomenon. On an 
interpersonal level, when the ingr oup - out group dichotomy is not 
necessarily salient, the racist may be able to deal ivith a Black man on 
a purely individualistic basis. In this case, the stereotype he has of 
the Black group may be less salient than the personal characteristics of 
the Black man he is interacting with. However, once group membership 
becomes salient, then the stereotype the racist holds of the Black group 
will become dominant in their relationships. Experiments by Doise and 
Sinclaire (1973) and McKillip et al,,(l977) have demonstrated the 
relationship between ingroup favouritism and salience of group member­
ship, and stereotyping and salience of group membership. In conditions 
of high group salience, ingroup members are perceived as possessing more 
favourable characteristics and group stereotypes become more prominent 
in intergroup evaluation, than in conditions of low group salience. It 
is when categorisation of the social world into »us* and 'them' becomes 
important that stereotyping behaviour is given the opportunity to gain 
prominence. A final note is that stereotypes, whether of the reciprocal 
or universal types (Levine and Campbell, 1972), seem to be often based 
on very little objective information. Evidence from the area of person 
perception suggests that people are prepared to make inferences and 
evaluations about others on the basis of very little information 
(Briscoe et al, 1967; DeCharms et al, 1965; Farina et al., 1968; Kramer, 
1963; McKeachie, 1952; Miller, 1970; Thornton, 19W;). The fact that, 
for example, apparently trivial physical characteristics can influence
9h
people*s perceptions and lead them to build up an image on the basis 
of inferences, suggests that there is a process very similar, if not 
corresponding, to stereotyping here.
Conclusion to Section 3
Social categories are not objectively given, but socially 
derived. Their contents reflect the dominant values of a society; thus 
their contents might differ across cultures at any one time and within 
cultures throughout history. Studies using non-social as well as social 
stimuli have demonstrated the differentiation-accentuation outcome of 
categorisation. Social categorisation appears to be a significant factor 
in stereotyping behaviour. To explain the content of a stereotype, it 
is necessary to explain the biased perceptions and attributions of those 
holding the stereotype. The assumption that the contents of categories 
always share a common element, implying that stereotypes may be on one 
basis at least rational, is invalid. Stereotypes are important partly 
because they directly influence social identity.
(1|) CATEGORISATION M D  SIMILARITY
In the previous section we argued that the categories used to 
structure the environment need not entail phenomena which possess a 
particular unique characteristic (»nominal essence*) which is not 
possessed by any other category. In putting forward this argument/we 
were not excluding the possibility that in certain situations the 
doctrine of *nominal essences* is valid. In what follows, we shall be 
arguing that, in certain conditions, similarity may be sufficient for 
social categorisation. More specifically, we are interested in instances 
when the most similar others areviewed as forming an ingroup and the 
outgroup(s) is composed of dissimilar others. It is important to note 
that it is perceived similarity, and not necessarily actual similarity, 
which we believe to be the relevant factor. As Wallach (1958) has 
pointed out, "The attributive basis for a judgement of similarity may be 
present and yet the judgement may not be made; and, on the other hand, 
an attributive basis for such a judgement may be lacking and yet the 
item may be judged similar" (p.103).
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Identifying with Similar Others
In arguing that social categorisation may occur on the basis of 
inteipersonal similarity, we have implied that,in certain situations, 
people will identify with a group of others who are in some way(s) 
similar to themselves. Of relevance to this issue is the large body of 
evidence suggesting that people are attracted towards others who are 
similar to themselves. In these studies similarity has usually been 
defined on some personality or attitudinal criterion. A review carried, 
out as early as 1939 (Richardson) demonstrated that a significant body 
of evidence had already accumulated suggesting the positive relation 
between attraction and personality similarity. One factor which may 
have led researchers to explore this area was that it presented a field 
in which the newly developed attitude scales (Lickert, 1932; Thurstone, 
1928, 1931 ; Thurstone and Chave, 1928) could readily be put to
practice. There have been some negative findings and certain apparently 
contradictory propositions (cf. Winch’s, 1958, complementary needs model 
and criticisms of it, Tharp, 1963)* Nevertheless, recent reviews of 
this area have concluded that, on the basis of personality and attitudes 
at least, the notion that similar people are attracted to each other is 
confirmed (Byrne, I969).
In his book "Attraction and Hostility", Pepitone (1966) wrote, 
"The association between similarity and liking is seemingly ubiquitous 
in all human relationships". This generalisation may be valid for a 
very much wider area of behaviour than attitudes and personality. For 
example, there is evidence to suggest that people who are experiencing 
fear are attracted to others who are in a similar emotional state 
(Schachter, 1959; Zimbardo and Formica, I963). More recent evidence 
suggests that construing people as similar leads to similar behaviour 
towards them (Bender, 1968, 1976). These studies were conducted in a 
personal construct fi*amework (cf. Kelly, 1955) and the similarity 
involved was applicable to diverse types of behaviour and evaluation. 
Behaviour of subjects towards similar others would, we expect, have been 
even more similar if social categorisation had been exqjlicitly 
introduced. That is, if subjects had been encouraged to view similar 
others as a distinct ingroup. In fact, this may have actually been the 
case; but Bender does not explore this issue.
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Wilder (1978) asked subjects to predict the beliefs of an actor 
after they had listened to either another individual or a member of 
the actor’s group. This group, subjects knew, had been arbitrarily 
formed for the experiment. Even so, subjects predicted members of the 
same group , to have more similar beliefs than individuals who were part 
of an aggregate. Thus, the categorisation - accentuation phenomenon 
was demonstrated by Wilder,with the constituents of the categories being 
social. However, it is relevant to point out that this experiment also 
deals with similarity. If categorisation can lead to the assumption of 
greater similarity within categories, this process may work in reverse 
in certain conditions also. That is, the assumption of greater similarity 
between a number of persons may lead to them being perceived and treated 
as a distinct category. Experiments by Hornstein and his associates 
relevant to this issue are discussed next. ;
Similarity, Helping Behaviour and Social Categorisation
Studies by Hornstein et al., (1971) and Hodgson et al., (1972) 
demonstrated that people were more likely to help others to attain some ; 
goal if the other held similar opinions to themselves. This is perhaps 
a not too unlikely finding when we consider that the subjects were 
pedestrians from a predominantly Jewish area in Brooklyn, New York, and 
that the similarity measure was in terns of pro-Arab or pro-Israeli 
opinions. A more recent series of experiments (Sole et al., n.d.) explores 
the relationship between similarity, attraction and helping,., more fully.
Tlie three experiments reported by Sole et al., employed the same 
procedure and context as experiments by Hornstein et al., (1971)♦ -
I, . Subjects were unsuspecting pedestrians who by
chance found a packet of two envelopes. This packet appeared to have been 
lost by another person who had intended to mail them, but had in fact 
been strategically positioned by the experimenter. In one envelope was a
which
cheque for a small contributionÀthe loser of the packet was making to a 
charity. The other envelope contained a sheet on which the ’loser’ had 
expressed four opinions by responding to questions. In the first 
experiment, the four opinions expressed were of a uniformly high 
importance for subjects. In the second experiment they were of a 
uniformly low importance. In the third experiment they were of mixed 
importance. On the basis of each set of responses, five levels of 
similarity between the opinions of the ’loser’ and the subject were
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established; 0%, 25^, 50^^ 75%, 100%. The statements used in the opinion 
questionnaire and the assumptions made about the opinions of subjects were 
tested in a pilot study.
The results show that in the first experiment (high importance 
opinion items) i|8.1% of the packets were sent by subjects. The
corresponding figure for the second (low importance opinion items) and
the third (mixed importance opinion items) experiments were 3^.6% and 
1+6.7%. Although these figures are fairly similar, if we compare the 
proportion of packets sent on the various levels of similarity across the 
three experiments, certain differences are apparent. In the case of the 
iaportant opinions (Fig. 1) a single dissenting opinion was sufficient to
cause a large proportion of subjects not to provide help by sending on the
package. One dissenting opinion was as disruptive as a total disagreement 
on all four opinions. In the case of low importance opinions, there was 
a much more gradual increase in helping and similarity. This finding is 
more in harmony with Byrne’s (1971) proposition that there is no specific 
single point at which the attraction for a stranger is disrupted as 
dissimilarity of opinion increases. But a comparison of the proportion of 
packets sent for varying degrees of similarity on the high importance and 
the less important opinions does show a relevant similarity. In both 
instances, the helping behaviour increases sharply once the level of
4 f
75% similarity is reached. This S P U r t  is more extreme in the case of
the important opinions (fig. 1 ). We seem to replicate this kind of
’threshold’ effect in one of our experiments.
Disregarding the levels of similarity in the study by Sole et al., 
the percentage of packages sent was similar in all three experiments using 
high importance, low importance and mixed importance opinion issues (1+8.1%, 
3l+*6% and 1+6.7% respectively. There isother evidence to suggest that, on 
their own, trivial similarities lead to as much favouritism as important 
ones (Clove and Baldridge, 1968, 1970; Byrne and Nelson, 1961;, 1965), but 
that this would vary if the trivial and important similarities were 
introduced in the same context. Billig (n.d) has explained this
phenomenon in terms of the level of interests subjects have in the
experiment, "... in the course of the experiment, the trivial similarities 
led to as much interest in the subjects as the ’important’ ones. This 
would happen when the experiment in itself is something interesting for 
the subjects and the trivial similarities become a central part of this
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Figure 1
Proportion of Checks Transmitted for Varying Degrees of Similarity on
Items of High Importance
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interesting situation” (p.7)« A contrasting explanation which we offer 
is in terms of the scarcity of relevant social cues to guide action in 
the experimental situation. When there are only a few social guides to 
action in a context, these guides assume importance. . This is so 
irrespective of their level of salience outside the experimental context.
Salience of Similarity Criteria and Social Context
We argue that the bases for social categorisation in the minimal
group studies should not be considered as 'trivial', since they
represented one of the few guides to action available to subjects. Sole
et al., (n.d.) have offered a similar- explanation ”... consider once
again the subject in Tajfel's experiment: He finds himself in a
situation which is, at once, socially impoverished and constraining of
his behaviour. He is given precious little on which he may base his
decision, and he is forced to use what he is given. The crucial issue
is that to "bhe subject in such a situation there can be no trivial
  ------------------
criterion. It is only when one views his plight from the contextually 
rich "outside world” that the information he is offered seems trivial”.
(p.22) (their underlining). In contrast to this situation. Sole et al., 
used trivial and important criteria independently in identical settings 
which were comparatively rich in social cues. They found slight 
differences in the way various levels of similarity influenced helping 
behaviour across the different criteria.
The findings of Sole et al, (n.d) seem to show that social
categorisation on the basis of interpersonal similarity may occur. This
is particularly so in relation to their first experiment, using more
important opinions. The dichotomy between the similar and the less
similar is reflected by the sharp change in responses once the 1 %  level
of similarity is reached. Sole et al., comment, "Quite clearly the
findings from the first experiment clarify an important theoretical
issue: we now see that when a stranger's opinions about issues of high
importance are available, the tendency to help is not based on attraction
for the stranger; rather, it is based on similarity and inclusion of the
»
stranger in one's "we group” (p.20). In the minimal group experiments , 
identification with the ingroup was assumed on the basis of the occurrence 
of ingroup favouritism. If, on the same grounds, we assume such 
identification from the occurrence of 'helping behaviour', we may assume
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that subjects categorised on the basis of the similarity criterion and 
identified with the 'ingroup*. This ingroup was composed of the most 
similar others.
Similarity, Identification and Social Rules
As regards the conditions in which social categorisation on the 
basis of a similarity criterion might occur, we have already mentioned 
the issue of 'identification' to be of relevance. It is also important 
to note that people value highly some of their oim characteristics, such 
as certain attitudes and opinions they hold. Being in a group with 
others having similar valued characteristics may give a person special 
pride and a sense of high social esteem. Other factors relevant to the 
conditions in which social categorisation on,the basis of a similarity 
criterion might occur, are social rules, norms and values. Certain 
types of inteipersonal similarities are considered important in some 
cultures, but not others. Also, the levels at which interpersonal 
similarity becomes an important influence on social categorisation may 
vary across cultures. This specifically affects the boundaries of the 
categories created. For example, if Sole et al.,(n.d) had cairied out 
their first experiment in another culture, they may have found that it 
was at the 2 %  similarity level, and not 1S%, that the sudden change 
in behaviour towards others occurred. The importance of these levels 
depends on social norms and values. Cross-cultural differences are thus 
likely.
Similarity and the Minimal Group Studies
The present discussion relates to our earlier discussion on 
minimal group studies in at least two ways. Firstly, in experiments 
carried out by Deutsch et al., (1969), Chase (1971) and also Billig 
and Tajfel (1973), social categorisation and 'ingroup' favouritism did 
not arise from interpersonal relations defined by similarity/ 
dissimilarity. An experiment by Eiser and Taylor (1972), in a context 
comparatively rich in social cues, also suggested that similarity/ 
dissimilarity was not a significant factor influencing biased behaviour 
towards others, but anticipated interaction was. In all these experiments, 
only two levels of similarity, i.e. similarity/dissimilarity, were used.
We argued that if the relationships between subjects and unidentified 
others had been defined on a wider range of similarity levels, subjects
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would have been more-likely to categorise on the basis of this 
similarity continuum and favour the 'oim group', the more similar 
others. In the Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) study, the number of lines 
subjects were asked to judge was 8, i| in each group. There is no 
reason why we should not use 8 similarity levels to define the relation­
ship between subjects in an experiment following the procedure of 
Deutsch et al.,(1969). If we are to explore the minimal condition in 
which similarity may be used as the basis of social categorisation, one 
obvious variable to manipulate is the level of similarity. An experiment 
meeting this requirement was carried out and is reported by us later.
Two impprtant outcomes of the categorisation process seem to be 
minimisation and differentiation. This is true for when the phenomena 
categorised are social, as well as when they are non-social.
Minimisation refers to the 'diminishing' of within group differences. 
Differentiation refers to the accentuation of between group differences.
In a situation where similarity is defined at only two levels, social 
categorisation which may take place on the basis of this similarity cannot 
entail minimisation. We argue that social categorisation is probably more 
likely to take place when both minimisation and differentiation are 
possible.
The second main way in which this discussion relates to that on 
minimal groups is in terms of the salience of similarity criterion. The 
minimal nature of the groups involved in studies by Tajfel and his 
associates might be assumed on the basis of the so-called 'trivial' 
nature of the similarity criterion on which the groups had been 
(apparently) formed. In the previous section we referred to studies 
in the area of person perception whose findings imply that people make 
far-reaching inferences about others on the basis of seemingly trivial 
information. We argue that such behaviour occurs when there are few 
social cues to guide action; what may be trivial information in other 
contexts assumes relative significance in these socially impoverished 
contexts. It is relevant to know that our argument seems to be 
supported by studies concerning trivial similarities (Clore and 
Baldridge, 1968, 1970; Byrne and Nelson, 196^, 1965).
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Conclusion to Section )4
This discussion on similarity and social categorisation is 
directly relevant to at least 3 of the experiments we carried out and 
which we report later.
In the first experiment we carried out, we aimed to demonstrate 
that similarity, even on a trivial criterion, might in certain conditions 
be sufficient for social categorisation. Several lines of argument, 
each supported by some evidence, have been presented to suggest that it 
is reasonable to expect that this demonstration will be successful. 
Firstly, it was argued that similarity might act as the criterion for 
social categorisation in certain conditions. Secondly, it was argued 
that people tend to favour those who are similar to themselves. In the 
minimal group studies, it has been assumed by all the researchers that 
favourable treatment of others implies identification with them. On the 
same basis, in our first experiment we assumed that favourable treatment 
of similar others implies identification with them. In this first 
experiment, interpersonal similarity was defined at 8 levels. We have 
argued, thirdly, that social categorisation is more likely to occur in 
situations where similarity is defined at more than two levels.’ This is 
because social categorisation based on only two levels of similarity 
could not lead to minimisation. It might be that social categorisation 
is more likely to take place in situations where both minimisation and 
accentuation are possible outcomes.
In the second experiment we carried out and report later, inter­
personal similarity again defined the relationships between the subjects 
and unidentified others. This time, however, subjects created*
groups. This classification could take place in various ways, The aim
of the experiment was to demonstrate the uniformities which arise when
people structure the social environment. Some evidence suggesting that
such conformity does arise in certain conditions has been reported. For
example, the study by Sole et al., (n.d) showed that when the level of
inteipersonal similarity was reached, there was a sharp and uniform
increase in the favourable behaviour of the subjects towards others.
.
The third experiment we carried out and report later aimed to
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demonstrate that on their own and^independent but identical settings, 
a trivial and an important criterion for social categorisation might 
have the same influence on intergroup behaviour. In several places we 
have presented evidence and arguments suggesting that this demonstration 
could be successful. For example, we re fe r re d  to studies suggesting that on. 
their own trivial similarities lead to as much favouritism as important 
ones (Clore and Baldridge, 1968, 1970; Byrne and Nelson, 1961;, 1965).
We also argued that in a social setting in which there are few social 
cues to action, there can be no 'trivial' criterion for social 
categorisation, since every social cue present might be treated as 
important. Sole et al (n.d., p.22) agree with this view.
Once again, the issues we have discussed should be viewed in 
relation to the general subject of 'identity'. The reason why 
individuals favour those who are similar.to themselves is probably partly 
because they value their own characteristics specifically, and themselves 
in general. Identification seems to take place with similar others,
rather than with dissimilar others. By defining the position of similar
others more favourably, the individual is probably defining the position
of the self more favourably also.
(5) SOCIAL CATEGORISATION, RACE AND ETHNICITY
The following discussion on social categorisation and ethnicity 
is directly relevant to one of the experiments we carried out and report 
later. This experiment involved groups from different nationalities.
The discussion on race and social categorisation is less directly relevant 
to our main experimental interests. This discussion is reported, however, 
because it helps to illuminate certain key issues which are relevant to 
our experiments.
For the present, it is sufficient to note that the experiment we 
carried out involving groups from different nationalities directly or 
indirectly concerned such general issues as; the values attached to 
ethnic groups, identification with ethnic groups, the salience of ethnicity. 
The following discussion mainly concerns itself with these general issues.
In addition, some other related issues are also discussed. For example, 
the issue of category boundaries based on race and ethnicity are discussed. 
This is because this discussion helps to highlight the influence of social
io4
factors in the process of category construction. In general, we 
believe social factors to be an important influence on the process of 
social categorisation and the establishment of values attached to 
various categories.
A final point is that our discussions involving race and ethnicity 
are to some extent independent, although we recognise that race may be 
subsumed under the category of ethnicity.
a ) Race 
Introduction
. "Race, scientifically, is a biological term and is narrowly 
confined to the body characteristics that distinguish one group of humans 
from another. It says nothing about any psychological or social 
characteristics, nor does it imply any judgement about the 'inferiority' 
or -superiority, of any race". (1971, p.i6)
Anthropologists generally classify the world population in terms
of three major constellations of race; the Negroid, the Caucasoid and the/ 
Mongoloid. Two other smaller categories are often also recognised, the 
Australoid and the Khoisanoid. Differences among races are described as 
being hereditary (Vallois, 1952), with the environment being an additional 
important influence (UNESCO, 196^). The description provided by Bloom 
(above) is in agreement with one widely accepted viewpoint (see Coon,
1966; Tobias, I96I; UNESCO, I96I1.). Tobias (I96I) notes the usefulness of 
the concept of race in helping to structure the complexities within the 
homo sapien, ",.. race is a biological concept which helps to bring 
order out of the otherwise meaningless range of human variation" (p.19).
He also describes race as a "... classification of anatomies, used for 
anatomical purposes" (p.19). There are two points we shall comment on 
in relation to the 'scientific' explanation of race which has become 
'official' (UNESCO, 1961;) doctrine. Firstly, 'official' doctrine, and 
possibly 'scientific knowledge', is at least partly dependent on social, 
political and economic factors. Secondly, the scientific or official 
doctrine is not necessarily the generally used one. Everyday under­
standings of 'race' may contradict others.
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Tile Concept of Race and Racial Boundaries in Everyday Life
Everyday understandings of the concept of race may not, and 
often do not, correspond to the 'official' or 'scientific' under­
standings.
Racial classifications in eveiyday life seem necessarily to 
involve an evaluative judgement also. Burnham (1972) has commented,
"... race as a genetic phenomenon is not in itself sociologically 
significant but gains its importance in this regard from social factors 
that are associated with it and the cultural beliefs that are based on 
it" (p.303). The most salient criterion on which race has come to be 
judged appears to be colour. It is not just the white group, the most 
highly evaluated group by the presently dominant Western value system, 
who have come to stress the importance of colour. The Negroes have 
also been influenced by this outlook. Isaacs (I963) claimed that in 
assimilating the majority view of themselves, Negroes have often raised 
'whiteness' to the highest value in all aspects of life. While the 
relationship between the evaluation of racial groups and their political 
and economic influence is often noted, the issue of the boundaries of 
each racial category is often neglected. Colour is of course a continuum 
and the way this continuum is structured is dependent on social factors. 
In "Passing for White in South Africa", Watson (1970) noted that,
"passing for white is made feasible... by the fact that there are 
infinite graduations between white and non-white skins and physiognomies, 
so that it is often not possible to tell from physical features alone to 
which race a particular person belongs" (p.I;59). In such a situation it 
is not surprising to learn that a person's racial classification may be 
changed - sometimes as often as five times (Russel., 1963). Each change 
of classification involves a change in expectations as regards how the 
person classified should behave, according to the rules governing the 
behaviour of whites and non-whites in South Africa. These rules are 
determined by the dominant white group. This reclassification also 
iufluences the evaluation of the person classified. We previously noted 
^iudings which demonstrated that when a white subject recognised a Negro 
as a Negro, he would evaluate him in a negative manner (Secord et al., 
1956; Secord, 1959). The link between social categorisation and stereo­
typing is clarified by this kind of evidence which demonstrates:
(a) the aroitrary nature of category.boundaries, (b) the accentuation
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of differences between categories and, (c) the application of a 
stereotype to each category derived.
In South African Society, as in many other societies, the values 
attached to a social group depend partly on the position of that group 
in the social structure. The Negro group has little influence on the 
dominant ideology in South Africa; its social position in terms of power, 
wealth and status is low. These are some of the factors which account 
for the negative evaluation of the Negro group in South Africa.
B) Ethnicity
The Increased Salience of Ethnicity
In recent years ethnicity appears to have become more salient, the 
issue of ethnic identity becoming an important political issue in many 
parts of the world. It is reported by Connor (I969) that nearly half 
the independent countries of the world have been troubled in recent years 
by some kind of "ethnic inspired dissonance". Gordon (1975) has referred 
to bhe 'Liberal expectation' that the differences between ethnic groups 
would eventually lose importance in a kind of 'melting pot' or 'cultural 
pluralism', claiming that this expectation has now been falsified by 
events. In response to these 'events', social scientists have written a 
great deal about ethnicity recently (e.g. . Bell et al., 1971;;
de Vos and Romanucci - Ross, 1975j Enloe, 19735 Glazer and Moynihan, 1975j 
Giles, 1977; Schermerhorn, 1970; Van den Berghe, 1970). Glazer and 
Moynihan (1975) have argued that the meaning of the term ethnicity has 
changed with the change of events, "... the fact that... social scientists 
tend to broaden the use of the term "ethnic groups" to refer not only to 
sub-groups, to minorities, but to all groups of a society characterised 
by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent, itself 
reflects the somewhat broader significance that ethnicity has taken up 
in recent years" (p.l;).
Ethnicity and Political Behaviour
A particularly interesting characteristic of the increase in the 
^ G of ethnicity is its links with politics. This had led writers 
to reconsider the role of class and, more specifically, question why 
ethnicity should become more salient and not class. Bell (1975) tackles 
this issue thus, "Ethnicity has become more salient (than class) because
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it can combine an interest with an affective tie. Ethnicity provides 
a tangible set of common identifications - in language, food, music, 
names - when other social roles become more abstract and impersonal.
In the competition for the values of the society to be realised 
politically, ethnicity can become a means of claiming place or 
advantage" (p.169). One critical point needs to be made here. In 
arguing that ethnicity has become more salient than class. Bell is 
implying that the reverse was once the case - a view not substantiated 
by evidence. But he does make an important point by implication. The 
process of identification seems to be aided in the case of ethnic groups 
by a much more tangible set of criteria than in the case of class. To 
explain why one set of criteria is more tangible, it is relevant to note 
their institutionalisation. Identification with class, one might argue, 
is discouraged, while identification with ethnic groups receives 
relatively more encouragement by the agents of socialisation.
The Arbitrary Nature of Ethnic Boundaries
It does not appear to be possible to clarify the boundaries of 
ethnic groups in a precise manner (Le Vine and Campbell, 1972, pp.81-113). 
When these boundaries are clarified, the specification of a boundary 
appears to be carried out in just as arbitrary a manner as the 
specification of racial boundaries on the basis of colour. Fishman (1977) 
has argued that, "... boundaries, whether between or within ethnicity 
collectivities, are no more objective realities than are the ethnicity 
paternities, patrimonies or phénoménologies that they separate.
Boundaries must be noticed by actors, interpreted by actors and 
implemented by actors" (p.28). One might go further and claim that 
boundaries are invented by actors. But this act of invention seems to be 
based on a consistent and rationalised, but not necessarily logical, 
process. The criteria for these boundaries, the accentuation of the gap 
between boundaries, and stereotypes of the categories, all evolve 
according to the consistencies of a particular evaluative system. For 
example, members of an ethnic group are viewed as being more similar on 
traits which are seen as part of the ethnic group stereotype than with 
regard to traits which are not seen as part of the stereotype (Tajfel, 
et al., I96I;).
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Accentuation and Ethnicity
Upmeyer and Layer (197U) have presented evidence that accentuation 
is a two-stage process. At the first level, 'input accentuation*, there 
will be increased sensitivity to relevant information as a result of 
increased attention. The second stage, 'output accentuation', involves 
the distortion of issues in favour of one's own views. Upmeyer et al
(1976) presented evidence supporting the input accentuation effect and 
less strongly the output accentuation effect. In terms of ethnicity, 
what will probably be 'relevent' information in the first stage, and what 
will be 'distorted', and how, in the second stage will depend on the 
nature of the boundaries chosen and the stereotypes evolved for the 
ethnic groups. The selection of information by prejudicial individuals 
to correspond to their own biases has been charted previously (Allport,
1954; Cooper and Jahoda, 1947), but as to entire groups acting in this 
way en masse and the soclaT.psychological processes involved, we know 
little.
Ethnic Identification
We earlier noted Glazer and Moynihan's comment that social scientists 
now tend to view ethnic groups as "all groups of a society characterised by 
a distinct sense of difference owing to culture or descent" (1975, P*W.
The use of the term 'sense of hints at some measure of voluntary or 
intentional identification on the part of ethnic group members. Patterson 
(1975) is more explicit on this issue. He states, "The fact that ethnicity 
is a chosen form of identification cannot be over-emphasised. An ethnic 
group only exists where members consider themselves to belong to such a 
group; a conscious sense of belonging is critical. It implies, on the 
one hand, that where all other criteria are met except this sense of 
belonging, the ethnic condition is not met - even where other members of 
a society may regard a given group of individuals as constituting an 
ethnic group. And it implies, on the other hand, that where, in objective 
sociological terms, the assumed bases of group allegiance do not exist, 
should members subjectively assume the existence of such "mythical" bases, 
the salient condition of ethnicity is met" (p.309). This account 
corresponds to our earlier arguments that 'interdependence', 'similarity', 
and other such criteria used for defining a group are all secondary in 
comparison with identification. If individuals do not identify with the 
group and perceive themselves as part of it, then a group does not exist
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- even though objective grounds for treating the set of individuals 
as a group exists.
The Context of Ethnic Identification
Patterson argues, as we have done, that the context of group 
identification is a crucial factor. This context, we proposed, guides 
the individual as regards what is appropriate behaviour and what are 
the values attached to various groups entailed in the situation. Also, 
the context gives guides as to which group identity a person should 
view as more salient. The notion that 'one does not choose to be Jewish 
or Black or Chinese', implying that intentional identification is 
irrelevant to such cases, is challenged by Patterson. He firsHv 
asserts that "... the context of a given ethnic experience is one of 
the most critical factors in defining it" (p.306). He moves on to claim 
that, "from a structural and contextual viewpoint, there is an 
important sense in which the significance of a. given ethnic attribute 
can change and, as such, one can be said to have some choice in the 
matter (of "being" in an ethnic group), since one can choose the 
sociological and psychological significance of the given trait. And 
the way this is done is simply by changing one's social context or 
seizing the opportunity offered by a change, over time, in one's social 
context", (pp. 306-307). To recount one of several illustrative 
examples he gives, "Take the case of the black Jamaican who is a 
citizen of Jamaica and a permanent resident of the United States...
In Jamaica, which is 95 pe rcent black, he belongs to the demographic ally 
dominant majority and is a member of the elite. In the United States 
he is a member of an ethnic group - the blacks, although he holds a 
position of some status in that society", (p.307). This individual, 
Patterson argues, changes his ethnic identity every time he travels 
from Jamaica to the United States, by changing his context.
Moreover, in each context his characteristics are evaluated differently, 
sfNce the group he is part of is positioned differently in the
social structure - and thus is evaluated differently.
The Historical Roots of Ethnic Identity
In considering the context in which intergroup behaviour takes 
place, we should be aware that such contexts entail historically 
derived characteristics. The nature of intergroup behaviour in the 
present is ^partly or wholly, dependent on what it was like in the past.
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A number of experimental studies have been carried out with members of 
different racial or ethnic groups as subjects. Some of these have been 
interpersonal or intergroup gaming studies. There has been particular 
concern to explore whether members of the same racial or ethnic group 
would cooperate more with their own group, or evaluate them more highly.
A comparison of the findings of these studies shows no clear pattern of 
bias, although on the whole, ingroup favouritism might be seen as 
predominant (see Boise, 1969bjHarford and Cutter, 1966; Heller, 196?,
Rice and White, 1961;; Sibly et al., 1968; Uejio and Wrightsman, 1967; 
Wilson and Kayatani, 1968). But the lack of a general pattern in the 
findings of these studies becomes understandable when we consider that 
the studies involve Negroes with Whites, French with German, Caucasian 
with Japanese, Japanese Americans with Caucasian Americans, among other 
groups. In real life the intergroup relations between these peoples are 
likely to be different, both in terms of context and in terms of the 
position of each group in the social structure.' Confronted with each 
other, these group members are unlikely to abandon their previously 
salient evaluative systems. Just as in the real world some groups are 
more highly evaluated than others, such differences will be found in 
the experimental context. However, what we may explore in the experimental 
context is specifically under what conditions a certain type of 
evaluation will be salient. Moreover, under what conditions group 
interests are of primary importance. But to make this kind of 
information meaningful, it is necessary firstly to provide a detailed 
account of the social-psychological history of a group.
The Social-Psychologist as Social Historian
Social-psychologists exploring intergroup behaviour will
C f ,
need to act as social historians also (Gergen,l9 7 3 ). This is for two
main reasons. Firstly, through historical analysis,it may be possible to 
paint in bold strokes the patterns linking general social changes to 
individual behaviour. More specifically, to chart the altered positions 
of groups in the social structure and link these to changes in behaviour 
between individual members of different groups. Secondly, in order to 
help explain the present dominant social evaluation system influencing 
intergroup behaviour. This kind of historical analysis has already 
received some general attention (see the chapter on "Prejudice and 
Psychology" in Milner, 1975, for example).
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The Transformation of Ethnic Social Identity
Our emphasis on the historical factors influencing intergroup 
relations, concerning large social groups particularly, reflects a 
belief that social evaluations relevant to some ^oups transform slowly. 
This belief is supported by some evidence (Child 4,19^ 3; Gilbert, 1951; 
Meenes, 19^3). The speed of transfbrmation of such evaluative systems 
is mainly dependent on the changes which came about in the social 
structure and the relative positions of the groups within it. But we 
should also emphasise how present events can suddenly change intergroup 
behaviour. Two illustrative examples follow.
The first is taken from an experiment by Lefcourt and Ludwig 
(1965  ^which focussed on the tendency of negroes to avoid competition with 
white opponents (see Katz et al, 1958 ' V 7 C, for
some relevant evidence). Three groups of negro subjects competed against 
whites who continually won. One of the three groups of negroes was 
composed of musicians who had been led to believe that the competitive 
game was related to their musical skills,. One might hypothesise in a 
post hoc manner that for this group,social categorisation on the basis of 
'musical ability' was more satisfying and salient than that on the racial 
criterion. Their past experience, as part of the 'musician' group, had 
led them to assume superiority over non-musicians on the criterion of 
musical ability. In the present context ^this past experience gave them 
confidence. They would, we expect, perceive it appropriate to compete 
strongly against the 'non-musician' group (who are also white). The 
results showed that they insisted on playing the game longer than any 
other group.
Our second illustrative example of how present events can influence 
intergroup behaviour is taken from a very recent study. Dor-Shar et al. % 
(1978) carried out an experiment on the basis of the assumption that 
"... within the broader Israeli society, 'Religious' and 'Secular' have 
come to constitute subcultural identification groups". That is, within 
the greater society, a new way of structuring the social world has 
developed and is salient for action. Subjects were two groups of Israelis 
who had either described themselves as 'religious' or 'secular'. They 
were asked to 'shock' victims for errors in a series of questions. It 
was found that secular subjects gave significantly higher levels of shock 
to religious subjects. The data for the religious subjects did not show
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the same significant difference. But the nature of the questions were 
found to be important for religious subjects, who gave significantly 
higher shocks to both 'orthodox' and 'secular' victims for religious 
related questions. This difference was not found for the secular group ,
A check on the overall shock levels used by the two groups 
of subjects showed no significant differences.
Conclusion to Section 5
The concept of race, and probably that of ethnicity, is used in 
a different way and is understood very differently in everyday life as 
compared to its 'scientific' use and understandings. Social factors 
appear to be highly influential in determining the boundaries of racial 
and ethnic categories. The values attached to particular ethnic and 
racial groups are at least partly determined by social factors. To 
explain the present social status of racial and ethnic groups, it is 
useful to consider their past histories.
Ethnicity has recently increased in salience. This change seems 
to have coincided with attempts by ethnic groups to achieve greater 
independence, and possibly to achieve a more favourable social image for 
themselves. Individuals to some extent have a choice as to whether or 
not they identify with an ethnic group to which they are nominated 
'from the outside'. We presented some evidence which we interpreted as 
suggesting that individuals are more likely to identify with an ethnic 
group if they can achieve a more favourable social identity through such 
identification.
A number of experiments have been carried out involving individuals 
from different ethnic groups. We argued that the outcome of interactions 
between two ethnic groups in the laboratory setting is best understood 
in the light of information about the relative positions of the two groups 
in the 'real world'. The social values attached to the two groups will 
not become 'detached' when they enter the laboratory context. These 
values are likely to remain stable when the groups enter the laboratory 
context. We carried out an experiment involving two different ethnic 
groups which we report later. We hypothesised that the highly valued 
ethnic group would be treated more favourably than the 'subordinate' group 
by the members of the 'subordinate' group; just as appears to be the case 
in the social world outside the laboratory.
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SECTIONS (6) AND (7)
The last two sections in this Chapter (6 and 7) include discussions 
of literature which are less directly relevant to the experiments which we 
carried out and report later. There are several reasons why these 
discussions have been included. The discussion on language and intergroup 
behaviour (6) has been included partly because of the importance of 
language in social life generally, and the importance of language as a 
basis for social categorisation specifically. The discussion on the 
development of intergroup attitudes has been included partly because of 
the importance of socialisation in the process through which social 
categories and the values attached to them are acquired. Another reason 
why these discussions have been included is because they underline our 
general concern with the issue of identity. Language encompasses our 
picture of the world, our place within it, and ourselves. It also provides 
a basis on which other people make inferences about our identity. In 
developing intergroup attitudes the child is learning about the identity . 
of others and how they 'should* be treated. He is also learning about his 
own identity and how he might expect others to behave towards him and 
his group.
(6) LANGUAGE AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR
Language is another important criterion on which social categorisation 
takes place. We shall develop this argument in relation to three specific 
themes. Firstly, the role of language in developing a unique group culture 
and sense of identity. Secondly, the role of language as a symbol of 
group identity. Thirdly, the social evaluation of a person on the basis 
of language. This discussion will take place particularly in relation to 
ethnic groups, although it is recognised that ethnic groups are not 
always definable on the criterion of shared language (Edwards, 1977;
Trudgill and Tzavaras, 1977).
Language and Social Reality
. Language not only communicates social reality, it transfôrms it 
cilso. Earlier,we noted Saussure's (i960) view that a particular 
combination of a signifier and signified is an arbitrary entity. There 
are diverse ways of structuring and classifying the world through linguistic 
signs. The particular historical experiences of a group are handed down to
Il4
nexf generations through language. Shared understandings within a group 
sharing a language are often unquestioned,simply because of the all- 
pervasive way language dominates our perceptions. Fishman (1977) has 
commented, "It is partly because language is so often taken as a 
biological inheritance that its association with ethnic paternity is both 
frequent and powerful. It is "acquired with the mother's milk". It is 
not only shaped by the inherited organism of speech but it, in turn, 
shapes the mind and the mental processes", (p.19). By the term 'paternity', 
Fishman means a person's 'descent related being', the central experience 
of ethnicity he feels he had inherited from his birthright. The extent to 
which a language entails the historically derived outlook of a group is 
sometimes highlighted when one is learning a new language, translating 
from one language to another. It becomes apparent in such instances that 
exactly corresponding words are seldom found and subtle meanings of phrases 
are lost,or changed,in moving from one language to another. Moreover, in 
successfully using a different language one does not simply use different 
but corresponding words, one applies a different perceptual framework.
The Symbolic Role of Language in Intergroup Relations
Language can have important symbolic significance in intergroup 
behaviour. A group may use language as a symbol of its distinctiveness, 
differentiating itself from other groups by accentuating language 
differences. Of course, the reverse process is also possible, with 
differences being minimised in order to achieve assimilation. Wïiich 
strategy is adopted depends partly on the importance the person 
attributes to his ingroup. This point is clearly illustrated by a study 
carried out by B our his and Giles (1977)» The subjects were two groups of 
Welsh-bom adults learning Welsh at a language school. When an English 
speaker attacked the subjects for learning a 'dying' language, those who 
valued their group memberships and itslanguage accentuated the difference 
between themselves and the attacker,by broadening their Welsh accents.
But the other group of subjects who did not give the same significance to 
the Welsh language, and possibly did not perceive the confrontation as 
involving their 'ingroup', softened their Welsh accents and converged 
towards the language of the attacker.
Language, Social Dsvelopment and Social Mobility
Language plays a key role in technological, economic and social
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development. Partly because scientific knowledge is so far developed 
in a few industrialised nations, it has become necessary for others to 
learn the language used by the more technologically advanced nations in 
order to benefit from their knowledge .-x- Another reason why the learning 
of certain languages is important is because they have become 
institutionalised, so that social mobility, within or between social 
groups, is moreeasily achieved once the dominant language is mastered 
and used (Smith et al., 1977)• Verdoodt (1977) has argued that certain 
minority groups in Europe are denied their linguistic rights. Edwards 
(1977) has attacked the recently incorporated bilingual programmes ; 
apparently aimed at helping minority groups in American schools to become 
familiar with their own, as well as the dominant institutionalised 
language. He claims they reflect 'artificial* attempts to help and are, 
in fact,designed to teach the minority group child very little of his 
own language, while preparing him for assimilation into the dominant 
group's language. But whether minority groups ^ e  denied linguistic 
rights or not, the fact remains that the use of certain languages for 
certain functions is, within the present world political structure, 
imperative for social mobility and also social change.
Problems arise when the language symbolising group identity differs 
from the language(s) most useful for achieving technological and social 
change for the group, and social mobility for the individual. These 
problems arise especially for many (in Western terms) under-developed 
groups. For the individual group member, a possible strategy is to 
adopt the language of the dominant outgroup - to act in terms of social 
mobility. R y sn and Carranza (1977) give an account of how some 
Mexican-American individuals adopt Anglo-American speech styles, achieving 
higher status within the dominant value-system. Of course, each language 
is likely to have a different status for different functions. For example, 
although English is used in some academic meetings in the Middle East, 
it would be a highly inappropriate and low status language to use in a 
religious context. A study by Cooper et al.,(1977) provides evidence 
supporting this view. For a group of Arab subjects in Jericho, an 
argument on a technical issue was more persuasive when communicated in
English has thus become an important 'export' (Randolph Quirk, The 
Observer, 9 July, 1978). ^
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Hebrew than when it was coimunicated in Arabic. But Arabic was a more 
persuasive language when the topic was a more traditional one. For a 
group of Jewish subjects (students),English seemed to be more persuasive 
when used as the medium for "scientific appeal" than when used as the 
medium for non-scientific appeal. Presumably,people learn which language 
is the more appropriate means of communication, as regards its 
evaluative qualities, and apply their understandings within the framework 
of dominant social rules and meanings.
Social Categorisation and Language
The links between social categorisation and language may be viewed 
as being of two types.
i) Firstly, we categorise others on the basis of their language. In 
the preface to 'language, ethnicity and intergroup relations', Giles has 
commented, "... the importance of social categorisation was never so 
clearly unveiled to me as when writing... with Peter Powesland, "Speech 
style and social Evaluation". This volume was concerned with interpersonal 
perception and speech; how we evaluate others on the basis of their 
language varieties, and how and why we change our speech style when 
interacting with others. Although the book was originally conceived of
at the inter-individual level, I could not escape the fact that time and 
time again much of the cognitive activity involved in social 
communication was related to intergroup behaviour". Language is an 
important social indicator of group membership. As such, it is also an 
important instigator of social categorisation and intergroup behaviour.
ii) The second kind of link between social categorisation and language 
is forged by the specific labels ascribed to a given social category.
These labels are never neutral. They always entail subtle social 
implications and evaluations which are highly meaningful within given 
cultural settings. An example of this is demonstrated in a book entitled, 
"Language and Attitudes", with the sub-title, "On the influence of the 
titles 'foreign worker' and 'invited worker' on attitudes towards workers 
from abroad" (Schonbach, 1970). The main hypothesis tested was that 
attitudes towards people are partly determined by the connotations of the 
verbal labels used to designate them. To test this hypothesis,the 
Author used the examples of two different labels and their connotations 
which designated the foreign work force in West Germany (1962-63);
HT
'Fremdarbeiter' and 'Gastarbeitertranslated as 'foreign worker' and 
'invited worker' respectively. As predicted, it was found that the 
label 'foreign worker' is given a relatively more unfavourable 
evaluation than thelabel 'invited worker'. Although these two labels 
share a common denotation, Schonbach has argued that they carry different 
connotations through the biasing effect of unconscious associations 
evoked by each. ^
Conclusion to Section 6
Social categorisation on the criterion of language has special 
significance. This is because,apart from acting as a symbol of group 
status, the use of certain languages brings practical benefits in terms 
of technological development. Language may be used as a symbol of group 
identity, but more importantly, it embraces the esoteric picture of the 
world which is part of the historical heritage of a group. An individual 
may re-define his group membership through the language he uses.
Although, again, the boundaries of categories of 'language users' seems 
to be arbitrary in important ways.
(7) THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERGR0I3P ATTITUDES 
Introduction
The development of intergroup attitudes in children has received 
considerable attention. Principally, this attention has focussed on 
attitudes in relation to ethnic groups. Although the general concern of 
researchers may be described as the development of intergroup attitudes, 
it is in most cases indirectly that the process of this development has 
been touched on. Most researchers have been content to demonstrate that 
children do have intergroup attitudes and are, or are not, prejudiced.
It is generally accepted that children's intergroup attitudes are 
influenced by their parents and other, less influential, agents of 
socialisation (Milner, 1975, pp.35-50; Bloom, 1971, pp.W-58),. But there 
is very little discussion concerning the stages of development in the 
formation of intergroup attitudes.
Two key issues might be distinguished in the discussion of the 
development of intergroup attitudes in children. Firstly, there is the 
issue of the child's cognitive capacity to distinguish between vario'os
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social groups in a meaningful manner and, acting on these distinctions, 
to respond in a manner deemed as appropriate by the relevant 
'evaluators' of social behaviour. Some kind of developmental pattern 
in this capacity might be expected, if we assume that the explanatory 
powers of structuralist models evolved by Piaget and others extends to 
this area. Secondly, there is the issue of the relations between 
information attainment and attitude formation. Do attitudes develop 
strictly on the basis of information?
The Assimilation of Social Rules
The development of intergroup attitudes should be considered in 
the context of general developmental processes. In the social context, 
one important aspect of the general development is the tendency to 
assimilate and instigate social rules generally accepted as appropriàte. 
Through a detailed study of children playing the game of marbles,
Piaget (1932; 1977) was able to unravel the way‘in which the rules of the 
game are learned and applied, and how the significance of these rules 
changes for boys as they grow. From the point of view of the significance; 
of the rules of the game, development was conceived as involving three 
stages; the second of which took place during the ages of about L-lO and 
the third of which took place during the ages of about 11-ll;. The 
younger children tended to regard rules as 'adult given* and everlasting. 
The older children saw rules as depending on common consent. They were 
more likely to have played in places where the game was played according 
to different rules. They thus realised the flexible nature of the game 
and its rules. However, it is interesting that by the time they had 
reached this level of awareness, their group was applying a strict, and 
sometimes unique, set of rules, obedience to which was strictly enforced. 
This general trend may be present in other areas of social life,where the 
adoption and application of social rules is important. Such social rules 
might in important ways influence the attitudes adopted towards given 
phenomena.
Allport's Developmental Model of Prejudice
Another model which is relevant to the development of intergroup 
attitudes is Allport's (195b) account of prejudice development, 
involving three phases in roughly chronological order. During the first 
phase (pre-generalisation),the child is as yet unable to generalise as
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adults do^  although he is aware of specific group differences. He is 
not yet able to recognise all the social cues in an inter group setting. 
Once he is able to categorise others on the basis of relevant cues, he 
enters the second stage (stage of total rejection). He is now able to 
coordinate cognitive and evaluative factors. After this stage of total ■ 
rejection, which is characterised by extreme ethnocentrist and occurs 
between the ages of about 8 and early puberty, the third stage (the 
stage of differentiation) begins. Behaviour is still mainly ethno­
centric, but a sharper differentiation and integration is achieved. ; This 
process of rigidity and flexibility corresponds in some ways with the way 
Piaget described the learning and application of rules in the game of 
marbles, "We have had occasion to see during our analysis of the rules of 
a game that the child begins by regarding these rules not only as 
obligatory, but also as inviolable and requiring to be kept to literally" 
(op.cit. p.lOli), "... for the older ones it (a rule) depends upon mutual 
agreement" (op. cit. p.97). •
A recent experiment (Jaspers et al., 1972) provided partial 
support for Allport * s (195i|) account of prejudice with respect to 
children's attitudes towards other countries. But in general, studies 
concerning the development of intergroup attitudes in children have not 
been tied to any specific theoretical account of development.
Ethnic Awareness
Goodman (I96J4.) has conceptualised three over-lapping stages in 
the development of intergroup attitudes. This conceptualisation has been 
adopted by Proshansky also (I966). During the first stage, lasting till 
the age of about 3 or I4., the child is becoming aware of his own ethnic 
identity. This ethnic awareness is part of a largerrawareness of the self 
as a distinct entity. A number of researchers have reported ethnic 
awareness by the end of this initial stage (Ammons, 1950; Clark and Clark, 
^9h7. • '. } Horowitz and Horowitz, I938; Landreth and Johnson,
19535 Norland, 1958; Stevenson and Stevenson, I96O; Stevenson and Stewart, 
1958; Vaughan, 196iiaj). These studies concerned black and white groups and 
the high visibility of colour is, of course, a factor influencing 
awareness of group differences. Groups defined on less visible criteria 
may be less affected on early awareness. Although, from the early study 
by Piaget and Weil (1951) to the more recent studies concerning the
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development of children*s attitude towards other nations (e.g. Jaspers 
et al., 1972), it is apparent that awareness of nationality also 
develops at an early age. It is certainly present to some extent by 
the age of about 6 or 7»
Ethnic Awareness and Social Context
Social context is another factor influencing the age by which 
children become aware of ethnic group differences . For example, given 
that race (as defined by colour) has been more salient in the south of 
the United States than in the North, it is not surprising to find that 
Southern children are more aware of racial distinctions (Norland, 1966). 
Also, racial categories play a more significant part in their lives than 
even those of age and sex and, inevitably, class (Horowitz and Horowitz, 
1936). But the relationship between the level of racial integration in 
a society and ethnic role awareness by its members is probably not as 
simple as we have implied (Bochner and Ohsako, 1977).
Ethnic Orientation
The second stage in the development of intergroup attitudes 
conceived by Goodman (I96I1.) is * ethnic orientation*. During this stage, 
lasting roughly between the ages of k and 8, some of the basic phrases 
and concepts applied to his own and other groups by the ingroup is 
acquired by the child. A kind of rudimentary attitude develops and, 
indeed, Goodman describes the differences between an ethnic orientation 
and an ethnic attitude in terms of strength rather than kind. During the 
stage of ethnic orientation, the child acquires a rudimentaiy vocabulary 
for intergroup description and differentiation, but does not achieve the 
conceptual understanding required to generalise from specific issues. 
However, a clear preference is reflected by his actions and the basics 
of prejudiced behaviour are present. This bias has been demonstrated 
in a number of studies (Clark and Clark, 19ii7; ;
Landreth and Johnson, 1953; Nilner, 1973; Nor land, 1958; Pushkin, 1967; 
Radke et al., 191+9; Stevenson and Stewart, 1958).
Intergroup Attitudes
Ihtergroup attitudes can be described as emerging at about the 
age of nine. Proshansky defines an intergroup attitude as "a cluster of 
tendencies to respond consistently to others in an evaluative fashion
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because of perceived group membership" (1966, p.313)« During the years 
proceeding the initiation of this stage, a clarification of concepts and 
an integration of cognitive and affective components of intergroup 
attitudes takes place. The nature of the intergroup attitude developed 
is assumed to be mainly dependent on the child*s group membership. There 
has been a tendency to find that black children devalue their own group 
and prefer the white outgroup. This action has sometimes been described 
as *misidentification’ or ’misplaced* identification. The earliest 
studies reporting this kind of ingroup devaluation by black children were 
by Lasker (1929), followed by the Clark’s (1939) and the Horowitzes’ 
(1936, 1939). Since the 1930’s there has been a steady accumulation of 
studies reporting that black children devalue their own group (see 
Greenwald and Oppenheim, 1968, and Porter, 1971, for recent examples). 
This tendency has also been reported by studies carried out in a number 
of different cultural settings, such as Britain (Jahoda et al., 1972; 
Milner, 1973; Richardson and Green, 1971), South Africa (Gregor and 
McPherson, 1966) and New Zealand (Vaughan, 1961|.b). On the basis of these 
findings. Norland (1969) hypothesised that in a multiracial society in 
which there are dominant and subordinate groups, there will be a tendency 
for children of the subordinate race to identify with the dominant group 
and the children of the dominant group to be biased towards and identify 
with their own group.
However, there has emerged a set of findings in the last decade 
or so which clearly seems to reflect an apparent change of intergroup 
attitudes among blacks (Baughman, 1971; Brigham, 19VL; Crain and 
Weisman, 1972; Fish and Larr, 1972; Genesee et al., 1978; Lerner and 
Buehrig, 1975).
Cognitive and Affective Components of Ihtergroup Attitudes
The relationship between cognitive and affective components in the 
development of intergroup attitudes in children has received some 
attention also. This relationship is important, since we need to know to 
what extent we may influence affective components through influencing 
cognitive ones. Piaget and Weil (1951), in a pioneering study of the 
development of children’s attitudes towards own and other countries, 
suggested that the development of a faculty for the integration of 
cognitive and affective components is necessary before an awareness of
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’homeland’ and a degree of nationalism emerges. They considered cognitive 
and affective elements as being ’parallel or isomorphons ’. The 
assumption that the child develops affective dispositions towards nations 
as he acquires knowledge about them is also made by others (e.g. Jahoda, 
1962), It is an assumption which leads to an emphasis on knowledge.
Milner (1975) has commented that, "... implicit in these approaches which 
emphasise the factual and cognitive aspects of attitude development is 
the suggestion of rationality, which is entirely in keeping with our 
attitudes towards attitudes. People like to think of attitudes as 
evaluations, based on rational appraisal of facts, the end product of 
some deliberation. To describe national attitude development as an 
almost simultaneous absorption of fact about countries, and production 
of feeling about them does not rule out rationality. In theory, it 
allows the feelings to be a response to the facts. The emphasis oh 
cognitive development and factual knowledge is quite in line with this 
idea of rationality and seems to suggest that ’facts’ are prerequisites, 
necessary conditions for attitudes to appear" (p.53).
As Milner points out, there is evidence suggesting that this so- 
called ’rational’ approach to attitudes is, so far as children’s rational 
attitudes are concerned, invalid. Studies by Tajfel and Jahoda (I966) and 
Johnson et al.,(1970) suggest that the feelings of children towards given 
countries are not directly linked to their knowledge about those countries. 
Stillwell and Spencer (1973) present results suggesting that the more 
children perceive another country to be like their oxm, the more they 
favour it. This contradicts Johnson et al’s.,(1970) suggestions that 
children know least about those countries towards which they feel neutral 
and have more knowledge about both nations they like and dislike.
However, at present we may conclude by commenting that attempts to 
influence the affective components in children’s intergroup attitudes by 
providing only more information may not achieve reliable results.
Inter-Class Attitudes and Development
¥e noted that the development of class-awareness and inter-class 
attitudes has received little attention. We might assume that the lower^ 
class is, in structural terms, in a similar position to blacks and other 
ethnic minorities in Western societies. Thus, the same own-group 
devaluation and outgroup identification may be present in the lower-class
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childreni(-. However, since class is not a concept made visible and 
emphasised by the dominant agents of socialisation, we should expect less 
class awareness than race awareness. Studies by Stendler (191+9) and 
Jahoda (1959), involving subjects aged 6-15 and 6-10 years respectively, 
showed that,as expected, children were able increasingly to differentiate 
between different social classes as they developed. Jahoda*s experiment 
is more interesting in that it suggests that class awareness may be 
present at an earlier age than we assumed. Warner (191+9) divided his 
subjects (aged 10-12 years old) into four classes; Upper Middle (U.M),
Lower Middle (L.M), Upper Lower (U.L) and Lower Lower (L.L).
Significantly, children from the U.M. group were chosen more frequently 
by others as ’best friends’. The exception to this were the L.L. class 
children, who tended to choose ’best friends’ from their own group. In 
rating each other on various traits, the subjects showed most preference 
for members of the U.M. group, followed by the L.M. group, the U.L. group 
and, lastly, the L.L. group. , ‘
Changing Self-Esteem
Early studies showed the self esteem of certain ethnic groups to 
be ’negative’. More recent studies (of which Genesse et al., 1978, is 
one of the latest) seem to show this self-esteem has changed to ’neutral’ 
or sometimes ’positive’. Adam (1978) has argued that it is not the self­
esteem which has changed, but the values and expectations of researchers 
themselves. He claims that to understand the change in findings 
concerning ethnic self-esteem studies, we must look to the ’subterranean’ 
dialogue not immediately apparent in the study reports themselves. This 
dialogue reflects the shift in partisan positions which the researchers 
adopted. Contemporary researchers, he argues, have obscured and so
“A corresponding assumption has been made by researchers exploring locus 
of control. From Rotter’s work,we may expect that individuals who are 
restricted by environmental barriers and feel subjected to limited, 
opportunities would develop an externally orientated view in life. As 
expected, it has been found that negroes and lower-class individuals generally 
have higher external scores than whites and middle-class individuals (Battle 
and Rotter, 1963; Lefcourt and Ludwig, 1965). Coleman et al., (1966) report 
that negroes and other ethnic minority children are more externally 
orientated than whites.
i2h
redefined the self-esteem concept that their findings are incomparable 
with those of early researchers (see also critical replies to Adam, 
by Simmons, 1978, and also Pettigrew, 1978).
Conclusion to Section 7
Children become aware of ethnic differences by about the age of 
four, A few years later^they show consistent preferences between these 
groups. The preferences they have are not necessarily based on 
knowledge, the affective and cognitive.components of their attitudes 
towards other groups often do not correspond. Children belonging to 
negatively evaluated groups have been found to 'misidentify' and favour 
the high status outgroup acting as a relevant comparison group. These 
children seem to be applying the social rules they have acquired,in an 
attempt to improve their own social identity. Recognising these social 
rules is one step towards changing them.
CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER IV
When viewed from the standpoint of traditional intergroup 
theories, the ease with which discriminatory intergroup behaviour arises 
is surprising. The mere presence of a relevant comparison group and 
identification with an ingroup seem to be sufficient for the occurrence 
of this behaviour. Interdependence, interpersonal similarity, 
contradictory goals, scarce material rewards - these are aZIl factors which 
increase discriminatory intergroup behaviour,once social categorisation 
has been introduced. But they are not in themselves sufficient or 
necessary for its occurrence.
The manner in which the social world is structured depends on the 
strategies a group adopts in order to best cope with its social and 
physical environment. In important ways, language both manifests and 
limits social reality. Social factors influence the way in which the 
social environment is structured. In particular, the boundaries of, and 
elements contained within, a social category will be influenced by social 
rules and interpreted according to social meanings. Such rules and 
meanings seem to be in some cases acquired very early in life.
Man acts in an intentional and directional manner. He imposes 
structures on the social environment and creates social categories.
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Through this act he defines the social world and his place within it.
Social categorisation on the basis of language, inter-personal 
similarity, race and ethnicity, have been reviewed. On each of these 
criteria a group may evolve only when individuals identify themselves 
as members. It is subjective identification with a group, and not 
objective definitions of it, which establish its existence.
Identification is more likely to take place when membership of a group 
will jjTiprove the social identity of an individual.
We have reviewed instances when identification with what is 
’objectively* described as an outgroup has taken place. This underlines 
the dynamic nature of man’s intergroup behaviour. An individual is able 
to define and re-define his own position, ’placing’ himself in a group 
which is, objectively defined, an outgroup to him. His intention by this 
action is to achieve a more favourable social evaluation,by being a 
member of a more highly evaluated group. We should expect the same 
dynamic behaviour under certain experimental conditions. The most 
important requirements for such conditions being (i) that the individual 
views the outgroup to be more highly evaluated than the ingroup and,
(ii) that he is allowed the freedom to identify with the outgroup. 
Experiments meeting these requirements were carried out by us and are 
reported later.
Social categorisation on the basis of minimal interpersonal 
similarity is more likely to occur when the relationships between 
individuals is defined by more than two levels of similarity. One reason 
for this might be that only when there are more than two levels of 
similarity defining interpersonal relations can both minimisation and 
differentiation arise from the social categorisation process. The 
boundaries of the categories derived will be influenced by social rules.
The strength of identification which takes place with the ’ingroup’ derived 
will depend partly on the salience which the criterion for interpersonal 
similarity has for the individual.. In conditions where only one criterion 
is used and it represents one of the few social cues guiding social action, 
it is likely to be perceived as highly salient. We report two experiments 
meeting these conditions, where interpersonal similarity was, as predicted, 
the basis for social categorisation introduced by subjects.
The importance which an individual or a group gives to a phenomenon
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depends partly on the part it plays in maintaining or improving his/ 
their social evaluation. In several areas, especially stereotyping and 
inter-ethnic relations, apparently trivial bits of information are given 
high significance in order to bolster a particular image of a person or 
a group. Differences between an ingroup and an outgroup may be based 
on highly trivial or fictitious information. But these differences, if 
they are the only ones present, may be given high importance in order 
to accentuate group differences.
In the same manner, ’trivial ’ differences between groups in the 
minimal group studies were given high importance by subjects. This is, 
because they represented the only differences between groups and were one 
of the few guides to social action. We referred to evidence suggesting 
that when a trivial interpersonal similarity criterion is present on its 
own, it might have the same influence as an important similarity criterion 
present on its ox«jn in an identical setting. Correspondingly, we report 
an experiment involving two criteria for social categorisation, one of 
high and one of comparatively low salience. Each of these was introduced; 
independently as the only criterion for social categorisation in. identical 
settings. We hypothesised that the two criteria would have the same 
influence on intergroup behaviour.
In conclusion, we should place a greater eirç>hasis on the more 
dynamic aspects of behaviour in experimental intergroup settings. 
Particularly in relation to two areas of behaviour.
Firstly, how the subjects define the groups and their place among 
them. Secondly, how the subjects ascribe meaning to intergroup 
differences.
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Chapter Five
THEORIES OF INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR:
FROM EXPLANATORY CONCEPTS TO AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY
General Introduction
This chapter is in two main sections. In the first section, we 
discuss some of the concepts which have been introduced by social psychol­
ogists to explain various aspects of intergroup behaviour. The work of 
Sherif (1967), Deutsch (1973), Rokeach et al.,(l960), and a number of 
researchers representing the 'new social psychologies' are considered.
The explanatory concepts these researchers have introduced do not con- , 
stitute a 'theory' of intergroup behaviour, whether we consider the con­
tribution of researchers individually or as a whole. The first 'integrative' 
theory of intergroup behaviour appears to have«been developed by Tajfel 
and his associates. This theory is discussed in the second section of 
this chapter. Certain elaborations of this theory are suggested.
The Range of Explanatory Concepts
There is a wide range of concepts which have been introduced by 
social scientists to explain intergroup behaviour. This diversity arose 
partly through the fact that researchers have focussed on different 
topics within the general area of intergroup behaviour, and partly through 
the fact that sometimes researchers from different branches of the social 
sciences have studied the same topics. For example, two different topics 
which have received much attention are ethnocentrism and conflict 
(cf. Billig, 1976; Deutsch, 1973; Le Vine and Campbell, 1972; 1
: Smith, 1971); while aggression is an example of a topic 
which has been studied by researchers from very diverse fields (cf.
Dawkins, 1976, p. 71 - 9^; Malinowski, 19^1). However, sometimes the 
same explanatory concepts have been emphasised by researchers from 
diverse fields. For example, the innate character of aggression is 
assumed by ethologists (Ardrey, 1966; Lorenz, 1966; Tinbergen, 1951) as 
well as by some social psychologists (Marsh, 1975).
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Part One; Explanatory Concepts Introduced by Social Psychologists
Most of the concepts,introduced by social psychologists to explain 
intergroup behaviour share some or all of the following four important 
characteristics (the work of Tajfel and his associates is the most import­
ant exception to what follows). Firstly, they tend to emphasise the 
rationality of intergroup behaviour. Secondly, they tend to neglect 
ideological factors. Thirdly, they tend to lack the dynamism required to 
explain both behaviour which is positively biased towards the ingroup, as 
well as behaviour which is positively biased towards the outgroup.
Finally, they tend to neglect the issues of identity and identification.*
There are three sections to this part of the chapter. In section 
(a ), we describe some of the concepts introduced by social psychologists 
to explain intergroup behaviour. In section (B), we point out some of the 
major weaknesses of each concept, with reference to the four character­
istics described above. In section (C), we consider the possible con­
tributions of the 'new social psychologies' towards the explanation of 
intergroup behaviour.
A) Description of Some Important Concepts Introduced to Explain 
Intergroup Behaviour
Sherif
The most important 'explanatory' concept to emerge from the work 
of Sherif is that of 'superordinate goal'. Sherif hypothesised that :
"When conflicting groups come into contact under conditions embodying 
goals that are compelling for the groups involved, but cannot be achieved 
by a single group through its own efforts and resources, the groups will 
tend to co-operate towards this superordinate goal" (1967, p. 88).
Sherif pointed out the most important features of his definition of 
superordinate goal in this way:
"Our definition of superordinate goal emphasises that it is unattainable 
by one group, singly; hence, it is not identical with a "common goal".
* Another important feature of these concepts is their tendency to
emphasise intra- and inter- personal processes,rather than inter-group 
processes (cf. Billig, 1976).
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Another implication of the definition is that a superordinate goal super­
sedes other goals each group may have, singly or in common with others; 
hence, its attainment may require subordination of either singular or 
common goals" (1967, p. 88)
The boys in Sherif»s experiments were in different groups and 
seemed intensely hostile to the idea of intergroup co-operation. The 
development of a competitive atmosphere and scarcity of material rewards, 
it seems, led to intergroup conflict. By creating a setting in which both 
groups recognised that only through combined effort would they achieve a 
common goal, ’peace* and intergroup co-operation was achieved.
Deutsch
Deutsch (1973) assumes that the way to replace intergroup conflict 
by intergroup co-operation is to improve understanding between groups, to 
reach a situation in which parties can perceive each other's point of view. 
He distinguishes between destructive and constructiveyproductive conflict. 
The former has a tendency to escalate and develop in a way so as to become 
divorced from its intial causes. He identifies three interrelated processes 
which lead to the escalation of this conflict : "(i) competitive processes 
involved in the attempt to win the conflict; (ii) processes of mispercep­
tion and biased perception; and (iii) processes of commitment arising out 
of pressures for cognitive and social consistency" (1973, p. 352').
Whereas destructive conflicts lead to consequences which satisfy none or 
only some of those involved, constructive/productive conflicts lead to 
consequences which satisfy most or all those involved (1973, p.17).
The implications of Deutsch's analysis is best clarified by his 
account of the Vietnamese war. He sees America's involvement with the 
war as not arising from "any large strategies or moral purpose" (1973, 
p. 357), but from some kind of 'error'. He describes America as having 
"stumbled into the conflict in South Vietnam" (1973, p. 357). The decision 
to remain and increase American involvement is described by him as being 
on an assumption "...with which we are familiar in connection with the 
psychology of gambling" (1973, p. 357). At every step, Deutsch neglects 
the ideological issues and concentrates on criticising actions as though 
they were part of a 'game', involving chance, errors and misunderstandings/ 
understandings.
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The Anticipated Belief Differences "Theory"
The anticipated belief differences "theory" of prejudice (cf.
Hyland, 1974) also shares an important element of ’rationality’, assuming 
a rational link between (attributed) belief and prejudice. It has been 
hypothesised that similarity of belief,rather than similarity of race, 
determines prejudiced behaviour (Rokeach et al., I960). This view has 
received s o m e  experimental support (Byrne and Wong, 1962; Stein et al.,
1965) and has been contradicted by some other findings (Boyanowsky and 
Allen, 1973; Triandis et al, 1966; Triandis and Triandis, 1960). Its 
most relevant implication for our discussion is the prediction that once 
belief is manipulated, there will be a corresponding change in prejudice. 
Thus, belief becomes a rational basis for prejudiced behaviour, while the 
path to ending prejudice involves the task of working out what people
believe about others and changing these beliefs.
The Gaming Approach
The 'gaming' experimental approach in social psychology also en­
tails a strong element of 'rationality'. The problem which researchers 
set themselves is that of establishing strategies by which errors in 
judgement can be recognised and corrected. Billig (1976, p.182) has 
distinguished between two contrasting schools of gaming research:
"The war games and the peace researchers". The former are often funded 
by militaiy establishments to investigate "problems of strategy and con­
flict behaviour". Conflict and aggression are thus accepted as an essential 
part of their models. The peace researchers, in contrast, "hope to 
abolish warfare, rather than make it more efficient" (Billig, 1976, p. 182)
But both these schools share the assumption that man acts rationally in
order to achieve maximum profit from a situation. There is, therefore, 
an implicit ideological element present in the approaches adopted by 
these schools.
Ethnocentrism
The final concept we consider has probably had the greatest in­
fluence on the approach of social scientists to the explanation of inter- 
group behaviour (cf. Campbell, 1965; Le Vine and Campbell, 1972). When 
Sumner (1906) introduced the concept of 'ethnocentrism', he explained 
it thus:
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"Ethnocentrism is the technical name, for this view of things in which one’s 
own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated 
with reference to it . . .Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, 
boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt 
on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the right ones, and if 
it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn . 
ethnocentrism leads people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their 
own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others." 
(p. 13).
Various facets of the 'universal* syndrome of ethnocentrism have, 
been outlined by Le Vine and Campbell (1972). We shall not discuss these 
facets, but simply make one important critical comment. The concept of 
ethnocentrism only refers to positive bias towards the ingroup, it does 
not explain or predict behaviour which is positively biased towards the 
outgroup. A great deal of evidence exists to suggest that positive out^ 
group bias does occur (cf. Chapter 4).
B) Major Weaknesses in the Concepts Discussed
We introduced four critical comments which were described as being 
wholly or partly relevant to each of the concepts introduced by social 
psychologists to explain intergroup behaviour. These critical comments 
focussed on, firstly, an emphasis on rationality; secondly, the neglect of 
ideology; thirdly, the lack of flexibility; fourthly, the lack of concern . 
with identity and identification in groups. In the discussion below, we 
shall demonstrate the relevance of these critical comments.
Ideology and Rationality
When we introduce ideology and consider groups whose interests, 
as defined by their respective ideologies, are contradictory, the 
'rational' approaches of Deutsch, (1973), Sherif, (1967) and others are 
severly tested. The conflict situation may not have arisen in Vietnam, 
as Deutsch (1973) implies, through misunderstandings and judgement errors. 
On the contrary, the parties to the conflict may understand each other's 
viewpoint very clearly. However, they may aim at achieving a conflict 
situation,exactly because they see the other's viewpoint correctly as 
being contradictory to their ideological position. Chomsky (1973) thus
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rejects the view that it was misunderstandings or errors in judgement 
which led to the Vietnamese war. In contrast to Deutsch (1973), he points 
to the conflicting ideologies of the two parties which led to systematic 
strategies of conflict.
The 'rational* approach for solving intergroup conflict proposed 
by Sherif (1967) involves the recognition and adoption of superordinate 
goals by the groups involved. Again, the assumption is that the ideol­
ogical position of the groups allows them to work for the 'common good'. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it assumes that there is a 
'common good' which can be defined,given differences in ideology. If 
one of the groups of boys in Sherif's experiments had resolved to exploit 
all situations to the benefit of itself only, what would have been the use 
of making appeals for the 'common good'? In fact, Sherif reports that there 
was a tendency for some boys who were in the best positions in the comp­
etitive situation to tiy to maintain the characteristics of that situation. 
This kind of behaviour, if intensified under more realistic intergroup 
settings, may lead to one group conceiving its goals and interests as 
distinct from other groups. When a condition is reached that one group 
bases its strategy towards outgroups on an ideology emphasising and just­
ifying domination and exploitation in its own favour, then the very notion 
of a superordinate goal becomes impractical, if not meaningless.
The anticipated belief differences "theory" implicitly assumes that 
prejudice arises through a rational process ; the point of departure of this 
process being a mistaken attribution of the beliefs of another individual 
on the basis of this other individual's group membership. The implication 
is that we can end prejudice through educating people to realise that a 
person's beliefs do not necessarily depend on his group membership. When 
people realise that members of outgroups do not necessarily hold different 
beliefs to the self, it is assumed that people will not be prejudiced to­
wards others on the basis Of their outgroup membership.
Two critical comments are relevant at this stage. Firstly, the 
implication of the anticipated belief differences "theory" seems to be 
that we can educate people to not be prejudiced towards those who are 
mistakenly assumed to hold dissimilar beliefs to the self, but in the 
case of prejudice which is towards those who are correctly assumed to 
hold dissimilar beliefs, we can do nothing. Secondly, this theory does
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not take into consideration situations where the members of a dominant 
group are prejudiced towards the members of a minority group because of 
the fact that they want to exploit the minority group and ensure that it 
remains in an inferior position. Exploitation and prejudice need have 
nothing to do with attributed beliefs.
The 'gaming' experimental approach to the study of intergroup 
behaviour is based upon an implicit ideology. This approach assumes that 
people act with the intention of maximising profit from a situation. The 
implication is that individuals and groups act primarily in their own in­
terests, and to the detriment of the interests of others. However, the 
issues of exploitation and domination of one group by another remains implicit 
in this approach.
Identity and Identification
The issues of identity and identification have been generally neg­
lected by psychologists studying groups and intergroup behaviour (cf.
Chapters 1 and 2). The explanatory concepts we discussed above (part (A)) 
all reflect this fact.- What has been termed 'realistic conflict theoiy' 
(R.C.T.) (Campbell, 1965) also neglects the issue of identification in 
groups. Freud is probably one of the few psychologists to have given
much importance to the issues of identity and identification when dis- 
.cussing groups.
The basic proposition of R.C.T., which was probably initiated by 
the Sherifs in social psychology, is that intergroup conflict is caused 
by real conflict of group interests. But in order that these real con­
flicts become salient, the individuals must first identify themselves as 
group members and view their own interests as corresponding to those of 
the group. How such identification arises, when the individual might be 
alternatively acting in terms of social mobility, is an issue little dis­
cussed in R.C.T. Although, it is recognised that intergroup competition 
enhances group cohesiveness and co-operation (eg. Fiedler, 1967). Real 
conflicts of group interest also tend to increase attachment and intensify 
identification with the ingroup (Sherif, I967). But, as Tajfel and Turner 
(In Press, p.2) have pointed out, this identification with the ingroup 
"has been given relatively little prominence in R.C.T. as a theoretical 
problem in its own right."
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The Need for a Dynamic Theory
Among the important aspects of intergroup behaviour which have 
been neglected are, firstly, positive bias towards an outgroup and, 
secondly, negative bias towards the ingroup. Freud is the most prominent 
writer to have given importance to these issues. Other writers have 
tended to concentrate on explaining behaviour which is positively biased 
towards the ingroup.
Two questions arise at this point. Firstly, should we view neg­
ative ingroup behaviour and positive outgroup behaviour as important? 
Secondly, if these areas are important, why have they been neglected?
In response to the first question, we argue that negative, ingroup behaviour 
and positive outgroup behaviour are important - particularly when viewed 
from the position of the minority group. Under certain conditions, the 
members of a minority group might act in favour of the dominant outgroup, 
to the detriment of the interests of the ingroup and the self. Through 
this action, they might help to maintain their own inferior position. We 
return to this theme in Chapters 6 and 7*
In response to the second question noted above, we might argue 
that the issues of negative ingroup bias and positive outgroup bias have 
been neglected partly because those who have been conducting social re­
search have been from dominant groups, both in terms of class and ethnicity. 
This does not mean that we are proposing that a conspiracy has taken place, 
with researchers helping to keep minority groups suppressed. What does 
seem to have occurred, however, is that researchers have focussed on issues 
which are seen as 'problems' from the point of view of their ingroup. The 
fact that researchers have been members of dominant groups has meant that 
certain issues have not been viewed by them as problematic and worthy of 
research. For example, there has been a general concern with achieving 
peace and unity, rather than conflict and independence. There has also 
been an emphasis on ethnocentrism, rather than negative ingroup behaviour 
and positive outgroup behaviour - the latter being problems faced by min­
ority groups.
The emergence of researchers who are members of minority groups will, 
hopefully, lead to a concern with issues which are defined as problematic 
from the point of view of minority groups. It is evident from the writings'
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of Freud that his experiences as a member of a minority group — more 
specifically, as a Jew living in Europe during the 1920*s and 1930's - 
had important influences on his approach to intergroup behaviour. As 
we noted, he was one of the few psychologists to emphasise the issues of 
identity and identification, as well as negative ingroup bias and positive 
outgroup bias.
G) The New Social Psychologies
This is a relevant point at which to consider the potential con­
tribution of the 'new social psychologies' to intergroup behaviour. They 
are represented by the ethnogenic, ethnomethodological and symbolic inter- 
actionist approaches (Blumer, 1969; Denzin, 1970; Garfinkel, 1967, 1972; 
Harre, 1972, 1974, 1976; Harre and Secord,'1972; Marsh et al., 1978; Stonq 
and Farberman, 1970; Turner, 1974; Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970). Billig
(1977) has clearly described certain inadequacies in the new social psy­
chologies. These inadequacies are highlighted when the topic of research 
is one such as fascism. That is, when we are dealing with a group which 
seeks to exploit and manipulate the situation and is not concerned with 
presenting an 'open soul'. The strategy of 'sympathetic understanding' 
does not lead us very far when the ideological basis of action is neg­
lected - and when it is exactly this ideology which leads our 'subjects' 
of enquiry to deceive us.
Marsh and his colleagues (Marsh et al,,1978) produced one type of 
research which we might expect to emerge from the new social psychologies. 
We are not here so much concerned with his emphasis on the innate nature 
of aggression or on male bonding, (cf. Tiger, 1971); but with his insist­
ence on keeping implicit the political issues and standing outside the 
wider social spectrum. This is not to say that the account which he pro­
duces of ritual aggression is without value. We briefly discuss below 
what role such accounts, with their emphasis on rules and norms, can play. 
But the role of these accounts will remain limited unless researchers con­
sider the source of social norms, rules and meanings.
Billig (1977, p. 420 - 421) notes that, "The ethnogenists and the 
symbolic interactionists would seem to presume that there are agreed-upon 
rules and norms for social behaviour/ He criticises this approach, suggest­
ing that It reflects ". . . the tendency to view social behaviour in terms
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of consensus, rather that conflict" (p. 420), and that it assumes that -
. . there is a commonplace everyday world, which is viewed as non- 
problematic' (p. 420). A possible confusion is entailed in this crit­
icism, although the general issue Billig raises is an important one.
Firstly, there does seem to be a tendency for social psychologists 
to see conflict as necessarily destructive and to seek to remove it; - 
see the debate initiated by PI on (Chadwick-Jones, 1976; Deutsch, 1974; 
Lemaine, 1976; Nemeth, 1974b;Plon, 1974 a, 1974 b), also Deutsch (1973,
p. 359). Assuming that we accept that conflict may also be constructive,
should this be a barrier to viewing social behaviour in terms of shared 
understandings and rules? We have not claimed that the interests or 
ideologies of agents are similar; or that they would not be in conflict; : 
only that they may tend to agree about what meaning a situation has and 
the kind of behaviour which is 'normal' in it. . Secondly, such agreements 
about meanings, norms and rules may come about through conflict. We argue 
that the nature of the meanings, norms and rules salient in a situation
may reflect the power structure of the context.
Thus, Billig may be justified in criticising the new social psy­
chologies for viewing social behaviour in terms of consensus rather than 
conflict, but this criticism should not lead to a rejection of the con-
of
ceptsirules and norms, since they may also play an important part in a 
model which views social behaviour in terms of conflict. A ruling group 
may ". . . have the power and resources to shape the ideology of the 
subordinate group" (Billig, 1976, p. 262). The rules and norms salient 
for the subordinate group may be part of this ideology. It is important . 
to explore whose interests these rules and norms serve. This issue the 
new social psychologies neglect.
Of relevance to the above point is the criticism concerning "the 
lack of social theory in the new social psychologies" (Billig, 1977, p. 421) 
An emphasis on interpersonal interactions and micro-units of social behav­
iour has meant that macro-social processes, which are a significant aspect 
of social psychology, are neglected. It is exactly this neglect which 
has led to an emphasis on social rules, norms and everyday understandings, 
without a similar concern for the wider social forces which influence the 
evolution of these phenomena. Thus, Marsh's account of football supporters
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tells us about the ’theatrical performance’ of the football crowd, the 
rules of performance, the ritual display of courage. While the import­
ance of football for the working classes is noted, among other issues, he 
does not consider the significance of football in the wider social structure, 
how its importance has evolved in relation to political structures, and 
the implications of the ’innate’ theory of aggression which he advocates.
We have argued that researchers should concern themselves with the 
source of social rules and meanings. This is particularly important from 
the point of view of the minority group when its members are behaving 
positively towards the.dominant outgroup and negatively towards the in­
group. In such situations, the minority group members may misidentify 
their interests as being the same as the outgroup and dissimilar to the 
ingroup. We present an example of the failure of the ’new’ social psy­
chologies to deal with such an issue below.
Harre (1976) reports a study in which people in Britain were asked 
to explain why they had bought a foreign car. The classification of res­
ponses to this question created four categories. Firstly, there were those 
who were not aware of the economic consequences of their ’act’, the ’dead 
ignorant’. Secondly, there were those whose economic knowledge did not 
allow them to see the economic situation and the consequences of their ’act’ 
clearly, the ’truly irrational’. A third group were those who bought a 
foreign car to rebuke the labour Unions, the 'Union bashers'. Fourthly, 
there were those 'who used the car as a symbol of public repudiation of 
their loyalty or commitment to the whole of society . . .' (p. 51). This 
information might provide a useful basis for a full investigation of certain 
issues. For example, what are the characteristics of the 'Union bashers'?
Are many of them from the working class? If so, how is it that they have 
come to see their interests best served by 'bashing' the Unions? What 
are the principle sources of their information and ideas about the Unions? 
Which groups do they see as serving their interests? Do these groups with 
whom they identify and support have interests which conflict with those 
of their ingroup (working class)? These are among the many issues which 
might be investigated,using the initial account gathering activity rep­
orted by Harre as a point of departure. This account gathering activity 
IS what does occur prior to many research studies and is sometimes referred 
to as a 'pilot' investigation.
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Part Two; Tajfel's Theory of Intergroup Behaviour 
Introduction
The work of Tajfel and his associates has led to a revision of our 
ideas about the required conditions for the establishment of groups and 
the occurrence of discriminatory behaviour (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). Social 
categorisation per se was shown to be a sufficient and necessary condition 
for such behaviour. The early writings of Tajfel and his associates reflect 
their reliance on the notion of ’generic norms’, derived from Sumner’s 
concept of ’ethnocentrism’, as the basis for an explanatory model of inter­
group behaviour (cf. Billig, 1972). The findings of Turner (1975 a, 1975 b) 
and the recognition of the importance of positive outgroup bias led to 
the development of a more dynamic theoretical model (Tajfel, 1974 a, b; 
Tajfel and Turner, in press; Turner, 1975^. A brief outline of this model 
is given below.
The ’Integrative * Theory
Categorisation is conceived of as a basic cognitive tool which 
allows the individual to structure the social environment and define his 
place in it. The knowledge that he belongs to certain groups and the value 
attached to group membership, in positive and negative terms, represents 
the individual’s social identity. This component (ie. social identity) 
forms an important part of the self-concept. It is hypothesised that 
individuals wish to belong to groups which compare favourably with other 
groups and which lead to positive evaluation for themselves. Through 
intergroup comparisons individuals will come to view their own group as 
psychologically distinct and, in relation to relevant comparison groups, 
they will try to make the ingroup more favourable. The attempt to achieve 
a comparatively superior position for the ingroup,on the basis of valued 
dimensionsjis the essential factor leading to discriminatory intergroup 
behaviour.
The dynamic nature of this theory becomes apparent when it deals 
with situations involving potential social change. Change will be desired 
by individuals whose group memberships provide them with an inadequate 
social identity. ’Inadequate’ in this context refers to either a neg­
ative social identity, or a social identity which is not as positive as
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one which the individual is satisfied with. Members of the dominant groups 
will want to maintain or extend their comparatively superior position. 
Members of the subordinate groups will wish to achieve some change in the 
intergroup situation, so that their social identity is improved compar­
atively. These contradictory aims result in competition and conflict, 
with a move by one group being met by reactions from other group(s).
Since only through social comparison is social identity meaningful, it 
IS the relative position of groups which is important and contradictory 
goals^re seen as an essential aspect of the intergroup situation.
Apart from inadequate social identity, the presence of perceived 
cognitive alternatives to the present intergroup situation is also re­
quired in order that a strategy for achieving social change is embarked 
upon. Unless members of the subordinate group are aware of cognitive 
alternatives, they will not attempt to act upon their dissatisfactions and 
change their intergroup situations. Whether or not such cognitive alter­
natives are perceived is influenced by two factors. Firstly, the extent . 
to which individuals believe the present intergroup situation can be 
changed and their position on the hierarchy can be altered (stability - 
instability). Secondly, the extent to which the present intergroup sit­
uation and hierarchy is seen as just and fair (legitimacy - illegitimacy).
When a group with an inadequate social identity does perceive cog­
nitive alternatives to the present intergroup situation and hierarchy, 
four different strategies for achieving change may be adopted. Initially, 
a group may attempt to become absorbed in the dominant group. This re­
quires complete cultural and psychological change. A second strategy 
might be to redefine the previously negatively evaluated characteristic 
of the group so that it is now positively evaluated (eg. Black is beautiful) 
A third strategy involves the creation or adoption of new dimensions for 
intergroup comparison and evaluation. Dimensions which had not been used 
and on which the group has a greater chance of defining itself more pos­
itively. And the final strategy involves direct competition with the 
dominant group. That is, a negatively evaluated group may challenge the 
position of other relatively positively evaluated groups in the status 
hierarchy. All four strategies, adopted by a group with inadequate social 
identity, will lead to the dominant group(s) reacting and adopting strat­
egies to maintain or improve their dominance.
l4o
When individuals do not perceive cognitive alternatives to present 
intergroup positions, they will do nothing to change their group situations 
but may well adopt individualistic strategies to improve self-position. .
An individual may attempt to 'exit' from the group and join a more pos­
itively evaluated group. This is the strategy of social mobility, but 
is only possible when 'exit' is available as an option (cf. Hirschman,
1970, 1973, 1974). If exit is not possible, the individual may compare 
himself with others within his own group (inter-personal, intra-group 
comparisons). This kind of comparison is less likely to lead to an un­
favourable evaluation for the individual.
Social Mobility and Social Change
This account of intergroup behaviour places considerable import­
ance on whether the individual perceives as possible social mobility or 
social change. Social mobility consists of a ". . . subjective structur­
ing of a social system (however small or large the system may be) in which 
the basic assumption is that the system is flexi^ble and permeable, that it 
permits a fairly free movement of the individual particles of which it 
consists" (Tajfel, 1974 b, p. 5). Social change is at the other extreme 
of ". . . the subjective modes of structuring the social system in which 
the individual lives. It refers basically to his belief that he is enclosed
within the walls of the social group of which he is a member; that 
he cannot move out of his own into another group in order to improve or 
change his position or his conditions of life; and that therefore the 
only way for him to change these conditions (or for that matter, to resist 
the change of these conditions if he happens to be satisfied with them) is 
together with his group as a whole, as a member of it rather than as some­
one who leaves it" (Tajfel, 1974 b, pp. 5-6).
•In the introductory chapter we referred to the political implic­
ations of these concepts. Social change necessarily involves intergroup 
confrontation; since, one group's efforts to improve its position 
vis-a-vis the dominant group(s) will be met by a reaction from those at­
tempting to maintain or increase their superior group position. Social 
mobility, in contrast, does not threaten the relative positions of groups. 
It is more likely to strengthen the dominant groups and weaken the sub­
ordinate ones, since the more able individuals will leave the latter to
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join the former. The Comprehensive School system which the Labour party 
is keen to establish in Britain assumes its importance exactly on the basis 
of this reasoning. The Grammar and Direct Grant Schools, it is thought, 
allow social mobility for the most gifted working class children, who sub­
sequently become part of the middle classes and are uprooted from their 
original class loyalties.
The Active Individual and the Source of Social Values
The basic theoretical outline developed by Tajfel and his associates 
seems to have extensive explanatory powers. However, there are at least 
three ways in which we believe that this account might be usefully sup­
plemented.
1) Firstly, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the active way in 
which social categories and meanings are imposed by people on the social 
environment. Given that the individual wishes to be evaluated highly, he 
is likely sometimes to impose structure on the social environment in order 
to achieve this aim, rather than to accept definitions of the position of . 
others and himself. The individual will ascribe meanings and significances 
to what may appear to be trivial criteria in order to establish a salient 
basis for group differentiation. Thus, the fact that social catégorisa^ 
tion on a minimal basis led to discriminatory inter group behaviour may be 
viewed as an indication of how a trivial phenomenon is ascribed signif­
icance and meaning^when the phenomenon is required to assume an important 
role in intergroup differentiation.
In order to demonstrate the active role of the individual in im­
posing social categories and ascribing significance and meaning to appar­
ently trivial phenomena , we introduce experimental settings in which 
subjects have the opportunity of structuring the social environment on the 
basis of a minimal interpersonal similarity criterion or criteria.
2) The second way in which we attempt to supplement Tajfel's theo­
retical account of intergroup behaviour is by considering more closely 
the source of social values and introducing the concept of false con­
sciousness. In this way, we believe the explanation of outgroup bias and 
ingroup devaluation may be particularly extended. The shared social under­
standings and expectations which play an essential part in the experimental
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setting have been referred to by Tajfel (1972). The assumption that 
social status and esteem of groups and individuals is evaluated accord­
ing to generally accepted value systems plays an important part in his 
work. However, the source of this value system and the dominant influences 
on the social rules and meanings, which are the basis of shared under­
standings and expectations, have received relatively little attention from 
him. In situations where an individual devalues his own group and is pos­
itively biased towards the outgroup, attention to the source or main in­
fluences on his system of evaluation, rules and meanings, is particularly 
pertinent. The concept of false consciousness,we feel,helps explain 
differences between what Billig (1976) has referred to as a ’group-in- 
itself compared to a 'group-for-itself’. It is, however, important to 
specify clearly what we mean by the term 'false consciousness' and how we 
believe it may describe a link between social forces on the macro-level 
and social action on the macro- as well as micro-levels. This term has 
become almost meaningless through diverse usage. We discuss the issue of 
false consciousness further in Chapter 6 and J.
3) Emphasising Social Mobility on a Purely Psychological Level
A third way in which we believe we may usefully supplement Tajfel's 
theory of intergroup behaviour is by placing greater emphasis on social 
mobility which occurs on a purely psychological level ('reference'). This 
type of social mobility has been noted by Tajfel; but it has not, we believe, 
been given sufficient attention. It is from the point of view of the 
minority group which this type of social mobility is of the greatest im­
portance. This is because through 'psychological' social mobility, 
minority group members might act in the interests of a dominant outgroup 
and to the detriment of the ingroup, when it is impossible for them to 
exit from the ingroup and/or join the outgroup in the material sense.
It may be recalled that, according to Tajfel, when individuals 
do not perceive cognitive alternatives to the present intergroup situation 
but do have an inadequate social identity, they may attempt to change their 
individual position by, among other strategies , the strategy
of social mobility. Exit from the present ingroup and membership of an 
outgroup may be achieved in many different ways and on diverse levels.
For example, a person may not be able physically to leave a group, but. _
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this does not prevent him from identifying with an outgroup.
Psychological exit from a group and membership of an outgroup may 
be defined in terms of the actualisation of two possible events. Firstly, 
disassociation of self identity from the ‘ingroup’. Secondly, the assoc­
iation of self-identity with the outgroup. The actualisation of these two 
possible events will lead to an identity shift, also involving a change 
in group loyalties. Given that (i) physical exit from an ingroup is poss­
ible or not possible and, (ii) physical membership of the outgroup is 
possible or not possible, we have a situation where an identity shift only 
improves the position of the individual, objectively speaking, in certain 
circumstances :-
Conditions Physical Exit 
From The Ingroup
Physical Membership 
Of The Outgroup
1 Possible Not Possible
2 Not Possible Possible
3 Not Possible Not Possible
4 Possible Possible
Only in condition (4), when physical exit from the ingroup and physical 
membership of the outgroup are both possible, will an identity shift lead 
to improved self position. In the other conditions,the individual will 
be favouring an outgroup to which he can not physically belong. The 
material benefits of this discriminatory act will thus be received only 
by others. Such discrimination is likely to be self-defeating, since it 
may result in outgroups receiving scarce resources,while the ingroup may 
remain relatively impoverished. It is specifically to describe this type 
of discrimination that we introduce the concept of false consciousness.
False Consciousness Defined-: For our limited purposes, false conscious­
ness is defined as being present when an objectified social reality in­
fluences individuals to act in the interests of the outgroup, to the 
detriment of the ingroup. We assume that social reality is constructed 
in important ways by dominant power groups for subordinate ones. In this 
way the black children in America and, as more recent work showed (Chapter
4) black children in Britain, tend to favour the dominant white power group 
In a similar manner,we postulate that Americans will represent a positively'
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evaluated outgroup for Iranians and experimentally test this postulate.
In some situations,an individual may be objectively more similar 
to an outgroup than an ingroup, but be prevented from physically joining 
the former or leaving the latter. Whether or not the individual favours 
the ingroup or outgroup in such situations will, we postulate, depend . 
partly on the salience of his similarity ’bond* with the two groups. In 
one experiment we test this postulate by varying the similarity relation­
ship of subjects with the ingroup and outgroup on high and low salience 
criteria.
Conclusion to Chapter Five
The concepts introduced by social psychologists to explain inter­
group behaviour have tended to share four weaknesses. Firstly, they have 
emphasised rationality. Secondly, they have neglected ideology. Thirdly, 
they have neglected the issues of negative ingroup bias and positive out­
group bias. Fourthly, they have neglected the issues of identity and 
identification in groups. Linked with this fourth point is the failure of 
researchers to predict the findings of the minimal group studies, when 
social categorisation per se led to intergroup discrimination and (we 
assume) identification with the ingroup.
Rules and meanings influence intergroup behaviour, they help the 
individual decide what type of situation he is in and what kind of behav­
iour is appropriate in a situation (we further explore these issues in 
the next chapter). It is important to consider the source of rules and 
meanings, especially from the point of view of minority groups. The 
’new’ social psychologies have failed to concern themselves with such 
’macro’ social issues.
Tajfel’s theoiy of intergroup behaviour is ’integrative’ in so 
far as it emphasises social as well as psychological phenomena. The 
individual’s wish for favourable evaluation becomes translated into mean­
ingful action within a social evaluation system which is salient for him. 
Tajfel’s theory is dynamic in the sense that it predicts situations in 
which ingroup and outgroup favouritism, as well as intergroup conflict, 
may arise. Certain elaborations of Tajfel’s theory were suggested and 
are discussed further in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE ACTIVE INDIVIDUAL AND THE 
NORMATIVE AND EVALUATIVE SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Introduction
In the previous chapter we suggested that Tajfel’s theory of inter­
group behaviour might be usefully elaborated in three ways • Firstly, by 
placing greater emphasis on the active way in which individuals categorise 
and ascribe meaning to the social environment. Secondly, by exploring the 
rules and meanings which influence intergroup behaviour - as well as the 
source of these rules and meanings. Thirdly, by placing greater emphasis 
on social mobility which takes place on a purely psychological level. In 
this chapter, we discuss these three issues^ but particularly attend to the 
first two. The issue of psychological social mobility is discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter (chapter 7, section 3).
The discussions in the present chapter are highly relevant to the 
five experiments we carried out and report later. These experiments were 
all concerned with the active individual. More specifically, two experiments 
explored the ways in which individuals actively structure the social 
environment and seem to define their own place favourably in the social 
structure. A third experiment explored the ways in which individuals actively 
ascribe importance to a social phenomenon in order to achieve a meaningful 
basis for intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism.. The final two 
experiments aimed to demonstrate social mobility on a purely psychological 
level in a situation involving two groups which were of comparatively high 
and low status. In these experiments the subjects were assumed to be active 
in defining the situation, structuring the social environment, ascribing 
meaning to phenomena and defining the position of the self in relation to 
others. These assumptions, and others, are discussed in the next two chapters.
The present chapter is in three main sections. In section one, under 
the title of ’the active individual’, we discuss social rules and meanings, 
intentionality and social comparison. In section two, under the title of 
’the normative and evaluative social systems’, we further discuss social 
meaning, the objectification of social meaning, and social rules. In 
section three, we discuss the sources of and influences on the normative 
and evaluative social systems. -
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1.0) The Active Individual
1.1) Social Comparison
In an atteirpt to achieve favourable social identity, individuals 
might actively ascribe high significance and meaning to apparently ’trivial’ 
phenomena which differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup. Social 
comparison on the basis of group membership, or on an individual level, may 
take place on any criterion which serves the purpose of ingroup/outgroup 
differentiation and positive ingroup evaluation. This statement may ■ 
contradict Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes (195i|), 
which restricted itself to comparisons of opinions and abilities. But it 
does not contradict the evidence which has accumulated to suggest that social 
comparisons are probably in terms of more than simply opinions and abilities 
( Hakmiller, 19665 Kinch, I9685 Marvis, 19725 Miyamoto and
zoope.r
Stanford, 19^6; QuarentelliA,19665 Sherwood, 196^5 Schmitt, I9665 Thornton 
and Arrowood, I9665 Wheeler, 1966), The evidencè seems to support Singer’s 
(1966) suggestion that, "People do not compare with others in order to 
evaluate only an opinion or ability. Implicitly, they are also evaluating • 
their opinion of themselves. In the general case, they are evaluating their 
self-esteem" (p.l05).
The link between self-esteem and social comparison is further 
strengthened by evidence which suggests that people are more likely to seek 
social comparison if .they believe that the outcome will not be harmful to 
their self-esteem (CoNOiiey et al., 19785 Ellsworth and Carlsmith, I9685
Ellsworth et al., 19785 ' _ ; iZimbardo
and Formica, I963), This link was neglected by Festinger, who focussed 
mainly on the person’s information -seeking activity and its assumed aim of 
achieving accuracy through comparison. Festinger did not consider the role 
of self-esteem enhancement or defensiveness against self-derogation (cf.
Jones and Rèyan, 197b).
Festinger’s assumption that social comparison is a less preferred 
means of self-evaluation than ’objective comparison’ and is only used when 
objective comparison is not available (19^ b, Hypothesis II) has been severely 
tested by Miller’s (1977) findings. This assumption had led to the view 
that objective and non-social information influences the behaviour of subjects 
confronted by social pressures, so that they are better able to resist social
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forces of change (Geller et al, 1973; Mistra, 1973). Miller (1977) showed 
that in certain coditions social, rather than objective, comparison is 
preferred for establishing the relative position of the self. The 
distinction between so-called ’objective’, non-social bases for comparison 
and social ones is not always useful, and certainly not as significant as 
Festinger assumed. Social reality itself may become objectified, so that 
it represents for the individual just as ’objective’ a basis for social 
comparison as non-social reality.
Festinger’s (I95b) view that individuals will prefer to compare 
themselves to similar rather than dissimilar others has received some 
support (cf. Sulls and Miller, 1977). The ways in which others should be 
similar has received some attention (Goethals and Barley^ 1977; Sulls et al., 
1978; Zarina et al., 1975). By making comparisons between self and others 
who are within a certain range of similarity, the likelihood of achieving 
more accurate self-assessment is, according to Festinger, increased.
However, an alternative explanation, which we adopt, is that comparisons 
with more similar others are preferred because they are less likely to lead^  
to unfavourable social evaluation. Group polarisation may be partly the 
outcome of social comparison processes which lead individuals to move nearer 
to positions which are seen as more highly evaluated (cf. Sanders and Baron, 
1977). The perception of relevant others for comparison was demonstrated 
in the minimal group situation by ■ > Turner!*(forthcoming). This seems
to represent one of the few elements of Festinger’s (195b) theory which has 
survived criticism.
Festinger (195b) concerned himself oniy with individual comparisons, 
Tajfel has argued that social identity becomes meaningful through social 
comparison processes and thus intergroup comparisons are important also. 
Festinger concerned himself only with comparisons of opinions and abilities 
on which, it was hypothesised, people need to evaluate themselves. The 
motivation for such evaluations, he argued, being the need to reduce 
uncertainty and achieve accuracy in self-evaluation. Evidence suggests that 
social comparisons involve much more than opinions and abilities. We have 
argued that they may involve any criterifln which may be used for group 
differentiation and favourable ingroup evaluation. Furthermore, it is the 
wish to achieve favourable evaluation, rather than accurate self-assessment^ 
which is the principle motive behind social comparisons. This motive 
influences all social comparisons, not just those concerning abilities.
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Festinger’s fourth hypothesis ("There is a unidirectional drive 
upward in the case of abilities which is absent in opinions") seems also 
to be invalid. The hypothesis is based on the assumption that, "No opinion 
in and of itself has any greater value than any other opinion" (Festinger, 
195b^ PP. 12b~125). Objectively, this assumption may be valid. However, 
subjectively, it is invalid. If a person did not value one opinion more 
than other opinions, he would not adopt it and act on it. From the 
individual’s subjective viewpoint, opinions must have differential value.
That similar, rather than dissimilar, others are preferred for 
social comparison, so that a range of "comparison relevance" may be said to 
exist, is thus one of Festinger’s (195b) conceptions which has received 
experimental support. But it is important to note that we are speaking 
in probabilistic, rather than absolute terms. For example, a member of the 
working class is more likely to compare his financial position with that of 
members of his own class,or of the middle class,’rather than the upper class. 
But he could compare himself with the upper class if he so wished.
We have argued that Festinger’s model of social comparison processes 
is too limiting. A more flexible model of these processes is required.
The flexible model would take into consideration the ability of individuals 
to compare themselves to others on any basis they wish to choose; also, their 
possible desire to be highly evaluated on any and every criteria in order to 
achieve a favourable position. In making comparisons, the individual is 
actively seeking to achieve a favourable self-image, not necessarily an 
accurate self-image.
1.20) Social Rules and Meanings
1.21) Introduction
Experiments are not conducted in ’social vacuums’ (Tajfel, 1972).
We assume that the most important characteristic of subjects in any 
laboratory experiment is that they are intentional and will seek social cues 
in the situation to guide their actions. The task of the experimenter is to 
ensure that social cues are provided by experimental variables which have 
been accounted for, and not by what Orne and others have called the ’demand 
characteristics of the situation. Consistent recognition and interpretation 
of social cues across subjects is only possible when common rules and 
meanings influence their behaviours.
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1.22) The Intentional Subject
The subject in the experimental laboratory is not a passive being 
waiting for outside forces to influence him, he actively seeks information 
and plans action. He has the capacity for intentional and purposive 
behaviour. As Brentano’s term ’reference to an object’ implies, psychic 
activity must be in reference ^  something, i.e. no hearing without something 
heard, no believing without something believed, etc. But besides indicating 
a relationship between the subjective and objective world, the concept of 
intentionality underlines the general ability of humans to have intentions 
(cf. May, 1969, Ch.9).
1.2-3) Intentions and The Meaning of a Situation
One important aspect of intentional social behaviour seems to be the 
identification of the.social meaning of the situation which represents the 
immediate context for action. Once this recognition has been achieved, it 
has further implications for intentional behaviour. Harre (197b, p.255) 
comments, "We must be able to identify the social meaning of a situation 
before we can properly act on the appropriate rule". This implies and 
assumes that there are social rules indicating the kind of behaviour which 
is more appropriate for each situation , It also implies and assumes that 
people do recognise differences between types of situations and their meanings.
The assumption that people recognise types of situations and 
differences in their meanings is entailed in the work of other writers, 
especially phenomenologists. For example, Franz From (l97l) places emphasis 
on ’ type-awareness ’, which can be described as a person perceiving a given 
activity as belonging to a certain class which requires a particular type of 
behavioural response. The nature of this ’type’ and the response it requires 
is, to some extent, culturally determined. Ethnomethodologists also give 
importance to how people differentiate between ’stages’ or ’types’ of 
(everyday) situations.. For example, Schegloff and Sacks (197b) explored how 
people come to mutually define and recognise the end of telephone 
conversations. The closing stage of the conversation.could be conceived of 
as independent in itself, with distinct initial and final sections. Harre’s 
concept of a social episode reflects a similar approach, in which shared 
understandings of the social meaning of a situation play an important part.
The social episode has been conceived of as a natural unit of
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interaction ( Harre and Secord, 1972). The boundaries of this
unit are concensually derived and appropriate behaviour within it is,to 
some extent at least, culturally determined. On investigating the social 
episode researchers have placed importance on non-verbal aspects of 
behaviour (Argyle, 1969; Mehrabiah, 1972), while cultural definitions of an 
episode have only recently received attention (Forgas, 1978).
The corresponding concepts of ’social episode’, ’situation type’, or 
’stage’, only become meaningful when the concepts A’social rules’ and ’norms’ 
are introduced. That is, there has to be some conception of and agreement 
about what normally occurs, and what should occur, in a given situation , 
before what is perceived as appropriate social behaviour may be initiated. 
Actions which are normal for a situation and those which depart from the 
norm are distinguishable (cf. Jones and Davis, 1965).
In interpreting the behaviour of subjects.in the minimal group studies, 
certain assumptions about the subjects’ intentional and interpretative 
behaviour have been made. These assumptions have all been based on the bias 
shown by subjects. Firstly, it has been assumed that subjects perceive the 
social situation as being of an intergroup type. Once subjects attribute 
this meaning to the situation it is assumed, secondly, that their intention 
becomes one of achieving a more favourable position for the ingroup. To 
explain this consistent intention, it is again, we argue, useful to 
introduce the idea of ’normal’ behaviour and the social rules which guide it. 
That is, subjects recognise the situation as belonging to a ’type’ (cf. Franz 
From, 1 9 7 1 ) which normally entails a particular kind of behaviour. This 
recognition is based on common understandings, "... Group life consists of 
acting units developing acts to meet the situations in which they are 
placed.... through previous interaction they develop and acquire common 
understandings of definitions of how to act in this or that situation. These 
common definitions enable people to act alike... since ready made and 
commonly accepted definitions are at hand, little strain is placed on people 
in guiding and organising their acts" (Blumer, .1969, p.187).
Symbols may play an important part in communicating to the individual 
the social meaning of a situation. Firth (1973, p.15) comments, "The essence 
of symbolism lies in the recognition of one thing as standing for 
(re-presenting) another.... the relation is such that the symbol by itself 
appears capable of generating and receiving effects otherwise reserved for
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the object to which it refers". Adopting this approach, the minimal 
group studies imply that social categorisation may in certain conditions 
act as a ’symbol* indicating an ’intergroup situation’. The subject is 
aware of the kinds of rules which are relevant to the situation indicated 
by the symbol. The rules provide guidelines for behaviour in the inter- 
group setting. The guidelines can be ignored, but they are more likely to 
be followed.
2.0) The Normative and Evaluative Social Systems
The normative social system refers to what ’regularly’ occurs and the 
rules which influence this regulation. The evaluative social system refers 
to the dominant system of values which, in any given situation, significantly 
influence the value component of social meaning. We elaborate on this point 
below. '
2.1) Social Meaning
The meaning ascribed to a phenomenon may entail two components : one 
functional and the other evaluative. The first refers to the purely practical 
role of the phenomenon. For example, the car as a means of transportation.
The second aspect of a meaning refers to its evaluative component. For 
example, the car as a status symbol. A meaning ascribed to a phenomenon need 
not entail both these components. The car may be viewed only as a means of 
transport, or only as a status symbol. However, it might only be in theory 
that these two components are separable.
There need be no logical link between the evaluative and functional
components of a meaning. This is clearly demonstrated in the realm of
fashion. For example, a survey of the development of human body decorations
in different cultures (Polhemus, 1978) or costumes (Lister, 1967) or, more
specifically, shoes (Wilson, 1974) or hats (Amphett, 1974), demonstrates how
some of the most impractical articles came to be the most highly valued. The
evaluation of these articles seemed to be in respect of their symbolic
importance mainly. A certain type of shoe, for example, may ’represent’
wealth, status, breed ing, and be an indication of social position. The tie
has been used in a much more specific manner to indicate group membership 
(Laver, 1968).
Groups which are functionally similar or identical may be 
differentially evaluated. Apart from experimental support for this statement '
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(Blake and Mouton, 1961a, 1961b, 1962b«Bass and Dunteman, 1963; Harvey,
1956; Johnson, 196?; Sherif, 1967), there are obvious and important 
examples in the ’real’ world. The differences between the British Tory 
and Labour parties, in the late 1960s particularly, were felt by some to 
be minimal. Football teams often function in identical ways, as reflected 
in their results, but receive intense support from followers who insist 
that their team is the best and also different.
2.2) The Objectification of Social Meanings
In what follows, we are mainly concerned with the value component 
of social meaning. This is determined mainly by the social evaluative 
system dominant in the situation. The social evaluative system is part of 
the ’objectified’ social reality. By describing a value system as 
objectified, we do not imply that it is static, universal or independent.
What this term implies is that those perceiving this value system as salient
may relate to it as if it represented objective truth.-x-
Social reality and the evaluative system it entails confront the 
individual as social fact. This is manifested by shared understandings and 
expectations of what might and should occur in a given context and how 
events and their circumstances should be evaluated. Such factors as group 
salience for the individual, the personal relevance of behaviour, the 
cooperative or competitive nature of the situation as perceived by the 
individual, how the individual scores on a personality measure such as the 
’Mirels-Garrett Protestant Ethic Scale’, are all factors which will possibly 
affect the diverse ways in which individuals behave in an intergroup setting 
(as suggested by our interpretations of — Boise and Sinclaire, 1973; 
Greenberg, 1978; Jones and DeCharms, 1957; McKillip et al., 1977;
Mirels and Garrett, 1971). But these possible effects of individual 
interpretations are only important in a reductionist analysis of intergroup 
behaviour. That is, an analysis seeking explanations at the intra- and 
inter- personal levels. It is the shared and objectified social reality 
that interests us here, since it helps to explain general values and 
systematic group behaviour.
% e  are reminded here of Vaihinger’s (1924) theory of the ’As If’.
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2.3) Social Rules
2 .31) Introduction
The concept of social rules and the assumed influence of rules in 
social behaviour is not new (cf. Collett, 1977). Although the »new social
psychologies’ all place importance on social rules, they treat the concept
differently (cf. Billig, 1977). In this discussion we firstly explore the 
’plasticity’ of rules (changes in and violations of), then distinguish 
between two major types of rules: constitutive and regulative.
2 .32) Rule Violation and Social Evaluation
An important requirement of a social rule, in contrast to a 
scientific law, is that it can be violated. Although in most contexts, 
especially ’formal’ ones, strict adherence to social rules is required 
(cf. ’table etiquette’, Allen, 1915; dinner party etiquette. Anon, I872),
this does not mean that such requirements are alfrays met.
The very fact, however, that a social rule exists suggests that there 
are expectations and evaluations influencing behaviour in the setting. That 
is, it is expected that individuals abide by a relevant rule and that 
infringement of this expectation, without perceived justification, may lead 
to a negative evaluation of the individual who is perceived to be infringing 
rules. We would generally expect that people would want to define their 
action as being in accordance with, rather than in contradiction to, relevant 
social rules. In situations of uncertainty, the safest course to take might 
be to define action as being similar to that required by the social norm.
This view seems to be supported by evidence produced by Codol (1975) in 
support of what he calls the ’superior conformity of the self’. When an 
individual compares himself with others in (what we describe as) the 
’uncertainty’ of the experimental setting, there seems to be a tendency to 
view the self as being more in conformity with social norms relevant to the 
situation than other people tend to be.
What is termed ’rebellious’ behaviour does not mean behaviour not 
influenced by rules; but behaviour which is influenced by an alternative set
of rules. Status-seeking behaviour (cf. Packard, 1959) will change, 
depending on how definitions and criteria for status are altered. For example, 
by developing a normative and evaluative social system which was in important 
ways contradictory to that of ’jriainstream’ industrial societies, the Hippies "
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could adopt alternative goals and behaviour patterns and yet,to some 
extent,avoid the stigma of failing - according to ’normal* criteria 
(Pitts, 1969). Carey (I968) points out that for the ’Head’, who is the 
regular drug user, "... identity does not come from the usual sources in 
American society: socioeconomic status, educational achievement, age, or 
race" (p.158). He describes an elaborate alternative normative and 
evaluative system which is no less rich and possibly no less restricting 
than that rejected by the Hippies, but which they adopted as better meeting 
their alternative needs and goals.
2.33) Changing Rules
A requirement of a rule which is stressed by some writers is that 
it be capable of change (cf. Waisemann, 1965). One way of clarifying the 
transience of social rules is to conduct a historical analysis - we give 
some examples below. Baldick’s (1965) history of duelling reflects not 
only changes in the rules influencing those specifically involved in the 
duel, but also peripheral characters and social classes. In his historical 
account of romantic behaviour, Owen (1975) explores how the concept of love 
and the rules guiding the behaviour of lovers and those surrounding them 
have altered. Newman’s (1968) account also suggests that what was 
recognised as love by ’courtly lovers’ and the rules guiding this recognition, 
were very different from what they are today in the West. Just as drastic 
a change has occurred with respect to the social rules concerning war 
(Barnie, 1974). In one sense the rule may be viewed as arbitrary, since it 
is one of many possibilities which may be relevant to a situation and it may 
be neglected and another adopted in its place.
We do hot infer that those adopting a rule will necessarily see it 
as arbitrary. On the contrary, social rules are often viewed by society’s 
members as objective and irreversible - sometimes holy. Certain rules are 
also seen by some social scientists as somehow universal and essential to 
social existence. For example. Winch (1972) considers truthfulness to be 
such a universal rule. Although social rules allow an individual to lie in 
certain conditions, a society whose rules advocate lying constantly is not 
seen as being viable by Winch.
2.34) Constitutive and Regulative Rules
An important distinction has been made between constitutive and
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regulative rules (Kant, I78I; I96I). A constitutive rule functions in a 
definitional manner. It indicates what an action is and what meaning it 
has according to a specific set of criteria. In the game of cricket, for 
example, the constitutive rule specifies what action meets the criteria 
of being ’caught out’. But it is only within a system of rules that a 
constitutive rule becomes meaningful. Thus, to catch the ball when it comes 
directly from the bat iN cricket, has different meaning from other situations 
in which the ball is thus caught.
A regulative rule does not define, but regulates and guides action. 
Thus, if a team of ladies is playing cricket against a team of gentlemen, 
a regulative rule might be ’gentlemen should not catch out a lady before 
she has made a run’. While constitutive rules have the property of 
equivalence (A counts as B; if ball is caught the man is out); regulative 
rules have the property of regulation (if A, then B). But it is a 
regulation which can be broken and it usually dobs change (if A, then B, C, 
...N). In the simple formulation of the regulative rule (if A, then B), the 
term ’then’ is narrowing possibilities rather than describing certainties. ;
Regulative rules become functional through the definitional role of 
constitutive rules. This definitional role involves the establishment of the 
meaning of a situation or an entity (an action or an individual) in the 
situation. Once this meaning is established, the kind of action appropriate 
to it is provided by regulative rules. This is a similar point to the one 
which we made when discussing the issue of ’social episodes’, ’sets’ and 
’situation types’. In the example of the gentlemen vs. ladies cricket game, 
the constitutive rules help the gentlemen to decide what kind of behaviour 
is appropriate by establishing who is a lady. Once their opponents are 
recognised as ladies, gentlemen conduct themselves in a manner they see as 
appropriate. .
An essential point to note, before we move on to Part Three, is that 
social rules imply.’correct’ and ’appropriate’ behaviour. A book such as 
Edwards and Beyfus’s (1969) ’guide to modern manners for the 1970s’ under­
lines this fact. This does not mean that we have to define a social situation 
in the expected manner, or decide what is appropriate action for such a 
situation as suggested by social rules. But it does suggest that negative 
more likely to be made of an individual following deviatory
action.
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These ideas have important implications for behaviour in the 
experimental context. Firstly, on the basis of the social cues present, 
the subject will decide what kind of a situation he is in. For example, 
the subject might identify with certain others and view himself to be in 
a group with them. If he also perceives an outgroup, he might view the 
situation as an intergroup one. Secondly, the subject might perceive 
certain rules to be relevant guides to behaviour in the situation he is in. 
Thirdly, the groups which are perceived might also be perceived as having 
certain social values attached to them. These values would influence 
behaviour, assuming that subjects desire to belong to favourably evaluated 
groups. In the next section, we discuss the sources of and influences on 
the values and rules which might influence intergroup behaviour.
3.0) Sources of and Influences on the Normative and Evaluative Social
Systems' '
3 .1) Introduction •
We have noted that individuals ' and groups may act in a manner which 
favours the interests of others to the detriment of themselves. We considered 
the case of social mobility on a purely psychological level, with no 
possibility of either physical exit from the ingroup or physical entrance into 
the outgroup, or both. We now turn to briefly consider some sources of and 
influences on the normative and evaluative social systems which result in 
such seemingly self-defeating actions.
3 .2) The Evaluater and The Evaluated
As regards the description of rules as ’prescriptive», Collett (1977) 
has commented, "This does not imply that they have some mysterious 
autonomy of their own which enables them to pass judgement on the deeds of men. 
Rather, what is meant is that prescriptive rules specify ’correct’ or 
’ appropriate ’ procedures, and that the members of a community which upholds 
a rule will, as it were, reserve for themselves the right to evaluate the 
performance of those individuals whom they take to fall within its 
jurisdiction" (p.8). He proceeds to make the very important claim that,
"... the community which evaluates need not be the same as that class of 
persons to whom the rule refers" (p.8). The significance of this claim lies 
in its implication that a community may have the power to create evaluative 
systems and to instigate evaluations which have influence on others, but 
not necessarily itself. This suggests a dominant-subordinate relation . 
between the evaluater and the evaluated.
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Four possible types of relationships are distinguished between 
a community (evaluators) which is evaluating "^ according to a rule it 
upholds and a class of persons (evaluated) who are viewed as being within 
the jurisdiction of the rule. These are illustrated below, with the 
community represented by squares and the class of persons who are viewed 
as falling within the jurisdiction of the rule represented by circles 
(from Collett, 1977).
(1) (2)
Correspondence • Class Inclusion
(3) (h)
Community Inclusion Separation
In the cases of relationship types 'community inclusion* and. 
'separation* (3 and 1;) there is likely to be a dominant-subordinate 
relationship between the groups. That is, the evaluaters will probably 
be in some respects the more powerful, since they can impose their 
evaluations on another group, but remain outside the influence of this 
evaluative system themselves. Such relationships are not uncommon, "... 
it is true in many respects that men make the rules for women in our 
society... white for black.., Foreign born ... (obey rules made).... by 
Protestant Anglo-Saxon majority... The middle class makes rules that the 
lower class must obey... in the schools, the courts, and elsewhere" (Berker, 
196It, p.17). The normative and evaluative social systems are affected by 
dominant power groups in a manner which is more likely to perpetuate their 
dominance. •
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3.3) The Value Component of Meaning and the Social Category
We noted (Introductory Chapter) that psychologists have 
emphasised the 'functional' and 'productive' aspects of groups. We have 
since argued that there is no rational link between the functional and 
value components of social meaning. The value component of the social 
meaning of a group is mainly determined by its power to influence the 
normative and evaluative social systems dominating a society in its own • 
favour. To a lesser extent, the value component of the social meaning of 
a group is determined by the group's ability to function as a productive
unit. The case of women is a good example. It is not a greater rate of
production, but more an intensity of propaganda affecting the norms, 
values and rules related to them, which is changing their position (cf.
Adams and Laurikietis, 1976a, 1976b, 1976c; Allen et al, 1971;; Beauvoir,
1972; Comer, 197U^  ^ , Morgan, 1970, 197^; Rowbotham, 197Ü; Weldon,
1973).
Groups of people are evaluated as groups and do stand in the social 
hierarchy as groups. To avoid being linked with negatively evaluated, groups, 
an individual may avoid members of such groups (Blalock, 196L, p.Ul). The 
mass media are a major factor helping dominant groups maintain their relative 
superiority. They are also a factor which may help to perpetuate stereotypes 
and ascribe negative values to certain groups.
3oU) The Mass Media
The mass media may be used to propagate the differential evaluation 
of groups. The negative evaluation of women through the mass media has
been critically examined (cf. Adams and Laurikietis, 197i|a, Berger, 1972;
Haskell, 1973; Johnston, 1973; Milium, 1975). Of more direct relevance to 
this thesis is the Western domination of mass communications systems and its 
effects on non-Western groups (since one of our studies involves Iranians 
and Americans). This issue is discussed in detail by Tuns tall (1977) in his 
work 'The Media are American: Anglo-American Media in the World". It is 
apparent that Westerners, particularly Americans, have come to dominate the 
mass media on a world-wide scale. Even Communist Societies are to some 
extent influenced by the images, values and meanings beamed out.
Referring to Iran, Tuns tall (.1977) notes that "... there is heavy 
importing of Anerican TV series and films. Imports accounted for about 
70 per cent of programming in 1972..." (p.2^7). The intensive efforts made
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by the Iranian Government to get televisions into even the most remote 
villages has resulted in such imports having a wide impact. But it is 
not just in television, cinema and the radio that Americans are dominating 
the media. This is occurring in printed communications also to some 
extent. A recent survey (Air Khayhan, 12 April, 1978) revealed that the 
circulation of some Western magazines and newspapers is so large (Newsweek 
and Time alone sell 30 thousand copies, disregarding the numbers ordered 
privately from abroad) that it exceeds the circulation of some important 
local papers.
A significant finding of this survey is that not all those who buy 
foreign journals and newspapers can properly read them. The report of the 
survey implies that people buy these goods in order to appear more 
Westernised. The same kind of motive may explain the popularity of the 
foreign language newspapers printed in Iran, the English-speaking television 
and radio stations and the general effort to achieve a Western lifestyle.
If we regard educational systems as part of the mass media, it is relevant 
to note the popularity of American Schools and the 'Americanisation* of the 
universities.
We are not advocating a simplistic notion of Western values imposing 
themselves on Iranians. An essential feature of the situation is the 
eagerness of dominant Iranian groups to embrace Western lifestyles. Despite 
recent reports in the Western press, based on invalid interpretations of 
social upheavals in Iran, claiming that Iranians are mainly against 
Westernisation, progress in Iran is perceived simply in terms of how 'modern* 
the Country has become.
In important ways, the wish by Easterners to become 'Westernised' 
is comparable to the wish by the working classes to join the middle classes.
In both instances the wish for change is only meaningful within the framework 
of a dominant value system which defines the hierarchy of groups, so that 
'working class' and 'Eastern' are less favourably evaluated than 'middle class' 
and 'Western'.
This dominant value system is not necessarily relevant to the 
traditional areas of behaviour within groups. We noted the findings of 
Cooper et al., (1977)^  for example, demonstrating that when a technological 
topic was discussed, Arabs were more influenced by an argument presented in
i6o
Hebrew than Arabic, and Israelis were more influenced by an argument 
presented in English than Hebrew, but this was not thé case when the issue 
was a traditional one.
The importance of the dominant value system is that it affects the 
outcome of intergroup comparisons. The result being, in the case of a 
member of the working classes or an Easterner, the high likelihood of an 
inadequate social identity for the individual. This outcome seems to lead 
many working class people to identify with the middle classes (cf. Alford, 
1973; Butler and Stokes, 1971; Chamberlain and Moorhouse, 197^; Gamble,
197U; Gray, 1975; Mackenzie, 1973; McKenzie and Silver, 1968; Moorhouse,
1973). But,in the majority of cases,this remains only what we described 
as 'identification on a purely psychological level', with physical exit from 
the ingroup and entrance to the outgroup not being achieved. We hypothesise 
that this same foim of 'psychological' social mobility will be manifested by 
Iranians. This assumes two things. Firstly, that the dominant evaluative 
system for Iranians is one which leads to an inadequate social identity for 
them when Americans are the relevant comparison group. Secondly, that such 
intergroup comparison, on the basis of this dominant value system^ may be 
experimentally evoked.
In conclusion, we have argued that dominant groups might create rules 
and values which are relevant to other classes of people, but not necessarily 
to themselves. Furthermore, they might influence the normative and 
evaluative social systems,so that their superior position in the hierarchy 
is maintained or extended. The mass media, which are controlled by dominant 
groups, are a major tool for achieving this end.
Conclusion to Chapter 6
We had earlier defined a group as existing when individuals identified 
with it and saw themselves as group members. We have argued that,in certain 
cases, an individual may identify with an outgroup on only a psychological 
level. In such cases, since the individual may not physically be part of the 
outgroup, his favouritism towards the outgroup is not only of benefit to 
others, but may be detrimental to the self. We report two experiments which 
test the existence of this kind of 'psychological' social mobility. The first 
involves experimentally created groups, the second real national groups.
l6l
Billig uses the teim *groups-for-themselves' . to describe groups 
whose ideology accurately reflects their material conditions, and the 
term *groups-in-themselves' to describe groups whose ideology reflects a 
false consciousness. Our discussion of whether individuals identiiy with 
the ingroup or with an outgroup to which they can only belong on a 
psychological level, reflects the same concern. Such 'mis-identification», 
which is detrimental to self interests, must be considered in view of 
wider social processes. As Billig (1977) states, "... identification is not 
Individual act which takes place within the individual's psyche and which 
can be understood purely in tenns of intra-individual psychological processes" 
(p.323). We have suggested that the efforts of dominant groups to influence 
the normative and evaluative social systems, so that their superiority is 
perpetuated, is one crucial aspect of the wider social issues affecting 
identification.
We described the individual as active and*intentional in defining the 
social world and ascribing meaning to it,so as to favourably define the self. 
We present three experiments testing this general proposition. More 
specifically, two experiments test in minimal conditions the hypothesis that 
subjects will introduce social categorisation and initiate intergroup 
discrimination themselves on the basis of interpersonal similarity relation­
ships. A third experiment in this series tests the hypothesis that when two 
^^Iteria for social categorisation are introduced in identical settings 
independently, they will have similar effects on intergroup discrimination, 
even though they are of different levels of importance when considered 
together in a single context. In the next chapter, we provide a cohesive 
outline of the general context of these experiments.
162
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE EXPERIMENTS AND THEIR CONTEXT
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the general 
context of the experiments we carried out and report later. There are 
five sections in this chapter. In the first section, we outline our 
general model of the active individual in society. Throughout this section 
we shall refer to the critical discussions of literature which took place 
in the previous chapters. In the second section, we indicate how the 
experiments we carried out were concerned with exploring three particular 
features of the active individual. In the last three sections, we discuss 
in more detail the three particular features of the active individual which 
we explored. These final sections deal with psychological social mobility, 
the structuring of the social environment and the attribution of meaning 
and importance to the basis of social categorisation.
1) The Superordinate Position of Identity in our General Model of the
Active Individual in Society
A diagrammatical representation of our model of the active individual 
in society is presented in figure (lO). The code numbers 1 to 15 refer to 
particular features of this model.
We assume that from the moment of birth (ii) the individual is actively 
engaged in structuring the social environment and defining the position of 
others and himself within it. The categorisation process plays a principle 
part in this structuring. The categorisation process seems to have certain 
outcomes which occur consistently, both when the phenomena being categorised 
are social and when they are non-social. Between-group differentiation and 
within-group minimisation (of differences) seem to be the most important 
consistent outcomes of the social categorisation process (cf. Chapters 3 and
h).
The issue of identity plays a superordinate role in our model of the 
active individual in society. The search for self-identity is assumed to be 
a central concern for all individuals. This concern is universal and is 
reflected in the intellectual tradition of the West, as well as the East.
We discussed this issue in the introductory chapter. In reviewing the 
definitions of group, intergroup behaviour and intergroup relations, we noted
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that the issues of identity and identification have been ignored by 
psychologists studying intergroup and group behaviour (Chapter 2). A 
crucial aspect of the individual^ s identity is dependent on the 
characteristics of the groups he is seen to belong to, by himself and 
others. Group membership has important influences on self-identity, because 
the individual is often, if not always, assumed to share certain 
characteristics with others in his group. This assumption might be
objectively invalid, and often is so. In criticising the doctrine of
’nominal essences’, we argued that the members of a group need not share a 
unique characteristic which is not possessed by any other groups or 
individuals. However, subjectively, people tend to act on the assumption 
that a person who is nominally assigned to a group must share a characteristic 
which is unique to that group. Stereotyping behaviour (which we discussed in 
Chapter entails such an assumption.
The individual is born within a social structure which is identifiable, 
in theory at least (l). This social structure has particular characteristics 
as regards social stratefication and the distribution of power. The social 
groups which an individual is born ’into’ can be positioned in the social 
hierarchy on the criteria of power, wealth, status, among others. Such group 
memberships will have profound influences on the subsequent behaviour of the
individual, even though he had no choice as to which groups he was born into# 
Some sociologists would argue that the individual’s position in the social 
structure and his membership of certain social groups will be the most 
prominent influences on his behavioiur. This is a point of debate. But what 
does seem to be established beyond doubt is that individuals are aware of 
their group memberships very early in life (Chapter i;).
A dominant ideology is assumed to exist within society (2). This 
ideology is created and propagated by the dominant social group. The model 
of social reality propagated by the dominant ideology serves the interests 
of the dominant group. But this does not mean that we are adopting a 
’conspiratorial* model, with all the agents of the dominant group assumed to 
be intentionally creating a false ideology as one means of suppressing the 
subordinate group. This view is too simplistic and does not consider the 
influence of the material conditions of society. We agree with Brook and 
Finn (1977) when they describe ideology as being determined by the material 
conditions in society, and go on to state that, "We would not disagree that 
certain aspects of working class ideology are representations of the
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interests of the ruling class, though we would take issue with any 
suggestion that this is done conspiratorily" (p.125). Whether the 
construction of social reality is a conspiratorial act or not, to perceive 
the objective social reality,the individual must firstly recognise the 
misleading nature of the views propagated by the dominant group.
An important aspect of the dominant ideology is the social evaluative 
system it establishes as salient in society. The social evaluative system 
not only defines the criteria on which social phenomena are evaluated, but 
also the values which should be ascribed to each phenomenon. In Chapter 6 
we argued that a dominant group might establish social rules which 
influence the behaviour of others, but not necessarily itself. In the 
area of intergroup behaviour the dominant group influences behaviour, 
among other ways, by establishing rules which influence the relative 
evaluation of the groups involved in the interaction. These evaluations 
influence the behaviour of individuals, assuming that individuals desire 
to belong to favourably evaluated groups.
We argued that individuals desire to be favourably evaluated 
(Chapter h) • This desire might be socially derived or possibly instinctive 
(6). We assume that this desire is particularly influential in the process 
of identification with groups, it helps to explain why individuals want to 
belong to some groups more than to others. Throughout the process of 
socialisation, while social reality is being acquired, constructed and 
interpreted, the social status of various groups is also being learned.
We discussed several accounts of the possible stages through which the child 
develops the social knowledge required in order to take part in intergroup 
behaviour (Chapter Ig.). One crucial aspect of such development is that the 
affective components need not, and often do not, develop on the basis of 
cognitive components.
Intergroup attitudes might be rationalised, but they are not always 
’objectively’ logical and based upon factual information. What children 
seem to acquire primarily are the biased attitudes of those around them 
towards other groups. They do not learn facts about these other groups 
firstly and then develop attitudes on the basis of factual information 
secondly.
Language plays a key role in the socialisation process (8). Language 
provides not only a system of communications, but also a perceptual frame-
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work through which a world might be viewed. As Wittgenstein (1921:1971) 
put it, "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". There 
is no ’natural’ universal way of structuring the environment and defining 
the world. We discussed the proposition, central to semiology, that the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified is an arbitrary one 
(9 and 10). Groups develop views of reality to help them cope with their 
environment and to suit their social structure, not necessarily to 
establish objective truth.
We argued that there need not be a logical, or indeed a rational, 
relationship between the functional and evaluative components of social 
meaning. We cited the example of fashion as an area in which the values 
attached to a phenomenon need not be logically related to its functional 
characteristics. In the same way, the values attached to social categories 
(12) need not be logically linked,to either the basis for social 
categorisation,or the functional characteristic^ of the category. It is 
the dominant ideology which has greatest influence on establishing such 
values.
One way in which we might explain some aspects of social behaviour 
might be to gather accounts of the rules and meanings which people perceive 
to be relevant and which might influence their behaviour in a given 
situation (13). For example, we might gather accounts which reveal some of 
the rules and meanings influencing an individual in defining an outgroup 
and the appropriate behaviour towards it. But such an account gathering 
exercise should be viewed as a preliminary step in the research act only.
Far more important might be the investigation of the source of such rules 
and meanings, for example (3). This source might be the dominant ideology. 
This dominant ideology might act to create a false consciousness (15), so 
that the individual fails to perceive the conflict of interests ’objectively’ 
present between his and other groups. He might mis identify his own interests 
as being similar to that of the outgroup’s and not the ingroup’s. We 
further discuss this issue in part 3 of this chapter.
The process of identification with groups continues throughout the 
life cycle (ll|). The nature of identification and the groups with whom 
the individual identifies are likely to vary at different stages during 
this cycle. Groups are used as crucial reference points when the 
individual is defining the position of the self and others in the wider 
social structure. This is one factor, among many, ensuring that the
i6t
identity of the individual is partly dependent on groups.
2) The Active Individual
The five experiments we carried out and report later all explored 
features of the active individual. In addition, experiments IV and V 
concerned psychological social mobility. Experiment III concerned the 
attribution of meaning and importance to a basis for social 
categorisation. The other two experiments (I and II) concerned the 
structuring of the social environment.
The individual actively constructs and interprets social reality.
The experiences he shares with others ensures that this construction and 
interpretation takes place within certain limits so that social conformity 
occurs to a significant extent. In figure (11) we indicate the ways in 
which the five experiments to be reported explore certain characteristics 
of the ’active’ individual.
In the first two experiments we report;, the social environment 
consists of unidentified others whose relationships with the subjects are 
defined by various levels of similarity. We hypothesised that the social 
environment would be structured in such a way as to achieve for the 
individual a position which is both distinct and favourable. In the third 
experiment, we explored how individuals ascribe meaning to the basis of 
social categorisation in order to achieve intergroup differentiation and 
ingroup favouritism. Two independent but identical conditions were 
established. In one condition, social categorisation was on the basis of 
a highly salient criterion. In the other condition, social categorisation 
was on the basis of a ’minimal’ criterion. It was hypothesised that, 
since in both conditions there is only one basis for intergroup 
differentiation and ingroup favouritism, the two criteria would be treated 
in a similarly important manner. The active individual would ascribe 
meaning to these phenomena to achieve his goals.
The final two experiments explored the ways in which individuals 
identify with outgroups, apparently re-defining their position within the 
’social structure’. Our focus of interest here is on the process of social 
mobility on a purely psychological level. We discuss this issue and the 
experiments related to it first.
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3) P^sychological* Social Mobility
A distinction has been made between groups whose ideology accurately 
reflects their material conditions and those groups whose ideology 
represents a false consciousness: referred to as 'groups for themselves* 
and 'groups in themselves* respectively (Billig, 1976, p.263). False 
consciousness is present when a subordinate group's ideology is determined 
by the dominant group in such a way that what we have termed the 'objective 
social structure* is misrepresented or concealed. In this situation,a 
subordinate group fails to accurately perceive the conflicts existing between 
its own interests and that of other groups.
False consciousness may influence individuals to serve the interests 
of an outgroup to the detriment of the interests of the ingroup. This may 
occur in a situation where the possibility of exit from the ingroup and 
entrance to the outgroup is non-existent at a material level. As an example, 
one might cite the case of Negroes who show favouritism towards the white 
'outgroup*. Studies demonstrating this phenomenon in Negro children were 
discussed (Chapter U)• It is clear that colour differences between the two 
groups prevents the Negroes from gaining exit from the ingroup and entrance . 
to the outgroup in the material sense. It might be argued,also,that the 
two groups have conflicting interests, as interests may be defined within 
the context of present social structures. By favouring the outgroup,the 
Negro might thus be acting to the detriment of his ingroup and ultimately 
himself.
What characteristics does the dominant group ideology need to entail 
in order that false consciousness should lead the subordinate group member 
to act in the interests of the dominant group, and to the detriment of its 
own interests, by definition? , This is an important question which might be 
tackled as it stands through a theoretical discussion. In order to 
experimentally explore this question, however, it is necessary to derive 
from it a secondary set of questions which are more specific. One such 
question might be, what are the minimal characteristics which a dominant 
group ideology needs to entail.in order that false consciousness should lead 
the subordinate group members to act in the interests of the dominant group, 
and to the detriment of the ingroup?
From among many possibilities, this question was chosen by us for
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empirical investigation because of two main reasons. Firstly, because it 
requires us to investigate the minimal conditions in which a particular 
aspect of intergroup behaviour takes place. The findings of such an. 
investigation would, we argue, have a meaningful role to play within the 
main body of minimal group studies. Secondly, because this question leads 
us to investigate what we feel to be a particularly important,but neglected, 
aspect of Tajfel's theory of intergroup behaviour - social mobility on a 
purely psychological level.
Tajfel predicts that in a situation where an individual has an
inadequate social identity and can perceive no alternative to the present
intergroup situation, he may attempt to improve his oim social position
through social mobility, among other strategies. This would involve trying
to join an outgroup which is favourably evaluated.When exit from the ingroup
and entrance to the outgroup is possible in the material sense, social
mobility potentially involves the complete move bf the individual from one
group to another, on both a material and a psychological level. However,
Jn
when exit from the ingroup or entranceito the outgroup, or both, are not 
possible in the material sense (because of black skin, for example), social 
mobility might take place purely on a psychological level. 'Psychological* 
social mobility occurs when an individual identifies with an outgroup and 
acts in the interests of this outgroup, without being able to join the 
outgroup in the material sense. The support he provides the outgroup does 
not benefit himself, it may, in effect, be detrimental to the ingroup and the 
self.
The most important * structural * requirement of the condition for 
'psychological* social mobility is that the outgroup be positively 
evaluated, relative to the ingroup. This is a requirement which we assume 
the dominant ideology could and does establish in certain conditions.
Through the creation and objectification of an evaluative system, the 
dominant group might create a situation in which it is itself defined as 
superior in comparison with other groups on some (socially defined) important 
criteria. In his book 'The Lords of Human Kind', Kiepnan (1972) presents a 
picture of the evaluative system which Europeans had established as salient 
within their Empires in the 'Imperial Age*. Through the influence of this 
objectified evaluative system, Europeans were defined as superior as 
compared to non-Europeans. One might argue that a similar situation exists 
today, with Westerners defining themselves as superior over non-Wes te rners.
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Given this critical structural characteristic, of differential group 
evaluations, the context is established for the potential occurrence of 
social mobility. Differential group evaluations might mean that the members 
of some groups have an inadequate social identity. The lack of cognitive 
alternatives to the present intergroup situation might lead to the process 
of social mobility. Thus, the minimal structural characteristic required 
of a condition for social mobility seems to be a salient evaluative system 
which negatively defines one group and positively defines another. In 
order that 'psychological* social mobility might occur, it is also required 
that exit from the ingroup or entrance to the outgroup, or both, be closed.
There are several ways in which we might create this assumed minimal 
condition for the occurrence of psychological social mobility. The 
evaluative system by which the groups are relatively defined and evaluated 
may be either experimentally created or 'imported* directly from the 'real 
world*. In experiment V we chose the latter course. Our subjects were 
Iranians,their outgroup were Americans. We chose these groups for several 
reasons. Firstly, because our discussion of ethnicity suggested that 
differential group evaluations are an important aspect of ethnic group 
relations in general. Secondly, because we believe the Western - Non- 
Western dichotomy to be a critical one at present. Linked to this, thirdly, 
because there is strong evidence that Iranians and Americans may be validly 
defined as negatively evaluated and positively evaluated groups respectively, 
in relation to each other. This evaluation is on the basis of an evaluative 
system which we believe to be salient for both Iranians and Americans, and 
possibly others also. We argued that this evaluative system is propagated by 
the Western influenced mass media, both within and outside Iran.
We need not view those within the mass media as 'conspirators' and 
supporters of Imperialism. As Knopf (I97I4.) argued, the structure and 
function of an organisation such as the press within the wider society may 
inevitably lead it to produce biased accounts.
In experiment IV we chose to experimentally create the evaluative 
system by which the two groups involved were differentially evaluated; in this 
way establishing the assumed most important minimal structural requirement of 
the condition for potential social mobility on a psychological level. The 
reasons for this were varied. Firstly, we aimed to demonstrate that 
similarity on an important similarity criterion can lead one group to be 
highly evaluated relative to another. We assume that people do value certain
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beliefs more than others, just as they view some beliefs to be more valid 
than others. A group whose members are highly similar to the individual 
on an important criterion might thus be favourably evaluated relative to 
a group whose members are only slightly similar to the individual on this 
same criterion. Secondly, we aimed to replicate Allen and Wilder's (1975) 
finding that outgroup belief similarity on an important criterion has no 
influence on intergroup behaviour. We argued that methodological weaknesses 
in Allen and Wilder's study might account for this finding.
The evaluative system was introduced indirectly in this experiment.
We did not explicitly label the groups as 'negatively* and 'positively* 
valued. We defined the relationship of the subjects with the ingroup and 
outgroup as being highly or slightly similar on an important and a 
relatively trivial criterion. From these definitions, it was assumed that 
the subjects would differentially evaluate the ingroup and outgroup. That 
group which was highly similar to the subjects on the basis of the important 
criterion would, we expected, be the most favourably evaluated.
1|) The Structuring of the Social Environment
Social reality is not passively accepted, it is actively shaped and 
moulded. Stimuli are perceived through.an evaluative perceptual system.
This system both limits and imposes its own particular characteristics on 
stimuli. There exists no 'natural* universal way of structuring the social 
environment. There are, however, strong conformities within societies, at 
least, as to how this structuring takes place. In our first two experiments, 
the social environment consisted of a number of unidentified others,whose 
relationships with the subjects were defined on a number of similarity levels, 
In experiment I similarity was defined on a minimal criterion. In experiment 
II similarity was defined on several criteria of different salience. It was 
the task of the subjects to reward these others. It was hypothesised that it 
would be possible to differentiate between the 'most similar* and the 'least 
similar ' others on the basis of the rewards allocated. It was assumed that 
the sub jects would identify with the most similar others, identification 
being indicated by favourable treatment.
In discussing the doctrine of 'nominal essences', we argued that the 
phenomena classified in one category need not share a common characteristic. 
This does not mean that similarity might not form the basis of social
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categorisation in some conditions, however. Individuals might categorise 
others and form an ingroup and outgroup on the basis of a similarity 
criterion. This criterion might be a 'minimal* one, as derived in the 
minimal group studies, for example. The crucial issue arises as to why 
researchers have failed to demonstrate that subjects might introduce social 
categorisation in a condition where interpersonal relationships are defined 
by a minimal similarity criterion* This question is particularly relevant 
to Deutsch et al.,(l969).
The process of categorisation seems to entail the two important 
characteristics of 'minimisation* and 'differentiation', among others. 
Minimisation refers to the diminishing of differences between the members 
within groups. Differentiation refers to the accentuation of differences 
between groups. These two characteristics seem to be present when we 
consider categorisation on a cognitive level, as in the experiment by 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963), as well as categorisation of social phenomena, 
as in the minimal group experiments (Chapter 3 ). It might be the case that 
categorisation is more likely to occur when both of these events are 
■possible, than when one or both of them are not possible. That is, when 
phenomena can be grouped and viewed in a way which minimises within group 
^i^fsrences and accentuates between group differences. These two aspects 
of the categorisation process might in important ways make the structuring 
of the social environment more clear-cut and meaningful, so that this 
structuring will more likely take place when both of them are possible.
In the 'real world ' there seem to be few instances when social 
categorisation occurs on the basis of similarity without the occurrence of 
both minimisation and differentiation. This is because similarity is 
usually (objectively) present and identifiable in the form of a continuum, 
rather than just on two levels. However, this continuum is often used 
as the basis for social categorisation and two distinct categories are 
developed, the similar and the dissimilar. For example, the colour 
continuum black-white is often used as the basis for social categorisation 
leading to the creation of 'black* and 'white' groups. Through this process, 
a white or black person might see others as similar or dissimilar. White or 
Black, ingroup or outgroup. In this process both minimisation and 
differentiation play crucial roles.
An important aspect of experiments by Deutsch et al. , (1969) and others
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seems to be that both minimisation and differentiation were not possible 
in the process of social categorisation which might have been embarked 
upon by the subjects. In these experiments the relationship of the 
subjects with unidentified others was defined on only two levels of 
similarity, similar/dissimilar. Differentiation between the two groups 
was possible, but minimisation within 'groups ' was nob possible. We argue 
that if interpersonal similarity had been defined on more than two levels, 
the likelihood of social categorisation being introduced would have 
increased.
5) Ascribing Meaning to the Basis of Social Categorisation
Ditergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism might take place 
on the basis of apparently trivial criteria. This is implied by both the 
findings of experimental research, the minimal group studies, as well as 
anthropological field studies. For example, the discussion of anthro­
pological evidence on ethnic boundaries by LeVine and Campbell (1972, pp. 
81-113) reveals how in many cases the boundaries between ethnic groups seem 
arbitrary and trivial when viewed 'objectively*, but are given social 
significance and become psychologically important. Ethnic groups seem to 
sometimes invent» differences, or give importance to trivial differences, 
between themselves and others,in order to have a meaningful basis for 
ingroup favouritism. The same process is probably taking place in the 
experimental context when ingroup favouritism occurs on a minimal basis.
This minimal basis seems to become transformed, it becomes important because 
of its potential role in intergroup behaviour.
In certain conditions,the critical factor determining the 'meaning* 
and significance of the basis for social categorisation seems to be the 
desire to achieve favourable social identity. The basis for social 
categorisation is ascribed meaning so that this desire can be achieved on a 
significant basis. In experiment III two identical but independent 
conditions were established. In one condition,the basis for social 
categorisation was minimal. In the other condition, the basis for social 
categorisation was relatively very important for the subject population.
In both conditions there was only one basis for inter group differentiation 
and ingroup favouritism. There was no reason to believe that the desire 
for favourable social identity would differ across the two conditions. We 
hypothesised that this desire would lead to both criteria being treated in 
a similarly important manner.
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EXPERIMENT I
Abstract
Previous research shows that social categorisation on a 
minimal basis can lead to intergroup favouritism which is positively 
biased towards the ingroup. Attempts to create situations in which the 
same minimal basis is used as the criterion for interpersonal similarity 
relationships which would lead to interpersonal bias, without social cat­
egorisation being introduced into the situation by E, have failed. This 
failure, it is proposed, was partly due to the fact that only two different 
levels of similarity were used to define the relationships between Ss and 
unidentified 'others’. In the present experiment,the relationships between 
Ss and 8 unidentified ’others’ were defined by 8 ‘different levels of sim- 
ilarity (20%, 30%, %0%, 50%, 60%,70%, 80%, 90%).
In Part 1 of the experiment each similarity relationship between 
’another’ and 8 was defined by the level of agreement they achieved with 
each other on a dot-estimation task. In Part II of the experiment Ss had 
the task of awarding points to the 8 others on the basis of 3 different 
Matrices. Each’other’person had the opportunity of receiving points 
by himself in comparison with’the seven others’.
It was hypothesised (i) that positive and negative bias would be 
shown in a consistent manner towards those who were respectively most and 
least similar to the Ss (ii) that on the basis of rewards allocated, it 
would be possible to differentiate between 3 categories of ’others’: the 
most similar, the most neutral and the most dissimilar.
The first sample of Ss (%2 male students from the East and the Far 
East) consistently showed significant positive and negative bias towards 
’others’ who were respectively ’most’ and ’least’ similar to themselves, 
while acting in a ’neutral’ manner towards those who were at the inter­
mediary similarity levels. The second sample of Ss (%0 female British 
secretaries) made a greater effort to award points on. the basis of the 
’maximum joint profit’ strategy when it was available, but were positively
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and significantly biased towards the ’more similar’ others when the choice 
of strategies was between ’fairness’ and ’favouritism’. For the two 
sample groups of Ss,there was consistency in the way positive cut-off 
points (about 70% or more similarity) and negative cut-off points 
(about 30% or less similar) were used. There was also within group con­
sistency in the way the strategies of ’fairness’, ’maximum joint profit’ 
and ’favouritism’ were used. For both groups of subjects, it was possible 
to differentiate between 3 groups of ’others’ on the basis of rewards 
allocated.
In the interpretation of results,it is suggested that the dimension 
of similarity (even when based upon a criterion which would appear 
’trivial’ in an everyday social context) can lead to the introduction of 
social categorisation and intergroup discrimination. The level of similar­
ity ’another’ has to achieve before he is perceived as being an ingroup 
member or an outgroup member is assumed to be dependent on social norms 
relevant to the situation.
Introduction
Individuals actively structure the social environment and define 
their place within it. There is ho ’natural’ universal way of structuring 
the social environment. Social factors are influential in this process 
and there are likely to.be important cross-cultural differences in its 
outcome(s). The experiences which members of a society share ensure that 
there is a significant level of conformity in the way that they structure 
the social environment.
One important factor determining the way in which the social 
environment is structured and the position of the self is defined is 
(we assume) the individual’s desire to be favourably evaluated. The 
individual might attempt to achieve a favourable position for groups 
with which his own identity is linked. The individual is more likely 
to identify with others who are similar to himself, than with others who 
are dissimilar to himself (cf. Chapter %). This identification with 
similar others might take place even if similarity is defined on the basis 
of a minimal criterion. A critical requirement for this behaviour ., we 
believe, is that the minimal criterion which acts as the basis for simil­
arity should be one of the few, or the only, social cues present in the
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context. In this way, by virtue of its unique and solitary position, the 
minimal criterion might be ascribed importance and achieve influence.
In the minimal group studies, it has been assumed (indirectly) by 
researchers that subjects identify with those whom they treat favourably 
(cf. Billig, 1976, pp. 3%%-3%5). . This assumption, which we adopt, plays 
a central part in all our experiments.
. In this experiment we hypothesised that the subjects would intro­
duce social categorisation and initiate intergroup discrimination on the 
basis of minimal interpersonal similarity relationships. We noted that 
Deutsch et al.,(1969), among others, disconfirmed this hypothesis. In 
previous experiments, this hypothesis had been tested in aisituation 
where the relationships between the subjects and unidentified others' were 
defined by only two levels of similarity,ie. others were similar/dis- 
similar to the subjects. In our experiments, these relationships were 
defined by 8 levels of similarity. This innovation, we argue, will make 
it more likely that social categorisation will be introduced to the sit­
uation by the subjects. This is because both minimisation and differen­
tiation become possible in our experiment. In a situation involving only 
two similarity levels, minimisation is not a possible outcome of the 
social categorisation process (cf. Chapter 7). The introduction of the 
term 'social categorisation' in this experiment might be criticised. If 
the subjects allocate different levels of rewards to the various others, 
are we justified in assuming that social categorisation had been intro­
duced? , We feel that this assumption is valid if it can be demonstrated 
that there was a significant difference in the way groups of others were 
rewarded. That is, for example, if a comparison of rewards for the 
similar, the dissimilar and the neutral others shows significant differ­
ences. This demonstration would reveal the between groups 'differentiation' 
effect. If it could also be demonstrated that there were NO significant 
differences between the rewards allocated to others who were within each 
of the 3 hypothesised groups (similar, neutral and dissimilar), then we 
would have to some degree demonstrated the within groups minimisation 
effect also. That is, we would have shown that between group differences 
were accentuated and within group differences were (relatively) minimised 
- or at least (relatively) decreased.
The independent variable in this experiment was level of inter-
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personal similarity and not social categorisation, as in the basic min­
imal design. As far as possible in other respects, however, we followed 
the procedure of the basic minimal group design. For example, the basis 
of relationships between subjects was minimal (dot-estimation task). The 
matrices developed at Bristol were used as measures of bias. The subjects
remained ignorant of the identity of others to whom they were giving
al
rewards. The basic two-stage experiment^procedure was followed,with 
relations between the subjects and unidentified others being established 
in the first part and the detection of any subsequent bias being attempted 
in the second part. Finally, the subjects never made choices which affected 
self-rewards, only rewards for others.
The two specific hypotheses tested in this experiment were:
Hypothesis (i) -: There would be positive and negative bias towards those
who were respectively most and least similar to the subjects.
Hypothesis (ii) -: On the basis of the rewards allocated, it would be
possible to differentiate between three categories of others. There would 
be significant differences between the rewards allocated to these categories, 
There would be no significant differences between the rewards allocated to 
those within each of the three categories. The three categories would 
consist of the most similar, the most 'neutral* and the most dissimilar 
others.
Design Overview
There were two distinct experimental stages. In the first stage, 
the relationships between the subjects and unidentified (and fictitious) 
others was established on the basis of similarity of dot-estimation 
performance. The second stage consisted of giving subjects the chance to 
allocate rewards to unidentified others. At no time were subjects alloc­
ating themselves rewards. The independent variable was the level of 
inter-subject similarity. The dependent variable was the method of 
awarding points. Social categorisation was not introduced explicitly by 
the Experimenter in the experiment.
Subjects: there were two subject samples.
Subject Sample 1 -: The first subject sample consisted of %2 males from
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'developing Nations* of the East and Far East. Their mean age was 25 
(range of ages 20 - 29) and they had been in Britain for an average of 
about 2.5 years. All were university students and most were post­
graduates .
Subject Sample II -: The second subject sample consisted of %0 British 
females, all secretaries. Their mean age was about 33 (range of ages about 
17 - 50). They all worked in a university.
The Procedure
The experimental procedure is described in two ways. Firstly, a 
description is given of how the experiment was presented by the Experimenter 
to each subject. Secondly, some additional information is given to 
supplement the subjects' view of the experiment.
The Experiment as Presented to Subjects
Each subject took part in the experiment by him/herself. Subjects 
were aware that others whom they personally knew were also taking part 
in the experiment, but they did not come into contact with other subjects 
in the experimental situation.. Only code numbers identified 'others' 
throughout the experiment.
Experimental Stage One -: On arrival,the subject was met by the
Experimenter and shown into Laboratory One. The subject completed a 
questionnaire giving information about his age, occupation. Nationality 
and number of years spent in Great Britain. He was informed that there 
were two distinct experiments to be carried out. The first involved a 
dot-estimation task and would be carried out in the present laboratory.
The second would involve a completely different kind of judgement task 
and would be carried out in a second laboratory.
Before the start of the 'first experiment',the subject became 
familiar with the workings of a tachistoscope. This was used for present­
ing the dots for estimation. After the subject indicated that he was 
ready to begin the experiment, 10 slides were shown. Each slide had on 
it a number of dots. The Experimenter was situated outside Laboratory 
One and was in communication with the subject via microphones. He had 
direct control of the tachistoscope from his position. After each
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slide presentation, the subject indicated his estimate and this was 
(apparently) recorded by the Experimenter. The subject was told that the 
Experimenter would compare each of his responses with those of 8 others 
who had previously taken part in the experiment. From these comparisons, 
the Experimenter would inform the subject which of these 8 others had 
responded in the same manner as himself. The subject would keep a record 
of who agreed with him on each trial. For the purposes of carrying out 
this task the subject was provided with a specially designed table (Fig 2 
Section A).
The sequence of events in 'experiment one' was thus as follows :
(i) The subject indicated his readiness to begin, (ii) Slide one was 
shown, (iii) The subject communicated his estimate of the number of?? 
dots on slide one to the Experimenter via the use of microphones. U
(iv) The Experimenter (apparently) recorded this response and compared 
it to those made by 8 others who had given an estimate previously.
(v) The Experimenter informed the subject which (unidentified) other(s] 
had responded in the same way as him on this trial, (vi) The subject ^ 
recorded each similar response on the table provided for this purpose. |
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After the ten slides had been shown, the subject counted and 
recorded the total number of agreements which he had achieved with each 
of the 8 others. A table was provided for this task (see Fig (2), Section 
B). The subject was informed that the first experiment was now completed 
and he was invited to go to Laboratory Two to take part in the 'second 
experiment'. He was asked to take the records of his performance in the 
'first experiment' with him to Laboratory Two.
•Experimental Stage Two
Some effort was made to give subjects the impression that this 
second stage was an independent 'second' experiment. Not only was the 
subject moved to a different laboratory, but the conditions in this 
second room were in certain ways different from the conditions in the 
first laboratory. The first laboratory was very brightly lit and domin­
ated by a tachistoscope. The second laboratory was lit by only a few 
spotlights. These cast light onto tables. The subject was situated 
behind one of these tables. The environment was comparatively dark and 
stark. There was no communication between the subject and the outside
I8l
For Use of Subject Number Nine 
Section A Fig. (2)
Code Number of 
the person you 
. are being 
compared with
1 2 3 % . .5 . 6 7 8 .9 10
Number of Trials 1-10, with each agreement marked 
by a cross (X)
1 X X X X X X X
2 X X
3 . X X X X X X X X
% X X X X X X
5 X X X X
5 X X X X X X X X . X
7 X X X : X X
8 X X X
Section B
Code Number of the person you 
are being compared with
Number of trials on which 
this person agreed with you
1 T
2 2
. 3 8
. % 6
5 k.
. 6 : 9
T 5
8 3
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via microphones, as in the 'first experiment'.
Subjects were informed that the task in this 'second experiment' 
involved making judgements using some matrices. For the sake of con­
venience, the 8 others with whom they had been compared in the 'first 
experiment' would be involved in 'this experiment' also, to find out 
how the choices on the matrices would be made. As a secondary factor, 
these choices would also help the Experimenter, by deciding for him how 
much reward each person would receive for taking part in the experiment. 
At no time would the choices which subjects made effect their own rewards 
They would only influence the rewards of others, ie. persons '1,2,.... 
7,8'. Each subject was asked to fill in two separate books of matrices. 
Examples of each of these books, which had been filled in randomly, were 
shown to the subject in order to clarify issues. An opportunity was 
given for him to raise procedural questions. ,
At no time did the Experimenter refer to 'groups', or to any 
related terms. It was with individual others that the subject had a 
'defined relationship', on the basis of similarity levels.
After the subject had completed both booklets of matrices, these 
were collected and debriefing and discussion took place.
The Procedure: Differences from the Experiment as Described to Subjects
In the dot-estimation task, the subjects' responses were not 
recorded by the Experimenter; nor were they compared by him to the res­
ponses made by ' 8 other persons who had taken part in the experiment 
previously'. All subjects were given exactly the same feedback by the 
Experimenter. That is, they were all told that (unidentified and fic­
titious) person number one agreed with them 7 times out of 10, person 
two agreed with them 2 times out of 10, person three agreed 8 times, 
person four agreed 6 times, person five agreed % times, person six 
agreed 9 times, person seven agreed 5 times and person eight agreed 3 
times. Section B of Figure (2) illustrates this point.
In effect, the dot-estimation task provided a means by which each 
subject could be presented with a standard set of relationships between 
himself and 8 unidentified others. These relationships being based on
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the similarity of dot-estimation performance. We had hypothesised that 
the subjects would treat others who were most and least similar to them­
selves in a positive and negative manner respectively (hypothesis l).
To test this hypothesis we needed to consider independently the rewards 
which were allocated to each individual other. On the basis of the 
second hypothesis, we expected that the most similar others, the most 
’neutral’ others and the most ’dissimilar’ others could be differentiated 
on the basis of the different rewards each category received. To test 
this hypothesis, we needed to compare the rewards across categories. We 
expected that there would be no differences between the rewards allocated 
to those within each category, but that there would be between-categoiy 
differences.
The’most similar’ category consisted of those 2 others who were 
at similarity levels 9 and 8. The ’most dissimilar’ category consisted 
of those 2 others who were at similarity levels 2 and 3. The ’most neutral’ 
category consisted of those 2 others who were at similarity levels 5 and 
6. This meant that the 2 others who were at similarity levels % and T 
were not included in the comparisons of the rewards allocated to the most 
similar, the most ’neutral’ and the most dissimilar others. Our method­
ology allowed us to further clarify the differences in rewards which were 
allocated to similar/dissimilar others by forming and re-forming categories, 
and comparing the rewards they received. An important comparison, the 
results of which we report, involved the rewards for categories which con­
sisted of the 3 most similar and the 3 most dissimilar others. The first 
category included the 3 others who were at similarity levels 9, 8 and 7*
The second category included the 3 others who were at similarity levels 
2, 3 and %. Similarity levels % and 7 were thus included in this analysis. 
At no stage did the subject receive information indicating how efficient 
he or others had been in the dot-estimation task. During the second phase 
of the experiment,it was stressed that there was no ’correct’ method of 
allocating rewards. The subject was asked to respond in the manner he 
thought most appropriate.
The Establishment of a Control Group
After trials involving the first subject population (male overseas 
students) had been completed, it was decided to incorporate a control group 
in the experimental design. This was to test the validity of an objection
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to the experimental procedure which had arisen at that time. This ob­
jection was based on the assumption that people have biases in relation 
to numbers (eg, unlucky *7') and that these preferences might coincide 
with the way in which numbers had been allocated by the Experimenter to 
’others’.
For the second set of subjects (female British secretaries), 
therefore, there was a control as well as an experimental condition, 20 
subjects in each. Those in the experimental condition experienced the 
procedures already described. The same is true for the control group, 
except that they were only provided with the ’code -numbers’ of others, 
and not the relevant dot-estimation performances on each trial to compare . 
themselves with. They were told that such comparisons would be made later 
by the Experimenter. If it was the code numbers which subjects were res­
ponding to in a biased manner rather than, or in addition to, the similarity 
levels, then the same, or similar, systematic bias should occur in the 
control condition as in the experimental condition. In the control con-; 
dition , therefore, the subjects just allocated rewards to 8 others who 
were represented by code numbers, without having even minimal information 
about these others.
The Matrices Used as Measures of Bias
Matrices I, II and III were used as measures of bias (see Appendix 
I for a description of these matrices).
In the second stage of the experiment the subjects were given two 
booklets. Each booklet consisted of 2% pages. On each page there was 
one of the three matrices. Thus, each matrix appeared 8 times in each 
booklet - once for each of the 8’others’ to whom the subjects were 
giving rewards. In booklet I, the ’other person’ ( from the 8 to whom 
the rewards were being given) received points from the top row of the 
matrices. In booklet II, the ’other person’ received rewards from the 
bottom row of the matrices. Each point was worth one-tenth of a penny.
Each time the subject made a choice on a matrix, he was giving 
rewards to 1 single other as compared to all the 7 others. The 1 single 
other would receive points from one row all to himself, while the 7 others 
would all have equal shares of the points chosen for them from the other
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row. For example, if on Matrix I the 1 single other received points from 
the top row and the J others received points from the bottom row and the 
subject chose box 1
1%
, then the 1 single other would receive 1 point all
to himself, while the 7 others would receive 1% points to be shared 
equally among them (ie. 2 points each).
Each of the 8 others was given the opportunity to gain rewards 
twice by himself. Once from the top row of the matrices and once from 
the bottom row of the matrices.
Results
The results are reported in two sections, each section relating 
to one hypothesis. . j
(l) Positive and Negative Bias Shown Towards individual Others
Hypothesis I predicted that there would be positive and negative 
bias towards those who were respectively most and least similar to the 
subject. In this section, we treat the rewards given to each;individual 
other independently and test for negative and positive bias in the way 
reward allocation had taken place. The rewards allocated by subject 
sample I, by subject sample II in the experimental condition (II E), and 
by subject sample II in the control condition (II C) are treated indep­
endently, rewards allocated by the subjects were scored and are referred 
to as 'scores’ (see Appendix I for an account of the scoring of the 
matrices).
Matrix ;I
The mean score for the subject samples are given independently 
in Tables (%), (5) and (6). A one-sample ’t’-test was computed on these 
scores to determine whether they differed significantly from the point of 
’no bias’ (ie. 6.5)
For subject sample I (Table %), five levels of similarity show 
significant results. Significant positive bias was shown towards those 
’others’ who were at similarity levels 7, 8 and 9. Significant negative 
bias was shown towards those others who were at similarity levels 2 and 3.
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Table (%)
Subject Sample I 
N= %2 .
Mean Scores on Matrix I
Code Number of Each 
other Person to Whom 
Rewards were Allocated
Level of Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
Mean Score of 
Rewards.Given to 
Each Other Person
One T 4.78**
Two 2 10.01*
Three 8 3.%5**
Four 6 6.%8
Five 7.57
Six 9 2.98**
Seven 5 6.82
Eight 3 9.19*
One-sample 't’-test (df %l) ’Fair’ mean = 6,5
** Significant at P< 0.001 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards other person 
* Significant at P < 0.001 (2 tailed) Negative bias towards other person 
Positive bias =<6.5
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Table (5)
Subject Sample II E 
N= 20
Experimental Condition 
Mean Scores on Matrix 1
Code Number of Each 
Other Person to Whom 
Rewards were Allocated
Level of Similarity 
Between other 
•Person and the Ss
Mean Score of 
Rewards Given to 
Each Other Person
One 7 5.1**
Two 2 7.7
Three 8 eg****
Four 6 5.9 \
Five % 7-3 .
Six : 9 k.3***
Seven 5 6.k
Eight 3 T.6 : ,
One-sample ’t’-test (df - 19) ’Fair’ mean = 6.5
** Significant at P< 0.05 (2 tailed) )
- ■ )
*** Significant at P<0.02 (2 tailed) )
, ) 
**** Significant at just below P c 0.05 (2 tailed) )
Positive bias =<6.5
All indicating positive 
bias towards the ’other’ 
person.
Subject Sample II C 
N= 20
Control Condition 
Mean Scores on Matrix I
188
TABLE (6)
Code Number of Each 
Other Person to Whom 
Rewards were Allocated
Level of Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and the Ss
Mean Score of 
Rewards Given to 
Each Other Person
One 6.3 :
Two 6.1
Three
■ 1
Four 6.6
Five ":::'6.1
Six 6.h
Seven 5.6
Eight 6.5
Favouritism shown by deviation from 6.5 (’fair’ mean score)
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Table (T)
Matrix I
Ranks of 'Other’ Persons 
on Basis of the Levels of 
Their Similarity with 
the Subjects
Ranks of ’Other’ Persons on Basis of 
Positive Favouritism Shown Towards Them
Subject Sample I
N= %2
Subject Sample II E 
(Experimental 
Condition)
N= 20
1. Person number six
2, Person number three 3*
3. Person number one
%. Person number four
5. Person number seven
6. Person number five
7. Person number eight
2*
h
5
6 
7
8. Person number two
* Indicates a disparity between the level of similarity a subject 
has with one of the eight persons he is being compared with, and 
the level of favouritism the subject shows towards this particular 
’other’.
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The ’neutral* category, therefore, consisted of those three others who 
were at similarity levels 6 , % and 5 *
For subject sample II E (Table 5),three levels of similarity show 
significant results. Significant positive bias was shown towards those . 
’others’ who were at similarity levels 7, 8 and 9. There was no signif­
icant negative bias towards any ’other’ persons.
Table (6) shows the mean scores on Matrix I for subject sample II 0. 
No score deviates significantly from the unbiased mean of 6.5.
A comparison of general strategies which were used by subject 
sample I and subject sample II E with respect to Matrix I can be found 
in Table (7). A comparison has been made between the ranks of other persons 
on the basis of similarity levels and the ranks of other persons on the 
basis of the level of positive favouritism shown towards them by the 
subjects. The only disparity between ranks is in relation to ’other’ 
persons 3 and 1, for subject sample II E.
The results for subject sample I confirm hypothesis I. These 
subjects showed significant positive bias towards the most similar others, 
and significant negative bias towards the most dissimilar others. The 
results for subject sample II E confirm the hypothesised positive bias 
towards the most similar others, but not the hypothesised negative bias 
towards the most dissimilar others. As we expected, subject sample II C 
did not show any significant biases.
Matrix II
On Table (8) are shown the means of scores for subject sample I 
on Matrix II. Six of the means reflect significant favouritism. On three 
similarity levels (7, 8 and 9) choices reflect significant positive bias 
towards particular individuals (persons one, three and six). Significantly 
negative bias towards three other individuals (persons two, five and eight) 
is shown at similarity levels 2, 3 and %. Persons four and seven, on 
similarity levels 5 and 6 are in a ’neutral’ category.
The means of scores on Matrix II for subject sample II E are shown 
on Table (9). Scores on two of the similarity levels reflect significant
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Table (8)
Subject Sample I
N= %2
Mean Scores on Matrix II
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Scores on 
the Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
:/o °/i
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Scores on the Two 
Types of Choice
One T 3.19 5.52 2.33**
Two 2 8.38 2.21 6 .17*
Three 8 1 .8 1 7.05 5:24*
Four 6 4.33 4.38 0.05
Five k 5.16 2 .6 2Î56*
Six 9 1.07 8.66 7.59*
Seven 5 4.45 3.83 0.62
. Eight 3 7.83 1.83 6.0*
^/q - When F and FAV coincide
^/l - When F
** - P< 0.05 
* - P< 0.01
and FAV conflict 
(all 2 tailed) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
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Table (9)
Subject Sangle II E Experimental Condition
N= 20
Mean Scores on Matrix II
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Score on 
the Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
I/o 0/-
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Scores on the Two 
Types of Choice
One 7 4.0 4.8 0 .8
Two 2 7.8 3.85 3.95*
Three 8 3.55 6.55 3.0**
Four . 6 3.65 5.05 1.4
Five 4 5.8 4.25 1.55
Six 9 4.5 6 .8 2.3
Seven 5 5.1 3.4 1.7
Eight 3 5.85 4.1 1.75
/q - When F and FAV coincide 
0/j - When F and FAV conflict
** - P<0.05 (2 tailed)
- P<0.01 (2 tailed) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
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Table (lO)
Subject Sample II C Control Condition 
N= 20
Mean Scores on Matrix II
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Score on 
the Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
7/o 0/-
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Scores on the Two 
Types of Choice
One 4.15 4.8 0.65
Two 4.2 3.6 0 .6
Three 5.25 4.55 o.T
Four 5.15 4.85 0.3
Five 4.05 5.7 1.65
Six 5.35 5.65 0.3
Seven 3.35 4.4 1.05
Eight 6.05 4.8 1.25
^/q - When F and FAV coincide 
^/j - When F and FAV conflict
Differences N.S. Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
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Table (il)
Subject Samples I & II 
N= 82 . Matrix II
GENERAL STRATEGY USED TOWARDS OTHER INDIVIDUALS 
P - Positive N - Negative
The Code Number 
of Each Other 
Person to Whom 
Rewards were 
Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
Subject Sample 
I
N - 42
Subject Sample II
II E II C
(EXP.COND) (CONT.COND) 
N-20 N-20
N N
N
N
N N
N N N
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bias. At similarity level 8, positive bias was shown; while at similarity 
level 2, negative bias was shown. The ‘neutral' category thus includes 
those 'others' who were at similarity levels 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7 and 9 (hot 8).
Table (lO) shows the mean scores on Matrix II for subject sample 
II C. There were no significant differences between the two types of 
choice.
The general form of bias reflected by the mean scores of all 
subject samples on Matrix II is shown on Table (ll). The most important 
comparison to make is that between the bias reflected by the scores for 
subject sample I and that reflected by the scores for subject sample II E.
The biases shown by these two groups of subjects are identical in direc­
tion. In both cases positive bias is shown towards persons one, three, four 
and six (similarity levels 7, 8, 6 and 9 respectively) negative bias 
is shown towards persons two, five, seven and eight (similarity levels 2 ,
4, 5 and 3 respectively).
The results for subject sample I confirm hypothesis I. These subjects 
showed significant positive bias towards the most similar others and sig­
nificant negative bias towards the most dissimilar others. The results 
for subject sample II E did not fully confirm hypothesis I. These 
subjects showed significant negative bias towards the one most dissimilar 
other and significant positive bias towards one of the most similar others.
As we expected, subject sample II C did not show any significant biases 
towards others.
Matrix III
Table (12) shows the results of choices on Matrix III for subject 
sample I. It can be seen that on six similarity levels there was sig­
nificant levels of favouritism. At similarity levels 7, 8 and 9 sig­
nificant positive bias towards an individual (persons one, three and six) 
was shown. At similarity levels 2, 3 and 4 significant negative bias 
towards an individual (persons two, five and eight) was shown. The 
'neutral' category consisted of those who were at similarity levels 5 and 
6.
Table (13) shows the results of choices on Matrix III for subject
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Table (12)
Subject Sample I
N= 42
Mean Scores on Matrix III
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Score on 
the Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
/o  0/]
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Score on the Two 
Types of Choice
One T 4.66 7.62 2.96*
Two 2 9.4 2.69 6.71*
Three 8 4.33 8.55 ' 4.22*
Four 6 5.62 6.09 0.47
Five 4 8.05 4.52 3.53*
Six 9 2.52 9.21 6 .69*
Seven 5 6.64 6.38 0.26
Eight 3 9.38 3.74 5.64*
I/o
°/I
- When MJP
- When MJP
and FAV 
and FAV
coincide
conflict
* _ P<0.01 (2 tailed) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
-i-y (
Table (13)
Subject Sample II E Experimental Condition
N= 20
Mean Scores on Matrix III
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Score on 
The Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
/o 0/-
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Scores on the Two 
Types of Choice
One 7 6 .2 ' 7.15 0.95
Two 2 7.7 4.15 3.55*
Three 8 5 .0 7.25 2.25
. Four 6 6.55 5.75 0.80
Five k . 8.4 5.2 3.2**
Six 9 5.2 8.15 2.95
Seven 5 6.2 5 .75 0.45
Eight 3 8.05 5 .2 2 .85**
^/q - When MJP and FAV coincide
^/j - When MJP and FAV conflict
** P 0.05 (2 tailed) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
* P 0.01 (2 tailed) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
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Table (l4)
Subject Sample II C Control Condition
N= 20
Mean Scores on Matrix III
The Code Number of 
Each Other Person 
to Whom Rewards 
were Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
The Mean Scores on 
the Two Types of 
Choice on the Matrix
0
Differences 
Between the Mean 
Scores on the Two 
Types of Choice
One 6.4 7.7 1.3
Two 5.5 7.0 1.5
Three 6.4 7.0 0.6
Four . . 8.1 6.75 1.35
Five 6.45 7.0 0.55
Six 6.85 6.05 0.80
Seven 6.95 7.0 .0.05
Eight 5.85 0.25
/q choices - when MJP and FAV coincide 
0/% choices - when MJP and FAV conflict
Differences N.S. Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
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Table (15)
Subject Samples I & II 
N - 82.
Matrix III
GENERAL STRATEGY USED TOWARDS OTHER INDIVIDUALS 
P - Positive N - Negative
The Code Number 
of Each Other 
Person to Whom 
Rewards were 
Allocated
The Level of 
Similarity 
Between Other 
Person and Ss
Subject Sample 
I
N - 42
Subject Sample II
H E  II C
(EXP.COND) (CONT.COND)
N-20 N-20
N N
N N
N N
N
N
N N
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sample II E. It can be seen that only three similarity levels (two, four 
and three) showed significant levels of bias. A fourth one, level ’eight’, 
was just below level of significance. The. direction of the significant 
bias shown towards others at similarity levels two, three and four was 
negative. The corresponding results for subject sample II C on Matrix III 
show no significant biases (Table (l4)).
The general direction of bias reflected in the choices of all 
subject samples is shown on Table (15). The general trend for subject 
sample I and subject sample II E is of positive bias towards ’most similar’ 
others and negative towards 'least similar' others. A greater proportion 
of 'negative' strategies (ie. negative bias towards an individual) is 
reflected in the choices of the second (female, British) subject^sample.
In the case of subject sample I, choices reflect 4 positive strategies 
(towards persons 1, 3 , 4  and 6). In the case qf subject sample H E ,  
choices reflect 3 positive strategies (towards persons 1 , 3 and 6) and 
5 negative strategies (towards persons 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8). Strategies used 
by these two subject samples differ over the treatment of person 4 (level 
of similarity 6). / ^  }
In the control condition of subject sample II there were 6 positive 
strategies (towards persons 1 , 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8) and two negative strategies 
(towards persons 4 and 6). This contrasts with the more negative bias of 
subject sample II E. The results for subject sample I confirmed hypothesis 
I. The results for subject sample II E did not fully confirm hypothesis I. 
The hypothesis was confirmed in so far as these subjects (ie. II E) showed 
significant negative bias towards the most dissimilar others. But they 
did not show significant positive bias towards the most similar others, as 
we had hypothesised. As expected, subject sample II C did not show sig­
nificant biases towards any 'others'.
The 'Puli' of F, FAV. and MJP
In the present experiment, FAV refers to positive bias towards an 
individual who is similar to the subject on dot-estimation performance, 
and/or negative bias towards an individual dissimilar to the self on the 
same basis. The meaning of F and MJP remain the same (ie. as defined on 
Table 1 ). FAV was the dominant strategy for subject sample I. F and
MJP exerted a less important pull on their choices. In all cases, choices
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by these subjects shoved significantly positive bias towards those who 
were most similar to the self, and significantly negative bias towards 
those who were most dissimilar to the self,
A different pattern emerges when we consider choices made by the 
second subject sample (II E), Although the direction of bias is the same 
for the first and second subject samples, the relative strength of FAV, F 
and MJP is different.
On Matrix III, the pull of MJP on choices made by subject sample H  E 
was highly influential, particularly when the most similar and 'neutral' 
others were being rewarded. This meant that,although there was significant 
negative bias towards dissimilar others, there was no significant positive 
bias towards similar others. On Matrix II, the pull of F on choices made 
by subject sample II E resulted in all but one of the most similar others 
and the one most dissimilar other being treated in an unbiased manner. On 
Matrix I, the pull of FAV on choices by these subjects resulted in signif­
icant positive bias towards the three most similar others. But there is 
no significant negative bias towards dissimilar others. Thus, F and MJP 
exerted a greater influence on choices made by the second subject sample.
(ll) Scores Across Similarity Levels
In this section we report results relevant to hypothesis II. We 
hypothesised that we would be able to differentiate between three categ­
ories of others: consisting of the most similar, the most neutral and
the most dissimilar. Also, that there would be significant differences 
between the rewards given to each category, but not between the rewards 
given to those within each category. To test this hypothesis,we first 
compared the scores for the two most similar others, with the scores for 
the two most neutral others, with the scores for the two most dissimilar 
others. Also, secondly, we compared the scores between the two others 
within each of these three categories. In addition, we compared the 
scores for the three most similar others with the scores for the three 
most dissimilar others. ANOVA was used to make all these comparisons.
We shall refer to each similarity level as a 'treatment'. For 
the analysis of scores on Matrices II and HI, there was repeated 
measures on two factors: 'treatment' (8 levels) and 'types of choice'
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(2 levels ie. ^/qs In the case of Matrix I, there was repeated
measures on only one factor (treatment). . The scores for the control 
condition of subject sample II (ie. II C) were not included in this an­
alysis. The scores for subject sample I and subject sample II E were 
treated independently.
Comparison Across Categories
Only the results directly relevant to hypothesis II are reported.
In comparing across the ’categories', we expected that on Matrices II and
III there would be a significant interaction between the factors 'types of
choice'and 'category'. This would demonstrate that the direction of
bias was significantly different in the different categories. Comparisons
of scores on Matrix I across the categories were expected to reveal a
significant main effect for 'category'. Our expectations as regards
differences across categories were fully confirmed. The relevant results
are shown on Table (l6) and the analyses are described in the Key to this
Table (p.203). Table (l6) it is 'analysis types'(2)and(t)which are most
relevant to hypothesis II, because they compare the scores on the three
most neutral
categories: most similar, most dissimilar,/.As expected, these analyses 
revealed significant interaction effect 'category X choice type' for 
scores on Matrices II and III (subject sample I, Matrix II, df - 2/82,
F= 96.077, P< 0.01; Matrix III, df - 2/82, F= 82.772, P< 0.01. Subject 
sample II E, Matrix II, df - 2/38, F= 5.959, P<0.01; Matrix III, 
df - 2/38, F= 6.865, PcO.Ol). The expected significant main effect 
'category' for the analysis of scores on Matrix I was also confirmed 
(subject sample I, df - 2/82, F= 74.895, P<0.01; subject sample H E ,  
df - 2/38, F= 6.134, P <■ 0.01 ). Exactly the same pattern of significant 
effects are demonstrated by analysis comparing the 3 most similar others 
with the 3 most dissimilar others (see analysis types (l) and . (3) Table (16))
These comparisons of scores across categories confirm (part of) 
hypothesis II, since they demonstrate differences between categories.
The 'F' scores for subject sample I were much higher than those for 
subject sample H E .  This indicates that subject sample I differentiated 
between the 3 categories to a great extent than did subject sample II E.
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Key to Types of Analys-is on Table (l6)
(1) 2 x 3 x 2  ANOVA
Repeated measures on all 3 factors.
Category x Treatment x Choice Type
Comparing the category composed of the three most similar others with that 
consisting of the three most dissimilar others.
Illustration of Model;
Category One 
(Most Similar Others)
Category Two 
(Most Dissimilar Others)
Treat.ment
1
Treatment
2
Treatment
3
Treatment
1
Treatment
2
Treatment
3
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
2
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
2
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
2
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
2
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
2
Choice
Type
1
Choice
Type
i .
Ss.l 
to
N
The focus being on 'Categoiy x Type of Choice' interaction ie. do bias 
strategies vary across category?
(2) 3 X 2 X 2 ANOVA
Repeated measures on all 3 factors.
Category x Treatment x Choice Type
Comparing the category composed of the two most similar others, with that 
composed of the two most dissimilar others, with that composed of the two 
most neutral others.
The focus being on 'Category x Choice type' interaction.
(3) 2 x 3  ANOVA
Repeated measures on both factors.
Category x Treatment '■
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(There is only one choice type for Matrix I)
Comparing the category composed of the three most similar others with that 
composed of the three most dissimilar others.
The focus being on the main effect 'category'.
(4) 3 x 2  ANOVA
Repeated measures on both factors.
Category x Treatment
Comparing the category composed of the two most similar others, with that 
composed of the two most dissimilar others, with that composed of the two 
most 'neutral' others.
The focus being on the main effect 'category'.
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Table (l6)
The Code Number 
Indicating the 
• type of analysis'
df F P<c df F P <
The significance levels reported refer to the 
interaction 'category x type of choice'. It was ■ 
expected, on the basis of hypothesis II, that 
this interaction effect would be significant.
See 'Key'(Pp.203-204) 
for explanation of 
'types of analysis'
Matrix II Matrix III
(1)
SUBJECT SAMPLE I
l/4l 93.789 0.01 i/4i 139.835, 0.01
(2) 2/82 96.077 0.01 2/82 82.772 0.01
(1)
SUBJECT SAMPLE II E
1/19 7.218 0.01 1/19 8.301 o.oi :
(2) 2/38 5.959 0.01 2/38 6.865 0.01
The Code Number 
Indicating the 
'type of analysis'
MATRIX I
The significant levels reported refer to main 7 
effect 'category'. It was expected, on the 
basis of hypothesis II, that this main effect 
would be significant.
See Key (Pp. 203-204) 
for explanation of 
'types of analysis'
Subject Sample I Subject Sample II E
(3) i/4i 93.718 0.01 1/19 8.653 0.01
(4) 2/82 74.895 0.01 2/38 6.134 0.01
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Comparison of Treatments Within Categories
On the basis of hypothesis IT we expected no differences between 
scores for those within each of the 3 categories: most similar, most 
neutral and most dissimilar. To test this, the scores for those within 
each of these three categories were compared. The comparisons of scores 
on Matrices II and III were expected not to reveal a significant inter­
action between ’treatment’ and 'type of choice'. The comparisons of scores 
on Matrix I were expected not to reveal significant main effect for 
'treatment'. The relevant results are shown on Table (17). The Key to 
this table also describes the analysis more fully (p.207). Mith some 
exceptions, the results confirm our expectations of 'no significant 
difference'. The significant results are shown in (i) comparisons of 
'others' 3 and 6, the most similar others, on Matrices II and III for 
subject sample I (ii) comparisons of 'others' 2 and 8, the most dissimilar 
others, on Matrix II for subject sample II E (iii) comparisons of 'others’ 
k and 7, the most 'neutral' others, on Matrix II for subject sample II E.
Two Additional Groups of Results
(i) Explicit Categorisation
After the matrices had been completed,the Experimenter explicitly
asked subjects to categorise others into 2 groups and award them rewards.
These rewards were to be equally shared by group members. The subjects
could either divide the others into 2 groups of equal numbers, with both
groups receiving equal rewards, or into 2 groups of unequal numbers, which
received unequal rewards. The subjects themselves were not part of any
group. About 89% of them divided others into groups on the basis of
similarity/dissimilarity, while about 86% favoured the more similar group.
The boundary chosen to divide these groups was just above the 70% similar-
ed
ity level on average . Moreover, subjects seem*» to carry out this task 
unhesitatingly. As discussions seemed to show, subjects appeared to 
have arrived at an idea about which 'group' of others should be treated 
more favourably by the time they began making choices on the 3 matrices.
(ii) Post-Experimental Discussions.
In the post-experimental discussions about 26% of the subjects 
explicitly stated that they had perceived a more similar and/or a more 
dissimilar group among the 'others' while making choices on the matrices. ■
207
KEY to Types of Analysis on Table (17)
Types of Analysis - (l),(2) and (3) are all:
2 x 2  ANOVA
Repeated measures on both factors 
Treatment x Type of Choice
The focus being on the interaction between the two factors.
Types of Analysis - (4), (5) and (6) are all:
One-factor ANOVA, with repeated measures. Comparing across treatments, 
with only one type of choice involved.
Comparisons made in each Type of Analysis
(1) & (4)
Comparing the two most dissimilar others, person number 2 and 8, 
who are at similarity levels 2 and 3 respectively.
(2) & (5)
Comparing the two most similar others, person numbers 3 and 6, who 
are at similarity levels 8 and 9 respectively.
(3) & (6)
Comparing the two most neutral others, persons 4 and 7, who are 
at similarity levels 6 and 5 respectively.
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Table (17)
The Code Number 
Indicating 'type 
of analysis'
The Code Number 
of 'others' who 
were compared
Subject Sample I.
See "key" (P.207] 
for explanation 
of "types of 
analysis"
Matrix II Matrix III
df : F p< . df F P<
The significance levels reported refer 
to the interaction 'treatment x type 
of choice'. It was expected that this 
interaction would not be significant.
(1) 2 & 8 1/41 0.389 N.S. i/4i 1.195 N.S.
(2) 3 & 6 1/41 13.794 0.01 l/4l 8.99 0.01
(3) 4 & 7 l/4l 0.489 N.S. l/4l 1.549 N.S.
(1) 2 & 8
Subject Sample H E
1/19 5.762 0.05 1/19 0.047 N.S.
(2) 3 & 6 1/19 0.386 N.S. 1/19 0.006 N.S.
(3) 4 & 7 1/19 5.252 0.-05 1/19 0.189 N.S.
The Code Number 
indicating 'type 
of analysis'
See "key" (P.207) 
for explanation 
of "types of 
analysis"
The Code Numbers 
of 'others' who 
were compared
Matrix I
Subject Sample I Subject Sample II E
The significance levels reported refer 
to the main effect 'treatment'. It was 
expected that this main effect would 
not be significant.
(4) 2 & 8 i/4i 3.589 N.S. 1/19 0.065 N.S.
(5) 3 & 6 i/4i 1.777 N.S. 1/19 2.721 N.S.
(6) 4 & 7 i/4i 3.989 N.S. 1/19 1.203 N.S.
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This information was offered during discussions, without the Experimenter 
mentioning 'groups', or a similar term.
Reports of Strategies Used
After each experimental session a brief discussion was held with 
each,subject,other than those in subject sample II C. They were asked 
about the basis on which they made 'choices'. Most of the subjects (about 
85%) mentioned FAV (denoting bias towards other single individuals). A 
smaller number (about 39%) mentioned the F strategy. Very few (about 5%) 
mentioned MJP. About 72% thought that others taking part in the experiment 
would make biased choices - but only about 11% thought that others would 
be as biased as themselves.
Discussion
We had hypothesised that positive and negative bias would be shown 
towards the most and least similar others respectively (hypothesis (l)) .
The results for subject sample I fully confirmed this hypothesis.. The 
results for subject sample II E only partly confirmed it. This second 
subject sample did show positive and negative bias towards the most and 
least similar others respectively, but they did not show both of these 
biases through choices on any one Matrix. On Matrix I, they showed positive 
bias towards the three most similar others. On Matrix II, they showed 
positive bias towards a similar other and negative bias towards the most 
dissimilar other. On Matrix III, they showed negative bias towards the 
most dissimilar others. In general, subject sample II E were more in­
fluenced by F and MJP than were subject sample I.
Hypothesis (ii) predicted that it would be possible to differen­
tiate between 3 categories of others on the basis of rewards allocated to 
each category. Also, that there would be no difference between rewards 
given to those within each category. The first part of this hypothesis 
was fully confirmed. Comparisons of the 2 most similar others, with the
2 most neutral others, with the 2 most dissimilar others,demonstrated 
significant differences between these 3 categories. We also compared the
3 most similar others with the 3 most dissimilar others. This comparison 
also revealed significant between-category differences. Thus, 'different-
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iation’ between categories seemed to have taken place.
The expectation that there would be no significant differences 
between those within each of the 3 categories (most similar, most neutral, 
most dissimilar) was not fully confirmed. Comparisons of the two 'others' 
within each of these groups revealed some significant differences - but 
these cases were relatively few and none of them were on scores for 
Matrix I, the most direct measure of FAV. There is, therefore, some 
basis on which we may claim that a certain level of 'minimisation' of 
differences between category members seemed to have taken place.
On the basis of the results from the control condition, we can dis­
miss the criticism that the subjects were biased towards certain 'others' 
because of their preferences towards, the code numbers identifying these 
others. In the control condition the only information subjects had about 
others was their code numbers. There were no significant biases in this 
condition.
When subjects were explicitly asked to categorise others, they did 
so mostly on the basis of similarity/dissimilarity. Almost all of those 
who categorised others on the basis of similarity/dissimilarity also gave 
the most similar category the highest level of rewards. In the post- 
experimental discussions, some subjects reported that they had identified 
'groups' among the 'others' - without the term group being introduced by 
the Experimenter.
We interpret these results as demonstrating that subjects actively 
structured the social environment within the experimental setting. It 
seems that such structuring might take place even on a minimal basis.
There were strong conformities in the way that the subjects carried out 
this structuring. These conformities seem to reflect the influence of 
shared experiences within a common culture. More specifically, these 
conformities might arise through the influence of shared rules and mean­
ings. These rules and meanings would influence the individual in deciding 
what 'type' of a social situation he is in and what 'type' of behaviour 
would he most appropriate. When both subject sample I and subject sample 
II E differentiated between categories of others, the 'boundaries' of the 
categories they differentiated were highly similar. The boundary for the
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most dissimilar category tended to be around *3* (30%). The boundary for 
the most similar category tended to be just above 7 (70%). Those others 
who were respectively below and above these boundaries tended to be treated 
in a significantly negative and positive manner respectively.
We have not only argued that individuals structure the social envir­
onment ; but also that they tend to define their own position within it 
favourably. In the introduction to the present experiment, we pointed out 
that researchers have assumed there to be a direct link between favourable 
bias towards certain others and identification with these others. On the 
same basis, we assume that our subjects identified with those others towards 
whom they were positively biased. The position of these others directly 
reflected on the social identity of the subjects. By achieving a more 
favourable position for these others, the subjects might have also improved 
their own social identity. In this experiment,. as in all our other exper­
iments, we are ultimately concerned with the issue of identity - how 
people desire to be viewed by themselves and others, and how this desire 
influences intergroup behaviour,
A final point is that when subjects were asked to describe the 
strategies they had used in making their choices on the .matrices, they 
seemed to find it very difficult to provide verbal accounts of the strat­
egies we have assumed they had used. This problem seems to have confronted 
other researchers also (see Appendix l).
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Experiment II
Abstract
Two different conditions were created to demonstrate the conformities 
which take place when people structure the social environment. The social 
environment was represented by 10 others whose relationships to the Ss 
were defined at 10 levels of similarity (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%,
70%, 80%, 90%, 100%). In both conditions, similarity was defined on the 
basis of task performance. In condition I, these were three identical, 
minimal tasks. In condition II, these were tasks of different importance. 
There were three categories into which Ss could place the 10 'others’: 
'reward', 'continue', 'drop-out'. Those placed in the first category 
were rewarded. Those placed in the second category were not rewarded, but 
retained the chance of gaining rewards in the future. Those in the drop­
out category did not receive rewards and lost all chances of doing so in 
the future. The Ss could place the 10 others into 3 categories, or any 
2 categories, or any 1 category. The Ss also chose the level of rewards 
for those in the reward category. It was hypothesised that (i) 75% and 
30% would be the boundaries of the reward and drop-out categories res­
pectively (ii) those placed in the reward category on the basis of their 
similarity to thé Ss on the least important criterion would receive least 
rewards, those in the reward category on the basis of their similarity to 
the Ss on the most important criterion would receive most rewards (iii) 
our assumptions about the relative salience of the three criteria for 
similarity would be confirmed. The third hypothesis was tested by three 
independent questionnaires. All three hypotheses were confirmed. These 
results underline the strong conformities which occur in the way that the 
social environment is structured.
INTRODUCTION
In our first experiment, we demonstrated that the individual might 
actively structure the social environment, even on a minimal basis. In 
this second experiment, we are particularly interested in the conformities 
which take place when the social environment is structured. In the con­
ditions we created, the subjects could categorise others ; either placing 
them all in one category, or two categories, or three categories. This 
categorisation could take place on the basis of similarity, or by chance.
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We aimed to demonstrate that those individuals who categorised others on 
the basis of similarity, would show strong conformities in the way they 
carried out this categorisation. In this experiment, we were directly 
interested in the presence of conformity, and only indirectly interested 
in the specific manner in which conformity was manifested.
In the minimal group studies, researchers have assumed that subjects 
identify with those whom they reward highly. On the same basis, we assume 
that subjects in this experiment identify with those others whom they 
place in the reward category. Through establishing a more favourable 
position for those with whom they identify, we argue, the subjects are 
also establishing a more favourable position for themselves.
As in Experiment I, the relationships between the subjects and 
unidentified others was defined on various levels of similarity. However, 
there were several crucial differences between this and the first experi­
ment. Firstly, interpersonal similarity was on the basis of, not one, 
but four different criteria. Secondly,. there were two different experi­
mental contexts, trivial" and "important", represented by conditions I 
and II respectively.
In each of the two conditions there were three tasks. All three 
tasks in condition I were identical and described as "trivial". The three 
tasks in condition II were independent and of different salience; the 
first being less important than the second and third, and the second being 
less important than the third. As in Experiment I, these "others" were 
identified by code numbers only. But the system of allocating in this 
experiment differed from the reward allocation system in the first ex­
periment. In this experiment, rewards were allocated by placing others 
in a reward category. The amount of rewards given to those placed in 
this categoiy could be varied by the choices made on a scale indicating 
the level of rewards to be allocated.
Apart from the reward category, there were also "neutral" and 
drop out categories, into which subjects could place others.
It was hypothesised that:
(i) When social categorisation was on the basis of similarity, those who
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were 75% or more similar to the subjects would be placed in the reward 
category, those who were 30% or less similar to the subjects would be 
placed in the drop-out category.
(ii) The individuals placed in the reward category on the basis of the 
three different criteria of the second condition would receive different 
levels of rewards. Those who were in the reward category because of 
their similarity to the subjects on the most important criterion 
("political character") would receive most rewards. Those who were in 
the reward category because of their similarity to the subjects on the 
basis of the least important criterion ("food tastes") would receive 
least rewards.
(iii) It was hypothesised that our assumption about the differential 
importance of the three independent criteria for similarity in con­
dition II Would be valid. The most important criterion was hypothesised 
to be "political character", and the least important "food tastes".
, The important aspect of hypothesis (i) is not the prediction that 
"the" levels of 75% and 30% similarity would be used as category bound—
that
aries, but1some levels would be consistently used. These specific levels 
were chosen by us for the reason that they had been influential in 
Experiment I, and might be so again. The boundary for the "most similar" 
others was chosen as 75%, rather than 70%, because Sole et al., (n.d.) 
had used the level of 75%* Also, because in our first experiment, we 
had found that the boundary for the "most similar" category was just 
above 70% on several measures. ,
Subjects
There were 23 subjects, all of whom were female. Their average 
age was about 40, although this figure is not very precise. All the 
subjects worked in the maintenance department of a university.
Procedure
There were two identical experimental sessions, involving groups 
of 11 and 12 subjects each.
The Experimenter explained to the subjects that they would be 
taking part in two independent experiments. These "two experiments"
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corresponded to the two conditions. The procedure in the two conditions 
were identical in crucial ways. The first condition was far less import­
ant than the second, part of its purpose, the subjects were told, being 
to familiarise the subjects with the procedure and allow them to think 
more clearly in the second condition. The subjects were explicitly told 
about the relative importance of the two conditions.
In each of the two conditions the subjects would carry out a task, 
then receive information about how similar 10 others were to the subjects 
on task performance. The similarities of these 10 others to the subjects 
were defined at the levels: 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 100%.
The subjects next indicated which of the 10 others,with whom they were 
compared,would be rewarded and would continue to the next task to be com­
pared with the subjects again; which others would not be rewarded but 
would continue to the next task and be compared with the subjects again, 
and thus retain the opportunity of being rewarded; and which others would 
be ’dropped' and not given the chance of gaining further rewards. These 
procedures were very carefully explained and extensive efforts were made 
to check that the subjects understood them. From hypothesis I, it was 
expected that there would be consistency across subjects as to how others 
would be divided up in these three groups . It was hypothesised that those 
who were 75% or more similar to the subjects would be rewarded, those who 
were 30% or less to the subjects would be 'dropped', while the remainder 
would be in the 'continue' category. It was emphasised that at no stage 
would the subjects be allocating rewards to themselves.
The subjects were told that the others they were compared with 
were from a total pool of persons who had taken part in the experiments 
previously. In order to prevent possible bias towards particular indiv­
iduals among 'others', code numbers would be used for identification 
purposes. The code number identifying each 'other' individual across 
tasks would be changed.
In condition I the subjects were first involved in three dot- 
estimation tasks. Each of these tasks were described as being independ­
ent of, but identical to, the other two. The three sheets of paper on 
which the subjects had written their estimations were collected and while 
they were apparently being analysed for the degree of similarity by a
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collaborator, the Experimenter explained the second part of the experiment 
to the subjects. In this second part,the subjects would receive inform­
ation about 10 others who were at varying levels of similarity to them­
selves in their dot-estimations. This information was on three separate 
sheets of paper, each sheet corresponding to a specific dot-estimation 
task (see fig. 3, for an example sheet). The subjects categorised these 
10 others, by writing their identification numbers in the relevant boxes. 
They could divide others into three groups ('reward’, 'neutral', 'drop­
out'), pr just two groups, or they could put everyone in the same group. 
This point was very clearly explained to the subjects. These sheets were 
collected at the end of condition I.
In condition II ('Experiment II' to the subjects), the subjects 
were firstly involved in completing three separate questionnaires con­
cerned with "three different types of characteristics of a good politician" 
The subjects were told that this was an experiment designed to investigate 
what people believed were the essential characteristics of 'efficient' 
and 'worthwhile' politicians. They were familiar with the procedure of 
'experiment II', since it was the same as in 'experiment I', but they 
were asked to treat it as being of far more importance. The three quest­
ionnaires dealing with the issues of 'food tastes', 'health and fitness' 
and 'political character’ were distributed. When completed, these 
questionnaires were collected. While they were apparently being analysed 
for degree of similarity, the Experimenter explained the next part of the 
experiment to the subjects.
The subjects were told that they would receive information about 
how similar 10 others were to them (the subjects) in the way these 
others had completed the three questionnaires. This information would 
be on three separate sheets, similar to those used for the purpose in 
'experiment I' . It was emphasised that this was a different experiment 
and that the subjects could divide others up, into three, two or one 
group, in a different way from that used in 'experiment I' if they 
wished. In instructing the subjects during both conditions, it was rep­
eatedly emphasised that they could 'group' others in any manner which 
they felt to be appropriate to the situation.
The subjects were next asked to complete three questionnaires.
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Example Sheet - Fig (3)
Levels of Similarity (%) Person (identification) number(s)
100 ..............
90 ........
80 ..............
70 ............. . ....... 10
60 ..... .
50 .....  . .......
40 ......... . ......  6
30 ............
20 ...............
0 ............. .
Category Person (identification) number(s)
Reward
Continue
Drop-out
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These were included to test the relative salience of the three issues in 
condition II. Also,to check the level of rewards chosen for those placed 
in the reward category on the basis of similarity on each issue ('food 
tastes', 'health and fitness', 'political character'). Each of these 
three issues represented a criterion for similarity. It was through the 
questionnaires that hypotheses II and III were tested. We had hypothes­
ised that the subjects would view as most important the criterion of 
'political character', second most important the criterion of 'health 
and fitness', and least important the criterion of 'food tastes' (hypoth­
esis III). We had also hypothesised that those placed in the reward 
category on the basis of the most important criterion would receive the 
highest level of rewards, and those placed in the reward category on the 
basis of the least important criterion would receive the lowest level of 
rewards (hypothesis II). These hypotheses were tested by the three 
questionnaires described below.
The first questionnaire asked the subjects to indicate what 'scale 
of rewards these others whom they had placed in the reward category should 
receive (on a 6-point scale, 6 corresponding to 'high' scale and 1 cor­
responding to low scale). This questionnaire tested hypothesis II. The 
second questionnaire required the subjects to indicate how useful the three 
sets of information were in telling them about the beliefs of the 10 others 
as regards the qualities of a good politician. For example, if the subject 
knew that person number 34 agreed with him 100% about what food tastes a 
politician should have, how useful was this information, in comparison 
^^th the other two sets of information about the agreement of herself and 
person number 34. The 'usefulness' of the information was to be judged 
on the criterion of how much it told the subject about the opinions of 
person number 34 as regards the characteristics the subject believed 
were required to be a 'good politician'. The 'usefulness' of each 
issue was indicated on a 1 - 6 scale (l corresponding to 'high' useful­
ness and 6 corresponding to 'low' usefulness). Thirdly, the subjects 
were asked to indicate how important the three sets of issues ('food 
tastes', 'health and fitness', .'political character') were in the context 
of deciding the characteristics of a good politician (high importance 
corresponding to 6 , low importance corresponding to l). Hypothesis III 
was tested by all the three questionnaires described.
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Finally, the subjects were asked, to complete the 'Activist Scale’. 
This scale was developed to differentiate between people according to their 
degree of involvement in political and community activities (Worcester, 
1972). It was included in this experiment in order to check for any 
possible wide variations in the salience of politics for the subject group.
A debriefing and group discussion took place at the end of each experimental 
session.
Results
The results are reported in three sections, corresponding to the 
three hypotheses.
(i) The basis of categorisation and the variations of category , 7  
Boundaries . V j
Similarity was extensively used as the criterion for social cat­
egorisation . The numbers of subjects categorising others on the crit­
erion of similarity in each of the two conditions is given in Table (18).
The difference in numbers using similarity as the basis for categorisation 
between conditions is not significant (df - 1, x^ - 1.333; McNemaf test 
for the significance of changes).
Table (I8)
Total number 
of subjects
Number of subjects 
categorising others on 
the basis of similarity
Condition I 21 16
Condition II 21 19
/ ?The difference between conditions is N.S. (df - 1, x - 1.333, McNemar 
test for the significance of changes).
It was hypothesised that those using similarity as the basis for 
social categorisation would place those who were 75% or more similar in 
the reward category, and those who were 30% or less similar in the drop­
out category. We therefore expected there to be on average 3 people in 
the drop-out categoly, consisting of those who were on similarity
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levels 10%, 20% and 30%; and 3.5 people on average in the ’reward’ cat­
egory, consisting of those who were at similarity levels 100%, 90%, 80% 
and (sometimes) 70%. To test this hypothesis,the number of persons who 
were placed in the reward and drop-out categories were firstly counted. 
Only the choices of the subjects who categorised others on the basis of
similarity were considered. (Note - l6 subjects did so in condition one,
19 subjects did so in condition two). The mean numbers of others who 
were placed in the reward and drop-out categories were estimated next. 
These means are shown in Table (19). Finally, the deviations of these 
means from the means we expected on the basis of hypothesis I were 
tested by computing a one-sample ’t’ - test. The expected means were 
3.5 in the reward category, and 3.0 in the drop-out category. The results 
show no significant deviations from these expected means. This is true 
for both conditions. (See Table 19). Hypothesis I is confirmed by these 
findings.
(ii) The level of Rewards Chosen for those ’others’ who were placed 
in the Reward Category.
On the basis of hypothesis II,we expect that those who were in 
the reward category because of their similarity to the subjects on the 
most important criterion (’political character’) would receive the 
highest scale of rewards. Also, that those who were in the reward
category because of their similarity to the subjects on the least
important criterion (’food tastes’) would receive the lowest scale of 
rewards. The mean scale of rewards chosen for those who were placed 
in the reward category on the basis of their similarity to the subject 
on each of the three criteria (political character, health and fitness, 
food tastes) is presented in Table (20) - under ’measure II’. As we 
expected, the mean for those who were in the reward category on the 
basis of similarity on the criterion of ’political character’ is 
highest (5 .190), while the mean for those who were in the reward cat­
egory on the basis of similarity on the criterion of ’food tastes’ is 
lowest (2.810). The scale of rewards chosen for others who were 
placed in the reward category on the basis of similarity on each of the 
3 criteria were compared by ANOVA with repeated measures on the one 
factor (see Table 21). The results show significant differences bet­
ween the three sets of scores (df - 2/36, F = 39.168, P<O.Ol).
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TABLE (19)
(Deviations tested by a ONE-sample *t'-test)
Categorisation The mean number of The mean number of
others placed in the others placed in the
Criteria reward category drop-out category
c (Test of deviations (Test of deviations
0
N
D
I
from 3.5) from 3.0)
Dot X - 3.44 X - 3,50
Estimation SD - 0,81 SD - 1.59
T
I
1 t 0.3132 N.S. t = 1.1962 N.S.
0
N
Dot X - 3.31 X - 3.31
0 Estimation SD -
0.70 SD - 1.45
N 2 t 1.0651 N.S. t = 0.8599 N.S.
E
Dot X - 3.63 X - 3.125
/V =16 Estimation SD - 0.89 SD - 1.258
3 t r 0.5648 N.S. t = 0.3976 N.S.
Food X - 3.79 X - 3.00
c tastes SD - 0.85 SD - 1.17
0
N
t = 1.4759 N.S. t = 0 N.S.
D
I Political X - 3.68 X - 2.95
T
I Character SD - 0.75 SD - 1.03
0 t 1.0624 N.S. t = 0.2234 N.S.
N
T Health X - 3.53 X - 3.11
W
0
and SD - 0.91 SD - 1.20
fitness t — 0.2076 N.S. t = 0.3835
// =19 ’Rewarded*
Category
*drop-out * 
Category
It was hypothesised It was hypothesised
that there would be that there would be
on average 3.5 on average 3.0
persons in this persons in thi s
category(100%, 90%, category (10%, 20%,
80% - 70% similar) 30% similar)
Cvj
CM
CM
O
CM
a
CQ
S
H
CM
m
c:) P
3
(D
CM
<D
-P Xi
ü
«H G
o <U
CQ
M G (D
m O G
(D CQ
M G G CQ
M 1—I O •H co 00 O 00 00 CO
M G •H C3 p P C^ C3)
«H ■P co co <35 CO Ci o lO
<D 0 a
w a CD T f O 00 o CM p
3 G p XW 0 -P ! 1 1 1 1 1
c3 <U «H
G «H S Q s Q S p
H •H 0 CQ CQ CQ
CQ
T3 >>
G <D G p
G CQ •H 0
<D 0 bû
O (D "G CD
c U -p CD -P
o O G
•H . «H o G ü
rH 0 -p 1—1
d M a V o 0- 00 00 o C-CQ M 9 73 p c:) CM 00 00 p CMtH . 0 (D G p 00 00 CM oo CO
9 d -P p«H U o a CD CD lO P T f P CM p
0 3 co o P
m 0 I > 1 1 1 1
w C3 0) iH O CD
9 pG r—( f l S Q s Q S QS H G > P CQ CQ CQ
Cfi
a
Q)
«H
0
..
(D
O
-P ,
P CQ co O p 00 o Ci
M O CD co G) o
a G 00 00 lO CM o V
(D a CQ
b  , M CQ lO p P 00 p
•H
w 1 1 1 1 1 1
(Q 9 0)
a x i s Q s Q ' s p
H -P CQ CQ CQ
G
0
•H p
-P CD CQ
G p CQ
P CQ ü CD
0 •H G G
«H P p P
O G •H
G fajO • = ! P
•H CD ü CQ
P ■P 73 CD
O G P G P
+J U G G CQ
•H ü G
P •H f l p
U G P P
•H •H P 73
CD ü P G o
X i O O O O
H co a W a
223
This result confirms hypothesis II.
Table (21)
Comparison of the scale of rewards chosen for those who were in 
the reward category on the basis of similarity on responses to the 3 
questionnaires - food tastes, health and sport, political character.
df F ' P
2/36 39.168 0.01
(iii) The Importance of the Three Criteria for Similarity
It was hypothesised that our assumptions about the relative 
importance of the 3 criteria for similarity in condition II were valid. 
That is, the subjects would view ’political character’ as the most im­
portant criterion and ’health and sport’ as the least important crit­
erion. The three questionnaires which required the subjects to rate on 
a 6-point scale the ’importance of issues’, the ’scale of rewards’ and 
’usefulness of the information on each issue’ tested hypothesis III.
The mean scores given to the criteria of political character, health and 
fitness and food tastes on each of the 3 questionnaires is presented in 
Table (20). These scores were compared by a 3 x 3 ANOVA. The two 
factors were ’scales’ (3 types of questionnaires) and ’criteria’ (3 
types of criteria for similarity). There were repeated measures on 
both these factors. If the 3 criteria for similarity are of different 
importance from the point of view of the subjects, there should be 
significant variations between the distribution of scores chosen for 
each of the 3 criteria. However, there should be no significant 
interaction between ’criteria’ and ’scale’; although the main effect for 
scale may be significant. The results confirm these expectations (see 
Table 22). Both the main effect for the two factors were highly sig­
nificant (scale, df = 2/36, F = 1^.138, PcO.Ol; criterion, df = 2/36,
F = 37.399, PcO.Ol). There was no significant interaction between the 
two factors (df = 4/72, F = 0.429, N.S.). These results confirm 
hypothesis III,
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Table (22)
Comparison of the scores chosen for the 3 similarity criteria. 
The scores were chosen on 3 scales measuring the importance of each 
similarity criterion.
Source of 
Variance df F P<
Scale 2/36 14.138 0.01
Criterion 2/36 37.399 0.01
Scale X Criterion 4/72 0.429 - N.S.
The Activist Scale
This scale was included to check for any wide variations in the 
salience of 'politics’ for our subject, sample. An earlier study carried 
out in 1971 (cited by Worcester, 1972) reported that only 7% of the 
sample had carried out 5 or more of the 10 activities on the list. This 
study had used a sample of almost two thousand British adults. Those who 
had carried out 5 or more of the activities on the list were termed 
’Activists’. The general social characteristics of Activists were that 
they were more likely to be male, to come from a higher class background 
and be middle-aged. Our subjects were all middle-aged, lower-class 
females. It is thus surprising, on account of their sex and social 
class, that l4.3% of them had done 5 or more of the 10 activities on the 
list. The highest score by any of our subjects was 6 and the lowest was 
1. The average score of our subjects was 2.8 (SD - 1.6). Since none 
of our subjects scored more than 6 it seems safe to assume, on this basis 
at least, that the issue of politics was of a similar importance for our 
subject sample. Comparison of the scores of our subjects with those 
reported by Worcester’(i9Y2), however, suggests that, in general, politics 
might have been more important for our subjects than for the ’general’ 
population.
Discussion
Significant conformities occurred when the subjects categorised 
others on the basis of similarity. The three others who were least
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similar to the subjects, those who were 10%, 20% and 30% similar on the 
basis of task performance, were placed in the ’drop-out' category. The 
three (and sometimes four) others who were most similar to the subjects, 
those who were 100%, 90%, 80% (and sometimes 70%) similar on the basis 
of task performance, were placed in the reward categoiy. Thus, hypoth­
esis I was confirmed. Those who were placed in the reward category on 
the basis of their high similarity to the subjects on the most important 
criterion were allocated the highest level of rewards. ■ Those who were 
placed in the reward category on the basis of their similarity to the 
subjects on the basis of the least important criterion were allocated 
the lowest level of rewards. Thus, hypothesis II was confirmed. We 
had hypothesised that the criterion of 'politicELl character* would be 
viewed by the subjects as the most important one. Also, that the crit­
erion of 'food tastes ' would be viewed by the subjects as the least 
important one. This (third) hypothesis was also confirmed.
None of the subjects scored very highly on the Activist Scale.
As far as this scale can be assumed to be a measure of the salience of 
politics, it seems that politics had about the same salience for our 
subject sample.
In the post-experimental discussion there was an attempt by the 
Experimenter to direct focus on two specific issues. Firstly, the 
issue of identification; had the subjects identified with any of the 
categories of others? Secondly, the issue of attribution; had the 
subjects attributed general characteristics to any others? It was soon 
clear that the subjects had not visualised 'character types', or attrib­
uted general characteristics to others. It seemed equally clear, however, 
that the subjects had identified with certain categories of others.
In general, the subjects reported that identification with a 
categoiy of others had taken place in the second condition only. When 
they were asked why they had placed others in different categories and 
rewarded only some of them, it was only in relation to condition II 
that most of them could provide ready answers. It seems that the dot- 
estimation tasks were 'important' and provided salient bases for social 
categorisation when they were one of the few social cues present in the 
context (condition l). But when the subjects looked back, the first
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condition and the tasks it entailed were seen as trivial in comparison 
with the second condition and the tasks it entailed. In this perspective, 
their action in condition I, action a which had been guided by such very 
limited social cues, seemed more difficult to rationalise.
In the minimal group studies researchers have assumed that the
subjects identify with those others whom they treat (relatively) fav­
ourably. On the same basis, and on the - basis of the post-
experimental discussions, we assume that the subjects identified with
those whom they rewarded. Because the subjects identified with certain 
others, their social identity was to some extent dependent on the 
values attached to these others - within the experimental situation.
In establishing a more favourable position for these others, the subjects 
were probably also improving their own social identity. We view the 
subject’s desire for a favourable social identity as being the critical 
factor influencing the way others were categorised and rewarded.
In these first two experiments we have not pinpointed a ’magic’ 
ratio or level(s) of similarity which influence behaviour. The sim­
ilarity levels 75% and 30% were only guidelines to behaviour within the 
highly limited confines of the situation we created. For the particular 
sample population included in these experiments, there is no evidence 
to suggest that these levels would have the same influence in other 
situations.
What the results do imply for the behaviour of people in other
settings, however, is that there will be consistency in the manner of
bias shown towards others who are perceived to be on certain levels of
be
similarity to themselves. Furthermore, there will/kconsistency in the 
manner in which others are categorised, on the basis of how similar 
they are perceived to be to the self. There will also be consistency in 
the nature of bias shown towards the groupings formed, with the more 
similar group being treated more favourably and with negative bias being 
shown towards the dissimilar group of others. The results reported by 
Sole et al.^ (N.D. ) to some extent have the same implications for the 
behaviour of individuals towards similar/dissimilar others.
It is proposed that the consistencies we found in the behaviour of 
subjects towards similar/dissimilar others would also be present
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within other populations sharing relevant social rules and norms. The 
influence of such rules and norms might lead to systematic differences 
between several such populations sharing different rules and norms.
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EXPERIMENT III
Abstract
Both research carried out *in the field’ and in the laboratory 
provide evidence to suggest that minimal differences between groups 
might be used as the basis for intergroup differentiation and dis­
crimination. In such situations, what seems to be most influential is 
not the ’objective’ importance of a phenomenon, but its potential role 
in helping the individual to achieve a favourable social identity - 
among other factors. The central hypothesis tested in the present 
experiment was that two criteria for social categorisation with different 
’real world’ salience would have the same influence on intergroup 
behaviour when they were independently the only criterion for social 
categorisation in two distinct,but identical settings. The subjects were 
66 schoolboys. In condition I, social categorisation was on the basis of 
a minimal criterion. In condition II, social categorisation was on the 
basis of the subjects’ school house system. Just as the subjects in 
condition II were members of past, present and future houses; the subjects 
in condition I were members of past, present and future groups - formed on 
the basis of the minimal criterion. Among the subsidiary hypotheses 
tested were that, firstly, ingroup favouritism would occur whenever the 
situation allowed the subjects to favour the ingroup and, secondly, in 
situations where the subject was allocating rewards to outgroups only, 
there would be no bias. The central hypothesis was confirmed. The 
subsidiary hypotheses were either fully confirmed or strongly supported.
These results seem to demonstrate the active way in which individuals 
ascribe importance to phenomena in order to establish a meaningful basis 
for intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism.
Introduction
Individuals play an active part in the construction of social reality. 
They intentionally ascribe meaning to the social environment. They interpret 
their own characteristics, as well as those of their ingroup and outgroup.
One important influence on this process of interpretation and reality 
construction is, we assume, the desire for a favourable social position for 
the self. In situations where the identity of the self is directly linked 
to the identity of the ingroup, the individual might seek to achieve both
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a distinct and favourable position for the ingroup. This intention might 
lead the individual to ascribe importance to ’objectively trivial’ 
criteria,on the basis of which.the ingroup might be differentiated from 
outgroup(s). By this action, he might be able to establish a meaningful 
and ’important’ basis for achieving a distinct and favourable position for 
the ingroup.
From both the contexts of the ’real world’ and the experimental 
laboratory, there is evidence that individuals ascribe importance to 
’trivial’ phenomenon and exaggerate certain characteristics,in order to 
achieve a more meaningful basis on which to differentiate between them­
selves and others. From anthropological literature, it is apparent that 
the boundaries of ethnic groups are sometimes ’objectively’ blurred, but 
subjectively appear as distinct and prominant. For example, Maquet (1961) 
reports that in the Ruanda culture, the height differences between the two 
major groups, the Tutsi and the Hutu, were emphasized and exaggerated.
This exaggeration helped to achieve intergroup differentiation and also 
accompanied certain values with it. The Tutsi were the dominant group and 
their exaggerated height superiority played an important part in defining 
their superior social position. In the context of the laboratory, the 
minimal group studies have clearly demonstrated that intergroup 
differentiation and discrimination might occur in a situation where the 
differences between groups are ’objectively’ highly trivial. The subjects 
in these experiments seemed to ascribe importance to these minimal 
differences,in order to have a meaningful basis for intergroup differentiation 
and discrimination (c.f. Chapters 3 andl;).
The meaning and importance which an individual ascribes to a 
phenomenon is partly dependent on the potential role of this phenomenon 
in establishing the social identity which the individual desires to 
achieve. The more crucial this potential role is, the greater will be the 
importance ascribed to the phenomenon. Two different phenomena, which have 
the same potential role in establishing the desired social identity, might 
be ascribed the same importance. This might occur even if thé ’objective’ 
meaning and importance of the two phenomena are very different.
In an intergroup situation where the individual identifies with the 
ingroup, his social identity will be influenced by the values attached to 
this ingroup. We assume that the individual desires to achieve a
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favourable social identity and this will lead him to attempt to improve 
(or maintain, at least) the social status of the ingroup. When there is 
only one criterion which differentiates between the ingroup and the out­
group, this criterion will be given a great deal of importance because 
of its potential role in achieving the desired social identity.
The central hypothesis tested in this experiment was that two 
criteria which were of different ’real world’ salience,for the subject 
population,might have the same influence on intergroup behaviour,when 
they are used independently as the only criterion for social categorisation 
in two distinct,but identical settings. The experiment was carried out in 
a school. The school’s house system acted as the assumed important and 
real world,basis for social categorisation (Condition II). Performance on 
a dot-estimation task was the assumed trivial criterion for social 
categorisation (Condition I). ‘
A method was devised by which the subjects rewarded not only the 
present ingroup and outgroups, but also past and future ingroups and 
outgroups. This methodology was possible because of the; characteristics 
of the school’s house system. It was hoped that the introduction of past
and future ingroups and outgroups would give the subjects greater scope to
manifest different levels and types of intergroun behaviour, than in 
situations where only present ingroups and outgroups were introduced. In 
turn, the manifestation of this wider range of behaviour may allow us 
greater opportunities for differentiating between behaviour in the two 
conditions.
The specific hypotheses tested in the present experiment were
that:
i) The ingroup would be favoured wherever possible.
ii) There would be significant differences between the rewards
allocated in situations where the ingroup could be favoured and
the rewards allocated in situations where the ingroup could not
be favoured.
iii) The rewards allocated to the different ingroups (past, present, 
future) would be the same..
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iv) When it was impossible to favour the ingroup, rewards would be 
allocated in an unbiased manner.
v) There would be no significant differences between bias strategies 
in the two conditions. This is the central hypothesis which we 
tested.
The most important hypothesis was the fifth one. The first four 
hypotheses will be referred to as ’subsidiary’ hypotheses.
Context
The school which provided the context to this experiment is 
divided into two sections; one for junior boys (aged 7-11) and the other 
for senior boys (aged 11-18). A house system operates in both sections 
of the school. However, the number of houses and the scope of inter- 
house competition is different in the two sections. This difference forms 
an integral part of the design of this experiment.
There are two houses in the junior section; Bentley and Gilmour.
All the boys belong to one or other of these houses.
There are four houses in the senior section. The boys in the 
junior section know which house they would join if they entered the senior 
section. They are given this information when they enter the junior 
section. Boys who are in Bentley in the junior school join either 
Chalmiers or Carey when they enter the senior section. Boys who are in 
Gilmour join either Livingstone or Moffat.
Subjects
Sixty-six subjects were included in the analysis. Two were 
eliminated because it was found, through post-experimental discussions, 
that they had not understood the instructions. All the subjects were male. 
There.were three groups; 21; ID-year-olds from Form 35 21; 11-year-olds from 
form l;j and 18 12-year-olds (? each from forms I.i. and I.ii.).
Conditions
The characteristics of the two conditions are presented in Fig. (i;). 
In condition H, social categorisation was established on the basis of the 
school house system. In condition G, social categorisation was established 
on the basis of performance on a dot-estimation task and by chance. The
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groups in condition H were; Bentley, Gilmour, Livingstone, Carey, Moffat, 
Chalmers. In exactly the same way and with identical implications for 
past and present or future memberships, the groups in condition G were:
X, Y; XI, X2, Yl, Y2. In each of the two conditions, H and G, there 
were 3 samples of subjects - from (a) Form 3; (b) Form It and (c) Forms 
(l.ii) and (l.i). These samples will be referred to as samples 1, 2 and 
3 respectively. The letters G and H will indicate the condition in which 
subjects from each sample are in. For example, the code H2 will represent 
those subjects from sample 2 who are in condition H. The various codes 
representing each subject sample in the two conditions are presented in
Fig. (5).
Fig. (5)
THE CODE REPRESENTING THE SUBJECT 
SAMPLES IN EACH CONDITION.
Subject Samples .
Conditions (form 3) (form 1|) (forms l.i & l.ii)
H HI * H2 H3
G G1 G2 G3
The conditions and treatments are described in detail below.
Condition H: Subjects in EL and H2
The rewards were allocated between members of present and future 
houses. There were U treatments. Rewards were allocated to each member 
of;
Treatments
One Your present house - other present house
Two ■ Your present house - other future houses
Three Your future house - other present house
Four Other present house - other future houses
The abbreviations for these i; treatments were as follows ;
Treatments
One PH/OPH
Two PH/OFH
Three FH/OPH
Four OPH/OFH
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Condition G; Subjects in G1 and G2
The choices were exactly the same as in condition H, treatments
HI and H2, In this case, however, houses were replaced by their
corresponding groups (X, Y; XI, X2; Yl, Y2).
The abbreviations for the 1; treatments were as follows;
Treatments
One PG/OPG
Two PG/OFG
Three PG/OPG
Four OPG/OFG
Condition H; Subjects in H3
There were past and present houses, there were no future houses.
There were Ij. treatments. Rewards were allocated to each member of;
Treatments
One Your present house - Other present houses
Two Your past house - Other present houses
Three Your past house - Other past houses -
Four Other present houses - Other past house
The abbreviations for these 1|. treatments were as follows;
Treatments
One PH/OPH
Two PtH/OPH
Three PtH/OPtH
Four ' OPH/OPtH
Condition G; Subjects in G3
The choices here were exactly the same as in condition H, H3.
However, the houses were replaced by their corresponding groups.
The abbreviations for the treatments were as follows ;
Treatments
One PG/OPG
Two PtG/OPG
Three PtG/OPtG
Four OPG/OPtG
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Throughout the experiment the relationship between the groups X 
and Y, and the groups XI, X2, Yl and Y2, corresponded to the relationship 
between Bentley and Gilmour, and Carey, Chalmers, Livingstone and Moffat. 
Just as those who were previously in Gilmour knew that they would be (in 
the future or present) in either Livingstone or Moffat, while those who 
were previously in Bently knew that they would be (in the future or 
present) in either Carey or Chalmers; correspondingly, those who were 
previously in *X’ knew that they would be (in the future or present) in 
either XI or X2, while those who were previously in Y knew that they would 
be (in the future or the present) in either Yl or Y2. Thus, for example 
on the basis of shared past memberships, those who were members of 
Livingstone had more in common with members of Moffat than with members of 
either Chalmers or Carey. Just as, on the same basis, those who were 
members of Yl had more in common with members of Y2 than with members of 
XI or X2.
The most important hypothesis we tested (hypothesis five) predicted 
that there would be no significant differences between bias strategies in 
the two conditions (H and G). In our methodology, the principle aim was 
to establish two sets of intergroup relationships which differed only with 
respect to the basis on which social categorisation was achieved. We 
expected that in all the treatments where the ingroup could be favoured 
(treatments one, two and three), significant ingroup favouritism would 
occur (hypothesis I). On the basis of hypothesis two, we expected that 
there would be significant differences between the rewards allocated in 
treatments where the ingroup could be favoured (treatments one, two and 
three) and when the ingroup could not be favoured (treatment four). On 
the basis of hypothesis three, we expected that the rewards allocated to 
the different ingroups would be the same. To test this prediction, the 
rewards allocated in treatments one, two and three were compared. The 
fourth hypothesis predicted that when it was impossible to favour the 
ingroup, rewards would be allocated in an unbiased manner. To test this 
prediction, rewards allocated in treatment. four were tested for possible 
bias.
Procedure
All 6 experimental sessions were carried out in school classrooms. 
There were between 9-12 subjects in each session. The subjects were 
informed that there were three distinct stages in the experiment. It was
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emphasised that they were not being tested in any way and that they 
should behave in the manner they thought most appropriate. Subjects in 
H3 and G3 were told that they would be in groups throughout the three 
experimental stages. Subjects in HI, H2 and Gl, G2, were told that they 
would be in groups during the second and third experimental stages. No 
reference was made to groups or similar concepts during the first stage 
of these ^ treatments.
Experimental Stage One
The first stage of the experiment involved a dot-estimation task.
The subjects wrote down how many dots they saw being flashed onto a screen. 
Before this task began, subjects in H3 were told that they were in their 
past house and subjects in G3 were told that they were in group X or Y for 
this task. Social categorisation for G3 was on a chance basis, the 
subjects were informed of this explicitly.
Experimental Stage Two
The subjects were told that they would be making choices to give 
’rewards* to others on the basis of some matrices. The numbers on the 
matrices were described as simply representing points. In order to 
perform this task, it was necessary that they be in groups. Because of 
the age of subjects, extra measures were taken to ensure that the four 
matrices used to measure intergroup bias were understood. Detailed 
instructions and worked examples of all the strategies were given. The 
subjects were required to show that they understood the use of the 
matrices in test trials before the experiment proper began.
Condition H
The subjects were informed that,for the sake of convenience, the 
school house system would be used to divide them into groups. The subjects 
in H3 were members of past and present houses. The subjects in HI and 
H2 were members of present and future houses; those in H2 would be joining 
their future house one year earlier than those in HI,
Condition G
The subjects were informed that for the sake of convenience, they 
^o^^d be placed into groups on the basis of how they had performed on the 
dot-estimation task. In order to establish relationships between groups 
which corresponded to those established in condition H, those subjects who
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were in group ! were told they would join either XI or X2,while those 
who were in group Y were told that they would join either Yl or Y2.
“While the subjects were filling in sample sheets of matrices, the 
Experimenter divided them up on the (alleged) basis of performance on 
the dot-estimation task.
Those in Gl were told that they would be in their future group 
during part 3 of the exqjeriment, which would take place ’next term’.
This was in order to establish a corresponding situation to those who 
were in HI and would join their future house one year later than those in 
H2.
Experimental Stage Three
The subjects in HI, H2, Gl and G2 were told that because of lack of
time, it might not be possible to include the third section in the
experiment; but that since the booklet of matrices had been designed to 
include future groups (or future houses) as well, they should also make the 
choices relevant to future groups (or houses). Since the subjects in H3 ;
and G3 did not have future groups or houses, this did not affect them.
They were simply told that the third part of the experiment was not going 
to take place because of lack of time.
The subjects were also given a questionnaire to elicit the 
strategies they used in making choices and the perceived characteristics 
of the groups they were in. One aim of the questionnaire was to detect 
the extent and manner in which the subjects in condition H had seen the 
experimental context as being one ' in which school houses were a genuinely 
relevant basis for action. How far was the inter-house rivalry carried 
into the experimental context? Also, it was of interest to know how 
subjects viewed the ’minimal’ groups they were placed in. Did they 
ascribe any characteristics to them? After the questionnaires had been 
completed, a group discussion took place and the subjects were encouraged 
to make comments on their experiences in the experiment. A de-briefing 
session followed.
Measures of Bias
The booklet of matrices each subject was given had 9 pages. On the 
•Tirst page, he recorded the name of his own and other groups (past, present, 
future). There were U matrices on each of the remaining 8 pages (see "
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Appendix I for a description of the i; matrices) .
Results
The results are reported in two main sections. In the first 
section, results are reported for each subject sample, treatment, 
and condition independently. These results are specifically relevant to 
hypotheses (i) and (iv). The other three hypotheses ( (ii), (iii) and 
(v) ) required us to make comparisons across treatments and conditions.
The results of these comparisons are reported in the second section.
(T) Within Subject Samples, Treatments and Conditions
Tables (23), (2l|.) and (25) show the means of the scores for 
subject samples 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The choices made on the basis of 
Matrix I were analysed by a one-sample *t*-test of the significance of the 
deviation of choices from the ’unbiased* mean of 6.5. The difference 
between the two types of choices made on matrices II, III.and IV was 
examined by the Wileoxon Matched Pairs test. On the basis of hypothesis 
(i), we expected that significant ingroup favouritism would occur in 
treatments one, two and three. That is, in all treatments where the in­
group could be favoured. This prediction proved to be correct, with two 
exceptions (Table (2i|), 02, Matrix II, Treatment Two; Table (25), G3,
Matrix IV, Treatment Two). On the basis of hypothesis (iv), we expected 
that there would be no significant biases in treatment four. That is, 
when only ’others’ could be rewarded, rewards would be allocated without 
bias . This prediction proved to be correct, with only one exception 
(Table (23), HI, Matrix II, Treatment Four). These results, therefore, 
provide strong support for hypotheses (i) and (iv).
Comparisons Across the Four Treatments and Two Conditions
Using ANOVA, three types of analyses were conducted to compare bias 
across the 2 conditions and k treatments. The first included all k 
treatments, the second included the first 3 and the third included the 1+th 
treatment only. We had hypothesised that; the first and second types of 
analyses would reveal significant main effects for factor D (type of choice). 
This would demonstrate ingroup favouritism (hypothesis (i) ). The first 
type of analysis would reveal between-treatment differences (hypothesis (ii)). 
That is, there should be significant differences between the first three 
treatments and the fourth. But there would be no significant differences
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between the first three treatments considered independently (hypothesis
(iii) ). We also hypothesised that there would be no significant 
biases in the last treatment (hypothesis (iv)). The most important 
hypothesis was that - there would be no significant differences between the 
two conditions (hypothesis (v)).
The significant results of the analyses mentioned are presented in 
Tables (26), (27) and (28) respectively. In addition, the results 
directly relevant to the central hypothesis are presented in Table (29). 
Only results which are directly relevant to the hypotheses are presented.
In the tables of results, the following letters represent the factors with 
significant effects;
C - Treatment
D - Type, of Choice (I/O - O/l)
The other factor in the analyses was ’condition* and this is represented by 
the letter ’A ’. In all the analyses, there are’repeated measures on 
factors C and D. Analysis of choices on Matrix I involved only 2 factors,
A and C, with repeated measures on C.
Types of Analyses - Tables 26^ 27,28,29 .
(i)
Comparison of choices across the 1| treatments via;
2 jx h X 2 ANOVA -
Condition X Treatment x Type of Choice 
(MATRICES II, III, IV)
Type (ii)
Comparison of choices across the i; treatments via;
2 X Ij. ANOVA 
Condition x Treatment 
(M.flTRIX I)
Type (iii)
Comparison of choices across the first 3 treatments via;
2 X 3 . X 2 ANOVA 
Condition x. Treatment x T/pe of Choice 
(MATRICES II, III, IV)
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Type (iv)
Comparison of choices across the first 3 treatments via;
2 X 3 ANOVA
Condition x Treatment 
(MATRIX I)
Type (v)
Comparison of the two types of choices in the Uth treatment across 
the 2 conditions via;
2 X  2 ANOVA
Condition X  Type of Choice 
(MATRICES II, III, IV)
Significant Effects
(i) The significant main effect ■ 
for factor D reflects ingroup favouritism when all k or the first 3 
treatments are considered (Tables (26) and (27) respectively), fii) The 
significant first order interaction effect ’CD’ reflects between 
treatment differences when all I; treatments are considered (Table (26)).
In the case of Matrix I, it is the main effect for factor C which reflects 
these differences (Table (26) ). . (iii) No such differences occur when 
only the first 3 treatments are considered (Taole (27) ). (iv) When the 
fourth treatment is considered independently, no significant differences 
occur (Table (28) ).
Most importantly, it was hypothesised that there would be no 
significant differences in bias across conditions (hypothesis (v)). This 
hypothesis is fully confirmed. The results for the main effect condition, 
and the first order interactions between condition and choice type 
(I/O - 0/1), and condition and treatment, are presented in Table (29). 
Several results came close to contradicting hypothesis (v). For example, 
the results of the comparison of scores on Matrix IV for the first three 
treatments (main effect condition (D), df - 1, 6i; F = 3.i|02i;, N.S.) 
show near significant results. But there is no doubt that the central 
hypothesis we tested is confirmed by those results.
In comparison with our other experiments, the bias shown in the 
present experiment is extreme. This is reflected by the relatively high 
F scores for factor D, The subjects tended to adopt bias strategies on
on all-or-non^'basis.
2hk
TABLE (26)
ANALYSIS OF ALL 4 TREATMENTS
Analysis
Type Matrix
Significant
Effects df F P
Direction 
of Bias
(i) 11
C
D
CD.
3/192
l/6k
3/192
36.0922
323.2%52
%8.0651
0.01
0.01
0.01
Positive
(i) 111
D
CD
1/6%
3/192
125.3652
50.8772
0.01
0.01
Positive
(i) IV
D
CD
1/6%
3/192
105.1191
%1.%%7%
0.01
0.01 Positive
(ii) 1 C 3/192 62.671 0.01 Positive
TABLE (27)
‘
ANALYSIS OF FIRST 3 TREATMENTS
Analysis
Type Matrix
Significant
Effects df F p
Direction 
of Bias
(iii) 11 D 1/6% 329.20697 0.01 Positive
(iii) 111 D 1/6% 169.7121 0.01 Positive
(iii) IV D 1/6% 132.1568 0.01 Positive
(iv) 1 None — Positive
See pages 242-2^3 for explanation of "types of analysis".
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TABLE (28)
ANALYSIS OF TREATMENT % INDEPENDENTLY
Analysis
Type
. Matrix
Significant
Effects df F P
Direction 
of Bias
(V) II None — -
(V) III None — ■ —  ■
(V) IV None . - “  ■
See pages 2%3~2%2 for explanation of "types of analysis".
It vas hypothesised that when the fourth treatment is 
considered independently,no significant bias vould be 
revealed (hypothesis iv).
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TABIÆ (29)
Results,for the main effect 'condition* (D) and the interactions 
condition x choice (AD) and condition x treatment (AXC). It was 
hypothesised that there would be no significant main effect for D, 
or significant interaction effects for AD or AC (hypothesis (v)). 
See pages 2%2-2%3 for explanation of "types of analysis".
Code Number 
for Type of 
Analysis
Matrix
df F P /L
Analysis of all li Treatments
(1) II
D 1,61* 1.699 H.S. 
AD 1,61* 2.677 
AC 3,192 0.697
(i) III
D 1,61* 0.031
ad 1,61* 3.171 H.S.
AC 3,192 1.262
(i) IV
D 1,61* 1.1*3
AD 1,61* 0.32 H.S.
AC 3,192 1.663
(ii) I D 1,61* 0.379AC 3,192 0.081* M.S.
Analysis of first 3 treatments
(iii) II
D 1,6% 1.11%
AD 1,6% 1.%98 N.S. 
AC 1,128 0.979
(iii) III
D 1,6% 0.056
AD 1,6% 3.229 N.S.
AC 1,128 1.915
(iii) IV
D 1,6% 3.%02
AD 1,6% 1.002 N.S.
AG 1,128 0.286
(iv) I D 1,6% 0.209AC 1,128 0.216 M'S.
Analysis of Treatment % Independently
(v) II D 1,6% 1.382AD 1,6% 0.807 M.S.
(v) III D 1,6% , 0.00% N.S. 
AD 1,6% 0.355
(v) IV D 1,6% 0.955 w q 
AD 1,6% 0.316 , M.S.
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Choice Strategies Reported
The subjects were asked to describe the strategies they used for 
allocating points. Table (%2) gives the numbers of strategies reported 
by the subjects in each condition.
TABLE (%2)
Strategy Condition H Condition G
FAV 17 18
F 8 6
MD % 7
MvJP 3 .2
MIP 16 12
N . 48 %5
X 1.45 1.36
The distribution of scores are not significantly different across 
conditions (Mann-Whitney, U = 17, P <0.938, 2 tailed) .
Descriptions of Own and Other Groups
Subjects were required to respond to the questions; "Are there any 
differences between members of your present group/house and members of 
other groups/houses? What characterises your group?".
Condition G
From a total of 33, only 9 subjects responded in any way at all to 
ohese questions. Only one subject referred to performance on the dot- 
estimation task as a basis for differences between groups. It appears 
that the dot-estimation task and its original function in group formation 
was forgotten (two other subjects stated it was "skill" which 
differentiated between groups, without specifying whether or not it was 
'dot-estimation* skill or some 'other' skill they were referring to). 
Highly "egotistic" responses were given by 5 subjects. For example, my 
group "... is the best group... but without me it's useless". From the 
post-experimental discussion, it appeared that a number of subjects in 
condition G did feel their presence in the group made it 'the best'.
Condition H
All 33 subjects responded fully in this section. Although the "
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questions focused attention on present own house, subjects often chose 
to speak in reference to past or future houses. It may be the case that 
they chose the most 'objectively* successful ovm house and identified 
with it for the purpose of making comparisons between oxm and other houses.
In almost all cases, differentiations were made between oxm and 
other houses which led to positive evaluation of the former and negative 
evaluation of the latter. Content analysis of the descriptions revealed 
66 responses folloT.dng this pattern. Only % instances of descriptions 
negatively evaluating an 'own house* were found.
Discussion
Social categorisation on the basis of criteria of different salience 
had the same influence on intergroup behaviour when each criterion was 
introduced independently,in identical settings. Our central hypothesis was 
thus confirmed. Other findings of this experiment were that, firstly, 
ingroup favouritism occurred in almost all situations where it was possible 
to favour the ingroup. Secondly, there were significant differences 
between the rewards allocated in situations where the ingroup could be 
favoured and where the ingroup could not be favoured. Thirdly, the 
different ingroups were favoured in the same manner. Fourthly, when the 
situation did not allow the subjects to favour the ingroup, rewards were 
allocated in an unbiased manner. Our four subsidiary hypotheses were, 
therefore, either fully confirmed or strongly supported.
In comparison with the subjects in our other experiments, the 
subjects in the present experiment showed very high levels of bias when 
favouring the ingroup. This high bias might be accounted for by two 
influencing factors, among others. Firstly, these subjects were very 
young. They seemed to identify with their ingroups more intensely and 
have a more competitive attitude in the intergroup experimental situation 
than the adult subjects in our other experiments. Secondly, a far 
greater effort was made to familiarise these schoolboy subjects with the 
choice strategies the four matrices made possible. They completed example 
exercises and demonstrated, for example, that they could make a choice 
which achieved MJP or FAV, before they proceeded to fill in the matrices 
proper. This may have meant that they made less mistakes in expressing 
their biases through the choices than the subjects in our previous 
experiments, who were possibly less expert at using the matrices. Although
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the schoolboy subjects received very detailed instructions on the use of 
the matrices, they still failed to describe in full all the choice 
strategies we assume they used.
When viewed in the general context of the minimal group studies, 
the results of this experiment seem to have two important implications, 
at least. Firstly, the results for condition G provide another 
demonstration that social categorisation on the basis of a minimal 
criterion could lead to intergroup discrimination. Secondly, the 
confirmation of the central hypothesis suggests that we should not 
inteipret the minimal criteria used as the basis for social categorisation 
in the minimal group studies as being necessarily trivial - from the point 
of view of the subjects. The criteria for social categorisation 
introduced in the present experiment were of widely different levels of 
salience for the subject population, when considered in the 'real world' 
context. However, when we established two identical settings in which 
the 'structural' role of the different criteria were identical, they had 
the same influence on intergroup behaviour. These results indicate that . 
the subjects in the minimal group studies might intentionally ascribe 
importance to the minimal differences between their own and other group(s). 
The active way in which individuals interpret and give meaning to the 
social environiment is emphasised by our findings.
The results of the present experiment also underline the influence 
oT the social structure in determining the importance of social phenomena. 
The different criteria which acted as the basis for social categorisation 
in the two conditions occupied identical positions in the social structure. 
The two most important characteristics of the social structure were, 
firstly, the relationships between the groups and, secondly, the position 
of the subject in relation to these groups. These characteristics were 
identical in the two conditions. The similar intergroup behaviour which 
occurred in the two conditions can be explained partly by referring to 
these structural similarities.
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.EXPERIMENT IV
Abstract
An earlier study investigating two explanations of intergroup 
behaviour - social norm and belief similarity - is elaborated upon.
Allen and Wilder (1975) suggest that intergroup bias is dependent on in­
group (I) characteristics and independent of outgroup (O) characteristics. 
Using a so-called 'trivial* basis for social categorisation, they 
established 2 groups and created % conditions in which Ss were similar 
(70^-90% agreement) or dissimilar (10^-30^ agreement) to I and 0 members 
on so-called 'important' similarity criteria. (An 'aesthetic preference' 
task formed the 'trivial' basis for social categorisation, while an 
'attitude and belief' scale helped in the creation of the 'important' basis 
for similarity relationships). Neglecting to demonstrate the comparative 
salience of the bases for 'social categorisation' and 'similarity', they 
incorporated only the latter variable in the data analysis. Thus, the 
untested pull of the so-called trivial basis for social categorisation might 
have accounted for the I bias achieved.
A pilot study preceded the present experiment to establish (com­
paratively) trivial and important similarity criteria. The subsequent 
experiment involved 1%% Ss (72 of each sex) taking part in mixed-sex groups 
of 12-18 Ss each. The procedure (folla-;ing Allen and Wilder's) consisted 
of two parts. In Part I, Ss answered questions on trivial and important 
issues. While their responses were allegedly being scored, they were 
instructed on how to use % Matrices to ax-rard points to I and 0 members.
Eight conditions were introduced (A)I and 0 chosen by chance, (B) I chosen 
by chance, 0 similar to S on both trivial and important issues, (C) I. 
dissimilar to S on important issues,but similar on trivial issues; 0 similar 
to S on important and trivial issues, (D) I dissimilar to S on important 
issues,but similar on trivial issues; 0 similar to S on important issues,but 
dissimilar on trivial issues, (E) I similar to S on important issues,but 
dissimilar on trivial issues; 0 dissimilar to S on important issues,but 
similar on trivial issues, (F) both I and 0 similar to S on important issues 
and dissimilar on trivial issues, (g) I similar to S on both important and 
trivial issues; 0 dissimilar to S on important issues,but similar on trivial 
issues, (H) I similar to S on both important and trivial issues; 0 chosen 
on a chance basis.
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The central hypothesis tested was that there would be favouritism 
towards I in all conditions, except in conditions B, C and D, where 0 
would be favoured. Two subsidiary hypotheses were that, firstly, there 
would be no sex differences and, secondly, there would be favouritism 
towards I when rewards allocated in all 8 conditions were analysed as a 
whole•
When results are considered as a whole, there is general positive 
■bias towards I. In particular cases where 0 members are similar and I 
members dissimilar to S on important issues, the Ss were favourable towards 
0. The I was favoured when categorisation was on a 'chance' or 'same' basis. 
Differences between sexes in conditions B, C and D showed that males were 
more influenced by 0 characteristics than were females, the latter tended to 
be positively biased towards I irrespective of belief similarity congruence.
In conclusion, the findings are in agreement with Allen and Wilder's 
in demonstrating general I bias irrespective of I and 0 characteristics. 
However, by incorporating in the analysis a 'trivial' and an 'important'
^^u^Iarity criterion,whose comparative salience had been established in 
relation to the S population, this experiment demonstrated that in situations 
where 0 is similar and I is dissimilar on an 'important ' criterion, there 
could be positive bias toxfards 0. This finding (which contradicts Allen and 
Wilder's) underlines the importance of establishing the comparative salience 
of criteria used as the basis for social categorisation and 'similarity' in 
such studies. It suggests that 0 characteristics are not irrelevant - 
influencing male bias strategies in particular. It also seems to demonstrate 
social mobility at a purely psychological level.
Introduction
In certain situations, an individual may share a characteristic with 
the outgroup but not with the ingroup. In cases where this shared 
characteristic is highly valued by the person, we predict that two events 
may occur. Firstly, the outgroup may be held in high esteem relative to the 
ingroup. Arising from this, secondly, the individual may attempt to change 
his group membership through the strategy of social mobility, in order to 
improve his social identity. If exit from the ingroup and entrance into the 
outgroup is not possible in the material sense, identification with the 
outgroup may occur on a purely psychological level.
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We assume that such 'psychological* social mobility may arise in 
a situation where an individual is similar to the outgroup and dissimilar 
to the ingroup on the basis of opinions which are relatively important to 
him. We are particularly concerned with opinions which are an essential 
aspect of the individual's social outlook. This excludes views which are 
related to issues that are seen as 'serious', but are not an important 
aspect of one's personal outlook.
Results from Allen and Wilder's (1975) experiment appear to 
contradict our predictions concerning the occurrence of 'psychological' 
social mobility,in situations where subjects are similar to the outgroup 
and dissimilar to the ingroup on important opinions. This study tested the 
hypothesis that belief similarity is a more important determinant of 
discriminatory intergroup behaviour than social categorisation. Two 
contrasting predictions were tested. According to one, the mere categor­
isation of subjects may lead to ingroup favouritism, regardless of the 
similarity or dis similarity of the subjects' views in comparison to those of 
the ingroup and outgroup. In contrast to this is the prediction that subjects 
will be positively and negatively biased towards those who are respectively 
similar and dissimilar to themselves, irrespective of their group memberships.
We predict that the similarity of the subjects to the ingroup and out­
group will influence intergroup behaviour. This influence will reach a 
significant level when the similarity characteristic is an important factor 
affecting the subjects' (assumed) perceptions of the relative status position 
of the groups. When the outgroup is highly valued relative to the ingroup, 
because its members share similar views with the subjects on important issues 
aud the ingroup members do not share these views, social mobility may occur. 
That Allen and Wilder's (1975) results do not confirm this prediction is, we 
argue, possibly due to certain methodological xfeaknesses in their study.
Subjects in Allen and Wilder's (1975) experiment filled in a 
questionnaire assessing their attitudes on a variety of* topics, 'ranging from 
artistic to political beliefs '. They then took part in a task expressing 
their preferences for a series of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky (cf. Tajfel, 
1971). The questionnaires were scored (allegedly) while the Experimenter 
told the subjects about the second part of the experiment. Subjects were told 
they would be divided into two groups and, for convenience sake, group member­
ship would be on the basis of picture preferences. Each subject was then..told.
253
privately of his group membership. Membership was randomly assigned, in 
fact. Subjects were given verbal as well as written accounts of how they 
had responded in comparison with others (ingroup and outgroup members) on 
these questionnaires. There were four conditions: (a) ingroup similar- 
out group similar, (b) ingroup similar - outgroup dis similar, (c) ingroup 
dissimilar - outgroup similar, (d) ingroup dissimilar - outgroup 
dissimilar.
In this experiment, the upper boundary of the dissimilar group and 
the lower boundary of the similar group were at 30# and 70# similarity 
levels respectively. A subject's beliefs were said to be similar to those 
of another when between 70-90# of the items on the attitude inventory were 
responded to in the same manner. Dissimilarity of views was achieved when 
only 10-30# of the items on the inventory were responded to in the same 
manner. These boundaries appear to have been adopted on an intuitive basis 
by Allen and Wilder. They do, however, correspond almost exactly to the 
category boundaries we found to be important in our first two experiments.
The findings of this experiment were interpreted as suggesting that 
the similarity/dissimilarity of ingroup members does affect the way subjects 
discriminate between the ingroup and outgroup. But the similarity/ 
dissimilarity of outgroup members does not seem to influence inter group 
discrimination. An important objection to this interpretation can be put 
forward, however, on the grounds that there were two similarity criteria 
present. Although they may have both influenced intergroup discrimination, 
Allen and Wilder assessed the influence of only one of them.
The second similarity criterion, which was not considered in the
analysis, was aesthetic preference. It was assumed that the aesthetic
preference task was 'trivial' and had no influence on intergroup
discrimination. This assumption may be invalid. In a situation where there
are so few cues to guide social behaviour, any criterion which may act as a
basis for intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism, may be
ascribed high importance - as the findings of our third experiment seemed to 
suggest.
A viable alternative interpretation of these findings is thus as 
follows: when subjects are placed into a group with others who share their 
aesthetic preferences, while outgroup members have different aesthetic
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preferences, they will be biased towards the ingroup. This ingroup bias 
will be maintained, irrespective of the similarity relationships subjects 
have with the ingroup and outgroup on the basis of »a variety of topics 
ranging from artistic to political beliefs *. The criterion of aesthetic 
preference , derived through an actual picture preference task,rather 
than a 'pencil and paper' attitude inventory, is thus a comparatively 
salient basis for social categorisation.
In response to what we felt to be weaknesses in Allen and Wilder's 
(1975) study, we introduced certain extensions and modifications to the 
procedure they had followed. Firstly, using a sample of the subject 
population, we developed two criteria for social categorisation through a 
pilot study. These criteria were judged to be 'important' and 'unimportant' 
relative to each other. Secondly, we took into consideration the influence 
both these criteria for social categorisation in the experimental 
analysis. We also introduced a condition in which both ingroup and out­
group memberships were on a chance basis. This was, firstly, to test the 
findings of an earlier experiment (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969) suggesting 
that social categorisation on a chance basis may lead to ingroup favouritism.
Secondly, we felt it useful to include in the experiment a criterion 
for social categorisation which was not derived from opinion similarity.
As regards the scoring of the % matrices which are the main measures 
of intergroup bias, Allen and Wilder (1975) give an incorrect report of 
the scoring method which should be used on Matrices III and IV. If the 
scoring method they report is used on their data, we arrive at conclusions 
opposite to theirs. Taking mean choices for Matrix III as an example, 
using their reported scoring method, we conclude that when the outgroup was 
similar there was positive bias towards the outgroup member. That is, a 
mean score of 7.5 (I/O choice) means that the ingroup received on average 
12.5 points and the outgroup received on average 15.5 points; while a score 
of 4.65 (O/l choice) means that on average the ingroup member received 9*65 
points and the outgroup member received 15.65 points.
With particular reference to some of the conditions in the present 
experiment, the term ingroup is used in a very limited and specific manner. 
The term ingroup has been used in the minimal group studies to refer to the 
category to which a subject is nominated. Allen and Wilder (1975) also used 
the term ingroup in this 'minimal group' fashion, but in one of the
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conditions of their experiment the subject was dissimilar to the rest of 
his own category on an important criterion, and similar to the members of 
'another* category on the same important criterion. In this condition, 
each subject had been nominally assigned to a category which could only 
constitute an 'ingroup' in a highly minimal sense. There were several 
conditions in the present experiment in which the subjects were assigned 
to categories whose members were dissimilar to the subjects on an 
important criterion, while the members of 'another' category were similar 
to the subject on the same important criterion. In discussing these ' 
conditions, particularly, the term 'ingroup' is used in a highly limited 
sense. In this experiment, just as in all the minimal group studies, the 
term ingroup has no triplications for identification with, or loyalty to, 
the category to which one is assigned. In the minimal group studies, 
identification with a category is inferred indirectly from favouritism 
towards that category. We follow this 'tradition'.
The central hypothesis tested in this experiment was that there would 
be ingroup favouritism in all conditions, except when the outgroup and 
ingroup were respectively similar and dissimilar to the subjects in terms of 
opinions on important issues, in which case there would be positive outgroup 
bias (hypothesis (i)). The two subsidiary hypotheses were that, firstly, 
there would be no significant sex differences in response (hypothesis (ii)). 
Although this hypothesis is not essential to this experiment, the emphasis 
which some writers (e.g. Tiger, 1971) place on sex differences in group and 
intergroup behaviour should, we felt, be given acknowledgement; even if 
only to show that such attention is not justified, in some areas at least. 
The second subsidiary hypothesis was that when the results of all 
conditions are considered as a whole, there would be ingroup favouritism 
(hypothesis (iii)). This hypothesis had been confirmed by Allen and Wilder
(1975).
Design Overview
In the first part of the experiment, the subjects filled in two 
questionnaires, respectively concerning unimportant and important issues.
In the second part of the experiment subjects were placed into groups. The 
relationships between the subjects and the ingroup and outgroup members was 
varied across 8 conditions. These variations being defined by similarity/ 
dissimilarity on important/trivial issues, and on chance basis. Subjects 
chose rewards for others on the basis of % matrices. Discussions and
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debriefing followed.
Methodology
Subjects took part in the experiment in groups numbering 12-18 
people. Each group approximately consisted of half males and half 
females • They were informed that there were two distinct parts in the 
experiment. In the first part they would fill in two questionnaires. One 
questionnaire concerned important and the other concerned trivial issues.
The second part of the experiment concerned a different judgement task, 
involving % matrices which would be described later.
The only lines of communication open during the experiment were those 
between the subjects and the Experimenter. There was no communication 
between subjects.
Part One
The Experimenter stressed that the first questionnaire to be completed 
concerned trivial issues (Fig. (6)), while the second concerned relatively 
important issues (Fig. (?))• In accordance with their respective importance,
.the time periods allocated for completion of the first and second 
questionnaires were 30 seconds and 10 minutes respectively. Subjects were 
asked to "rush through" the first questionnaire, but to "ponder over" the 
second one. When the second questionnaire was completed, both questionnaires 
were collected and taken outside, to be (apparently) scored by a 
collaborator.
Part Two
While the questionnaires were being (apparently) scored, the 
Experimenter explained to the subjects the procedure for the second part of 
the experiment. They were told that they would be making judgements on the 
basis of % matrices. For this task they needed to be in groups. It was 
convenient to decide group membership on the basis of their questionnaire 
responses - or chance, depending on the condition. When the results from 
the questionnaires were ready, the subjects were told that each of them 
would be given an information sheet. This explained which group he/she 
was in and why. There were 8 types of information sheets, one for each 
condition (see example on Fig. (8)).
Each sheet provided information concerning (i) the identity of the
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Fig. (6)
TRIVIAL ISSUE
Subject Number:
Please place a mark in the appropriate box,
a ) I like butter more than margarine Yes
B) I like jam more than honey Yes
No
No
C) I like sliced bread more than | [~ I
unsliced *--' *— — *
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Fig- (7) important issues
Apter each, question you will find a row of numbers whose meaning is 
indicated. All you have to do is to draw a ring around the number which 
describes your opinion best.
1) This country is under the control of Trade Union leaders.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 T 8 . 9  10 Completely disagree
2) Women should stay at home and look after the children because that is
what they are best at doing.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
3) The music created by the Beatles is more relevant to us today than the 
music created by Beethoven, Bach and other so-called "classical" 
composers of the past.
Completely agree 1 2  3 %  5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
%) Nice Guys finish last.
Completely agree 1. 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 *9 10 Completely disagree
5) Corruption and power go hand in hand.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
6) Marriage is a MANtrap.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
7) Most of what is called "Modern Art" is rubbish.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
8) Men like to be dominated by women.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
9) In starting and waging a war it is not right that matters but victory. 
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
10) British students do not receive sufficient grants.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
11) The great nations have always acted like gangsters, and the small 
nations like prostitutes.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
12) The woman of today is neither feminine nor elegant.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5  6 7 8 9 1 0  Completely disagree
13) The right to work is more important than the right to vote.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
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Fig. (T) (contd.)
1%) Men think about sex more than women do.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
15) You cannot make a man by standing a sheep on its hind legs. But by
standing a flock of sheep in that position you can make a crowd of men.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
16) No healthy male ever thinks or talks of anything save himself. 
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5. 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
17) A fifth of the people are against everything all of the time.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
18) Few people can be happy unless they hate some other people, nation or 
creed.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
19) A politician is an animal who can sit on a fence and yet keep both 
ears to the ground.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree;
20) Students should be forced to work in industry in the holidays and in
this way pay back the grants they get.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 7 8 9 10 Completely disagree
21) The average man’s opinions would be much more foolish if he thought for 
himself.
Completely agree 1 2  3 % 5 6 7 8  9 10 Completely disagree
22) The student life is a lazy life and most young people only become 
students in order to evade real work.
Completely agree 1 2 3 % 5 6 J 8 9 10 Completely disagree
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Fig. (8).
You are subject number,
The next judgement task requires that all subjects are divided into 
two separate groups. These groups will be referred to as "Group X" 
and "Group Y".
You are in fact a member of Group X
Your responses in the last two judgement tasks (the "trivial" and the 
"important") agreed only slightly (10# - 30# of the time) with the 
responses of other members of Group X.
By contrast, in both the "trivial" and the "important" judgement 
tasks your responses were quite similar (between ?0#-90# similar) to 
those given by members of the "other group" - group Y .
Your task is to award points to all other subjects, i.e. subjects of. 
Group X and Group Y. You are only provided with information as regards 
the group membership number and group identity of other subjects - 
their true identity will not be revealed to you.
At no time will you be awarding points to yourself.
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group the subject was in, (ii) how similar the subject was to the rest 
of the ingroup on the way he had responded on the trivial issues and,
(iii) the important issues, (iv) how similar the subject was to the 
outgroup on the way he had responded on the trivial issues and, (v) 
important issues. Also, (vi) the sheet informed subjects when ingroup 
and/or outgroup membership was on a chance basis. Subjects were described 
as being highly similar to 'another* when between 70-90# of their responses 
were the same. Mien only between 10-30# of their responses were the same, 
they were described as being slightly smilar.
Throughout the experiment,*others' were only identified in terms of 
X/Y group memberships. Each point awarded represented 1/10 of a penny.
At no time could subjects reward themselves. Four matrices (cf - Appendix 
I) were used to award points. The Experimenter explained the nature of 
these matrices and discussions continued until the subjects clearly under­
stood the procedures involved.
Each subject was given a booklet consisting of 16 pages. Each page 
had on it one set of % matrices. Alongside each matrix was information 
stating (i) which row each of the two individuals being compared would 
receive rewards from and, (ii) the group membership of these two 
individuals. The two 'others' who belonged to different groups and were 
being compared were always given the same code numbers. As always, each 
two others were compared with each other on the same matrix twice: Once 
when the ingroup member received points from the top row, and once when he 
received points from the bottom row.
After each experimental session had been completed, subjects were 
invited to discuss openly the experiment they had taken part in, before and 
after the Experimenter had revealed its real aims. It was through these 
procedures that 8 subjects were eliminated from the analysis. Five of them 
because they had doubted the basis of group formations during the experiment, 
The other three were eliminated from the analysis because they appeared to 
have misunderstood the tasks.
Conditions - Description of Table (30)
Social categorisation was described as being on the bases outlined 
below. In fact, however, group membership was purely on a chance basis in
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TABLE (30)
CODE FOR EACH OF . THE 8 CONDITIONS
INGROUP CH CH/SS DS/SS DS/SD SD/DS SD/SD SS/DS SS/CH
Important Issues
Highly Similar - - - X X X X
Slightly Similar - ■ - X X — — —
Trivial Issues
Highly Similar - - X X - - X X
Slightly Similar — — — — X X
Chance Only X X - - - - -
OUTGROUP
Important Issues
Highly Similar - X X X - X —
Slightly Similar — — — X . X
Trivial Issues
Highly Similar - X X X - X -
Slightly Similar — ■ — — X — X
Chance Only X • - ■ - - - - - X
CONDITIONS A B C D E F G H
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all conditions.
The numbers of males and females in each condition was equal. We 
had hypothesised that there would be no sex differences in the way 
intergroup discrimination took place (hypothesis (ii)). We had also 
hypothesised that there would be ingroup favouritism in all conditions, 
except when the outgroup and ingroup were respectively similar and 
dissimilar on important issues, in which case there would be favouritism 
towards the outgroup (hypothesis (i)). Our third hypothesis predicted 
that there would be ingroup favouritism when the rewards allocated in all 
conditions are considered as a whole.
There were 8 conditions. Each condition involved 18 subjects, ^ 
males and ^ females (total - D|%). Table (30) illustrates the 
characteristics and the identification codes for the conditions. In condition 
A (code *Ch') both the ingroup and outgroup were formed on a purely chance 
basis. In condition B (Ch/SS) the ingroup members were chosen on a chance 
basis. The outgroup members were highly similar to each other, and the 
subjects, in the way they responded to questions on both trivial and 
important issues. In condition C (DS/SS) the ingroup members were highly 
similar to each other on responses to trivial issues, but only slightly 
similar to each other on responses to important issues. The outgroup 
members were highly similar to each other, and the subjects, on responses to 
both trivial a n d . o r tant issues. In condition D (DS/SD), the ingroup 
members were highly similar to each other on responses to trivial issues, 
but only slightly similar to each other on responses to important issues.
The outgroup members were highly similar to each other, and the subject, 
on responses to important issues, but only, slightly similar to each other, 
and the subject, on responses to trivial issues. In condition E (SD/DS) 
the ingroup members were highly similar to each other on responses to 
important issues, but only slightly similar to each other on responses to 
trivial issues. The outgroup members were only slightly similar to each 
other, and the subjects, on responses to important issues, but highly 
similar to each other, and the subjects, on responses to trivial issues. In 
condition F (SD/DS) both ingroup and outgroup meirbers were highly similar to 
other group members, and the subjects, on responses to important issues, and 
slightly similar on responses to trivial issues. In condition G (SS/DS) the 
ingroup members were highly similar to each other on responses to both
trivial and important issues. The outgroup members were highly similar to
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each other, and the subjects, on responses to trivial issues, but only 
slightly similar to each other, and the subjects on responses to important 
issues. In condition G (SS/Ch) the ingroup members were highly similar to 
each other on responses to both important and trivial issues. The out­
group members were chosen on a chance basis.
Itesults
The results are reported in two sections. In the first section, the 
results for each condition are reported independently. In the second- 
section, the results of analysis on several or all conditions combined are 
reported. Hypothesis (i) was tested by, firstly, analysing the rewards 
allocated within each condition independently (results reported in section 
one). Secondly, hypothesis (i) was tested by making comparisons across 
conditions. For example, by analysing the rewards allocated in all the 
conditions where the outgroup was similar to the subjects on important 
issues and the ingroup was dissimilar (results reported in section two). 
Results relevant to hypothesis ii, which predicted that there would be no 
sex differences, are reported in section two. The third hypothesis required 
us to analyse the rewards allocated in all 8 conditions as a whole. It was 
hypothesised that this analysis would reveal ingroup favouritism. The 
results of this analysis are reported in section two.
SECTION ONE 
Within Conditions
The means of choices made on the basis of the % matrices are presented 
in Tables (31) to (34) inclusive. The mean choices for the sexes are shoifn 
both independently and combined.
Choices on matrix I show bias favouring the outgroup in condition D 
(Table 31). The direction of bias favoured the outgroup in condition B also, 
but it did not reach a significant level. The positive outgroup bias in 
condition D is significant when choices of both sex groups are considered 
together, but much stronger in the case of , the male subjects. Comparisons 
of conditions B and D, particularly, suggest we may find sex differences 
when conparing across conditions.
In conditions A, E, F, G and H choices revealed significant ingroup 
favouritism (Table 31).
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TABLE (31)
EXPERIMENT IV MATRIX I (Key Overleaf)
Nos.
Cells of Ss. Ingp Outgp
9
12.
12
9;
9
9
9
9
9
9
:i
9
18
18
18
18
18
18
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
DS
DS
DS
DS
SD
SD
SD
SD
Ch
Ch
SS
SS
SS
SS
SD
SD
DS
DS
SD
SD
Sex
Male ] 
Female )
Male ) 
Female /
Conds
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
A
B
Male )
D
E
Means of scores, 
sexes treated 
independently
X
(8 df)
*3.8 
*3 .3
5.6
8.6
6.6
5.8
* * 9.7 
6. 6
***4.5
*3.8
Means of 
scores, sex€ 
combined
(IT df)
Mean 3.55
Mean 7.1
***4. 9 /
Mean 6.2
Mean 8 .15 ##
Mean 4 .15 **
Mean 4.6 **
13
lA
15
16
^^ 18
9/
18
SS
ss
ss
ss
DS
DS
CH
CH
Male
Female
Male
Female H
n**4.34
**
##4.01
Mean 4.13
Mean 4 .14
T = ihh
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KEY to table (31)
MATRIX I
The choices made on the basis of Matrix I were analysed by a 
one-sample ’t' test of the significance of the deviation of choices 
from the ’unbiased' mean of 6.5.
Within each cell (df - 8) - Responses of sexes treated independently
* Significant at P<0.02 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards ingroup
** Significant at P<0.02 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards outgroup
*** Significant at just below P<0.05 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards 
ingroup
** Significant at P<0.05 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards ingroup 
Within each condition (df - 1?) ~ Responses of sexes combined for analysis
*** Significant at P<0.001 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards ingroup 
*** Significant at P<0.05 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards outgroup
**** Significant at P<0.01 (2 tailed) Positive bias towards ingroup
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TABLE (32) EXPERIMENT IV ' MATRIX II
Cells Nos, of Ss Ingp Outgp Sex
9
12.
ii
13
ii
15
16
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Ch Ch Male
Ch Ch Female
Ch SS Male
Ch ss Female
DS ss Male
DS ss Female
DS SD Male
DS SD Female
SD DS Male
SD DS Female
SD SD Male
SD SD Female
SS DS Male
SS DS Female
SS Ch Male
SS Ch Female
Means of scores Means of scores 
sexes treated sexes combined 
Conds independently ------—  -----
X
B
D
O/I / 1/0
1.5 7.2 
2.% 8.2
3.8 1.%
6.6 2.3
5.6 3.6
2,8 7.0
8.0 2.0 
%.2 3.7
2.6 6.6
1.7 5.3
2.1 . 6.0 
1.0 3.6
Mean 1.95 
Mean 5.2
Mean %.2
0/1 1/0 
/ 7.7
/ 1.85 
/ 5.3
Mean 6.1 / 2.85
Mean 2.25 / 5.95
Mean 1.55 / %.8
1.68 6.03
3.15 T.32 Mesa 2.42 / 6.68
H
1.56 6.51
2.oil 6.61. Meaal.8 / 6.58
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TABLE (33) EXPERIMENT IV ' ' MATRIX III
Cells Nos of SS Ingp Outgp ' Sex Conds
9
ii
ii.
ii
13
ii
11
l6
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Ch Ch Male
Ch Ch Female
Ch SS. Male
Ch SS Female
DS SS Male ,
DS SS Female
DS . SD Male
DS SD Female
SD DS Male
SD DS Female
SD . SD Male
SD SD Female
SS DS Male
SS DS Female
SS Ch Male ,
SS Ch Female,
E
Means of scores, 
sexes treated 
independently 
X
O/I / I/O
Means of 
scores, 
sexes 
combined 
O/I I/O
2.7
2.6
8.0
9.3 Mean 2 .65 8.65
7.1
6.8
5.5
6.9
Mean 6.95 6.2
8.1
5.1
4.2
7.8
Mean 6,6 6.0
8.8
5.7
2.8
5.8
Mean 7.25 4.3
5.7
3.8
5.3
7.1
Mean 4.75 6.2
2.6
3.8
6.8
6.3
Mean 3.2 6.55
U.19
%.%5
8:55
6.68 Mean 4.32 7.62
3.12
3.46
7.86
7.75
Mean 3.29 7.8
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TABLE (34)
EXPERIMENT' IV MATRIX IV
Cells Nos of SS Ingp Outgp Sex
9
11
13
11
l6
9 ) 
9
9
9
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch
DS
DS
DS
DS
SD
SD
SD
SD
SS
SS
SS
SS
Ch
Ch
SS
SS
SS
SS
SD
SD
DS
DS
SD
SD
DS
DS
Ch
Ch
Maie
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male 
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Conds
B
D
Means of scores Means of
sexes treated scores, sexes
independently combined
X
O/I I/O
2.9 7.4
3.0 6.2
7.2 5.6
7.4 2.8
6.5 4.0
4.9 6.8
7.9 4.3 
6-.0 5.1
6.6
4.1
5.5
5.9
2.2 5.9 
3.7 6.3
0/1 1/0 
Mean 2.95 6.8 
Mean 7.3 4.2
Mean 5.7 5.4
Mean 6.95 4.7 
Mean 5.35 5.7
Mean 2.95 6.1
H
3.62 8.25
3.72 8 24 3'67 8.25
3.5 8,19
4.31 8.42 3.91 8.31
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TABLE (35)
EXPERIMENT IV
Analysis of 
Pairs Test.
choices on Matrices II, 
The responses of both
III and IV, using 
sexes combined.
Wilcoxon Matched
MATRIX
DIRECTION OF 
BIAS P<(2 tailed)
CONDITION A II POS 0.01
III POS 0.01
IV POS 0.01
CONDITION B II NEG 0.01
III NEG n.s
IV NEG 0.01
CONDITION C II POS n.s.
III NEG n.s.
IV NEG . n.s.
CONDITION D II NEG 0.01
III ■ NEG n.s.
IV NEG n.s.
CONDITION E II POS 0.01
III POS 0.05
IV. • POS. n.s.
CONDITION F II POS 0.01
III POS 0.01
IV POS 0.01
CONDITION G II POS 0.01
III POS 0.01
IV POS 0.01
CONDITION H II POS 0.01
III POS 0.01
IV POS 0.01
Key to Direction of bias;
POS - Positive bias towards the ingroup 
NEG - Negative bias towards ingroup
TABLE (36)
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EXPERIMENT IV
Analysis of choices on Matrices II, III and IV, with sexes treated
independently using Wilcoxon matched pairs test (2 tailed)
POS - Positive bias towards the Ingroup
NEG - Negative bias towards the Ingroup
FEMALE MALE
CONDITIONS MATRICES
II III IV p< 11 III IV
A 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05
POS POS POS POS POS POS
B 0.05 n .s. 0.01 0.05 0.05 n .s .-
NEG POS NEG NEG NEG NEG
C n .s. n.s. n.s. o’.05 0.01 0.05
POS POS POS NEG NEG NEG
D n.s. n.s . n.s. 0.05 0.05 n.s.
NEG POS NEG NEG NEG NEG
E 0.05 n.s. n.s. 0.01 n.s. n .s.
POS POS POS POS NEG ■
F 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01
POS POS POS POS POS POS
G 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01
POS POS POS POS POS POS
H 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
POS POS POS POS POS POS
Nos. of NEG Strategies k
Nos. of POS Strategies 20
(Underlined strategies show differences)
11
13
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Comparison of conditions C and D seems to show that even similarity/ 
dissimilarity of the outgroup on a trivial criterion had some influence on 
choices. In both conditions the ingroup was chosen on the same basis 
(SD). But the outgroups in the two conditions differed, one being similar 
and the other dissimilar to the subject on a trivial criterion. This 
difference seemed to affect the choices (means 6.8 and U.85).
Mean choices on Matrices II, III and IV are shown in Tables (32), 
(33) and (34) respectively. A summary of results is presented in Table 
(35), with results for the sexes combined. The direction of bias is the 
same for all the choices on the 3 different matrices, with one exception in 
condition C. Significant ingroup favouritism occurred in conditions A, E, 
F, G and H; that is, in all the conditions in which the ingroup was similar 
to the subject on the important criterion, and in the condition in which 
both the ingroup and outgroup were formed on a chance basis.
The direction of bias favoured the outgroup in conditions B and D 
on all three matrices, as well as in condition C for matrices III and IV. 
This bias reached a significant level in conditions B (on matrices II and 
IV) and D (on matrix II).
Table (36) shows the results for matrices II, III and IV, with the 
sexes treated independently. Differences in direction of bias between the 
sexes occur in conditions B, C, D and E. There was a far greater tendency 
for males to show bias in favour of the outgroup. As far as the direction 
of bias is concerned, this occurred in conditions B, 0 and D on all 3 
matrices, and in condition E on matrices III and IV. This positive outgroup 
bias reached significant levels in conditions B (matrices II and III), C 
(matrices II, III and IV) and D (matrices II and III).
The female subject sample showed a greater tendency to favour the 
ingroup irrespective of similarity/dissimilarity. In the direction of bias, 
they favoured the outgroup only in conditions B and D (both on matrices II 
and IV), It was only in condition B (matrices II and IV) that this bias 
reached the level of significance.
In conclusion, analyses of the rewards allocated within each condition
demonstrates that positive bias towards the outgroup did occur in certain
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choices. In both conditions the ingroup was chosen on the same basis 
(SD). But the outgroups in the two conditions differed, one being similar 
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This bias reached a significant level in conditions B (on matrices II and 
IV) and D (on matrix II).
Table (36) shows the results for matrices II, III and IV, with the 
sexes treated independently. Differences in direction of bias between the 
sexes occur in conditions B, 0, D and E. There was a far greater tendency 
for males to show bias in favour of the outgroup. As far as the direction 
of bias is concerned, this occurred in conditions B, C and D on all 3 
matrices, and in condition E on matrices III and IV. This positive outgroup 
bias reached significant levels in.conditions B (matrices II and III), C 
(matrices II, III and IV) and D (matrices II and III).
The female subject sample showed a greater tendency to favour the 
ingroup irrespective of similarity/dissimilarity. In the direction of bias, 
they favoured the outgroup only in conditions B and D (both on matrices II 
and IV). It was only in condition B (matrices II and IV) that this bias 
reached the level of significance.
In conclusion, analyses of the rewards allocated within each condition
demonstrates that positive bias towards the outgroup did occur in certain
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conditions, particularly for tiie male subjects. Outgroup similarity, on 
important criterion at least, did influence intergroup discrimination.
In all conditions where the outgroup was dissimilar to the subjects on 
imporbanb issues, the ingroup was favoured. Ilypobliesis (i) therefore, 
receives strong support from analysis of results within each condition. 
Bias towards the ingroup seems to have been mainly on the basis of MTP 
rather than MD. Only in conditions G and H does MB exert a strong pull. 
MJP was influential, particularly when the outgroup was favoured. In 
conditions B, C and D, important sex differences arose. The females were 
more influenced by F. The males tended to be more biased towards the out­
group. In general, the males gave higher rewards to those most similar to 
themselves on the important criterion than did the females.
Section Two: Comparisons Across Conditions
Four further analyses,using ANOVA, 
were conducted,in order to clarify the patterns of intergroup bias 
across conditions.(l) Firstly,all the conditions were compared.
(2) Secondly,those conditions (A and F) in which the ingroup and 
outgroup were selected on the same basis were compared.(3) Thirdly,
274
only conditions in which the ingroup was similar and the 
outgroup was dissimilar on the important criterion or selected 
by chance were compared (conditions E,G and H).Finally (4),and 
most importantly from the point of view of our central 
hypothesis,only the conditions in which the outgroup was 
similar and the ingroup was dissimilar on the important 
criterion or selected by chance were compared (conditions B,C 
and D) .
It was hypothesised that the first three analyses would reveal in­
group favouritism. The fourth, it was hypothesised, would reveal I
favouritism towards the outgroup.
Three factors were included in all the analyses: sex (2 levels), 
condition (8 levels) and choice type (i.e. l/O-O/l) (2 levels). These are t 
represented by the letters M, N and P respectively. In all analyses, there ' 
were repeated measures on factorP .
The results of analyses are presented in Tables (37), (38), (39), 
and (40). Only significant results are reported. In these tables, the 
terms Pos and ^  refer to positive and negative bias towards the ingroup.
1) Comparison of All Conditions
Table (37) sliows the results which are significant when the rewards 
allocated by subjects in all 0 conditions are analysed via:
2 X  8 X  2 A N O V  A
sex X condition x choice type
The most .Important rcsuJ.t is that the main effect of factor p j.s significant 
for all 3 matrices (matrices 11, III, IV). That is, when the 0 conditions 
are considered as a whole, significant ingroup favouritism is fully confirmed 
But the first-order interaction between factors N and P is also significant 
on all 3 matrices. That is, bias varied significantly across conditions.
This suggests that we need to consider more closely differences between 
certain conditions. Our assumptions of between sex differences, on the basis 
of earlier within condition analyses, seems to receive very tenuous support
TABLE (37)
275
COMPARISON OF ALL 8 CONDITIONS
Code for Factor
Significant
Effects df F
Direction 
of Bias
P
MP
NP
1,8
1,8
7,8
Matrix II
23.756
5.093
11.885
0.01
0.06
0.01 Pos
. MNP 7,192 ■ 2.102 0.05
P 1,8
Matrix III 
23.579 0.01 PosNP 7,8 9.099 0.01
P
Matrix IV
20.047 0.01 PosNP 7,8 12.544 0.01
TABLE (38) COMPARISON OF CONDITIONS A AND F
Code for Factor '
Significant
Effects df F P <
Direction 
of Bias
P 1,8
Matrix II 
13.155 0.01 Pos
. P 1,8
Matrix III 
19.832 0.01 Pos
P 1 ,8
Matrix IV 
10.153 0.05 Pos
Only Significant Effects are Reported
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from the near significance of the MP (sex x choice type) first order 
interaction for matrix II,
2) Comparison of Conditions A and F
Table (38) shows the significant results when the choices in 
conditions A and F are analysed via:
2 X  2 X  2 ANOVA
sex X  condition x choice type
Condition A - Ch/Ch) , , .
characteristics
Condition F - SD/SD)
In these two conditions both the ingroup and the outgroup were selected on 
the same basis. The only significant results are for the main effect of 
factor P. Significant ingroup bias occurred on all 3 matrices. There were 
no significant differences between conditions or sexes.
3) Comparison of Conditions E, G and H
Table (39) shows the results which are significant when the choices :
in conditions E^ G and H are analysed via:
2 X  3 X  2 ANOVA
sex X  condition x choice type
Condition E - SD/DS)
Condition G - SS/DS) characteristics
Condition H - SS/Ch)
In these 3 conditions the ingroup is similar and the outgroup is dissimilar 
to the subjects on the important criterion or selected on a chance basis. 
Again, the main effect P is significant for all 3 matrices, reflecting high 
ingroup favouritism. There were no significant differences between 
conditions or sex.
4) Comparison of Conditions B, C and D
Table (40) shows the results which are significant when the choices
in conditions B, C and D are analysed via:
2 X  3 X  2 ANOVA 
sex X  condition x choice type
TABLE (39)
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COMPARISON OF CONDITIONS E, G AND H
Code for Factor
Significant
Effects df F P <
Direction 
of Bias
P 1,8
Matrix II 
25.550 0.01 Pos
P 1 ,8
Matrix III 
l4.4lO 0.01 Pos
P 1,8
Matrix IV
18.632 0.01 Pos
TABLE (40) COMPARISON OF CONDITIONS B, C AND D
Code for Factor
Significant
Effects df F P <
Direction 
of Bias
None —
Matrix II
— Neg
P 1,8
Matrix III
7.147 0.05
• MP 1,8 6.087 0.05 Neg
MNP ' 2,72 3.489 0.05
P 1 ,8
Matrix IV
6.667 0.05 Neg
MNP 2,72 3.118 0.05
Only significant effects are reported
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Condition B - Ch/SS)
Condition C - DS/SS) characteristics
Condition D - DS/SD)
It should be noted that the characteristics of conditions B, C and D
correspond *inversely* to the characteristics of conditions E, G and H 
(as outlined above). In conditions B, C and D the outgroup is similar 
and the ingroup is dissimilar to the subjects on the important criterion 
or selected on a chance basis. The direction of bias is negative for mil 
3 matrices i.e. outgroup favouritism occurred. This bias reaches the 
level of significance for matrices III and IV. Sex differences across these 
3 conditions are reflected by the first order interaction effect MP (sex x 
condition) for matrix III. They are also reflected by the second-order 
interaction effects MNP (sex x condition x choice type) for matrices III 
and IV, in a less direct manner. But the main effect sex was not 
significant.
In conclusion, outgroup bias is shown to occur when the outgroup is 
similar and the ingroup is dissimilar to the subjects on important criterion 
or selected on a chance basis. However, when we compare the results for 
conditions B, C and D with those for conditions E, G and H, the strength of 
bias towards the ingroup is evidently greater. Sex differences seem to be 
an influential factor in this case, with the males being more influenced by 
opinion similarity!
Post-Experimental Discussions
Post-experimental group discussions clearly indicated that the subjects 
viewed the second (important) similarity criterion as having been more 
influential on their choices than the first (trivial criterion). About 72^ 
of them reported that they had not been influenced by the trivial similarity 
criterion at all. However, all the subjects (100%) thought that a 
similarity criterion which was more salient, for the/, could have been devised 
to replace the * important * second criterion. For example, many subjects 
thought that a more salient criterion would have emerged if the second 
questionnaire had dealt with people*s *actions*, rather than *attitudes*.
Discussion
In contrast to .Allen and Wilder (1975), we found that outgroup 
similarity did influence intergi’oup discrimination. When the outgroup was
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similar and the ingroup dissimilar to the subjects on an important 
criterion, or chosen on a chance basis, there was bias favouring the 
outgroup, In all other conditions, the ingroup was favoured. Our central 
hypothesis receives strong support from these results. When the rewards 
allocated in all 8 conditions were analysed, ingroup favouritism occurred. 
Hypothesis (iii) is thus confirmed. There was some evidence to suggest 
that sex was an influential factor in several conditions (B, C, D), 
Hypothesis (ii), which predicted that there would be no sex differences, 
is therefore not fully supported.
In criticising Allen and Wilder *s (1975) experiment, we pointed 
out that they failed to (i) take into account the influence of both 
(supposedly) trivial and important similarity criteria and, (ii) establish 
the validity of the assumption that the criteria involved were relatively 
* trivial * and * important *, In our experiment, we seem to have amended 
these methodological weaknesses. By doing so, we have demonstrated that 
these weaknesses could have been responsible for Allen and Wilder*s finding 
that ".,. subjects favoured the ingroup under all conditions, regardless of 
whether outgroup members possessed similar or dissimilar beliefs" (1975,
P.975).
We were not, however, concerned to show the relative importance of 
ingroup and outgroup similarity on intergroup behaviour. It may be that, 
under certain conditions,ingroup similarity is more important, while in 
others outgroup similarity has greater influence. Explorations of these 
issues need to include measures of the relative importance of all 
similarity criteria involved for the subject population. Allen and Wilder 
(1975) failed to meet this essential requirement.
The apparent tendency for males to be more influenced by opinion 
similarity than females might be explained,among other ways,in terms of 
the possible differential salience of the important similarity criterion 
for the two sexes. As the post hoc explanation presented below suggests, 
this may be the case despite the fact that the proportion of males to 
females in the pilot study was the same as in the experiment (50/50).
In the pilot study we were concerned with establishing 2 similarity 
criteria, one relatively important and another relatively trivial. This 
was established for both sex groups. However, we did not establish that 
the important criterion was of the same salience when considered
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independently across sex groups. The important criterion included 22 
statements ( F i g .  7 ). All the statements were either constructed by
the male Experimenter, or a quotation from a ’famous’ male. They may 
have reflected issues which men give greater importance to than women.
This possible difference may have been one factor leading to the 
relatively high influence of opinion similarity on choices made by males 
as compared to females.
Post-experimental discussions seemed to provide support for our 
theoretical interpretation of the results concerning outgroup bias. We 
had expected that when the outgroup was similar and the ingroup dis­
similar to the subjects on the important criterion, the outgroup would be 
held in relatively high esteem. We assumed that subjects would wish to 
achieve a favourable social evaluation. This wish would, we expected, lead 
them to identify with,and be biased towards,the more highly evaluated group 
(i.e. those who held views similar to the subjects).
The post-experimental discussions which yielded information relevant 
to this explanation were with subjects in conditions B, C and D. In these 
discussions, subjects made frequent references to the outgroup as being, 
for example, ’more sensible’, ’more intelligent’, the *ones who have got 
their head screwed on the right way I ’. It is true that these comments were 
sometimes made in a jocular manner. They do, however, indicate that the 
situation was ’ego-involving’. The subjects did seem to identify with and 
praise others who agreed with them highly. Subjectively, own opinions 
sometimes do seem to be valued more than other, different opinions .
A theoretical significance of these findings is that they seem to 
demonstraite social mobility at a purely psychological level. It was 
impossible for the subjects to either exit from the ingroup or enter into 
the outgroup at the material level. They could, however, identify with 
the outgroup psychologically. In conditions where the ingroup and outgroup 
were respectively dissimilar and similar to the subjects on an important 
criterion, we argue, the subjects valued the outgroup relatively highly. 
Post-experimental discussions seemed to support this view. In a situation 
where there are few criteria for intergroup comparisons and the outgroup is 
in a relatively favourable position on the basis of the most important 
criterion for comparison, we would expect that the subject would have a
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negative, and probably inadequate, social identity. In attempting to 
improve his social identity the subject might, among other strategies, 
attempt to achieve social mobility. When, as in the present experiment, 
exit from the ingroup and entrance into the outgroup is impossible in 
the material sense, ’psychological* social mobility might occur. 
Identification with the outgroup could be manifested through favourable 
treatment of the outgroup. This favourable treatment would further improve 
the relative position of the outgroup and the social identity of the 
subject.
What are the minimal characteristics which a dominant group ideology 
needs to entail in order that false consciousness should lead the 
subordinate group members to act in the interests of the dominant group, and 
to the detriment of the ingroup? In answering this question (in Chapter 7), 
we argued that the minimal structural requirement for the occurrence of 
social mobility seems to be a salient evaluative* system which defines two 
groups in a comparatively positive and negative manner. This situation, we 
assume, maybe the point of departure for a process involving (i) inadequate 
social identity for individuals belonging to the negatively evaluated group, 
(ii) the attempt by these individuals to improve their social identity 
through social mobility and (iii) the achievement of social mobility at a 
purely psychological level when exit from the ingroup and/or entrance into 
the outgroup is found to be impossible.
In the present experiment, the evaluative system by which the two 
groups were (we assume) positively and negatively defined, relative to each 
other, was derived from the value system of the subjects themselves directly, 
but also manipulated by the Experimenter indirectly. The subjects valued 
their own views on the important issues, this was very evident from the 
heated and ’ego-involving’ group discussions which took place after each 
experimental session. We assume that the subjects valued those others who 
shared their views more highly^ than they valued those others who held 
dissimilar views to themselves. The value system according to which the two 
groups were differentially evaluated was, therefore, derived directly from 
the values of the subjects themselves. By establishing a context in which 
the subjects viewed one group as similar and another as dissimilar to 
themselves, and by providing the criteria for, and the definitions of,
8ijnilarity/dissimilarity, the Experimenter indirectly influenced the 
’dominant’ value system which (we assume) influenced behaviour in the
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experimental situation. In this respect, the Experimenter adopted the 
manipulative role which could be adopted by a dominant group.
The findings of this experiment are import ant, because they indicate 
the crucial influence which a dominant value system could have in inter­
group behaviour.. This dominant value system defines the relative position 
of each group in the status hierarchy. It thus defines the effect which 
membership of a group might have on the social identity of its members.
This dominant value system is in important ways influenced by the dominant 
group in society; just as the dominant value system in an experiment can be 
manipulated by the Experimenter. The groups we introduced in the present 
experiment were ’ingroups’ in a highly limited sense, particularly in 
conditions B, C and D. However, this is not a weakness in the experimental 
design, since we were exploring the minimal conditions in which a dominant 
evaluative system may arise which would lead to a process involving the 
differential evaluation of two groups, inadequate social identity, and social 
mobility at a purely psychological level.
A central theme in this experiment, as in all our experiments, is the 
concern with identity. Individuals seemed to actively define their own 
position in the social structure. In post-experimental discussions, some 
subjects in conditions B, C and D explicitly stated that they had 
identified with the outgroup. The subjects did care about group memberships. 
They had specific ideas about which group they wanted to be a member of, 
and wiiich group they did not want to be a member of. They took an active 
part in defining their oi-ra identity within the experimental context.
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Experiment V
Abstract
25 Iranian students gave rewards to other unidentified Iranians 
and Americans on the alleged task of selecting pictures to represent own 
national characters. In fact these were indeterminate pictures, chosen 
by a different sample of the subject population as equally reflecting both 
national characters. The pictures were randomly allocated to one of two 
groups, representing Iranian and American national characters, then re­
allocated between the two experimental sessions. Students also gave 
descriptions of the moods and feelings shown in the pictures. Americans 
are high status in Iran and ’Americanisation' highly valued. It was 
hypothesised that positive outgroup bias would occur in both the allocation 
of rewards and the descriptions of the pictures. 9 Iranians scrutinized 
these descriptions for bias, after the identities of the two groups involved 
had been changed to 'X' and 'Y'. The trend of bias on all the matrices 
showed positive outgroup bias, although only the bias on matrix I was 
significant.. This significant bias was matched by that detected by the 
judges of the descriptions, The two independent measures of intergroup 
bias may be viewed as having demonstrated ’psychological’ social mobility.
284
Introduction
In this experiment we attempted to demonstrate social mobility 
on a purely psychological level,using two real Nationalities as the 
populations from which our subject samples were selected. The ingroup 
were Iranians, with Americans as the outgroup. Americans have high status 
in Iran and ’Americanisation' is highly valued. It was hypothesised that 
positive outgroup behaviour would be manifested by Iranians in a context 
where Americans were the outgroup.
Iranian subjects were to act as judges of certain abilities of 
Americans and other Iranians at a common task. These abilities were in 
fact designed to be identical. The subjects would be told that groups 
of Iranians and Americans had selected pictures to represent their own 
'national characters’ and that it was the subjects’ task to reward them 
for this job. They were also to describe what they thought the pictures 
showed about the Iranian and American national characters. Rewards would 
be distributed by making choices on Tajfelian matrices. The descriptions 
of the pictures would be judged by other Iranians and the biases they 
showed Cin relation to the two groups) would be compared with any biases 
detected by the matrices.
Two critical problems arose in relation to the methodology; these 
concerned, firstly, the nature of the pictures shown and, secondly, the 
method of detecting biases in the accounts given of these pictures. Since 
there is a great deal of diversity in the life-styles and characters of 
Iranians and Americans, how could a set of representative pictures be 
selected? More importantly, we obviously did not want pictures which 
were all ’more’ like American life-styles and characters or more like 
Iranian life-styles and characters. This was particularly crucial in the 
case of Iran, since discussions with samples of the subject population 
revealed, that some saw Iranian culture and character as being still 
essentially Eastern and traditional, a few saw it as being more like 
modern Western nations, while another group felt that the East-West dimension 
was not a meaningful basis for evaluating or defining Iran,
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In order to establish a set of pictures which might reliably be 
representative of both Iranian and American life-styles and characters 
it was decided that, firstly, highly ambiguous pictures would be used.
Secondly, a pilot-study would be carried out to ensure that, in the 
opinion of a sample of the subject population, the pictures used did 
not give impressions of Iranian character and life-style any more than 
they did of American character and life-style. Thirdly, the pictures 
would be randomly allocated to two groups representing Iranian and American 
characters.
Once the two sets of pictures had been established, their role (as 
being representative of Iranian and American National Characters) would be 
reversed in two experimental sessions. Also, as a further control, the 
subjects were asked to concentrate on the moods and feelings which were 
expressed in the pictures, rather than their material contents.
The second problem facing us in the experimental methodology was to 
find a means of assessing any bias shown in the descriptions which subjects 
.gave of the two national characters as shown in the pictures. The solution 
chosen involved asking another group of people,from the same subject populatior 
to judge the bias in these descriptions. All references to the identity 
of the two groups involved (Iranians and Americans) were obliterated in 
the accounts and replaced by the letters X and Y. The judges were told 
that they were to read accounts related to the lives of two groups, X and 
Y, as shown by some pictures. They were to indicate if they detected any 
bias in favour of, or against, either of the two groups in the accounts.
It was only bias in relation to the two groups which the subjects were to 
concern themselves with. The order in which judges read the accounts, 
whether it was of group X or Y, was randomly varied. It was hoped that 
by presenting judges with the complete descriptions of the pictures, and 
not ’cleaning’ the data through content analysis, a more complete and 
possibly more accurate impression would be formed by them and this would 
lead to a more valid judgement.
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Subjects
These were 25 Iranian subjects, 6 females and 19 males. Their 
average age was 26 and the average time they had been in Britain was 
4 years. The Experimenter was Iranian and Farsi was used throughout the 
experiment, both in written and spoken communications.
Procedure
Subjects took part in the experiment in groups of 11 and l4.' They 
were told that they were taking part in a programme designed to create a 
. set of symbolic and pictorial representations of national characters (Post- 
experimental discussions proved this explanation to have been highly 
convincing), In this programme,500 Iranians in Iran and 500 Americans 
in America had been set the task of selecting a small number of pictures, 
from a set of 50,which seemed to them to best illustrate their own national 
character,through the atmosphere of the scene. The 500 persons represented 
a cross-section of their respective nations.
The 8 pictures which were shown to the subjects were all vague in 
content. Some were silhouettes. The characters in them were dressed very 
simply. All the pictures were in black and white. An example of these 
pictures is presented in Fig, (9).
The subjects were asked to describe the scene in each picture. They 
were to give consideration to the moods, feelings and personalities in the 
pictures and indicate their evaluation of them. The subjects were told 
that they would be shown the 4 pictures which were chosen by Iranians,as 
being the best illustrations of their national character,together. They 
would also be shown the other 4 pictures together, chosen by Americans 
as being the best illustrations of their national character. Each picture 
was shown for 4 minutes, it was during this time that subjects had to 
describe each picture. A trial picture was shown to begin with,so that 
the subjects could practice. They wrote in Farsi,so that they would be 
as fluent and accurate as possible.
Secondly, the subjects had to decide whether there were any differences 
between the levels of success with which the two groups of 500 persons had 
chosen pictures showing scenes which accurately reflected their national 
characters. They were told that the choices they made would determine the
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An example of the pictures shown to the subjects. The subjects were told 
that groups of Iranians and Americans had chosen these pictures to represent 
their own national characters.
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amount of rewards each group would receive. The subjects could not 
reward themselves by the choices. Each subject received a booklet with 
4 matrices on each of its 2 pages. These matrices have been described in 
Appendix I. On the first page of the booklet the Americans received rewards 
•from the top row, while on the second page the Iranians received rewards 
from the top row. Debriefing and very lengthy discussions followed each 
experimental session.
Procedure for Judges
There were 9 Iranian judges, 5 males and 4 females. They were 
informed that they would read accounts of 2 groups, X and Y. Their task 
was to indicate the relative degree of bias towards the two groups they 
detected in the accounts. The instructions were left as vague as this 
deliberately so that no type of intergroup bias would be precluded.
Some examples of accounts were read. An exhaustive discussion was held 
in order to clarify two points. Firstly, that it was bias for and/or 
against the two groups relative to each other which should be the primary 
concern of the subjects. Secondly, general agreements were reached as 
regards what constitutes bias. Among the conclusions was that there could 
be no useful specific definition of bias and that judges should put them­
selves "in the shoes" of the persons who had written each description and 
decide whether they would themselves give such a description of a group 
which they liked or disliked. In these discussions,the judges were the 
pace-setters and policy makers, not the Experimenter. After several dummy 
examples had been judged and the criteria for making choices had been 
settled, there was a short interval. During the interval the Experimenter 
distributed the 13 point scales on which judgments would be made to 
indicate bias. The positions of X and Y were randomly varied on the poles 
of the scales.
After the interval the accounts which were to be judged were distributed, 
Each judge gave one score for the degree of bias he detected in all 8 
accounts given by any one subject. This one score indicated the strength 
and direction of the bias detected by the judge. There were thus 9 x 25 
judgments (judges x subjects). The 9 judgments for each subject were 
then pooled to give each subject a mean bias score. The 8 accounts given
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by each subject were kept together and passed around until they had been 
judged by all 9 judges. Once the judgment task had begun, communication 
between judges did not take place.
Results
The choices made by the Subjects
TABLE C4l)
MATRIX I/o o/j
NATURE OF BIAS 
TOWARDS THE INGROUP
I 7 .47* Negative
II 2.12 - 3 .6 n
III 5.28 - 6.8 " e
IV 4.52 - 6.12 11
* p <0.02 (.2 tailed) one - sample t-test
Cdf-24 , t = 2.6581).
The means of choices made on the 4 matrices by the 25 subjects are 
presented in Table (4l). The trend of bias shown by all the means reflect 
negative bias towards the ingroup. This negative bias reaches the level 
of significance for choices on matrix I only. The l/^ and O/^ choices on 
matrices II, III and IV were analysed by the Wilcoxon test, as well as 
Univariate F tests with repeated measures, and no significant differences 
were revealed.
The Scores Given by Judges
The mean score given by the judges was 7.1 (SD- 1.25)jthe bias which 
they detected favoured the outgroup. The unbiased point on the scale was 
6.5. A one- sample ’t ’ test of the significance of the deviation of choices 
from the unbiased point shows a significant result (df 24, t = 2.3999,
p <0 .05).
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Discussion
The Farsi term ’gharh-zadegee' , coined almost two decades ago by 
the Iranian philosopher Ahmed Fardeed^ means literally "West-struck" .
The term has been used to describe the admiration of Iranians for things 
Western and their intense desire to Westernise their own society. In 
this experiment,we appear to have demonstrated one way in which "gharb- 
zadegee" may influence the attitudes of Iranians towards their own and 
an American outgroup,in certain situations. All the measures revealed 
a trend of positive bias towards the outgroup, although this bias reached 
the level of significance on only some measures.
Because of the high interest shown by the subjects it was possible 
to conduct full post-experimental discussions, lasting several hours after 
each session. Several significant points emerged from these discussions. 
Firstly, the 'cover story' about the purposes of the experiment had not 
been suspected. Secondly, the general opinion among subjects was that the 
hypothesis we tested was valid. The subjects were mostly insistent, 
however, that Westerners in general, rather than Americans in particular, 
are highly evaluated in Iran today.
Most of the subjects agreed with the view that although Iranians are 
attempting to become Westernised, they nevertheless feel that many facets 
of Western life are inferior to those of the East. Some of the subjects 
believed that the experiment would have been more meaningful if it had 
been concerned with comparisons and evaluations on more specific bases.
A few subjects agreed with the view that their interpretations of the task 
might have led them to favour the outgroup. The alleged reason for the 
study had been to create symbolic and pictorial representations of national 
character. This seemed to them the kind of programme which Westerners, 
rather than Easterners, would undertake. One in which Americans might be 
more efficient . than Iranians. Thus, they awarded more points to 
Americans. ■
Most of the subjects reported during the discussions that they had
a
favoured the outgroup when (warding points. The process of 'psychological' 
social mobility was described to them. Did they feel that this process
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explains their behaviour accurately? There was no clear consensus on 
this issue. Those who thought that this process did not accurately 
describe their behaviour mostly did so because they did not feel they 
had identified with the outgroup. However, many subjects perceived 
there to be some distance between themselves and the 500 Iranians who 
had apparently been a cross-section of Iranian society. They explained 
that their views and life-styles were likely to be similar to only a 
small section of this group of 500.
When discussing Iranians in general, speakers were far more willing 
to say that positive outgroup bias takes place when Westerners are the 
outgroup. They described, for example, how children are sent to the 
West to be educated and "the more Western they appear when they return, 
the more educated and ’improved’ they are assumed to have become". Some 
felt that the high status of Westerners in Iran is based upon economic 
factors. For example, "if a Westerner, an Iranian educated in the West, 
and an Iranian educated in Iran, are equally qualified and similarly 
employed, the first will probably receive a higher salary than the second ' 
and third, and the second will probably receive a higher salary than the 
third".
In experiment IV we aimed to demonstrate social mobility at a purely 
psychological level in a context where the dominant value system was 
manipulated by the experimenter. In the present experiment, we aimed 
to demonstrate social mobility at a purely psychological level in a context 
where the dominant value system was "imported" intact from the "real" world. 
We have argued that when members of two different groups interact, the 
outcome of this interaction is to an important extent dependent on the 
values.attached to the two groups. For example, if these values are such 
that the members of one group have an inadequate social identity, social 
mobility might be one outcome of this interaction, among other possibilities. 
It is of crucial importance to explore the source of the values attached to 
each group.
In relation to the above, three questions which are useful to ask are, 
firstly, what are the agents which influence the values attached to a
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particular group? Secondly, what are the channels which are used to 
achieve this influence? Thirdly, what are the social-psychological 
factors which make the values attached to groups so important in 
intergroup behaviour? In response to these questions we have argued 
that (cf*Chapters 6 and 7), firstly, the principle agent influencing the 
values attached to a group is the dominant group in a "society " Secondly, 
among the important channels used to achieve this influence are the mass 
communiation systems. These are under the control of the dominant group, 
by definition.. Thirdly, the importance of the values attached to groups 
in intergroup behaviour arises partly from peoples' desire to belong to 
favourably evaluated groups. In the present experiment, we argue, 
this desire was influential in the process through which subjects actively 
identified with the highly valued outgroup.
29h
' ■CONCLUDING CHAPTER
This chapter is in three main sections. In the first section, we 
discuss the ways in which the results of our experiments provide evidence 
in support of the theory of intergroup behaviour developed by Tajfel and . 
his associates at Bristol. In the second section, we elaborate on 
certain aspects of the ’Bristol’ theory, describing how our experiments 
contribute to the theory. In section three, we indicate how our future 
research might develop and how our future path might diverge from that of 
Tajfel and his associates.
SECTION ONE
In Support of the Social Identity Model
The concept of a social group has been redefined in cognitive termslj 
by Tajfel and his associates. Instead of emphasising the affiliative - 
interactive aspects of group membership as other researchers have done 
(cf. Chapter 2), Tajfel et al., have given importance to the issue of 
identification. Turner (1978) states that, ’’A social group... is two or ; 
more people who share a common social identification of themselves or, 
which is nearly the same thing, perceive themselves to be members of the 
same social category” (P.1), The theory developed at Bristol is sometimes 
referred to as the ’social identity’ theory (Turner, 1978, p.16) in 
recognition of the importance it places on the issues of identity and 
identification.
Our experiments further confirm the validity of the social identity 
model, but under a range of new, experimental conditions'. These conditions 
represent important features under which we believed the model needed 
testing. The model places great emphasis on the individual’s perception of 
his own social position and group memberships. It also assumes that the 
individual desires to achieve a favourable social evaluation. We explored 
new ways in which the individual could structure the social environment, 
achieve social mobility at a purely psychological level, and ascribe 
importance and meaning to the basis of social categorisation. We 
demonstrated that, throughout these processes, a central concern of the 
individual was to achieve a favourable position for the ingroup and (we 
assume) for the self.
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There are at least two good reasons why we should adopt the social 
identity model. Firstly because,as we argued in Chapter 1, the issue of 
identity is of central concern and influence in all aspects of social 
life, and in intergroup behaviour in particular. This influence is 
reflected in the intellectual history of man, both East and West 
(of. Introductory Chapter). Secondly^ we should adopt the social identity 
model because it better explains more of the empirical evidence.
Two aspects of man’s concern with the issue of identity might be 
distinguished. The first is a definitive one. It stems from the two basic 
questions, ’’who am I?” and,’’where is my place in the world?”. These unending 
questions seem to haunt man.
’’Among a. hundred mirrors 
before yourself false... 
strangled in your own net 
Self-knowerI 
Self-executioner I 
Crammed between two nothings, 
a question mark...”
Nietzsche
The second aspect of the concern with the issue of identity is an 
evaluative one, it stems from the (assumed) desire of the individual to 
achieve a favourably evaluated identity. It is important that this 
favourable evaluation should ultimately be achieved,not only from the point 
of view of the self, but also from the viewpoint of others whose opinions 
are socially valued. This aspect of the concern with the issue of identity 
IS reflected in Man’s concern with, for example, his ’reputation».
Shakespeare provides many sharp examples of this concern:
’’Reputation, reputation, reputation I 0 1  
I have lost my reputation, I have lost the 
iunmortal part of myself, and what remains 
is bestial”.
(Othello, II, iii)
”Who steals my purse, steals trash; ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his and has been slave to thousands.
But he that filches from me iry good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him.
And makes me poor indeed”
(Othello, III, iii)
The second good reason for adopting the social identity model is that
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it better explains more of the empirical data. This is particularly in 
relation to the more recent research which has demonstrated, for example, 
that social categorisation on the basis of a minimal criterion can lead 
to intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism,under certain 
conditions (cf. Chapter 3). Our findings were in agreement with this 
evidence. In the ’G’ condition of Experiment III, the subjects were 
categorised on the basis of a minimal and a chance criterion. They 
allocated rewards to others,who were members of the ingroup or outgroup in 
the present, or had been so in the past, or were to be in the future. In 
all the situations where the subject could favour the ingroup, ingroup 
favouritism occurred. In situations where the ingroup could not be 
favoured and rewards were only distributed between two outgroups, the subjects 
acted in an unbiased manner.
In condition of Experiment IV, social categorisation was on a 
chance basis. The subjects allocated rewards to the present ingroup and 
outgroup members. Significant ingroup favouritism occurred.
In Experiment I, the relationships between the subjects and un­
identified others were defined at 8 levels of similarity. Social categorisatioi 
was not introduced by the experimenter, implicitly or explicitly. The subjects 
treated the most similar others, the most neutral others and the most 
dissimilar others in a positive, neutral and negative manner respectively.
When the rewards allocated to each of these categories was compared, 
significant differences were demonstrated. When the rewards allocated to 
those within each category were compared, there tended to be few differences. 
Post-experimental discussions suggested that the subjects perceived different 
groups within the social environment, as represented by the unidentified 
others. These results suggest that interpersonal similarity on the basis of 
a minimal criterion could lead to the sequence involving social 
categorisation, social identity and social comparison (cf. Tajfel, 197h;
Tajfel, in press; Tajfel and Turner, in press; Turner, 1975).
There were two sets of subjects in Experiment I, male students from 
’developing’ countries and female secretaries who were British. The rewards 
which these two sets of subjects allocated to individual others,who were at 
different levels of similarity to the subjects, were considered independently. 
The way in which rewards were allocated by the two sets of subjects was not 
always the same. The males showed positive bias towards the ’ingroup* and
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negative bias towards the ’outgroup*, as we expected. The females, 
however, tended to show either negative bias £r positive bias in the way 
that we had expected, but not the two types of predicted bias in choices 
on any one matrix. This ’negative* finding might be usefully interpreted 
in two ways, at least.
Firstly, it might be that the males were more anxious in the 
laboratory setting than were the females. They might have been less familiar 
with such ’formal’, ’office-like’ conditions• Their relative lack of 
efficiency at the English language might have also increased their anxiety.
In order to lessen their anxiety, the males might have attempted to create 
and become part of a cohesive group. The females, who were possibly less 
anxious, might not have felt the need to create a cohesive ingroup to the 
same extent.
A second way in which we might usefully interpret the differences, 
between the way in which the two sets of subjects allocated rewards, is by 
reference to the different social rules and meanings relevant to the 
context of Experiment I. The subjects seemed to view the experimental 
situation as an ’intergroup’ one. The ingroup being composed of the most 
similar others and the outgroup being composed of the most dissimilar others.
The males viewed the intergroup setting as one in which negative and positive 
bias should be showed towards the ingroup and outgroup respectively. They 
showed this bias consistently, irrespective of changes in the choice 
strategies available. The females,who were more influenced by changes in the 
choice strategies available, tended to allocate rewards to a greater extent 
on the basis of ’maximum joint profit’, when this strategy was available.
The subjects might be said to have behaved in the way they thought 
’appropriate’ in the experimental situation. Tajfel and Billig (I97i|) have 
stated, "It can be assumed that, unless they have clear evidence to the 
contrary, individuals finding themselves in an unfamiliar social situation 
will attempt to place it within a class already familiar and to which 
familiar norms of behaviour apply" (p.169). The two sets of subjects in this 
experiment might have been influenced by different norms , derived from their 
(different) cultural backgrounds.
In Experiment II, the relationships between the subjects and unidentified 
others were defined at ten levels of similarity. Four criteria of differing 
salience were used as the basis for defining similarity. At least the first of
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these criteria was minimal. It was found that even interpersonal 
similarity on this minimal basis influenced subjects to introduce social 
categorisation and place the most similar, most neutral and most dis­
similar others in different categories, while identifying with the most 
similar others. In this experiment, as in Experiments I, III (Condition G), 
and IV (Condition a ), the affiliative-interactive aspects of interpersonal 
relations were kept at a minimal level, but group-formation still occurred.. 
This finding provides strong support for the theory developed by Tajfel and 
his associates, and contradicts traditional intergroup models.
In our experijnents,group formation was assumed on the basis of 
favourable bias shown towards a set of others.
In Experiments I and II, these others 
were individuals who had not been implicitly or explicitly categorised by 
the experimenter. In Experiments ill and IV, social categorisation was 
explicitly introduced by the experimenter. In interpreting the results, 
we emphasised the (assumed) desire of the subjects for a favourable social 
identity. It is therefore relevant to note that Turner (1978) cites a 
recent experiment by Oakes (1978) which demonstrates that minimal intergroup 
discrimination of the kind which took place in our experiments does 
significantly increase subjects' self-esteem.
Tajfel and his associates have argued that the individual structures 
the social environment and defines the position of the self and others within 
the social world. In Experiments I and II, we demonstrated that such a 
process of structuring and self-orienting can take place even when the social 
environment is a minimal one. Previous researchers (e.g. Deutsch et al., 
1969) had attempted to achieve this demonstration through introducing a 
'social environment' which consisted of unidentified others whose relation­
ships to the subjects were defined at only two levels i.e. similar - 
dissimilar. We created settings in which these relationships were defined 
at eight or ten levels of similarity. In the settings we created, 
differentiation of between - group differences and minimisation of within- 
group differences were both possible outcomes of the social categorisation 
process. Results of Experhnent I suggest that differentiation and, to a 
lesser extent, minimisation did occur. In previous experiments, where only 
two levels of siriilarity were involved, both these outcomes were A possible. 
This seems to be a possible factor which will explain the results we achieved 
in contrast to the results of Deutsch et al., (I969) and others. What is
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clear, however, is that this type of ’structuring* is not explained by 
traditional accounts of intergroup behaviour, but it can be predicted 
from the account provided by Tajfel and his associates.
When an individual has an inadequate social identity and can perceive 
no (cognitive) alternatives to the present intergroup situation, he might 
attempt to improve his social identity through social mobility, among other 
strategies (Tajfel 197^j Tajfel, in press; Tajfel and Turner, in press).
In situations where exit from the ingroup and/or entrance into the outgroup 
is not possible in a material sense, social mobility on a purely 
psychological basis might take place. The results of Experiments IV and V 
confirm this prediction. The groups in Experiment IV were created in the 
laboratory and the values attached to each group were manipulated by the 
experimenter. The groups in Experiment V were "real" (two Nationalities) 
and the values attached to each group were "imported" intact from outside 
the laboratory. In some conditions in Experiment IV, and in the single 
condition in Experiment V, it was assumed that the outgroup Was highly 
valued relative to the ingroup. Intergroup comparisons were expected to 
lead to an inadequate social identity for the subjects. Since exit from the 
ingroup and entrance into the outgroup were impossible in the material sense, 
the subjects were expected to try and improve their social identities 
through the process of social mobility achieved at a purely psychological 
level. This prediction was assumed to have been confirmed, on the basis of 
the positive outgroup favouritism which occurred. ’Traditional’ accounts 
of intergroup behaviour, which tend to emphasise ’ethnocentrism’, could not 
predict this finding.
In the next section we discuss the value of our experiments within the 
’Bristol’ approach.
SECTION TWO ■
Elaborating on certain Aspects of the Social Identity Model
(i) The Active Individual
Social reality is actively constructed and interpreted by individuals. 
Social reality is not static and given. It is flexible and continually being 
transformed. Social categorisation is an important cognitive tool through 
Which the social environment is structured. The individual does not passively
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adopt the social categorisation system salient in society. He could, 
and sometimes does, create and use a social categorisation system which 
differs from the ’norm’.
The experiments which we carried out and have reported demonstrated, 
under new conditions,the active way in which individuals structure the 
social environment, ascribe importance and meaning to social phenomena, and 
define the position of the self and others within the social structure. 
Throughout these processes, the desire for a favourable social evaluation of 
the ingroup and (we assume) of the self, was of central importance.
The adoption of an active model of the individual in the social 
structure had certain important implications for our research. Firstly, this 
model led us to assume that the individual could actively structure the 
social environment. He might categorise a number of other individuals and 
’create’ an ingroup and an outgroup. Secondly, the individual might re­
interpret the meaning and importance of intergroup differences. If he 
wished to establish an important and meaningful basis on which to achieve 
intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism, he might re-interpret 
a trivial basis on which his group differed from an outgroup and actively 
ascribe meaning and importance to ito We could not, therefore, assume that 
a basis for social categorisation which was ’trivial’ in the ’real world’ 
would be necessarily perceived as such in the laboratory context. Thirdly, 
the adoption of a model which viewed the individual as an active agent in the 
social structure led us to expect that the individual could re-define his 
position in the social structure. He might, for example, prefer to identify 
with what was, from an objective viewpoint, his ’outgroup’. This 
’misidentification’ might lead him to act in the interests of a group 
to which he could not ’materially’ belong.
(ii) Structuring the Social Environment
The social identity model assumes that individuals actively structure 
the social environment and define the position of themselves and others 
within the social structure. In Experiments I and II, we demonstrated that 
this process, of structuring and self-orienting, might take place under 
minimal conditions. Furthermore, the findings of these two experiments 
indicated that when minimisation of within—group differences and accentuation 
of between-group differences are both possible outcomes of the social 
categorisation process, social categorisation is more likely to occur.
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In Experiments I and II, the social environment consisted of eight 
and ten unidentified others respectively. The relationships between these 
others and the subjects were defined at different levels of similarity.
In Experiment I, the basis for social categorisation was minimal and the 
subjects gave rewards to individual others. In Experiment IV there were 
four different bases for social categorisation, at least one of which was 
minimal. The subjects placed the unidentified others into one, two or 
three categories. One of these three categories was a ’reward’ category, 
and all those placed within it were rewarded. In both Experiments I and II, 
social categorisation was introduced by the subjects, not by the experimenter. 
The subjects identified with those (’group’ of) others who were most similar 
to themselves.
The boundaries and contexts of the categories created by the subjects 
were highly consistent, both across subjects and across experiments. 
Unidentified.others who were about 30^ or less similar to the subjects were 
discriminated against. Unidentified others who were about 70^ or more 
similar to the subjects were treated relatively favourably. In interpreting 
these results, we stressed that the actual levels of similarity chosen for 
category boundaries were not important. There was no evidence to suggest 
that these levels would be chosen in another context, by the subjects or 
any other persons. What important, however, is the consistent way in 
which certain levels were chosen, both within and between subjects. This 
behaviour reflects uniformities, which also occur in the everyday world.
The actual rules of behaviour which influence behaviour are not necessarily 
important. What is of far greater importance is that some kinds of social 
rules are influential and social conformity occurs.
Tlius, Experiments I and II contributed in three ways to the body of 
research gathered in the ’Bristol’ tradition. Firstly, by demonstrating 
that the sequence of social categorisation, social identity and social 
comparison, can take place on the basis of interpersonal similarity 
relationships.It was the subjects,not the e x p e r i m e n t e r , who actively 
created different groups. Secondly, by demonstrating that strong
conformities occur in the way that a ’minimal social environment ’ is 
structured. By implication, thirdly, these two experiments showed that 
individuals are greatly influenced by social rules and meanings, which both 
■define situations and ’regulate’ behaviour within social settings.
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(iii) Ascribing Importance and Meaning to the Basis for Social Categorisation
Although Tajfel and his associates have emphasised the influence of 
cognitive processes in intergroup behaviour, they have not, we believe, 
placed enough emphasis on the active way in which individuals construct and 
interpret social reality. This general issue is crystallised in the way in 
which the minimal basis for social categorisation in the minimal group 
studies is interpreted. We have argued that the criterion in these studies 
is minimal - but should be regarded as important rather than trivial, from 
the point of view of the subjects in the laboratory context.
Two factors are important in transforming the salience of the minimal 
criterion from being ’trivial* in the everyday world, to being ’important’ in 
the minimal group laboratory context. The first factor is the (assumed) 
desire of the subjects to achieve a favourably evaluated social identity.
This desire leads the subjects to seek out bases for intergroup differentiation 
and ingroup favouritism. The second factor is the structural position of the 
minimal criterion for social categorisation. When there is only one basis on 
which intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism can be achieved, 
this sole basis becomes highly important - in view of the (assumed) desire of 
the subject.
In Experiment III, we demonstrated that when these two factors, the 
structural role of the criterion and the (assumed) desire for favourable 
social evaluation, have the same influence in two independent but identical 
conditions, then the importance of the different bases for social categorisation 
in the two conditions can be the same. In one condition, the basis for social 
categorisation was experimentally derived, minimal, and also trivial when 
considered in the context of the everyday world. In another condition, the 
basis for social categorisation was real and important to the subjects in the 
context of the everyday world. But, because there was only one basis for 
intergroup differentiation and ingroup favouritism in each experimental 
condition, the two criteria for social categorisation had the same influence 
on intergroup behaviour. On the basis of this same influence, the two 
criteria can be assumed to have been of similar importance from the viewpoint 
of the subjects.
The results of this experiment have three important implications.
Firstly, they imply that it is invalid to assume that the basis for social 
categorisation in the minimal group studies was regarded by the subjects as
303
being trivial - in the laboratory context. The unique position of the 
minimal criterion is an important reason why it is ascribed importance. 
Secondly, these results underline the need to incorporate a dynamic and 
active model of man in a theory of intergroup behaviour. This model must 
take into consideration man’s ability actively to ascribe importance to 
social phenomena, to ’construct reality’, in order to achieve his own 
desired position in the social structure.
The third, and possibly most important, implication of the results 
of Experiment III is that we should emphasise and explore further the forces 
which influence the way reality is constructed. Social reality is not in 
any way static, ’natural’ or objectively ’given’. It can and does change.
It can be and is manipulated by social groups. Given these factors, it 
becomes important to explore the extent and nature of the influence each 
group can have on social reality, and the extent to which this potential 
influence is realised.
A dominant group might, for example, use its influence to highlight 
and make salient the differences between various subordinate groups. When 
these differences are perceived as being important by the minority groups, 
they might concentrate on competing against each other - neglecting the 
’ superordinate ’ goal of competing with the dominant group. One might argue
, , , , , , 1 . 1  Tôv/vev et cJ
that the study which Rupert Brown (/.in press) carried out in a factory 
context, which showed the conflicts between groups of workers and their lack 
of mutual cooperation in confrontations with the management, reflects such 
a situation (cf. Chapter ij.). The ’ divide and rule ’ strategy, which dominant 
groups sometimes adopt, is well known. What seems to be less well known, 
and what we are pointing to at the moment, is the great influence which the 
dominant group can have on social reality as a means of achieving this 
’divide and rule’ strategy.
Social Mobility Achieved at a Purely Psychological Level
We have argued that the process of social mobility which occurs at a 
purely psychological level is of great importance, particularly from the 
point of view of the subordinate group. We believe that Tajfel and his 
associates do not place enough importance on this process. In Experiment IV, 
we explored the minimal conditions in which ’psychological’ social mobility 
can occur, using experimentally created groups. In Experiment V, we 
demonstrated this process using ’real’ groups whose relative evaluations 
were ’imported’ from the everyday world.
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The process of social mobility which occurs at a purely 
psychological level can be influential in maintaining the subordinate 
position of a minority group. Through this process, individuals might 
act in the interests of a dominant outgroup and to the detriment of the 
interests of the ingroup, even though they could not belong to the out- 
group in the material sense.
When an individual has an inadequate social identity and can 
perceive no (cognitive) alternative to the present intergroup situation, he 
might attempt to improve his social position through the process of social 
mobility, among other strategies. If exit from the ingroup and/or entrance 
into the outgroup is impossible, then the individual might simply re-define 
his social position at a purely cognitive level. He might identify with the 
outgroup psychologically and perceive his interests as being similar to the 
outgroup’s, and dissimilar to that of the ingroup. His actions: might 
help the outgroup maintain or develop its superior position, to the detriment 
of the interests of the ingroup and the self. In order to maintain or 
develop its superior position, the outgroup might attempt to create conditions 
in which ’psychological’ social mobility are more likely to occur.
In the interests of minority groups, particularly, it is essential 
to explore the ways in which a dominant outgroup might manipulate social 
factors in order to increase the likelihood of the occurrence of ’psychological’ 
social mobility. We argued that the dominant social group has an important 
influence on the social evaluative system salient in society, together with its 
various rules and meanings. This evaluative system influences the criteria 
on which groups are evaluated, as well as the outcomes of social evaluations 
of groups. Inadequate social identity for members of certain negatively 
valued groups might arise through such evaluations. By influencing the 
perceived stability/instability and legitimacy/illegitimacy of the present 
social structure, among other factors, the dominant group might also influence 
the cognitive alternatives which are salient in society. The two essential 
conditions for the occurrence of social mobility, inadequate social identity 
and the lack of cognitive alternatives to the present intergroup situation, 
thus might be manipulated by the dominant group.
From the theory of intergroup behaviour developed by Tajfel and his 
associates, we derived the hypothesis that the minimal required 
characteristics of the dominant ideology, propagated by the dominant group 
in order that social mobility should arise, is the establishment of a salient
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evaluative system, according to which one group should be relatively 
negatively evaluated and its members should have an inadequate social 
identity. Given that this characteristic is present, if exit from the 
ingroup and entrance into the outgroup is impossible, then social mobility 
at a purely psychological level could arise. We tested this hypothesis 
in Experiment IV. In certain conditions in this Experiment, the subject 
was assigned to a category whose members were dissimilar to him on important 
issues, while the members of the other category were highly similar on the 
same important criteria. We argued that the outgroup would be highly valued 
by subjects and that intergroup comparisons would lead to an inadequate 
social identity for them. Since exit from the ingroup and entrance into the 
outgroup were impossible, social mobility on a purely psychological level was 
hypothesised. This hypothesis was confirmed.
In Experiment V, social mobility on a purely psychological level was 
demonstrated using two real groups. On the basis of the social evaluative 
system which seemed to be salient in the everyday life of the two groups, 
it was hypothesised that intergroup comparisons would lead to inadequate 
social identities for members of the negatively evaluated group . In 
everyday life, the members of this (assumed) negatively evaluated group were 
making efforts to change their life-styles and become more like the (assumed) 
positively evaluated group. The influence of this desire for change showed 
itself in the experimental setting through the process of social mobility. 
However, we have argued that intergroup behaviour should be considered in 
the wide historical context. The two nationalities involved in Experiment V 
have past histories which influence their present behaviour. In the 
’epilogue’ to the dissertation, we briefly indicate how historical analysis 
might help in the development of social psychological understanding of inter­
group behaviour.
(v) . Rules and Meanings
"In a private debate the scholar Salih Awami said to Sufi Rahimi:
’What you have just said lacks references and proofs through quotations 
from ancient authority’. ’Not at all’, said Rahimi, ’for I have them all 
here, chapter and verse’. The scholar went away, saying, ’That was what I 
wanted to know’. The next day he made his famous speech on Rahimi which 
began:
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’ The lecture which you are about to hear from Sheikh Rahimi lacks 
conviction. Why, he is so unsure of himself that he has actually adducted 
written proofs and authorities to what he says* ".
Idries Shah (Thinkers of the East)
This Sufi tale illustrates simply, among other things, the influence 
which one social agent can exert on the evaluation of,another social agent 
through manipulating some relevant rules or meanings. We have focussed 
on the ways in which rules and meanings might be manipulated by one group 
in order to maintain or develop their own superiority over other groups.
We described rules and meanings as being part of a general social evaluative 
system. Through an analysis of the rules and meanings salient in society, 
it is possible to clarify the influence which a dominant group has on the 
salient social evaluative system.
The conformities which we demonstrated in our experiments probably 
reflected the influence of salient rules and meanings. The subjects 
interpreted the meaning(s) of the experimental contexts and came to 
conclusions about the way they should behave in these contexts, in a highly 
uniform manner. In Experiments I and II, the social categories which were 
introduced by the subjects had the same contexts and boundaries. In 
Experiment III, ’a minimal basis for social categorisation was ascribed 
importance in a setting in which it provided the only basis for intergroup 
differentiation and ingroup favouritism. There was strong conformity in the 
way in which this ’re-interpretation* took place, probably reflecting the 
influence of salient rules and meanings. In Experiments IV and V, the 
(relative) values attached to the ingroup and outgroup were consistent across 
subjects. This evaluation was one factor which led to the process of 
’psychological’ social mobility.
It is important to consider the source of rules and meanings 
influencing behaviour. This strategy will highlight the influence which the 
dominant group has on the social evaluative system salient in society. This 
strategy will also impell the social psychologist into the political arena. 
This is because the relative power of groups to influence the evaluative 
system salient in society ^  a political matter. It is when we come to the 
issue of political structure and its analysis by social psychologists, that 
our future path might diverge from that of Tajfel and his associates. This 
issue is a main concern of the next section. We also indicate in the next
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section what we believe to be a value of experimental social psychology 
in research exploring 'political’ issues.
SECTION THREE
Some Issues Concerning Future Research
In this section we indicate, firstly, in what ways our future path 
might diverge from that of Tajfel and his associates. We also discuss the 
kind of experimental research we hope to undertake, and what we feel could 
be the ’radical’ role of the social psychologist as disseminator of 
ideology.
(i) Future Development of Social Psychology and the Social Identity Model
We should like to see two developments take place in social psychology, 
Firstly, the development of intergroup research guided by explicit ideology. 
The ideology guiding research at present is mainly implicit and in the 
interests of dominant groups (cf. Introductory Chapter). Secondly, the 
development of research which explicitly takes into consideration the 
• political structure, and adopts and generates models of the political 
structure. It is particularly in relation to this second point that we 
emphasised our concern with the source of rules and meanings,which influence 
the sequence of social categorisation, social identity and social comparison. 
It is at this point that our concern with the dominant ideology, the dominant- 
subordinate relations between groups, and the sociopolitical structure 
begins. It is also at this point that our path might diverge from that of 
Tajfel and his associates in important ways. We believe it necessary to push 
social psychology into the macro-socio-political arena and place greater 
importance on this issue than do Tajfel and his associates. There can be no 
doubt, however, that the focus of attention must be the individual.
To clarify the ways in which our proposed approach might differ from 
that of Tajfel, it is useful,firstly^to consider what the aims of a theory . 
of intergroup behaviour might be. Tajfel (1978) has argued that "... the aim 
of a theory of intergroup behaviour is to help us to understand certain 
selected uniformities of social behaviour. In order to do this, we must know 
(1) something about the ways "groups" are constructed in a particular social 
system; (ii) what are the psychological effects of these constructions; and 
(iii) how the constructions and their effects depend upon, and relate to, 
forms of social reality" (pp. 6-7). The third poirb implies that social
308
psychologists should have an understanding of forms of social reality, 
since this third point refers to the relationship between ways of group 
construction, their psychological effects, and forms of social reality.
But Tajfel also states that, " ’social reality’ can be described or 
analysed in terms of socioeconomic, historical and political structures.
Such descriptions or analyses are not within the competence of the social 
psychologist" (1978, p.9). This claim is probably correct in terms of the 
scope of social psychology and the activities of social psychologists as 
they are at present. However, this scope and these activities are, we 
argue, too limited at present.
Socioeconomic, historical and political factors are all important 
influences in intergroup behaviour. By claiming that these influences 
should be incorporated in social psychological accounts of intergroup 
behaviour, we are not suggesting that the social psychologist can, or should, 
take on the roles of sociologist, economist, historian, or political , 
scientist. But the social psychologist can, and should, be aware of 
descriptions and analyses offered by these social sciences which are concerned 
with wider macro-issues, and he should translate this awareness inbo his 
model of behaviour . What we can provide at present are cognitive accounts 
of group formation. What we lack are the links between these accounts and 
the accounts of socioeconomic, historical and. political structures.
(ii) The Value of Experimental Social Psychology
An invalid assumption which has gained currency among psychologists 
is that research carried out in the experimental laboratory can only be 
useful in creating an ’authoritarian’ or ’reactionary’ model of man. There 
are several important reasons why this assumption is invalid. Firstly, because 
it confuses criticisms which are relevant to a method of research, with those 
which are relevant to a theoretical model, from which hypotheses might be 
derived. In the English forward to Boise’s (1978) book, "Groups and 
Individuals: explanations in social psychology", Tajfel has stated that,
"... to attack a method of conducting research for reasons other than the 
demonstrable weaknesses of its internal logic is a waste of time". The 
second reason why this attack on the experimental method is invalid, is 
because it assumes that the models of man adopted by psychologists are 
directly based on empirical research, and that the ’authoritarian’ or 
’reactionary’ nature of these models is dependent on the kind of empirical 
data available, rather than the belief systems of researchers themselves.
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One of the unique and important contributions which experimental 
social psychology can make is that of analysing and conceptually 
clarifying the manner and extent to which a dominant group can influence 
social behaviour. For example, in Experiment III,we demonstrated one set 
of conditions which could be constructed so that minimal differences 
between groups might lead to the same kind of intergroup discrimination as 
when important differences between groups exist. This, contribution of 
experimental social psychology has sometimes been misunderstood. For 
example, Mixon (I97ii) asserts that "The overall objective of both the 
tyrant and many social scientists can be summarised with the same two words - 
prediction and control" (p.75), and that "The conventional experimentalist 
sees his task as essentially similar to that of the tyrant" (p.75).
One step towards destroying tyranny can be taken by demonstrating 
clearly why and how the tyrant has influence. If the experimental social 
psychologist succeeds in this aim by acting the part of the tyrant in the 
laboratory setting, this is a justified strategy. We cannot explore 
tyranny by acting the part of a liberal, or socialist, or communist - or 
anything else except a tyrant. Milgram (197Ü) was heavily criticised for 
exploring the issue of obedience and authority through ’deception’ and 
’authoritarian’ methods. In Appendix I of his book ’Obedience and Authority’, 
(197li);Milgram discusses the issues of ethics and research. His response to, 
the critics is highly illuminating, "Is not the criticism based as much on 
the unanticipated findings as on method? The findings were that some subjects 
performed in what appeared to be a shockingly immoral way. If, instead, 
every one of the subjects had broken off at "slight shock", or at the first 
sign of the learner’s discomfort, the results would have been pleasant, and 
reassuring, and who would protest?" (p.19b), "The experiment is also 
criticised on the grounds that "it could easily effect an alteration in the . 
subject’s .... ability to trust adult authorities in the future"... However, 
the experimenter is not just any authority: He is an authority who tells the 
subject to act harshly and inhumanely against another man. I would consider 
it of the highest value if participation in the experiment could, indeed, 
inculcate a scepticism of this kind of authority... I see it (the experiment) 
as a potentially valuable experience insofar as it makes people aware of the 
problem of indiscriminate submission to authority" (pp. 197-198).
We believe that the future development of the social identity model 
should be more strictly directed towards the exploration of such issues as
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deception, power, and exploitation. These issues have been trivialised by 
psychologists and treated at the interpersonal level. For example, while 
researchers have been keen to condemn the ’deception’ of subjects by 
experimenters in the laboratory setting (see Baumrind, 196b; Mixon, 197b; 
Kelman, 1968; Parsons, 1969; Swingle, 1973), they have shown relatively 
little interest in exploring the deception of one group by another. The 
ways in which political parties might deceive the people they ’represent’, 
the deception of workers by the management, the deception of an ethnic 
group by other ethnic groups - these are all issues which have been neglected 
but are, we argue, far more important than interpersonal deception, whether 
it takes place in the laboratory or not.
(iii) A Possible Programme for Future Experimental Research
In future research,we would particularly aim to explore further the 
processes of social change and social mobility. The social identity model 
has postulated certain basic requirements for the occurrence of these two 
processes. Research needs to be carried out to further test these 
postulates, as well as to elaborate on them. This is particularly with a 
view of exploring the conditions in which the individual might abandon the 
strategy of social mobility, and adopt that of social change. This possible 
change is crucial from the point of view of minority group interests, since 
it is only through social change that the minority group, as a group, could 
improve its position.
We have argued that social mobility, rather than social change, is 
emphasised by the dominant value system in the West, at least (c.f. 
Introductory Chapter). The concepts of self-help and individual 
responsibility are important in this dominant value system (the ’Protestant 
Ethic’). The ’self-made’ man, who is the hero of American films, moves 
through the social hierarchy, passing from one group to another, without any 
loyalty to "collectives". It is through personal effort that this hero wins . 
the ’fight’, ’the girl’, and our ’admiration’. Not everyone is able to move 
through the social hierarchy as the hero does, however. One reason for this 
is because potential movement is not free for members of certain groups, at 
the material level at least. The only way in which individuals belonging to 
’closed’ groups can improve their position materially is by achieving social 
change.
The first stage in our programme of future research would be to test
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the validity of the hypothesis that social mobility, rather than social 
change, is important in the dominant value system. We could test this 
hypothesis in relation to value systems of Western or/and Eastern 
societies. A brief account of an experiment testing this hypothesis is 
given below.
Elis experiment involves three conditions. There are two independent 
variables• The first independent variable is the strategies available to 
the subjects in order to improve their social identities. These strategies 
consist of: social mobility at a purely psychological level, social mobility 
at a material level, social change through direct competition. The subjects 
are told that the likelihood of them succeeding in improving their social 
identities,through each of these three strategies,are the same. The second 
independent variable is the ’level of success’ of subjects. The dependent 
variable is the number of times each strategy is chosen by the subjects as 
a basis for improving their social identities.
Each subject has three ingroups. A, B, C, and one outgroup, 0. The 
’other’ members of the ingroups and the outgroup remain anonymous. The 
subject takes part in three identical competitions, as a member of: firstly 
A, secondly B, and thirdly C. The rival group in all these competitions is 
the outgroup, 0., The outcomes of these three competitions are identical, 
with the ingroup doing very poorly and the outgroup doing extremely well.
The instructions at this stage differ, depending upon the experimental 
condition. In condition I, the subjects are told that in all three 
competitions they performed "well above average" for their groups. In 
condition II, the subjects are told that in all three competitions they 
performed "about average" for their groups. In condition III, the subjects 
are told that in all three competitions they performed "well below average" 
for their groups. This constitutes the manipulation of the "level of 
success" of the subjects. This "level of success" is reinforced, through 
verbal comments from the experimenter, e.g. "Well done, very good effort", 
or "That was O.K.", or "You did rather poorly, not good at all".
On the basis of this first part of the experiment, we assume that 
subjects have an inferior social identity through group memberships. There 
will, however, be differences in ’individual self-esteem’, because of the 
differences in feedback from the experimenter as regards the quality of 
individual effort.
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In the second part of the experiment, the ’strategies’ for improving 
social identity are introduced. The subject is told that there is one 
final competition and he should choose one of the groups. A, B, or C as’his 
team’ in order to compete against 0. The past record of A, B and C are 
the same. But they now offer very different possibilities;the subject 
might change ’sides’, or directly challenge *0’. The strategy of 
’psychological’ social mobility is offered by A, social mobility at a 
material level is offered by B, and social change through direct competition 
is offered by C. This constitutes the manipulation of the independent 
variable ’strategy’. Eie dependent variable is the number of times A, B and 
C are chosen as the ’team’ for the final competition.
From this basic design, a second set of experiments could be created. 
These would investigate the influence of variables not manipulated in the 
basic • experiment, such as the level of success of groups, importance of 
task, cultural background of subjects. We believe that this could be a
me
basic stage in an experimental programfto investigate certain aspects of 
social change and social mobility. '
Another area in which we aim to conduct research is that of the
mass media, with specific reference to the influence of the mass media on
intergroup behaviour. This influence is important, but it should not be 
viewed simply as a ’response’ which needs to be accurately ’measured’. The
political nature of decisions taken by those in control of the mass media
(see Smith, 1972) again underlines the need for research which takes into 
account the political structure (see Appendix II).
(iv) The Social Psychologist as the Source and Disseminater of Radical
Ideology ~ ' :
The view of the relationship between dominant ideology and 
subordinate groups which we have adopted might lead us to consider the need 
for radical alternative ideologies in society. These radical alternative 
ideologies might function to emphasise the conflicts of interest and 
inequalities existing within society. Such radical ideologies might be in 
the interests of subordinate groups. Similar views have been expressed by 
other writers. Parkin (1971), for example, states that, "It seems plausible 
to suggest that if socialist parties ceased to present a radical, class- 
oriented meaning system to their supporters, then such an outlook would not 
persist of its own accord among the subordinate class. Once the mass party
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of the underclass comes to endorse fully the values and institutions of 
the dominant class, there remains no major source of political knowledge 
and information which would enable the subordinate class to make sense of 
their situation in radical terms" (p.98). One might argue that one role 
of the social scientist should be to provide such a radical alternative 
viewpoint. Of course, as we argued in the introductory chapter, the social 
psychologist should concern himself with all groups, not just the social 
classes.
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EPILOGUE 
Personal Note:-
An important test for any social-psychological theory might be, 
whether or not the theory helps people to make sense of their own social 
position and cultural/historical background. In applying this test, I 
feel that the social identity model developed by Tajfel and his associates 
is highly useful and generally valid. In particular, this model has helped 
me to interpret the history of my own Gountiy, Iran. In the brief 
discussion which follows, some examples of such interpretations of ’my’ past 
history are offered. The value of social psychologists conducting 
historical analyses is also discussed.
Historical Analysis and Intergroup Behaviour
There are at least three good reasons for social psychologists 
conducting historical analysis of intergroup behaviour. Firstly, because 
this approach might influence us to focus on groups and to avoid 
reductionist explanations of inter group behavioirr. Historians have 
traditionally been concerned with group and intergroup histories. When a 
historian sketches the life of an individual, it is usually because of the 
insight such a sketch gives as regards the development of various groups 
which the individual was associated with, and not because of an interest in 
the unique individual’s life - stoi’y alone. Secondly, through historical 
analysis the social psychologist may be able to gain insight as to when and 
how the processes he has hypothesised occurred in the past. .Thirdly, ' 
historical analysis might highlight new aspects of intergroup behaviour which 
seem important in historical terns, but have been neglected by researchers. 
The discussion below is intended to illustrate these three points.
The influence of Western powers in Iranian society probably first had 
an important social psychological impact during the early part of the 19th 
century. Contacts with Westerners had been made before this period (the 
Portuguese had established themselves in the Persian Gulf as early as 1507), 
but these early contacts did not have a profound impact on social life in 
Iran. After the treaties of ’Gulistan’ (1813) and ’Turkomanchai’ (1828), 
Western influence in the area grew immense. It is of psychological relevance 
that these treaties arose out of humiliating defeats at the hand of Russia.
It has been noted that, "These defeats by Russia opened a phase of history 
which was particularly to affect the northern part of the coiuitry but which.
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once Great Britain became involved, also led to international pressures 
that have overshadowed the whole nation until now" (Avery, 1965, p.16).
The essential social psychological features of Iran’s relationship 
with the West has been the development of a highly salient social 
evaluative system which defines the Westerner as positively valued and the 
Iranian as negatively valued on the basis of some key criteria. In 
certain intergroup comparisons where Westerners are the outgroup, Iranians 
are likely to feel that they have an inadequate social identity. The 
intense drive towards ’Westernisation’, by the dominant group in Iran 
especially, should be considered in this context. Just as the analysis of 
Iranian-Western relations at present can reveal clear examples of the 
attempt to improve social identity through assimilation and social mobility, 
the same processes can be highlighted through an analysis of Iran-Arab 
relations which began over thirteen hundred years ago,with the spread of 
Islam.
At the time when the Arabs conquered Iran and ’converted’ Iranians 
to Islam, the Iranians had already achieved a highly advanced civilisation.
In comparison with the Arabs, they were far advanced in the arts and 
sciences. They were able to apply themselves to Islamic philosophy and soon 
surpass their ’conquerors’ in certain academic areas. The Cambridge 
historian Levy (1962) writes that, "... the earliest and most eminent of the 
professors of the learned arts in Islam were Persians. But the chieftains 
that led the various tribes composing the Arab invading armies, true to 
their traditions, regarded the conquered peoples as inferior beings and 
looked upon letters and the sciences as fit only for underlings. Those who 
had an appreciation of these matters went so far as to deny the Persians 
any claim to scholarship or skill in the field of Arabic literature, although 
in fact the most learned investigators into Arabic grammar, the most 
assiduous commentators on the Koran, and not a few compilers of creditable 
Arabic poetry were men of Persian origin" (pp. 59-6o).
Since the Persians were denied favourable evaluation as a group and 
since a change in the intergroup situation could not be envisaged, because 
of Arab military might, we would expect that social mobility might be 
attempted by individual Persians, as one strategy through which they could 
improve their social identity. This prediction would seem to be correct.
Levy (1962) reports that some Persians attempted to pass off as Arabs,
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changing their names, and "... even going to the length of fabricating 
Arab genealogies for themselves" (p.60).
Analysis of the relationship between the Arabs and the people they 
conquered also reveals the process of assimilation to have been attenpted » 
as a strategy for improving social identity. The Arabs brought with them 
a weapon which proved to be far more effective than the sword in 
persuading the conquered peoples to evaluate their conquerors favourably. 
This weapon was Islam. Through this religion, a new, powerful social 
evaluative system was established. According to the new system of values, 
those who were closest to the Prophet were the most highly valued, "... 
Kinship with him was regarded as the touchstone of the true nobility"
(Levy, 1962, p.56). Since the Arabs were the first group to adopt the 
faith, they saw themselves as superior to those who subsequently followed 
in conversion (Levy, 1962, p.57). The influence of the new value system v 
was such that the Arabs became a highly valued outgroup for all those they 
conquered. The intergroup comparisons between conqueror and conquered 
seemed to result in inadequate social identity for the latter. The 
conquered people attempted to improve their social identity by, among other 
strategies, assimilating with the Arabs. Levy (1962) noted that, "... 
entire peoples sought to enhance their status in the eyes of the Muslim 
world by claimiiig Kinship with the Arabs of Arabia, and providing themselves, 
with Arab ancestry. At one time, the Kurds and Berbers and even Afiican 
negroes, e.g. the Barnu and Fatu, wished themselves or their rulers to be 
considered as having an Arabic origin" (p.6b).
We have briefly referred to examples of how historical analysis can 
reveal examples of social mobility and assimilation. More comprehensive 
discussions could reveal how and when such strategies for improving social 
identity were used, under what conditions they seemed to succeed, and other 
such issues. But we now turn to consider an example of how historical 
analysis can highlight aspects of intergroup behaviour which seem important 
in the historical developnent of groups, but which have been neglected by 
social psychologists.
A consistent finding from our historical analysis is that it is the 
elite section of the subordinate group who have most readily adopted the 
life-style and values of the dominant outgroup. This is true in Iran today. 
It seems to have been also true of Iran in the past, when the dominant 
outgroup were the Arabs. The historians Gibb and Bower (1957) noted that
317
when Islam spread in Iran, "... The nobles and the official class 
generally adopted the Sunni creed of the Arab Aristocracy, while the 
population of the great cities and some parts of the countryside showed 
a preference for the extreme forms of Si’ism... (p.71). In considering 
this observation, we should keep in mind that Islam is literally a ’way 
of life ’ and that the adoption of different forms of Islam could have led 
to profound differences in belief systems and life-styles.
This tendency for the 'elite section of the subordinate group to
adopt the values and life-style of the dominant group is also revealed
through a historical analysis of other societies. Discussing the cultural 
history of Japan, Sanson (1976) has noted the tendency of the Japanese to 
ape the customs of the traders and Jesuit preachers who were in Japan 
before the period of long isolation (from the early 17th to the mid 19th 
century). Sanson (1976) notes that, "We know that rosaries and crucifixes 
were eagerly bought and worn by many who were not Christians, even, it is
said, by Hideyoshi himself; and it was modish to wear foreign clothes and
to be able to recite Latin prayers" (p.l;23). It was the “élite group who 
were most keen on this fashion. The reference to Hideyoshi is significant, 
since he became regent ( ’Kampaku’ ) in 1581| and, as such, was at the 
pinnacle of the social status hierarchy.
From this kind of historical analysis, a number of issues arise which 
might usefully be explored through social psychological research. For 
example, what are the factors which might lead the élite members of the 
subordinate group to identify more closely with the dominant outgroup, 
rather than the rest of the subordinate group? If^ ien will the élite members 
of the subordinate group reject the values of the dominant outgroup? In 
what ways do the relationships between the dominant outgroup and the élite 
of the subordinate group affect the rest of the subordinate group?
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APPENDIX I
Measures of Intergroup Bias
The main measures of intergroup bias used in our 
experiments are matrices developed by Tajfel et al., although 
questionnaires and discussions were also used. These matrices were 
each designed to reflect particular characteristics of intergroup bias 
and extensive discussions concerning their origins and prototypes can 
be found in theses by Billig (19T2, pp. 31-^5) and Turner (1975, pp. 
19-32).
Apart from a detailed consideration of the nature of these 
matrices, the present discussion focuses on three issues which have 
been neglected by some previous writers and treated in contradictory 
ways by others. These issues are, firstly, the 'level' of measurement, 
achieved by the matrices. Secondly, the most useful and valid way to 
statistically qnalyse such measures. Thirdly, the validity of the 
assumptions made concerning the various 'bias' strategies reflected by 
choices undertaken on the matrices.
Characteristics of the Four Matrices Used
The subjects used four matrices as the basis for making 'reward 
choices'. A matrix consisted of either 13 or 1^ boxes, each containing 
two numbers. In each case the subjects had to indicate their choice by 
ticking one of the boxes. The position of 'others' (i.e. ingroup and 
outgroup members who received rewards on the basis of these choices) 
were altered from the top row to the bottom row of the matrix across the 
two choices made by the subjects on the basis of each matrix. This 
alteration of the row on the matrix from which the recipient would 
receive rewards , allowed the pull of various bias strategies to be 
tested against each other. A discussion of these strategies follows.
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MATRIX I
1 2 3 U 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ik
l4 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Of the U matrices, matrix I is possibly the most direct measure
of ingroup bias. The fairest choices are in the centre of the matrix.
However, it is only by coordinating the two choices made on the basis 
of this matrix that a specific 'fair point’ is achieved (e.g. by
choosing box X on the 1st choice and box ^ on the 2nd choice). The
. . .choices which subjects make on the basis of this matrix are scored from
0 to 13, a choice giving maximum rewards to the ingroup member being 
zero (i.e. a choice giving lU to the ingroup member and 1 to the out­
group member). A choice showing maximum favouritism towards the out­
group is scored 13 (i.e. a choice giving 1 to the ingroup member and lU 
to the outgroup member).
MATRIX II
This matrix allows us to directly assess the strategies of 
’fairness’ and «’ingroup favouritism’, by comparing choices made when 
these strategies (a) coincide and, (b) conflict. MJP is constant
ikthroughout this matrix. The fair point is represented by the box
MATRIX II
ik 15 l6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2k 25 26
ik 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 k 3 2
When ingroup members are on the top row of the matrix and outgroup 
members oh the bottom row (i.e. when rewards for ingroup members are 
from row 1À...26, and rewards for outgroup members from row 14....2),
FAV and F conflict. When row l4...2 stands for rewards for the ingroup 
members, however, and row 14...26 stands for rewards for outgroup 
members, then F. and FAV coincide and are represented in their extreme 
form by the same box (i.e. lU/li|). The choices on this matrix are scored 
0 to 12, with the point of fairness always as zero. When F and FAV
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coincide, FAV is thus also scored as zero. When F and FAV conflict, 
maximum FAV is scored as 12.
MATRIX III
Matrix III allows us to assess the pull of the strategies of 
FAV and MJP. The point of fairness is in the centre of the matrix
MATRIX III
19 18 IT l6 15 I k  13 12 IT 10 9 8 T
1 3 5 T 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
(Box 13/13). The strategies of FAV and MJP either coincide or conflict 
with each other depending on whether the top or bottom row of the matrix 
represents rewards for the ingroup member. When the top row of the 
matrix (row 19...7) represents rewards for the ingroup member, and the 
bottom row (row 1...25) represents rewards for the outgroup member, then 
FAV (19/1) and MJP (7/25) conflict. When the positions of the ingroup 
and outgroup members are reversed, however, then FAV and MJP coincide 
and are both represented (in their most extreme form) by the box 7/25. 
The comparative pull of each strategy is assessed by comparing choices 
made when the strategies coincide with choices made when they conflict. 
The choices on this matrix are scored from 0 to 12, with choices
reflecting MJP as always zero and the point furthest away from MJP
(i.e. box 19/1)5 as always 12.
MATRIX IV
Matrix IV permits an assessment of MJP, MD and MIP strategies.
The point of fairness is at the centre of the matrix (box 13/13). When
MATRIX IV
7 . 8  9 10 11 12 13 lU 15 16 17 18 19
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
rewards for members of the outgroup are represented by the top row of
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the matrix (row T...19) and rewards for members of the ingroup are 
represented by the bottom row (row 1 ...25), then the strategies of 
MJP, MD and MIP correspond and are represented by box 19/25. When the 
reverse is the case and the top row represents rewards for members of 
the ingroup, the values of MJP and MIP which coincide (and are 
represented by box 19/25) vary in the direction opposite to the values 
of MD. Thus, in this second choice type, the strategies of MIP and 
MJP conflict with that of MD. The choices on this matrix are scored 
from 0 to 12, with MJP (box 19/25) always as zero and the point furthest 
from it (box T/l) always as 12 ,
The 'Level* of Measurement Achieved by the Matrices
There has been little discussion of the 'level' of measurement 
achieved through the use of matrices such as the k we have presented 
as measures of intergroup bias, although implicitly and explicitly 
contradictory views on this issue are held by different researchers.
Brarthwaite and Jones (1975), for example, used matrices which 
were the same as,or similar to,the U we have described. They were 
testing bias in an intergroup experiment involving English and Welsh 
groups. They report that the results of the study ”... have been 
analysed as frequencies because the subjects' choices of columns 
provide essentially nominal data” (p. 329) (our underlining). Brarthwaite 
and Jones are here using the term 'column' as we have used the term 
'box'.
In analysing results achieved through experiments on intergroup 
behaviour,using similar or essentially the same matrices as Brarthwaite 
and Jones to measure bias, Tajfel and his associates have consistently 
used parametric methods and thus implicitly assumed that at least 
'interval.' scale measurement is generated by the matrices (see Siegel, 
1956, pp. 20-30, for a discussion of 'levels' of measurement and 
appropriate statistical tests).
The only relationship between data points of a nominal scale is 
that of 'equivalence', so that when a given class is partitioned into a 
given set of mutually exclusive subclasses, all members of any one sub­
class are 'equal' with regards to the criteria for classification. 
Clearly, the scores generated by the matrices have this property. But
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it is equally clear that they have other properties. In comparing
data points from such scores,one can also specify ’greater-than’
relations, as in the 'ordinal-scale’, as well as the ratio of any
two intervals between data - as in the 'interval' scale. It is not
necessary to debate the issue of whether or not the level of
measurement reaches that of 'ratio', since the validity of the case
for analysing the said data via parametric methods is already established.
We have argued that the choices made by subjects on the basis of 
the matrices described are scored in a manner which achieves 'interval' 
measurement (at least). The objection may be made that subjects do not 
'perceive' the original matrices as achieving interval measurement and 
that the Experimenter is invalidly transforming what is perceived by 
subjects to be 'nominal' or 'ordinal' data,via re-scoring it to 'create' 
'interval data' (this 're-scoring' being in terms of the scales 0-12 
or 0-13 as earlier described). =
In response to this objection, it.is noted that, objectively , 
the original matrices described ^  possess the characteristics of 
'interval' level measurement. But, like many other measurement scales 
used in psychology, such ( objectively defined ) properties may not be 
in harmony with, the subjective perceptions of subjets.This 'weakness ' is 
here acknowledged, but not discussed further.
Analysis of Scores Generated by Matrices
In choosing rewards for any given others, subjects make two choices 
on each matrix. The position of the 'others' changes so that 'X' is on 
the top row and 'Y' is on the bottom row for the first choice, and then 
their position is reversed for the second choice. It was pointed out 
that this alteration was necessary in order to clarify the 'puli' of the 
various strategies being tested by each matrix. Billig (1972) and Turner 
(1975) have set two contrasting precedents as regards the analysis of the 
scores generated by the matrices.
Billig (1972) treated the two scores,which subjects chose to 
reward an 'other', as dependent (repeated) measures. Considering the 
choices made by all the subjects, he scored the matrices in the same way 
as we have described and analysed the variance between the two (dependent, 
repeated) choices so as to highli^t the 'pull ' of given bias strategies.
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The present writer followed the same path.
Turner (1975) treated scores generated hy the matrices differently, 
devising an approach which allegedly allows the calculation of the two 
separate strategies measured hy each matrix as separate indices of the 
subjects' choices. A two-step process is involved when the 'puli' of any 
strategy is being measured. Firstly, a zero score is given to the 
optimal choice for the variable against which the 'puli' is being measured. 
Secondly, the subjects' score on one choice on the matrix (when all 
optimal strategies coincide) is subtracted from his score on the other 
choice on the matrix (when optimal strategies conflict ). Thus, analysis 
is in terms of scores derived via a two-step transformation, whereas 
Billig's approach involves analysis of scores derived via a one-step 
transformation of the original data (i.e. actual choices made by subjects).
The advantage of Turner's approach is that it allows a more detailed 
investigation of each single bias strategy (however, in view of the 
critical discussion, in the next section, of the assumptions made about how sub 
jectsview the various strategies, this may prove to be a not very significant 
advantage). The advantage of Billig's approach is that (a) only a one-step 
transformation of the subjects' choices takes place in order to achieve the 
'standard' scor.es, and (b) a direct comparison is made between scores on 
the two choices.
Assumptions .Concerning Bias Strategies Used
An essential feature of the experiments on intergroup behaviour and 
social categorisation designed by the Tajfel et al,is that assumptions are 
made about the way subjects perceive and utilise the matrices described.
The testing and questioning which has been undertaken suggests 
that these assumptions are not always fully valid.
The matrices described earlier have been introduced in experiments 
on the basis of the assumption that subjects will share the experimenter's 
viewpoint about which particular bias strategies each matrix is testing 
and how a particular choice on a matrix corresponds to a given bias 
strategy being tested. From the earliest reports of experimentation, it 
has been evident that, in relation to particular bias strategies, these 
assumptions are sometimes invalid. For example, Billig (1972. p.l8U,
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Table 36) reports that from a total of 80 subjects, 43 subjects
reported that they did not use any of the strategies the Experimenter
. thad assumed he was testing via the matrices. Or^ 5 subjects reported 
that they used 2 strategies. When we compare these reports with 
Billig's interpretation of the subjects' choices on the matrices, we 
find a marked contrast. This contrast is apparent also in the work of 
Turner (1975). >
Repeatedly, the reports given by the subjects concerning which 
bias strategies they perceived and used has been neglected and the 
choices made on the basis of the matrices have been interpreted from 
the experimenter's point of view. This is particularly so in relation 
to the strategies of MJP and MD which have been seldom mentioned by 
subjects,yet given much importance by experimenters. (The present
experimenter also found that these two strategies are very seldom
reported by subjects).
It may be argued that since subjects' choices can be shown to
reflect bias strategies assumed to be present by the experimenter, it
is not significant that the subjects do not report using some such 
strategies. Such an argument would be convincing and relevant if we 
were primarily interested in the experimenter's perception of the 
experimental situation and how subjects' actions can be accommodated to 
it. However, since our primary interest is in the behaviour of subjects, 
it would be invalid to neglect their observations of the experimental 
situation, especially since experimenters have recorded such observations. 
In this case, more importance should be given to the basis on which 
subjects made choices according to self-reports, rather than according to 
the experimenter's assumptions which in certain significant respects 
contradict such self-reports.
We noted that the advantage of Turner's method of analysis is that 
it allows us to more directly assess the pull of each single bias 
strategy. However, the main strategies which the subjects have reported 
as using, have been FAV and F. In effect, subjects have mostly either 
reported that they were 'fair' or that they were biased towards the 
ingroup, or that they used a combination of these strategies. If we give 
significance to subjects' self-reports, MD and MJP strategies become 
unimportant issues and it becomes far less crucial to isolate and determine
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their influence. It becomes far more crucial, however, to explain 
what have been described as the two 'opposing norms' of 'fairness 
and discrimination' (Branthwaite, 1976).
It would not be valid to neglect MD and MJP strategies 
completely for several reasons. Firstly, because they are reported by 
some subjects. Secondly, because the argument that 'subjects are 
using these strategies when making choices but are not articulate 
enough to report their use ' may be highly valid in reference to a 
significant proportion of the subject population (see Turner, 1975a, 
p.44). Thirdly, because these are strategies the experimenter has 
assumed (rightly or wrongly) the matrices are measuring. Fourthly,
(and, it is proposed, more importantly), because these strategies may 
be usefully viewed as being subsumed under the 'super-ordinate' 
strategies of 'bias towards ingroup' and 'fairness' (an analogy with 
'super-ordinate' constructs, or 'core' constructs, and the 'peripheral' 
constructs subsumed by them in the Kellyian system may be of help here) .
Subjects have been consistently reported as having articulated 
their use of F and FAV strategies. It is suggested that subjects 
perceived MJP as a 'sub-strategy' subsumed under 'F', while they perceived 
MD as a 'sub-strategy' subsumed under FAV. This view has been 
substantiated by post-experimental discussions which the writer critically 
questioned subjects' accounts of the strategies they used. It was 
repeatedly found that subjects viewed MD and MJP as 'sub' strategies, or 
'minor' strategies, through which FAV and F (respectively) could be 
achieved. Thus, 'fairness and discrimination ' are the crucial ('opposing' 
Branthwaite, 1976) goals - 'MD' and 'MJP' are examples from a pool of 
possible strategies which may be used, or not used, in relation to these 
goals.
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APPENDIX II
THE DOMINANT GROUP AND THE MASS MEDIA
In our model of the active individual in society (presented in 
Chapter 7) we gave central place to the concept of dominant ideology. This 
dominant ideology was assiuued to be in important ways influenced by the 
dominant group in society. We argue that by influencing the boundaries of 
groups, their contexts, the criteria on which they are evaluated, as well 
as the values attached to them, this dominant ideology influences intergroup 
behaviour in inportant ways. This kind of influence has been noted by 
others, including Tajfel. In a recent discussion on the social psychology 
of minorities, he states (N.D) that ’*... minorities are often defined on 
the basis of the criteria originating from and developed by, the majorities. 
They are different in certain ways which are important, but they are 
different from something which, itself, need not be clearly defined. The 
contemporary trend towards differentiation represents an explicit rejection 
of these one-sided definitions. It represents an attempt to create or 
preserve criteria of group definition which are not imposed from the outside. 
Rather than consisting of departures from the "norm", these newly developing 
criteria reflect attitudes to develop a positively valued identity from the 
group in which its "separateness" is not compounded of various stigmas of 
assumed inferiorities" (pp. 18-19).
The dominant group can be considered as the ‘source* of the evaluative 
system salient in society, together with its various rules and meanings, 
which influence intergroup behaviour in important ways. Parkin (1972) has 
distinguished between a dominant value system, subordinate value system and 
radical value system. He sees the dominant value system as operating to 
promote the endorsement of existing inequalities in resource allocation and 
status. We argued that the main way in which the dominant group propagate 
and make salient the dominant value system is through the mass media. The 
possible influence of the Western media in Iran was outlined, but we 
rejected the * conspiratorial * model which might view those working within 
the mass media as intentional *supressors* and exploiters.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence on the effects 
of the mass media on intergroup behaviour (Weiss, 1969). The research which 
has been carried out tends to proceed on the basis of simplistic models of 
how this effect might come about (e.g. Peterson and Thurstone, 1933}
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Rosen, 19i|8), Too often, researchers have looked for simplistic stimulus- 
response effects, with the response being measured by very crude methods. • 
Some exceptions to this general rule are Boskin (1970), who described the 
*Sambo* effect, and Hortlmann and Husband (1974). The latter carried out 
a study with the objective of assessing the contribution of the media on
trace relations’ in Britain. They found no simple responses, but a general
influence in the way that people viewed the whole racial issue, "... People
have derived from the media a perception of the coloured population as a
threat and a problem..." (p.208).
We inplied that the influence of American films has been significant 
on Iranian value systems. More specifically, these films influences the 
way Iranians valued themselves and Westerners. The same point could be 
made about the influence of American films in Britain, and on intergroup 
behaviour in particular. A content analysis of one week’s viewing found 
that nearly of the non-white characters seen in British TV drama 
appeared in programmes imported from America. Of the non-white characters 
seen in feature films on British TV, 67% were in American films ("Non- 
Whites on British Television", BBC Audience Research Unit, 1972).
We have argued that Western printed material has also had an influence
on the value system in Iran, according to which Westerners are highly
evaluated relative to Iranians on some key criteria. An additional point
we raise here in support of this view is that Western children’s literature 
s
is ued to teach Iranian children the English language. Analysis of this 
type of literature suggests that intergroup biases are present in it (cf. 
Becker, 1973; Egoff, 1969, Haviland, 1973; Jan, 1969; Winter, 1974; Zimet, 
1972).
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